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Chapter 1  
Theoretical-methodological framework 
1.1 Introduction 
In this introductory chapter I provide an outline of the general aim of this study by 
discussing and defining some main concepts that will appear throughout the text. 
Although each chapter could also be read separately for their own arguments, some 
concepts and terms will be important across all chapters as they are crucial to 
understand the overall aim and reasoning of this study. Therefore I will start with a 
general conceptual framework that presents key analytical notions that are employed. 
It sketches the broad discussions in which I situate my work, while the chapters will 
involve more theoretical elaboration and empirical data. This study takes a critical 
approach to the anthropology of religion and gender within a context of development.  
My main concern is to understand authoritative discourses about FGC in present-
day Egypt and how they are competing and in dialogue with each other. More 
specifically, this question is narrowed down to discourses on the relation between FGC 
and religion. This means that I examine dominant perceptions of FGC as a cultural and 
religious practice, and particularly as Islamic, and how these discourses produce and 
promote certain understandings of religion while suppressing others. I asked why FGC 
is defined and considered Islamic for some and not for others and bring these 
discourses into relation with each other. My main approach can therefore be seen as 
a “discursive study of religion” (von Stuckrad 2010), which I will clarify more later.  
When entering the field of study of circumcision, both male and female, a central 
differentiation in literature and scholarship immediately becomes clear. Male 
circumcision is generally accepted as a religious practice, which means that surgery is 
legitimized on grounds of freedom of religion (in addition to medical therapeutic 
reasons). Female circumcision on the other hand is generally considered a traditional 
practice and “labeled as a ‘cultural’ practice that ought to be the subject of meticulous 
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public scrutiny” (Barras and Dabby 2014, 91). Moreover, much effort is invested in 
anti-FGC campaigning to maintain this differentiation. Minority voices of scholars and 
activists plead to consider both male and female circumcision as similar practices that 
should not be legitimized on any ground whatsoever. The dominance of the 
development discourse –because of the power vested in international development 
agencies as international norm producers – invites us to look into how exactly this 
differentiation between the cultural and the religious is being managed in practice.  By 
taking anti-FGC campaigning as a case study, I aim to show how the maintenance of a 
divide between the cultural and the religious operates ‘in the field’ and how and why 
it is contested. This study shows how international anti-FGC discourse constructs and 
deconstructs religion, how this campaigning discourse is then translated and 
vernacularized in the Egyptian context, and how these discourses relate to other, 
competing, authoritative discourses.  This allows us to see development intervention 
as a cultural and secular intervention that impacts on and rearranges cultural, social 
and religious debates. It thus contributes to our insights in the anthropology of 
development/globalization, gender and the politics of morality.  
While religion and perceptions of the relation between FGC and religion are my 
main focus, I also look at representations of gender and sexuality.  Anti-FGC 
campaigning forms part of the development agenda and is mainly implemented by 
certain development actors of NGO’s. They form the main intermediaries between the 
transnational discourse and the local. Official campaigning discourse is embedded in 
a discourse of violence against women and a discourse of women’s and children rights 
and also this discourse has become “vernacularized” (Merry 2006, 39). I consider 
campaigning initiatives as a socio-cultural intervention aimed at “accelerated social 
transformation” (UNICEF 2005a, 24) that leaves traces by interacting with, 
rearranging and reinforcing certain social public debates. By asking anthropological 
questions into how new meanings are being created and contested through 
campaigning initiatives, this study adds to the body of literature on FGC with a novel 
approach.   
1.2 Conceptual framework 
1.2.1 A Discursive study of religion (and secularism) 
A discursive study of religion entails studying “the way religion is organized, 
discussed, and discursively materialized in cultural and social contexts” (von Stuckrad 
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2010, 166). Grounded in constructionism, religion is then defined and considered as a 
discursive formation rather than having a sui generis nature, i.e. possessing 
distinguished features that remain permanent across time and space. This study’s 
departure point is indeed one opposed to a sui generis understanding and rather 
assumes that “’religion’ […] is an empty signifier that can be filled with many different 
meanings, depending on the use of the word in a given society and context” (ibid.). Von 
Stuckrad proposes a discursive study of religion that is interdisciplinary but grounded 
in the history and sociology of knowledge. My own approach shares a constructionist 
departure point and shares an interest in understanding how religion is given 
meaning in certain contexts at specific locations. I will seek to answer these questions, 
however, through anthropological research and hope to contribute to the 
development of anthropological scholarship of religion and gender in a context of 
development.  
Treating religion as a discursive formation relies on understandings of the concept 
of discourse as outlined in Foucault’s work and developed and applied by many others 
after him. He argues in his seminal text ‘The Order of Discourse’ that “discourse is not 
simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but it is the thing for 
which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized” 
(Foucault 1981 (1970), 53). The structure of different authoritative discourses 
possessing power to guide social practice provides the general framework of this 
dissertation. Within the order of discourse, systems of exclusion, delimitation and 
control operate that arrange, organize and legitimize knowledge. This study is then 
interested in how ‘religion’ is being used and understood within the context of 
transnational anti-FGC campaigning and in Egyptian contexts of competing 
discourses. It interrogates how FGC is actively being made religious and how it is being 
un-made as religious.  
The discourses under study that construct FGC as either religious or secular (or 
cultural or traditional) circulate in a world characterized by great power imbalances. 
The context of transnational anti-FGC campaigning produces discourse on FGC and 
religion that is more powerful than Egyptian contexts that produce discourse on the 
same relation. A part of this study is dedicated to an analysis of this particular 
transnational context: the ideologies of transnational feminism which produced the 
international norm against FGC, set by bodies representing the so-called ‘international 
community’, and postcolonial critiques on transnational feminism and the anti-FGC 
norm (chapter two and three). Subsequently, it will be shown that this context 
produced understandings of the relation between FGC and religion that are strongly 
secular (chapter four). Let’s look first at the crucial concepts that define and underlie 
contemporary anti-FGC discourse.  
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1.2.2 Transnational/ liberal feminism and development 
Transnational feminism has played a crucial role in bringing global activity against 
FGC to the place where it is now. The particular development and expression of 
transnational feminist activism through liberal second-wave feminism will be 
discussed at length in chapter two. Through the method of genealogy I will trace early 
concerns with women’s plight globally in the epoch of colonial feminism. The 
universalist claims of “the woman cause” supporters in the early twentieth-century 
find new expression conceptually in the language of human and women’s rights and 
in the discourse of violence against women. The formulation of FGC as a violation of 
women’s rights and a form of violence against women dovetailed with the global rise 
of rights discourse and the political, economic structure of NGO’s. The process of NGO-
ization and the role of NGO’s as mediators between transnational discourse and “the 
local” have been theorized as having ambiguous effects and outcomes (Bernal and 
Grewal 2014). NGO’s have become a powerful determining feature of anti-FGC 
activism and as such their position plays a role in the translation of campaigning 
discourse to the Egyptian vernacular.  
The feminist claims that have been expressed through transnational feminism - and 
especially the movement lobbying for the recognition of women’s rights as human 
rights – need to be understood as liberal feminist claims. From a postcolonial 
perspective, this is important analytically to grasp how and why development 
discourse against FGC intervenes in other cultural understandings. Liberal feminism 
has been the main ideological influence in shaping dominant understandings of 
feminism and women’s rights in the field of development. Here the work of 
philosopher Martha Nussbaum has particular salience (Beasley 2005, 40; Nussbaum 
2000). Liberal feminism stresses rationalism and the individual’s ability to make 
rational choices and to go beyond traditional forms of authority and knowledge. The 
development field, the methodology of awareness-raising of anti-FGC projects and 
liberal feminism share these underlying conceptions of people, culture and social 
change.  
Nussbaum argues “for global justice on the basis of a gender-orientated liberal 
feminism (using a language focusing on women), as a means to enunciating the 
viewpoint of liberal humanism. She asserts that the liberal focus on the universal 
degendered ‘Human’ can be expanded, […], to include women on equal terms with 
men. By virtue of human-ness – the capacity for moral choice, the capacity to be 
‘choosers’ – all human beings are not only worthy of equality but they compel us to act 
to achieve this equality” (Beasley 2005, 40). For Nussbaum, it is the humanist 
conviction that all people possess the capacity and free will to choose and to make 
moral judgments that should motivate us to act in working toward gender equality.  
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The development of liberal feminism in the 1970s in Euro-American countries 
coincided with rising feminist critique of development practice and theory. A group of 
American development professionals coined the term “Women In Development” 
(WID) and this became the first paradigm that aimed to include women in 
development projects on an equal foot to men (Razavi and Miller 1995, 9). In the 
following decades, WID gave way to “Gender and Development” (GAD) with the aim 
to shift the focus from women to gender relations and gendered power balances as a 
whole. Despite the changed discourse and the use of a gender terminology, in practice, 
the majority of development institutions (states and international agencies) 
maintained the earlier WID approach, which is also most compatible with the 
hegemonic neoliberal economic ideology (Chant and Sweetman 2012; Wilson 2015, 
807). This process of mainstreaming or institutionalizing gender in development 
policy has been criticized for in se being a universalization of American liberal 
feminism – including its Protestant bias and missionizing attitude (Grewal 2005; 
Massad 2015, 110-212), which has maybe become most substantiated by the 
elaborate and detailed UN Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) of 2005 
dedicated to the theme of women. Joseph A. Massad and Frances Hasso among others 
criticized from a postcolonial perspective that such efforts are based on faulty theories 
and assumptions (such as taking Western gender equality ideals for reality) and its 
methodology based on reification. For Massad, such reports are political blueprints to 
implement Western norms on gender and sexuality based on forceful social, cultural 
transformation (Hasso 2009; Massad 2015, 125, 170-171).  
Other voices such as critical development theorists argued that gender-
mainstreaming approaches do not go beyond rhetoric and do not reflect the depth that 
feminist scholarship offers on questions of development (Pearson 2005). Studies 
concerning the effects of neoliberal reform on women and gender relations are not 
taken up by those writing the policies, allocating funds and determining the programs. 
Gender sensitive approaches have therefore been criticized as an instrument 
maintaining the status-quo that  “rely on, reinforce and extend unequal gendered 
structures and relations” (Hasso 2009; Wilson 2015, 804). Such approaches 
“‘instrumentalize’ and dilute gender equality objectives and neglect questions of 
consciousness in favour of an exclusively material understanding of empowerment” 
(Cornwall and Edwards 2014; Wilson 2015, 807). This critique has been especially 
salient in the field of reproductive health and rights. Development policies have been 
more concerned in practice with population management and control than with 
realizing feminist understandings of women’s reproductive rights and bodily 
autonomy (Mohanty 2003, 48; Pearson 2005, 174; Smyth 1996). 
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In the present study, however, “questions of consciousness” will receive attention 
and even be of central importance in the actual practice of anti-FGC campaigning. The 
methodology of raising consciousness and awareness to the negative and harmful 
aspects of FGC will be discussed in-depth in chapter three. In awareness-raising 
seminars, representations of FGC are embedded in understandings of gender and 
sexuality. At this moment, it is important to understand the liberal feminist 
underpinnings of transnational development discourse, reflected in anti-FGC 
discourse, in order to understand its vernacularized subversion in campaigning “on 
the ground”.  Related to this, is language of modernization and secularism.  
1.2.3 Development, the secular subject and “the religious turn” 
Notions of individuals making moral judgments autonomously and adapting 
behavior accordingly, does not only characterize liberal feminism. Such 
understandings of the human subject are thoroughly modern and secular. Conceptions 
of moving on the road to progress through (self-)empowerment define a secular 
human agency concept (Asad 2003, 79). The underlying assumption of the secular 
subject is an “active subject”: an individual that has and uses its agency to resist 
external forces of oppression, to reduce pain and suffering and to seek freedom and 
pleasure. This particular understanding of human agency and resistance forms part of 
the larger project of modernity, a “historical project whose aim is the increasing 
triumph of individual autonomy” (Asad 2003, 71). In contrast, within a religious 
worldview, understandings of subjectivity and agency are made up differently and 
emphasize different aspects.  
The predominant, normative, understanding of agency has been secular/liberal and 
this colored how other aspects of human agency have been conceived of in the 
academy and beyond (Bracke 2003; Mack 2003). A most influential effort to 
reconceptualize agency by looking at particularly religious, Islamic, agency brought 
into light the importance of notions as self-disciplining and moral agency and the 
underlying non-liberal non-secular desires that may guide and shape them (Mahmood 
2001, 203; Mahmood 2004). In a context of religious education, practices of worship 
and the fashioning of the moral self, the predominant secular concept of agency 
becomes radically redefined and renders visible other, religiously based forms of 
agency. A recognition of religious agency enables theorizations of agency that go 
beyond the liberal logic of opposition of subordination and autonomy, “self and other,  
of ownnes and alienation and consciousness and body” (Pritchard 2006, 264).  
Other contexts that are not related to immediate religious environments such as 
marriage, dating and romantic relationships are also important sites that offer 
different understandings of how women develop and live non-secular, religious 
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agency (Burke 2012; Irby 2014). Indeed, gendered relations that make up of social life 
may be approached and understood very differently by typical secular subjects and 
other, religious subjects who rather challenge the dominant secular understanding. 
The presupposition of a secular agent-subject in official development discourse as 
normative can therefore conflict with the religious life worlds of those who are 
addressed. It is this basic incongruence that forms the background of the discursive 
study that runs throughout chapters four until seven. I will argue that official 
development discourses, as in reports, training materials and strategies of 
transnational agencies, assume a secular agent-subject that aims to eliminate pain. 
Actual development practice vernacularizes and partly subverts this narrative. 
Chapter four discusses the meeting of rights-based development discourse assuming 
the secular agent-subject in transnational anti-FGC discourse with the Egyptian 
religious social context. Part of my fieldwork consisted of attending awareness-raising 
seminars against FGC in Egypt, showing the translations and subversions of 
transnational discourse into the local context.  
When reviewing literature on religion and development, however, it is clear that 
the theme of religion is on a rise since the last fifteen years. There has developed a 
greater interest in development circles for the meanings and roles of religion. It has 
even become “fashionable” to discuss religion and development (Jones and Petersen 
2011, 1292). This indicates that the representation of religion as the antithesis of 
development-as-modernization has shifted into different models. It does not mean 
that secularism has lost its dominance but rather that secular modes of governance 
have adjusted. Secularism has a central position in the historical political project of 
modernity and is now articulated as the promotion of “a single social model over the 
globe”, led by transnational agencies such as the World Bank, IMF (Asad 2003, 12-14).  
Talal Asad characterized secularism as the political mediation of particular 
identities related to class, gender and religion by means of offering transcendence. 
Whereas the nation-state has typically enacted mediation that transcends those 
particularities (Asad 2003, 5), this role is now also played by the “international 
community” exemplified by institutions as the World Bank and UN agencies. The 
transnational sphere of development is thus characterized as a secular sphere in 
which engagement with religion has been refigured and redefined. Indeed, secularism 
is understood as an ideology that brings or imposes new meanings onto the religious 
(von Stuckrad 2013, 2). Following a discursive approach to religion, in my view, entails 
that speaking of the religious necessarily means speaking of the secular as well. It 
looks at those contesting over the power and authority to delineate precisely what the 
boundaries between the religious and the secular are. What matters for this study 
then, is that the “religious turn” in development partly involves reconfigured secular 
modes of understanding and delineating religion.  
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In the field of development cooperation the most attention has been given to the 
role of faith-based organisations (Carbonnier and al. 2013). As with the case of gender 
mainstreaming, here too we find critical voices deploring that interest in religion has 
been driven by the instrumentalist desire to “make better use of it” (Bartelink 2016; 
Jones and Petersen 2011). Jones and Petersen argue that it has generally been inspired 
by a wish “to do development ‘better’”: aiming to understand religion and religious 
organisations better in order to put it more efficiently in service of dominant 
development goals (Jones and Petersen 2011, 1291).  
While the subfield of ‘religion and development’ developed recently, the historical 
relationship between organized religion and development work has since long known 
both harmony and conflict. During the colonial era the links between faith 
organizations and states were tight and uncontested. This changed after the end of 
colonialism and when the role of religion in formal public life in Western Europe 
decreased. In the 1990s, the relationship between faith organizations and 
international development changed again, while simultaneously the classical 
secularization thesis was being critically reviewed in the social sciences (Clarke 2008, 
15). A series of high-profile religion and development conferences were organized by 
the end of the 1990s (Clarke and Jennings 2008, 2) leading to a higher involvement of 
religion and faith leaders in development discourse and practice. This reinforced 
relationship culminated in the articulation and promotion of the Millennium 
Declaration by the United Nations General Assembly in 2000 and the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), which the UN aimed to achieve by 2015. The main 
powerful development actors relied and called on faith leaders and religious 
communities to mobilize the necessary moral support for the MDGs (Clarke 2007). 
The greater involvement of religion has been met with enthusiasm by some scholars 
arguing that: 
“The language of faith, the religious idiom, frequently better reflects the cultural 
norms in which the poor and marginalized operate. They are better able to draw 
such individuals and communities into global discourses of social justice, rights 
and development, without recourse to the often distancing language of secular 
development discourse” (Clarke and Jennings 2008, 15). 
Whereas this quote illustrates an instrumentalist approach and essentialist 
understanding of religion (more on the essentialization of religion follows in the next 
section), it indicates an enthusiasm for engaging with discourse that goes beyond the 
secular. Whether cooperation between organized religion and development is 
supported or criticized, religion has become recognized as a dimension to be taken 
seriously. Sociologists and anthropologists have argued that development policies 
based on Western secular values fail to understand and engage with people’s 
religiosity. For them it is crucial to grasp that religion constitutes “an essential 
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medium through which development is mentally digested by those at the receiving 
end” (Bradley 2011, 26; van Ufford and Schoffeleers 1998, 1).  
These engagements with religion invite further reflection on what exactly is meant 
by “the religious idiom” and secular values. By taking a discursive approach to religion, 
I have been concerned with bringing religion/secularism into focus as an analytical 
lens through which to look at development discourse and practice, such as human 
rights and violence against women. This approach aims to contribute to a necessary 
critical conversation that interrogates the ways in which “religion” is involved, 
whether this involvement affects local understandings of the religious/secular and 
how a religious perspective at the receiving end may alter the development message.  
Some scholars have questioned the ways in which development policies engage 
with organized religion in terms of cooperating with religious representatives, 
authorities and leaders (Østebø and Østebø 2014; Pearson and Tomalin 2008). 
Feminist concern has been that the religious voices that are heard, tend to be of 
established religious leaders. These voices do not reflect on-going discussion within 
the faith communities, and most often, do not offer a progressive reading that is in 
support of gender equity goals. This approach risks a selective and reductive 
involvement of religion that may support a gender-conservative status-quo. Pearson 
and Tomalin warn “that the ‘religious turn’ in development is too frequently adopting 
the ‘let’s see what religious leaders have to say’ model and that without a gender 
analysis, with little regard to the hard-won commitments to gender equality within 
development policy and practice, this will result in further silencing of the range of 
women’s voices within those religions” (Pearson and Tomalin 2008, 47).  
Inviting religious leaders to be part of the development enterprise has become a 
crucial feature of global anti-FGC campaigning (Kirmani and Phillips 2011, 90-93; 
Marshall 2010, 38). Leaders are considered as potential powerful actors that can help 
to persuade women and men to abandon FGC. As campaigning has become globally 
centralized by certain institutions (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)), 
the strategy to involve religious leaders also became a generalized feature. Such 
efforts, however, intervene in particular social contexts, political cultures and cultural, 
religious life worlds of “target communities”. Cooperation between transnational 
development actors, religious authorities and governments do occur, in other words, 
within a power-laden context and within cultural/religious structures of meaning. An 
instrumentalist development approach “assumes religious leaders as vessels of 
authority and power as an attribute to formal positions in hierarchical structures” 
(Østebø and Østebø 2014, 84).  
In line with Østebø and Østebø (2014) – who have studied anti-FGC campaigning in 
Ethiopia – I aim to show that such intervention does not neutrally intervene but rather 
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carries certain assumptions about religious authority in an already existing context 
where ideas of religion and authority are being contested. Conceptions of what 
religion and what religious authority is, indeed form an important aspect of 
development interventions that deserves more scholarly attention. Jones and 
Petersen attribute the scarcity of academic research to the fact that chronologically, 
“interest in religion came more from the development industry, particularly the big 
multilateral and bilateral donors, than from universities and research organizations” 
(Jones and Petersen 2011, 1292).  
In addition to research scarcity, it is important to note the intertwinement of the 
development industry with the academy. The “religious turn” clearly indicates both 
(academic) scholarly and professional (and/or activist) interest and as is common in 
the field of development, the work of both groups are often entangled with each other. 
This is of particular relevance in the case of the global campaign against FGC. In 
chapter five I will interrogate in detail how activist and scholarly work both 
contributed to the body of knowledge on the question how FGC relates to religion. This 
entanglement will be problematized precisely because of the bias in knowledge 
production toward activists’ interests and engagement toward abandonment of the 
practice.  
1.2.4 Researching constructions of gender in Egypt. Toward an 
anthropology of gender and development 
Until well into the 1990s gender analysis that used the terminology of patriarchy and 
attempted to characterize Arab gender regimes within an overall frame of patriarchy 
was common. Deniz Kandiyoti famously characterized the North-African and Middle 
Eastern region as instances of “classic patriarchy”. Characteristic of her ideal-typical 
discussion of classic patriarchy, is that “the implications of the patrilineal-patrilocal 
complex for women not only are remarkably uniform but also entail forms of control 
and subordination that cut across cultural and religious boundaries” (Kandiyoti 1988, 
278). Bringing the subject of women and gender within the scope of kinship, her 
definition of patriarchy went beyond cultural constructions or religious prescripts. 
Within this ideal-type classification, women typically resort to “interpersonal 
strategies that maximize their security through manipulation of the affections of theirs 
sons and husbands” (ibid. 280). This domain of interpersonal relations, strategies and 
negotiations on gender norms among spouses, relatives and in relation to the wider 
community became indeed subject of one line of significant further research (Abu-
Lughod 1999; Ghannam 2013; Inhorn 1996; Joseph 1999). 
Concerning the period of the last few decades, analysis of gender norms in Arab 
countries has additionally become mainly interwoven with two major developments: 
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religion, religious revivalism (al-sahwa al-islamiyya) and/or the rise of political Islam 
on the one hand and the effects of economic reform, neoliberalism policies and 
globalization on the other. Changing gender norms under influence of an expanding 
and deepening social landscape of religiosity drew attention to studies of women’s 
religious agency, piety, practices (Karam 1998; Mahmood 2005); women’s 
negotiations with religious norms and systems of meaning (Badran 2009b; Hélie and 
Hoodfar 2012; McLarney 2015) and another line of research could be described as 
(men and) women’s negotiations with religious norms in interaction with changes in 
women’s employment, division of labor, neoliberal policies and urbanization (Hoodfar 
1997; Koning 2009; Macleod 1991; Singerman and Hoodfar 1996).  
An underrepresented social area, however, is how the development sector and the 
mainstreaming of gender into development projects contributes to shaping ideas on 
gender roles and circulating notions of gender equality in Egyptian society. 
Anthropologist Kamran Ali examined how family planning programs in Egypt “help 
train and produce new bodies and selves” (Ali 2002, 1). Arguing that they do more 
than reducing the number of children, he demonstrates that these programs also 
“introduce or foster notions of individual choice and responsibility, risk aversion and 
personal independence” (ibid.). In another context, relating to approaches to violence 
against women, anthropologist Sally Merry showed how communities respond 
differently in formulating answers to violence against women, of which “the assertion 
of rights” that “relies on a feminist analysis of patriarchy” is only one approach (Merry 
2001, 38). In a similar vein, we can ask how gender discourses that are formulated on 
a transnational level are being translated (Merry 2006) and promoted “on the 
ground”. How do they affect – or attempt to affect – women’s lives, perceptions and 
attitudes concerning women’s roles in society, marriage, or motherhood? Dominant 
frames within transnational gender discourse today are a rights-based discourse and 
one of violence against women. How do these frames connect to the lifeworlds of 
women who are “targeted”?  
An anthropology of gender and development initiatives can indeed help to shed 
light on how development initiatives address and change women’s (and men’s) 
awareness concerning profound and intimate experiences and ideas concerning 
marriage, motherhood and child-rearing. Interventions within the gender and 
development frame often touch on several areas including: experiences and ideas 
surrounding men-women relations, constructions of female and male and appropriate 
gender behavior, happiness in marriage and child rearing and gendered norms 
concerning dealing with the immediate environment of family and neighbours. 
Generally gender and development initiatives are characterized by a conscious goal to 
invoke social and cultural change or even to accelerate social transformation and to 
shape new social or moral subjectivities.  
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Central in these processes as well is the structure of the NGO, and its mediation 
between the state and beneficiaries. As the NGO is the physical space bringing women 
together to listen to talks and share their stories, it occupies a central role in 
disseminating and translating discourses on gender and sexuality roles and norms. In 
the words of anthropologist Inderpal Grewal: 
“NGOs focused on gender issues or women are engaged in the process of 
constructing gender and producing certain kinds of “women” and “men”(.. ) in 
the course of doing and defining their work. Through these relations, some 
groups are produced as beneficiaries or recipients of resources and training, and 
their characteristics and needs are defined through these relations. Projects of 
modernity and development have long histories of creating and consolidating 
gendered categories, as have nationalist and postcolonial struggles (Grewal 
2014, 306).  
In this dissertation I aim to discuss these questions within the context of campaigning 
against FGC in Egypt, programs that by their nature (with a mode of operation 
characterized by foreign funding, project implementation and evaluation) belong in 
the sphere of development and NGO work. Whereas the global economic neoliberal 
regime remains the material basis and background against which such campaigning 
initiatives have been organized, the two predominant discursive frames in 
transnational campaigning are rights-based and one of violence against women. NGO’s 
are therefore an important space of producing and reproducing constructions of 
womanhood and gender relations as they mediate between what can be considered as 
external demands (such as the demand to abandon FGC) and local cultural debates. . 
1.3 Introducing part two  
The first part analyzes the genealogy of anti-FGC campaigning (chapter two) and the 
Egyptian history of campaigning (chapter three), looks at the translations of global 
discourse in the development practice of awareness-raising seminars (chapter four) 
and interrogates the relation between FGC and religion through the intertwined 
academic and activist production of knowledge (chapter five). Building on that, the 
second part of this dissertation looks at discursive responses in the Egyptian religious-
political landscape to anti-FGC discourse.  
In the first part, I demonstrate that the global discourse is embedded in a secular 
liberal feminist language that proclaims FGC is a strictly cultural practice that is “not 
connected to” religion, “not sanctioned” by religion, nor against religion. The second 
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part looks at Egyptian discourses that are religious or Islamic-based: official state-
appointed representatives of Islam, notably al-Azhar institution (chapter seven) and 
actors that belong to the larger transnational group of actors of political Islam or 
Islamism (the Muslim Brotherhood in chapter six and the Salafi movement in chapter 
seven).  
Al-Azhar is considered as the historical representative of Islamic orthodoxy and 
equally as a part of the Egyptian state bureaucratic system that represents those 
Islamic standpoints that the state aligns with. The latter group of islamist actors are 
part of political opposition and equally challenging the established bastion of al-Azhar 
orthodoxy. The declaration of FGC as a strictly cultural practice by transnational 
discourse is most strongly contested by islamist actors who are more inclined to see 
FGC as an Islamic practice. Finally, chapter eight looks at discourses surrounding FGC 
through the lens of Muslim-Christian relations. Placing the FGC debate in a context of 
Muslim-majority and Christian-minority relations allows us to look at the 
religious/secular question from yet another more complex angle. It brings in 
processes of identity formation as factors that shape and play into the debate 
surrounding the religious/secular nature of FGC.  
Also in this part, I will continue to look into the relation of FGC and religion by 
examining how these religious actors and groups have constructed opinions on FGC. 
It discusses religious argumentation and their political expressions and places them 
in the current post-Uprising context. Before but especially after 2011, Islamist groups 
as the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist groups and parties have been playing a crucial 
role in formulating answers to anti-FGC campaigning discourse within an Islamic-
based discourse. In order to introduce my analytical framework, I will complete this 
conceptual framework with clarifying my use of notions of Islamism, Islam, and 
processes of reifying and essentialising religion (and Islam in particular). Most 
importantly, I will suggest the notion of “Islamicate” is a fruitful explanatory analytical 
concept to grasp what is at stake in the contestations over defining FGC as either a 
religious or a cultural practice.  
My aim is not to engage with theories concerning the state and political opposition 
or to discuss Islamism as a mobilizing oppositional force. The role of the state will be 
pointed at only in terms of the larger research questions concerning the debate on the 
religious/secular nature of FGC. For the sake of clarity, however, I consider the 
Egyptian state as a secular state in terms that are based on Talal Asad’s 
understandings of secularism as mentioned previously. Anthropologists Saba 
Mahmood, Gregory Starrett and Hussein Agrama – building on Asad – theorized how 
and why the Egyptian state is secular in terms of its ongoing and deepening 
involvement with regulating and delineating religious practice (Agrama 2010; 
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Mahmood 2012; Starrett 2010). Central in Asad’s, Mahmood’s and Agrama’s analyses, 
secularism figures as “an element of modern governance” (Starrett 2010, 636).   
I have argued earlier to see the transnational sphere as a secular sphere 
empowered with discussing and deciding on what is to be considered religious and 
what not. Most modern states naturally operate along the same lines. The Egyptian 
state has a significant role in framing FGC as a cultural or religious practice. Through 
its engagements with the transnational sphere and after committing to a national 
strategy against FGC in 2000 (see chapter three), it has had an important voice in this 
debate. Since 2000, the state allied with transnational partners and funds and actively 
sought to generate religious opinions that declare FGC as a cultural practice that is not 
sanctioned by Islam. Representatives of the official religious establishment of al-Azhar 
indeed formulated opinions distancing FGC from Islamic doctrine. What followed is 
what historian Margot Badran called “highly visible ‘re-Islamizing’ moves regarding 
FGC” (Badran 2009a, 180). The questions I am asking are what does it mean to be re-
islamizing FGC? Specifically in the current moment of post-2011 Egypt, who has made 
such moves, in which ways, under which conditions and with which goals? In other 
words, the insistent discursive making and unmaking of FGC as religious and the 
intertwinement of both categories of the secular/the religious remains the heart of my 
concern. Let’s start the remaining of this conceptual framework with looking further 
into notions of Islamic authority.  
1.3.1 Diversification of religious authority and the “transfer of 
moral and cultural authority”  
One of the most important changes in Islamic societies since the late nineteenth 
century is a fundamental change in the status of the traditional religious authorities. 
This group traditionally called ᶜulamaᵓ (scholars and educated elite) received a 
classical training in Islam, Islamic history, jurisprudence etc. In Egypt, they have been 
trained and educated at al-Azhar University. Radical political, economic and social 
changes in society eroded the status of this traditional class of religious scholars. New 
technologies revolutionized the production and dissemination of religious knowledge, 
and this development continues until today through internet and social media. The 
system of knowledge production and transmission through the traditional channels of 
Islamic education started to change dramatically from the mid-nineteenth - early 
twentieth century (e.g. Messick 1993; Mitchell 1991; Starrett 1998; Zeghal 1999).  The 
“massification” of education and rising literacy rates consequently enabled the 
“fragmentation of religious authority”, Dale Eickelman (1985) . 
Whereas “the diversity of views within the tradition” has always formed a 
characteristic within Islamic history (john bowen, 5), modern developments 
  17 
strengthened the phenomenon of decentralization of authority, especially since the 
1970s. Some scholars argue that traditional religious scholars maintain a large part of 
their classical prestigious and authoritative status, although globalization processes 
disturb and destabilize them (Mandaville 2007, 103-4).  
Globalization processes and a pluralization of religious authority have multiple 
consequences. A tolerance of multiple and more open interpretations of religion, and 
a widening of hermeneutic horizons, emerge in certain contexts, whereas a “closing 
down of Islam’s discursive parameters” occurs in other contexts (Mandaville 2007, 
103,106). Some authors analyzed the closing down or turning inwards of Islam’s 
discursive parameters as a tendency toward a strengthening of authoritarian 
knowledge production and opinion making Moll (Abou El Fadl 2001). In either case, 
of a widening or closing of hermeneutic horizons, what can be seen is “a transfer of 
resources and of moral and cultural authority away from official religious 
institutions”, which Starrett rightly points out as a paradoxical feature of 
secularization, as this does not need to coincide with or be part of secularism (Starrett 
2010, 640). The transfer of moral and cultural authority away from classic official 
religious authorities enabled the creation of alternative knowledges and practices 
such as those formulated within political Islam and by salafi shaykhs. Concomitantly, 
there is a growing diversity of subjective approaches to religion and a diversification 
of personal goals in seeking religious knowledge (Mandaville 2007).  
1.3.2 Islam: an outline of reification and essentializing 
Processes of mass education and the importation of modern pedagogies in Egypt 
have had an impact on Islam as a historical religious tradition. It entailed the 
objectification and functionalization of Islam as a religious tradition (Starrett 1998). 
These processes assisted and were part of what has been analyzed as the reification 
of religions, in this case Islam. Islamic-inspired political movements have surfaced 
across the Middle East and North Africa since early Islamic history. It is only since the 
17th century, however, that reification processes were reinforced reaching a sort of 
culmination in the twentieth century, as occurred in the case of Christianity and to 
other ‘religions’, according to scholar of religion Wilfred Cantwell Smith. Smith 
famously described Islam a special case for “its rather unique insistence upon itself as 
a coherent and closed system, a sociologically and legally and even politically 
organized entity in the mundane world and an ideologically organized entity as an 
ideal” (Smith and Hick 1978, 84).  
He argued that Islam from its inception bore qualities enabling Muslims to 
understand it self-consciously (compared to other major religions) as an entity-like 
political, ideological system, as illustrated by a linguistic and historical analysis of the 
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uses of the word din (religion).  However, and Islam is not a special case, actual steps 
of reification increased and strengthened dramatically in modern times. “It appears”, 
writes Smith, “that the almost universal Muslim use of the term islam in a reified sense 
in modern times is a direct consequence of apologetics. […] The impulse to defend 
what is attacked would seem a powerful force toward reifying” (ibid. 115).  
Reification occurred in other words, through interaction between Western 
hegemonic powers and Islamic countries that seem to reinforce exactly such 
reification. This “transcultural dimension” or “transcultural space” as Salvatore called 
it, originates in the second half of the nineteenth century “when defining ‘Islam’ as a 
reified ideological system, or as a framework of communal reference, became a major 
concern for both Western (Orientalist) and Islamic authors” (Salvatore 1997, 68). It is 
through this historical, physical (through colonialism) and intellectual interaction that 
both the “West” and “Islam” became constructed as the inevitable background for 
further knowledge production about Islam on both sides.  
Reification thus means considering the concept of Islam as an autonomous, 
independent entity instead of an abstract concept that acquires concrete meanings in 
relation to other historical and sociopolitical dynamics. It leads to the 
institutionalization of religion, when “concepts, terminology, and attention shift from 
personal orientation to an ideal, then to an abstraction, finally to an institution” (Smith 
and Hick 1978, 76). In this process, the immediate faith experience and personal 
religious orientation becomes subordinate (receives less intellectual attention) to 
religious ideals and abstractions which subsequently lead to prioritizing the totality 
of the religious system and the building of an “entity”.  
Scholars and analysts may make the mistake of reifying Islam similarly to the 
possibility of reifying other concepts such as the nation, or ethnicity.1 Whereas a 
reified or essentializing notion of Islam gives over-importance to Islam as a meaning 
making system, a reductionist notion of Islam underplays Islam as a meaning making 
system in favor of other social and political explanatory factors.2 Throughout my 
research process, I have been guided by questions as to how reification and other 
constructions of religion are contested in the debate between proponents and 
 
                                                     
1 Analytical mistakes may also go in the opposite direction of essentialism and result in reductionism, as 
Anthias and Yuval-Davis pointed out (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989, 3-6). Functionalist analyses that 
reduce Islam/religion - or ethnicity for that matter - to merely representations or instruments that serve 
the interests of certain political groups and social forces underestimate the creative meanings and more 
stable characteristics of Islam/religion etc.  
2 Marnia Lazreg argued that “the point is neither to dismiss the role that Islam plays in women’s and men’s 
lives, nor to inflate it. More importantly, it is to study the historical conditions under which religion becomes 
significant in the production and reproduction of gender difference and inequality” (Lazreg 1994, 14). 
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opponents of FGC. In which ways and to what extent is FGC subject of Muslim, islamist 
cultural politics and transnational liberal feminist politics?  
In the case of studying Islam, transcultural dynamics have meant that Western 
Orientalist scholarship and popular constructions of “Islam” contributed to and 
greatly shaped political intellectual thinking about Islam by Muslims themselves. Here 
is not the place to discuss these historical political processes at length; my aim is 
rather to lay out the importance of notions of a transcultural space and ongoing 
instances of reification as crucial concepts to understand contemporary religious-
secular dynamics. When thinking of making cultural practices into religious ones, or 
the reverse of un-making FGC Islamic, these processes form the inevitable 
background. Transnational campaigning discourses argue that FGC is not Islamic and 
thus that the practice should not be attributed meaning within the Islamic meaning 
giving system. Can this be considered as a measure of de-reification by disentangling 
the Islamic from the cultural/secular? Or should it be read rather as a measure that 
reinforces reifying thought by reassuring the “true” Islamic-ness of Islam?  
Other political and social forces that are generally more investing in the reification 
and essentialization of Islam are adherents of political Islam. By emphasizing the 
importance of institutionalizing and materializing Islamic vision and belief in the 
mundane world of politics and social organization, they can be recognized as highly 
interested partners in reinforcing reification. Let’s therefore now turn to Islamism.  
1.3.3 Islamism, post-islamism and socio-cultural change 
“A complicated web of discourses and politics has grown up around the issue of 
FGM”, writes historian Margot Badran (Badran 2009a, 168). “FGM appears to be pawn 
in the contest between the secular state and society, on one side, and the Islamists or 
“fundamentalist” movement, on the other. Divergent stands on FGM signal power 
struggles between the majority of religious scholars centered on the bastion of Islamic 
learning at al-Azhar […], and those who belong to the populist Islamist opposition 
seeking to ‘re-Islamize’ the state and society” (ibid. 169). Immediate questions that 
arise are what exactly is meant by re-Islamizing society and how does a claiming of 
FGC as an Islamic practice happen? Surprisingly, islamist politics of culture has been 
rarely studied as such. If analyzing Muslim cultural politics means looking at “the 
multiple ways in which Muslims themselves define Islam both in terms of the ideas 
they present and the practices they engage in” (Moors 2004, 6), how then should 
Islamist cultural politics be defined and understood? I will argue that the concept of 
the Islamicate, coined by islamologist Marshall Hodgson, offers an interesting venue 
to look at islamist cultural politics. Notably, in the chapters six and seven, I will look 
concretely at how contemporary islamist groups (the Muslim Brotherhood and 
 20 
salafist groups) have dealt with FGC as a gendered Islamicate practice, as part of their 
actual politics.  
Islamism has been mainly examined as a political force and ideology that is put in 
relation to the concept of modernity. The question whether and how political Islam 
may or must be considered as a modern phenomenon holds a central position in this 
scholarship. The field of Western and non-Western literature on Islamism (or political 
Islam or what has also been referred to as Islamic revivalism or ‘fundamentalism’) is 
vast. Especially since the 1980s it has been characterized by the overlap and 
interdependency in knowledge production between academic scholarship, 
geopolitical interests and popular writings and journalism (Salvatore 1997).  
Islamism needs to be located in what Salvatore coined the transcultural space of 
interaction and interconnectedness between ‘East’ and ‘West’, as geopolitical units. In 
late modernity, classic orientalism as an academic discipline flourished in the study of 
Islam, first as an essentialized religion radically different from the West, and then as 
possessing two autonomous dimensions, a religious and political one (ibid. 117). This 
epistemology further develops into the “bidimensional hermeneutics of political 
Islam: Islam is no longer a civilization of the text and law closed on itself, but a global 
issue on the Western political agenda” (ibid. 143). The political “crisis” of the 1970s 
takes on a permanent character, writes Salvatore, and the field of political Islam 
“provides a contrastive image for a redefinition of Western political subjectivity in 
times of crisis” (ibid.).  
This fundamental observation remains valid until the present-day if not 
exacerbated by the post 9/11 international climate of war on terror and foreign 
occupation, and the post 2011 Middle East and North Africa region witnessing a series 
of revolutionary protests followed by war and violence and the emergence and decline 
of an Islamic State. These are all factors that contributed to the promotion of 
speculative theorizing against the backdrop of Western interests more than objective 
analysis of actual politics, transformations and shifts on the ground (Zemni 2013, 134-
138). However, the many radical changes within revolutionary jihadist Islamism and 
the benefit of having had more and longer political islamist governance lead analysts 
to speak of a failure of Islamism as a political revolutionary project and a general 
diminishment of popular appeal to political Islam. Post-Islamism has been suggested 
as a term to denote the contemporary complex situation in which Islamism as an 
international political project to take state power has been replaced by more 
moderate stances on governance, democracy, rights, plurality and historicity (Bayat 
2007a, 19; Bayat 2007b; Ismail 2001). 
Let’s have a short review of the make-up of this transcultural space and a few 
defining characteristics because they are relevant to the discourses that I examine in 
chapters six and seven. The interrogation of Islam and modernity has often centered 
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on the well-known dichotomy of tradition versus modernity. Here, tradition is 
understood as reliance on Islamic historical traditions to accommodate contemporary 
challenges. One main line of reasoning holds that Islam is foremost an expression of 
traditionalism and anti-modernity. This was particularly clear in the early literature 
that referred to the term fundamentalism. Classic orientalist scholarship, as 
exemplified for instance by William Montgomery Watt, emphasized what they called 
the (political and cultural) immobility and stability of traditional Muslim societies. It 
sought to explain ‘fundamentalism’ as the apparent inadaptability of ‘Islam’ to 
modernity and social change. Watt problematizes ‘traditionalism’ by pointing at a 
feature that is, according to him, shared by Muslim societies in general, notably the 
“traditional self-image of Islam”. He argues that this tends to insulate Muslims from 
the rest of the world, makes them retreat in self-sufficiency that keeps them blind and 
unwilling to engage with modern changes (Watt 1988). This long-standing paradigm 
of political/cultural/social immobility of Muslim societies gave way to theories 
looking at Islamists as actors of resistance and reform. Social scientists started to join 
traditional orientalist scholars based in text study and historical research. Also mass 
media started to take up a role in defining questions and having an impact on 
knowledge production on socio-cultural change in the Middle East. Islamism became 
recognized as an active and mobilizing force –albeit in an attempt to ward of changes 
invoked by modernity and to defend tradition. Sociologist Anthony Giddens found that 
fundamentalism expresses a “defense of tradition, in a traditional way” (Giddens 1994, 
253) in (Bracke and Fadil 2008). Political scientist Bassam Tibi spoke of a 
“reislamization” to denote the “appeal to Islam as the solution for every social 
problem” (Salvatore 1997, 173).  
Islamic studies scholar John Voll analysed social transformation in Islamic societies 
through a framework of an ever-present dynamic between adaptation to external 
novelties and what he calls “reaffirmation of Islamic principles and traditions”. He 
places political Islam in a larger historical dynamic of  “adaptation to the new and 
reaffirmation of the Islamic self” (Voll 1994, 378). Throughout Islamic history, he 
discerns four “basic styles or modes of Islamic experience: the pragmatic adapters, the 
conservatives, the fundamentalists, and those who emphasize personal spiritual 
power” (Voll 1994, 10). 
This division aims to capture four basic forms of Islamic response to political and 
social changes of modernity: “the pragmatic adaptationists created new ways of 
action, the conservatives preserved the gains that had been made in the past, and the 
fundamentalists kept the responses to change within the bounds of what was clearly 
Islamic” (Ibid. 13). Here, the theorizing on fundamentalism is placed in a historical 
perspective in which there has always been a role attributed to a type of 
fundamentalists as guardians of Islamic tradition while at the same allowing for 
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adaptation to new social and cultural environments. The coexistence of all three 
groups (or social attitudes) allowed for the incorporation of changes into Islamic 
culture and tradition, according to Voll. This typology enables taking account of 
dynamics and social transformation while at the same time, however, assuming that 
there is a core of Islamic doctrine that has been maintained throughout history.  
Islamism (particularly salafism) as a political tendency has been analysed by others 
as resisting popular and Islamic culture (such as “literature, philosophy, mysticism”) 
and arguing instead for a refusal of this history in favor of a return to an authentic 
Islam  (Roy 1995, 100-101). This relation between culture in all its broad 
characteristics and salafist doctrine was studied in-depth for Egyptian salafist groups’ 
definition and practices of purity by anthropologist Richard Gauvain (Gauvain 2013). 
He demonstrated that what belongs to sufist (mysticist) and other popular traditions 
is not necessarily rejected by salafists but may rather become reformulated and 
incorporated in salafist practice.  
My interest lies in looking at islamist responses to FGC against the background of 
transnational anti-FGC campaigns, specifically by the Muslim Brotherhood and its 
post-2011 political party equivalent Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), and prominent 
salafi groups and shaykhs. These islamist groups became particularly salient after the 
2011 uprisings in both dominating the political landscape and voicing opinions on 
FGC. They will be both contextualized and discussed at length in chapters six and 
seven.  
Taking discourse on FGC as a particular case of islamist cultural politics, I will argue 
in agreement with Gauvain, that islamist responses concerning tradition (or ᶜadat wa 
taqalid) cannot be schematized in simple pros and contras. Islamist parties or salafi 
shaykhs do not necessarily attempt to ward of traditions that can be said not to strictly 
belong to Islamic doctrine. They do not form a univocal bloc rejecting culture and 
tradition (FGC specifically) as not Islamic, neither claim it univocally as Islamic. To 
understand the diversity of responses I suggest, based on my research findings, to 
define FGC as a gendered Islamicate practice. Bringing insights from Islamic studies 
into dialogue with questions of religious and development studies – as outlined above 
– offers a novel understanding of FGC and its contemporary discursive contestations. 
I elaborate on this notion in the following sections. 
1.3.4 FGC as an Islamicate practice: on the intersection of the 
cultural and the religious 
The term Islamicate was first coined by classic orientalist scholar Marshall G.S. 
Hodgson. What may at first seem as a mere conceptual rephrasing that remains on the 
level of terminology in fact grasps the political and cultural conflict at the heart of 
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current discursive contestations on FGC. In The Venture of Islam, he suggested to limit 
the use of words of Islam and Islamic to refer only to that what directly pertains to 
religion (faith and religious doctrine) and introduced two other terms to refer to 
broader aspects: the term Islamicate to refer to culture and Islamdom to refer to the 
level of society. He coined the term Islamicate to refer to those social and cultural 
phenomena that fall out of the scope of Islam as a religious system but are nonetheless 
related to and interconnected with the larger social sphere, Islamdom. Islamicate 
indicates: “[…] a culture, centred on a lettered tradition, which has been historically 
distinctive of Islamdom the society, and which has been naturally shared in by both 
Muslims and non Muslims who participate at all fully in the society of Islamdom”  
(Hodgson 1974, 58).  
Through his argument for semantic precision he reflects the need of a more 
nuanced and complex understanding of how the religious is always intertwined with 
and yet can be conceptually separated from the secular, cultural and social. His theory 
has been especially taken up by scholars of Islamic societies that do not geographically 
belong to the core area of the Middle East. Terms as Islamicate and Islamdom allow to 
expound on historical and contemporary acculturation processes. It goes to the heart 
of the dynamic relationship between the cultural and religious to precisely point at 
shifts and transformations of what constitutes as religious (or cultural) at a given 
point in a given context. The neologism Islamicate “allowed students of civilizational 
change to refer to the broad expanse of Africa and Asia that was influenced by Muslim 
rulers but not restricted to the practice of Islam as a religion” (Gilmartin and Lawrence 
2000, 2). It enabled to capture the mutual influence and exchange between the so-
called Arab center – the Arab homelands of the first centuries of Islamic history – and 
the “peripheries” in Asia and Africa. Scholars have used Hodgson’s terminology as well 
in a deliberate effort to move “away from the nineteenth century universalizing 
European idea that distinguishes between the world’s cultures in part on the basis of 
religious denomination and that had dominated Islamic studies until Hodgson’s 
proposition”  (Babayan and Najmabadi 2008, ix).  
Cultural practices as FGC fit the description of the double adjective Islamicate 
denoting a grey zone between religion and culture. As a cultural practice it predates 
the advent of islam and the Qurᵓanic revelation but it has historically become 
associated and  entangled with Islam. It became associated with Islam through certain 
interpretations of hadith (see chapter four) incorporating the practice within Islamic 
tradition. At the same time it was and still is practiced by all inhabitants of the larger 
society in which Islam forms the majority-religion (Islamdom).  
Indeed, FGC is practiced by both Christians and Muslims in contemporary Egypt and 
the complexities of FGC as an Islamicate practice in the frame of relations between the 
Muslim majority and Christian minority is discussed in final chapter eight. Regarding 
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FGC as an Islamicate practice enables us to consider what goes on in the debate that 
attempts to restrict FGC as either a religious or a cultural practice. Whereas 
transnational discourse against FGC invests in defining FGC as merely cultural, 
Islamist discourses are more diverse. Some recognize a religious, Islamic, basis for the 
practice while others do not. Some claim it without hesitation as a religious practice, 
others point at the ambiguity of its Islamic-ness. This show above all that the variety 
of islamist and Salafist discourses contrasts with the homogenous transnational 
discourse that unmakes FGC as religious and claims it as cultural only.  
1.3.5 Tradition, norms and values: religious gender 
conservatism  
In this final section, I want to reflect on the meanings of tradition and religious 
gender conservatism as these notions will occur in the text and especially in chapters 
four, five and six. When employing terms as conservatism – or religious gender 
conservatism – I do this analytically rather than normatively taking liberal feminism 
as a standard. In relation to the history of second-wave feminism, Western feminist 
scholarship on sexuality and the narrative of “sexual liberation”, conservatism has 
been used to refer to those resisting gender equality norms and sexuality: “In reaction 
to the profound disappointments of what has passed for "sexual liberation," some 
feminists are replicating an earlier tradition, focusing exclusively on danger and 
advocating what we believe to be a conservative sexual politics” (Vance 1984, 32).  
Prominent feminist scholar Carol Vance  argued “The conservative attack on 
feminist gains has taken the form of a moral crusade. In its campaign against the evils 
of abortion, lesbian and gay rights, contraceptive education and services, and women's 
economic independence, the Right is attempting to reinstate traditional sexual 
arrangements and the formerly inexorable link between reproduction and sexuality” 
(ibid. 2-3). This framing of conservatism as supportive of a gender status-quo and 
resistance to women’s reproductive rights based on morality has become dominant 
among supporters of sexual and reproductive rights and gender equality among 
development and feminist theorists and practitioners. Amy Coates et al. argue that the 
Holy See for example represents a stable conservative position “strategically 
interpreting human rights norms in ways consistent with its own position; and 
framing sexuality and reproduction in the context of “the family”” (Coates, et al. 2014, 
114). Pleas for maintaining the social status-quo and phrasing such thought in terms 
that emphasize family norms and values are also part and parcel of Egyptian 
conservatism.  
Conservatism has been highlighted as a central feature following religious revival 
in Egypt and across the region. Religious revivalism was characterized by “enrollment 
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increases in religious studies programs at university, the spread of private Islamic 
schools, the increased availability of religious publications, commodities, and 
broadcasts, and the very purposeful development of religious discourses as measures 
of social control” (Starrett 2010, 640). Starrett goes on to state that this “can appear 
to express a growing religious hegemony in public space, even if portions of that 
growth can be described as "fragile and unstable accomplishment[s]" (Hirschkind 
2006, 108) rather than as "pervasive, persistent, and normal" (Starrett 1998, 90)” 
(ibid.). Its specific features and shape may have undergone changes over the decades,  
the religious revival in the Egyptian public sphere has gained permanence.  
This staying power of religiosity in the social and cultural sphere – rather than in 
the political institutionalized sphere – was described as the contemporary post-
Islamist phase (Bayat 2013). Sociologist and anthropologist of religion, Asef Bayat 
argues that “the unsettling of the Islamist core did not mean a waning of religious 
commitment and activism. On the contrary, many indications pointed to a growing, 
albeit fragmented, trend of conservative religiosity and piety” (Bayat 2013, 194). The 
rise in conservative religiosity and individualized piety was characteristic of the 
decades leading to the 2011 uprising. Whereas “[t]he ‘seculareligious’ state nurtured 
the dominance of Islamist discourse, the postrevolution Egypt under the Islamist 
Muslim Brothers ironically signals the rise of post-Islamist sentiments”, wrote Bayat 
during islamist governance (Bayat 2013, 186).  
In short, the rise of public and private religiosity was paired with a rise of 
conservative values in family and gender norms (Ismail 1998; Mahmood 2004; 
McLarney 2015). A gender-traditional religious view “promotes the belief that men 
and women were created to fulfill different and complementary roles that tend to 
privilege the status of men” (Burke 2012, 122). When referring to religious gender 
conservatism, it is this particular social and cultural trend and vision that is in mind. 
Other voices, that I will join (in chapters five to nine), have argued to consider 
conservative values and discourse on tradition in its emphasis and concern of social 
cohesion. Salvatore argued to see values and traditions in “their capacity to support 
the social bond at a micro-level” (Salvatore 2009, 8). “Tradition should not be 
understood as non-reflexive, primordial culture, but more dynamically”, argues 
Salvatore “as the ensemble of practices and arguments that secure the social bond and 
provide cohesiveness to human communities of varying scale” (Salvatore 2009, 5).  
Indeed, I will argue to place discourse on the reinforcement of conservative gender 
norms as part of a response to a global configuration. Irby for instance outlines 
characteristics of contemporary conservative religious views globally, illustrating 
how “conservative Protestantism privileges a complementary heterosexual marriage 
as a life goal, especially for unmarried women who without it can face an identity crisis 
about who they are and what God wants from them” (Irby 2014, 1275). In this context, 
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this study hopes to contribute to the anthropology of development/globalization and 
the politics of morality. Scholars have argued how “[g]lobal-local interaction, and 
especially the influence of global neoliberal order on local contexts, has led to an 
emphasizing of the existing gender norms and has drawn conservative responses in 
different contexts” (Lynch 2007). A more global outlook on conservatism, morality, 
sexual politics and the nation-state is required rather than to keep a specific Middle-
East focus. It is within such a perspective that I have placed contemporary islamist 
discourse on gender and FGC (see chapter six) (Van Raemdonck 2015a).  
1.4 Methodology and methods  
As it has been argued in the previous sections, this is a discursive study of religion and 
secularism, notably of discourse on the relationship between FGC and religion in 
Egypt. It is largely based on empirical data that are gathered partly by ethnographic 
research carried out in Cairo and Luxor between 2012 and 2014  and partly by study 
of literature, media and grey literature. It is therefore an interdisciplinary study 
drawing on concepts and insights from the social sciences (anthropology, Middle 
Eastern studies/area studies) and humanities (gender studies, religious studies, 
Islamic studies). I hoped to demonstrate how exactly I have done this by the above 
conceptual framework that outlines my main theoretical departure points and used 
concepts. Although my data are mainly discourse and text-based (audio of awareness-
raising seminars, interviews, group talks, media articles, speeches by al-Azhar 
shaykhs and salafi preachers) I have also conducted ethnographic research based on 
informal talks, participant-observation and non-participant observation. Before 
discussing my used methods, a few words on methodology.  
1.4.1 Methodological perspectives: feminist, critical and 
postcolonial 
When researching FGC there has often been a perceived sense of conflict between 
on the one hand anthropological relativism that involves an interpretative perspective 
and holds the priority of understanding over judging and on the other, an ethical and 
feminist appeal to take a stance against a practice that often harms women’s bodies 
and minds. How does an engaged and critical anthropology on FGC look like and is it 
even possible to combine an ethically engaged with a critical more interpretative 
perspective at the same time? Feminist anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes, known 
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for her work on violence, encourages anthropologists not to stay on the sideline and 
to speak out on political events that happen around us. She promotes “[t]he idea of an 
active, politically committed, morally engaged anthropology” (Scheper-Hughes 1995, 
415) asking rhetorically why anthropology would escape from any moral appeal.  
What would make anthropologists different and exempt them “from the human 
responsibility to take an ethical (and even a political) stand” on the historical events 
that we witness ( ibid. 411). She pleads for what she calls “barefoot anthropology” or 
militant anthropology that is not afraid of staring back at the historical, political, and 
morally appealing facts that are enrolling in front of our eyes (and does not believe in 
the possibility of being a noninvolved observer). If we agree with Scheper-Hughes’ 
position of the desirability of a politically and morally engaged anthropology, does this 
mean that one should support the struggle of activists against FGC and of those 
speaking in the name of victims and all those who suffer from the practice? Or, should 
we look at campaigns against FGC as efforts to orchestrate forcibly social and cultural 
change, steered by external decision-makers. Is it maybe more “militant” and ethically 
just in current times to listen to those rejecting campaigns as imports from Western-
dominated agencies, feeling that traditional family and gender values are threatened 
by an encroaching international – but Western-dominated – sphere? 
This debate is of course not new, however, the case of FGC epitomizes as no other a 
long-standing anthropological debate on the role of ethics and cultural relativism. It 
has been argued that FGC and male/female circumcision in general is a crucial case 
where anthropology could (and should) show its value and relevance by developing 
new perspectives and new theorizing (Silverman 2004, 437). Circumcision may be a 
subject that makes the fundamental tension between interpretation and ethics most 
explicit; we can find similar concerns on topics as forms of violence against women 
(VAW), as it has been categorized over the last decades in the transnational sphere of 
activism and women’s rights advocacy.  
Writing on the question of the primacy of the ethical, feminist anthropologist Aihwa 
Ong responds to Scheper-Hughes that it is a task of anthropology to develop “a mobile 
sensitivity to cultural difference that nevertheless insists on defending minimal 
modern human rights (freedom from hunger and torture and the right to survive as a 
people)” (Scheper-Hughes 1995, 430). She argues “[i]f it is to remain relevant into the 
next century, anthropology must develop its own relational ethics to societies and 
peoples everywhere, guided by the "weak" human universal of emancipation (ibid.)” 
A “relational ethics” departs from understandings of cultural mutual interdependency 
and exchange. In agreement with Ong, I argue that an approach that foregrounds 
relationality between researcher and researched and between constructions of 
cultures – such as a transcultural space in which a reciprocal dynamics produces 
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epistemologies as theorized by Salvatore – offers the ability to transcend the dilemma 
of either cultural relativism or adopting an abolitionist stance.  
Taking a critical and ethically engaged position in the case of anthropological work 
on FGC can go beyond “picking sides” in a polarized context (in both popular, media 
and academic discourse). Many have pointed out how a hardened notion of 
culture/tradition plays a role in maintaining the perception of a dilemma. Lila Abu-
Lughod has criticized the homogenizing and objectifying effects of the concept of 
“culture” (Abu-Lughod 1991). Christine Walley similarly argues for the need of 
analyses that point at the potential of transformation within these practices. Analyses 
that unravel a hardened and immobile concept of culture and tradition but are instead 
historically-contextualized and non-essentializing offer ways to transcend the 
perceived dilemma (Walley 1997).  
When referring to “culture” I speak of dynamic units that are fundamentally only 
understood in relation to other cultural units. Showing how cultures are affected and 
transformed by historical and political contexts, as Abu-Lughod and Walley argue, is 
not sufficient but, I believe, needs to be complemented by a methodology that puts 
central the notions of relationality, reciprocity, interdependency and 
interconnectivity. Putting relationality central may offer adequate responses to 
certain postcolonial critiques and concerns (e.g. the danger to universalize local norms 
and histories, of objectifying and homogenizing Others (Mohanty 2003; Narayan 
1997)) and to more recent critical scholarship of transnational feminist advocacy and 
NGO’s (Bernal and Grewal 2014; Grewal 2005; Grewal and Kaplan 1994). Such an 
approach goes beyond a mere comparing cross-culturally (Pedwell 2010) but instead 
foregrounds interconnectivity and relationality and destabilizes “a particular 
configuration of apparent stabilities for permanent associations between space, 
territory, and cultural organization” (Appadurai 2013, 8).  
1.4.2 Ethnographic methods 
My position as a researcher of a subject that is typically described as a gendered, 
harmful cultural practice in a postcolonial context calls for a reflective and self-
conscious research design and methodology. As a white European female researcher 
with a working-class family background, my awareness of my privileges in this world 
and consciousness of global (and local) power imbalances informed and inspired my 
research design before entering the field. Undoubtedly my personal raced, gendered 
and classed background shaped a lot of my “pre-understanding and prejudice” with 
which I entered the field (Crapanzano 2010, 58). It largely shaped my sensitivity to 
postcolonial points of view that are critical of Western feminist interventionism. At 
the same time, it influenced feelings of sympathy with Egyptian activists who show 
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passionate rejection of FGC – whether they considered themselves feminist, activist or 
rather civil servants working in the national interest.  
It is indeed important to keep in mind that one’s own inevitable predispositions and 
sensibilities shape choices of research questions and methods. Once in the research 
process and in the field, we can only aim and hope to have the ability “to identify with 
a character (and, I would add, a point of view) without losing our own identity, our 
own point of view, the confidence of our position” (Crapanzano 2010, 58). Our own 
personal backgrounds affect how we approach the field, which questions we find 
intriguing, how we process encounters and interpret field data. As Peter Berger 
asserts, there “is no cardinal way to conduct ethnographic fieldwork, since it depends 
on numerous factors such as topic, personality, region, political context and, perhaps 
not so frequently acknowledged, coincidence” (Berger 2012, 326) Coincidence, “the 
contingent and accidental” (Crapanzano 2010, 60) of fieldwork encounters have been 
equally important in determining the course of my fieldwork. Meeting certain people 
who destabilize certain assumptions or helped to meet others who did so, I belief is a 
crucial part of any fieldwork experience. Additionally, political and social conditions 
impact on and create fieldwork opportunities.  
After I had determined to put anti-FGC campaigning discourse as a central research 
question and analyse it in contrast or comparison to discourses that condone or favour 
the continuation of FGC, the challenge was to find fieldwork opportunities. After the 
2011 protests, foreign funds for campaigning had largely halted and so had on the 
ground activities. One of the few active organizations in civil society seemed a newly 
created Coalition of NGOs, that in 2012 was in the final stages of obtaining all formal 
state cooperation and ministerial embedding in order to receive international funds 
and implement activities. They started with a series of awareness-raising activities in 
close cooperation with small scale local NGO’s from September 2013 onwards. This is 
when I joined them as an observer and listener in the seminars. I spent all-together 
more than 15 months in the field between September 2012 and September 2014.  
My first fieldwork encounters were in the autumn of 2012 with female activists of 
the previous governmentally supported task force against FGM that was operating 
from 1994 until 1999. I met the main members of the task force and conducted in-
depth interviews (Aida Sayf al-Dawla, Siham Abd-al Salam, Amal Abd-al Hadi, 
Mawahib al-Moualhy, Marie Asaad, Vivian Fouad) in addition to Magdy Helmy 
(Caritas) and Ahmad Ragab (al-Azhar’s International Islamic Centre for Population 
Studies and Research) who have been influential in the development of state policy 
since 2000 after the disbandment of the voluntary task force. Throughout the 
dissertation I have anonymized my interlocutors, except for these prominent task 
force members. All of these interviewees had a long experience with talking to 
researchers and press about their early experiences of anti-FGC campaigning and their 
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participation in the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development 
(ICPD) that was held in Cairo. They are widely publicized and have published 
themselves as well on the subject but were willing to review and recount their 
experiences to me. Through these interviews (and some follow-up meetings in April 
2013), I constructed Egypt’s specific genealogy of anti-FGC campaigning discourse 
through the lens of activism, state policy and transnationalism. It revealed a major 
shift between voluntary (and self-denoted) feminist activism to state-supported 
campaigning (see chapter three).  
In Spring 2013 I spent several months in Cairo taking additional classes in Egyptian 
colloquial in preparation of fieldwork of campaigning activities. From November 2013 
to January 2014 I was indeed able to spend time with NGO’s under guidance of the 
Cairo-based Coalition of NGOs against FGM, headed by Randa Fakhr al-Din. I attended 
a series of seven awareness-raising seminars, which is the common naming of the 
activity in English and also the literal meaning of how they are referred to in Arabic, 
nadawat tawᶜiyya. The seminars were funded, organized and coordinated by the 
Coalition, that allowed me to sit in on the meetings and record the audio of what was 
being said. In making my request I had proposed not to register any video or pictures 
or to reveal the identities of any women involved. I presented myself as a researcher 
who was interested in discourse and aimed to understand people’s different 
perceptions and feelings about the practice. Each seminar was given at a different 
location in the northern outskirts of Cairo, hosted each time by a different local small 
NGO and facilitated by different trainers. One seminar consisted of a talk by a local 
shaykh graduated from al-Azhar.  
Chapter five’s analysis is mainly based on the discourse and recurrent themes in 
the awareness-raising seminars. It also relies on interviews and informal talks with 
trainers of seminars, other NGO-personnel and participants of the seminars and 
includes a study of grey literature such as organizational reports and currently used 
training-of-trainers manuals. The discussion is thus based on a selection of themes 
that were recurrent across the seminars and that were equally often brought up in a 
large number of informal conversations and casual meetings.  
The seven seminars that were coordinated and funded by the Coalition of NGO’s 
Against FGM I attended at the local NGO’s together with one employee of the Coalition. 
Each session was organized by locally implanted NGO’s and given by a different trainer 
at a different locality, all situated in the northern outskirts of Cairo (ᶜAyn Shams, ᶜ Izbet 
al-Nakhl, Imbaba/Mohandisin). Two other seminars were organized outside of the 
scope of the Coalition. One was convened and organized by a contact person in Luxor 
who is active and well-connected in Luxor’s civil society and works with youth clubs. 
In this occasion, a local shaykh was invited to address women on the harms of FGC. A 
second seminar was attended via a large transnational NGO in Luxor. During fieldwork 
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I agreed to anonymize the NGO and its leaders and employees’ personal opinions so I 
will refer to it as TNGO (Transnational Non-Governmental Organization).  
I had been introduced to this NGO via the same local contact person. My question 
was whether it was possible to attend awareness-raising seminars organized by them, 
to compare to the activities I had witnessed in Cairo. Initially it would have been 
possible to accompany TNGO’s personnel to attend their activities in a few villages 
located between Luxor and Qena but unfortunately I did not obtain all necessary 
permits from both the TNGO and Egyptian state security services to enable these 
visits. Through TNGO, however, I met a local trainer and previous employee who 
regularly gives talks about the subject of FGC in schools and churches and other civil 
society venues. I had the opportunity to attend such an awareness-raising meeting in 
a school in the outskirts of Luxor. 
All meetings were held in Arabic, i.e. Egyptian colloquial, and were audio-recorded. 
All trainers and NGO personnel allowed audio-recording upon my request. While I 
started to transcribe some of the recordings myself, the majority was transcribed by a 
research assistant in Cairo. Being able to read the transcripts facilitated my 
understanding greatly since I missed knowledge of certain vocabulary to properly 
understand the recordings in all its details. On the basis of what was said in the 
seminars, I coded the transcripts in 25 recurrent themes. The number of themes 
expanded as I processed the transcripts, with half of the themes having a very high 
repetition, while the other half were less frequent. All of the themes however, 
resonated with the informal talks and individual and group interviews that I 
conducted. So the selection of themes was made on the basis of its recurrence and 
resonance with other gathered data by interviews, informal talks and readings of grey 
literature such as organizational reports and currently used training-of-trainers 
manuals.  
1.4.3 Participant observation 
Although my role was formally reduced to observing the seminars, it goes without 
saying that the boundaries of participation and observation are fluid. My presence 
certainly impacted on trainers’ choice of words and performance and on attending 
women’s questions and behaviour during the sessions. In most of the cases, when 
there was an occasion, I made a point of introducing myself as a university researcher, 
a “disinterested observer” in my desire to differentiate myself from Western activists 
or employees representing NGO’s or donor funds. As I was meeting new groups and 
trainers I repeated this self-presentation at every meeting, usually before the start of 
the seminar. Nevertheless, I was often considered by both trainers and attending 
women as “part of the NGO-team” sharing in the aim of raising consciousness toward 
 32 
abandonment of the practice. Being a white European woman being present in a 
context of anti-FGC campaigning seems to automatically conjure up assumptions that 
I must have travelled in order to support the cause of FGC abandonment.  
My concern of being seen as an activist who wanted to persuade to stop the practice 
and how this possibly influenced women was on my mind most of the time in the first 
half of my fieldwork, especially during the awareness-raising sessions that I attended. 
My concern was that informants would consciously not share their experiences and 
opinions when only perceiving me as an activist. This concern with perception and  
misperceptions is also described in the literature (e.g. Johnson 2000, 226). More 
specifically anthropologist Christine Walley discussed how she was concerned with 
finding Kenyan girls’ authentic voices on FGC, only to conclude that authenticity is 
hard to define and that girls were “strategically merging their voices with those of 
more powerful others” (Walley 1997, 338). Indeed, as my dissertation argues, 
historical (and colonial) discursive legacies, the workings of identity politics, the 
central importance of gender and sexuality in nation-building processes are central to 
the formation of discourse and opinions for and against the practice.  
My initial concern and self-reflexive awareness of my presence and representation 
as a researcher gradually waned as my fieldwork progressed. Coming to understand 
“methodology as open-ended and incomplete” and fieldwork as a ”structured learning 
process” (Cook 2010, 239) fits my own experience and sense of personal progress very 
well. Berreman describes such considerations about field contacts’ perceptions of 
yourself as a researcher, however, as necessary “impression management” (Berreman 
2007). He argues that “[a]ttempts to convey a desired impression of one's self and to 
interpret accurately the behavior and attitudes of others are an inherent part of any 
social interaction, and they are crucial to ethnographic research” (ibid. 138). In his 
view, what comes before the actual fieldwork, all the necessary interactions, 
anecdotes and provisional information which one acts upon, including your own 
impression management, is crucial to gain access and enable the actual ethnographic 
work. For myself this translated into not wanting to appear as a Western campaigner 
against FGC in some circumstances (such as the seminars, in interviews with women 
beneficiaries) while wanting to appear, however, as sympathetic to the cause in 
interaction with activists, trainers, state employees and church volunteers. While I 
believe that such impression management was indeed relevant to enable further 
interactions, I may have overestimated its importance.  
In addition to participant observation in awareness-raising seminars, I joined 
Christian volunteers in a Cairene suburb in two tours of house visits to families. Coptic 
Christian volunteers (khudam) of a specific church visit families living in the district 
surrounding that church. In this frame one discusses different social topics related to 
parenting, volunteering and church activities, child rearing, marital relations, or it may 
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be geared toward awareness-raising against FGC, which was the main reason behind 
the house visits I participated in. In the case of the seminars, the NGO leadership’s 
permission was crucial to allow me to join in. Likewise, the approval of the Coptic 
Patriarchate and the leadership of development projects against FGC was important 
to enable my fieldwork. Chapter nine discusses this more ethnographic fieldwork at 
length and places it within dominant discourses of sameness and difference among 
the Christian minority. Also here I participated explicitly as a researcher although I 
belief I was even more considered to have affinities with the volunteers’ actions and 
concern against FGC.  
1.4.4 Interviewing and group talks 
Other methods that I used were mainly interviewing and group conversations. After 
three awareness-raising seminars organized by the Coalition of NGO’s against FGM, I 
had interviews with fifteen attending women. The interviews I count and describe 
here are all audio recorded but the number of informal talks I have not counted but 
mentioned where relevant in my field notes. One time this occurred immediately 
following the seminar itself and two other times the local NGO leadership and I had 
set up occasions where I could meet and talk with women separately, however, always 
still in the company of NGO employees. Because the NGO setting literally framed those 
meetings, my questions were adapted to that setting and I let the women lead the 
conversation where they wanted to.  
After my cooperation with the Coalition ended I went to Luxor in March 2013 where 
I met and befriended my two main (Muslim) informants through the suggestion of a 
mutual (Christian) friend who was working in development NGO’s in Cairo. Their help 
was crucial in opening up new fieldwork sites, the most important of which was a 
small NGO located in a town near Luxor headed by a female lawyer and a voluntary 
association to promote Muslim-Christian understanding and tolerance. I interviewed 
four women in the small NGO, including the founder and leader. In another small 
German NGO located centrally in Luxor, I interviewed two women.  
The most important and beneficial for my research questions, however, were four 
group interviews I held, three in Cairo and one in Luxor. In the three group interviews 
in Cairo participated women who had been attending awareness-raising seminars and 
who were regular visitors of the local organizing NGO’s. One was a mixed Muslim-
Christian group and two groups were separate by only Muslims and only Christians, 
again each time the meetings were held in company of NGO employees. These group 
conversations were more interesting as they enabled interactions and a “dynamic 
synergie that is absent in individual interviewing” (George 2013, 257).  
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I prepared the meetings by outlining a list of questions and a chronological scheme 
of topics I wanted to address but I generally let the group dynamic take over if 
possible. I thus did not follow specific rules of moderating focus groups but rather 
consider those meetings as group talks, in which the dynamic that was created by the 
participants was not constricted by my questions. In my interviews and in everyday 
conversations generally, I aspired to enable meetings that somehow showed 
recognition and awareness of our “different” positions. This means to have an 
encounter that “would necessitate awareness of the relations of power which already 
mark some bodies differently than others” (Pedwell 2010, 56-7). In other words, I 
attempted ambitiously to “undo” raced hierarchies by showing critical awareness of 
colonial discursive legacies of Western interventionism.  
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Chapter 2  
A genealogy of anti-FGC campaigning: from 
transnational feminist activism to global 
norm production 
2.1 Introduction 
“It is important to recognize how deeply gender and race have been worked into 
the apparently natural body of biology and science, and through those 
discourses into development. It is also important to contextualize why the 
interest in bodies, including my own interest, emerged in the 1980s and 1990s 
along with key political and social changes in demography and age, patterns of 
disease, new technologies and feminisms” (Harcourt 2009, 20).  
This quote by development studies scholar and practitioner Wendy Harcourt captures 
many of the points I wish to discuss in the course of this chapter. This chapter aims to 
offer a genealogy of activism against FGC and thus to explore under which conditions 
global interest in fighting FGC was raised and how it succeeded in pushing the issue to 
become one of the top concerns of United Nations agencies. By using the word 
genealogy I refer to my interest in “working back from our present to the 
contingencies that have come together to give us our certainties”, as Talal Asad put it 
(Asad 2003, 16). My aim is in other words to look back at how fighting FGC has become 
an overwhelming, universalized, moral certainty. By pointing out underlying 
rationales that raised the topic to become a global norm and by reviewing major 
critiques of this global campaign, the wider context is sketched against which to 
understand Egyptian discussions and discourses against and in favor of FGC.  
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The central angle from which I approach this, is one of knowledge production. With 
a genealogical approach is intended to highlight the conditions under which 
knowledge is being produced and the central themes underlying discursive shifts. 
The first section looks specifically at the ascend of the topic of FGC on the agenda of 
international development, feminists’ contributions and their critiques. The second 
section broadens the scope to include a wider look at transnational feminist activism 
and advocacy. The anti-FGC campaign is part of the successful rise of transnational 
feminism and the different institutions and tools that resulted from it. The recognition 
of feminist concerns in international development agencies coincided with the 
development and spread of non-governmental organisations. Since the 1990s, 
promotion of women’s rights and women’s issues in general (including FGC) has been 
strongly associated with NGO-work, as differentiated from the form of social 
movement. The third and final section aims to synthesize by moving beyong an NGO-
ization critique1.  
2.2 On the power of setting the terms and writing the 
script 
2.2.1 Colonial discourse, colonial feminism and female genital 
cutting  
Western interest in campaigning against the practice of female genital cutting first 
emerged in the 1920s during British colonization and the arrival of Christian missions 
in Africa (Boddy 2007b, 403). British colonial administration in Sudan and Kenya 
developed policies and legislation to reduce or eliminate what they saw as barbarous 
and backward customs (Boddy 2006; Boddy 2007a; Njambi 2007; Thomas 2000a; 
Thomas 2000b; Thomas 2003). This concern was part of a larger preoccupation with 
women, their bodies and health, child rearing and children’s upbringing. A major 
reason for trying to change the practice of FGC and infibulation in Sudan in the 1920s 
was the colonial administration’s concern for the consequences of the practice on 
women’s fertility. Colonial efforts undertaken against the practice are then best 
understood within a larger imperial population policy. Lynn Thomas argues that 
 
                                                     
1 This chapter is largely based on two previous publications: (Van Raemdonck 2013; Van Raemdonck 
2015b). 
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“Late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century imperialism coincided with European 
states’ heightened interest in regulating sexual behavior and promoting the growth 
and health of national populations” (Thomas 2003, 11). The attention for FGC and 
colonial attempts to control it, is part of what Thomas calls “politics of the womb”. This 
colonial politics of the womb refers to attempts to regulate population growth and 
women’s reproductive organs by focusing on initiation rites, pregnancy and 
childbirth. It “conflated concerns about improving women’s status with efforts to 
encourage population growth and expand the availability of cheap labor” (ibid. 13).  
Worried about declining population growth rates in Sudan, the British aimed at 
eliminating infibulation and modernizing midwifery training in order to assure human 
reproduction and to increase the Empire’s production in the world market (Boddy 
2006, 84). Pro-natalist colonial policies by the British colonizers,  and the aim to 
increase population numbers are then presented as one of the “philanthropic 
objectives of British rule” (Thomas 2003, 11-12).Policing and controlling women’s 
bodies and reproductive capacities took a central position in a larger endeavor to 
control culture and society at large. As anthropologist Ann Stoler and historian 
Frederick Cooper state it: “[colonial officers] sought to balance colonial demands for 
African land and labor against the need to maintain political control and to fulfil the 
“white man’s burden” of civilizing the “barbaric” and improving women’s status”,  in 
(Thomas 2003, 5)  
This means in other words that Western resistance against FGC is anchored in a 
specific context, namely that of colonial occupation and civilizing missions. When the 
topic would resurface again in the 1980s after decades of relative silence, the language 
in which FGC was condemned bore close resemblances to the original colonial context. 
In this discourse, African cultural traditions are associated with ‘barbarity’, a longtime 
characterization of African culture and sexual norms. “Since as early as the sixteenth 
century [slave trades], accounts of African men’s virility and African women’s 
licentiousness and fecundity had been a staple of European representations of African 
‘barbarity’”, argues Lynn Thomas (Thomas 2003, 10). Similarly, cultural traditions are 
painted as holding back the development of knowledge and socio-economic progress. 
Silverman notes how this language and style is similar to the way in which Jewish 
circumcision has been portrayed historically: “Critics of Jewish particularism since the 
medieval era—actually, since the letters of Paul– have painted Jewish circumcision 
with the same colors of barbarism and ignorance that now so frequently taint Africans 
and Muslims” (Silverman 2004, 432-3). While the racist undertones of anti-FGC 
campaigning discourse have been pointed out by critical voices and anthropologists, 
its similarities with anti-Jewish sentiments has rarely been pointed out. So Silverman 
argues: “To the extent that European objections to Jewish circumcision often are 
rooted in the bodily assumptions of Pauline-Hellenistic Christianity, opposition to FC 
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[Female Circumcision] may be seen as a similar form of bodily imperialism” (ibid. 
433).  
2.2.1.1 The politicization of FGC under colonial rule  
Colonial attempts to stop or transform the practice was often met with local resistance 
that took the shape of political opposition to the foreign ruler and its dictates that 
attempted to regulate social and cultural life. In colonial Sudan the subject of FGC 
became most heavily politicized after the introduction of legislation banning the 
practice in 1946. Mahmoud Mohammed Taha, the renowned Sudanese Islamic 
reformist, lead the Rufa’a revolt against the British in defiance of the new law banning 
the practice (Ibrahim 2011a).  
Janice Boddy relates how the British colonial administration brought to trial two 
women after the practice had been legally banned in 1946 in Sudan. This case sparked 
violent anticolonial protest that was stirred up by the organization of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Sudan (Boddy 1991, 16). Thomas, Njambi and Pedersen present a 
similar politicization of the issue in various episodes of Kenyan colonial and 
postcolonial history (Njambi 2007; Pedersen 1991; Thomas 2000a; Thomas 2000b). 
In Kenya the rejection of the practice by Christian missions and British officials 
brought about fierce resistance by Kenyan women and nationalist leaders.  The 
missionaries’ aversion of the practice in combination with the general societal 
destabilizing effects of colonization even reinforced the practice and gave it new 
meaning. Historian Lynn Thomas explains how Kenya “knows a particular historical 
episode known as “the female circumcision controversy”, between 1928-31, which 
were the most important years of Kenya’s struggle for independence. (Thomas 2003, 
1-2).  
This specific episode of “”the female circumcision controversy” is generally 
considered as the most important episode of anticolonial resistance” (ibid. 2). It 
started after the Protestant mission had established many black congregations and 
had learned through this way about female initiation rites and its component of female 
circumcision. The missions then were first to call for a ban on excision, “together with 
metropolitan-based feminists and social reformers” (ibid. 13). Susan Pedersen equally 
emphasizes the central role that the Protestant missions played in addressing the 
issue and in raising interest for the cause at home. The question of FGC in Kenya – irua 
– became a hot debated topic in British parliament: “Revelations of the conflict in 
Kenya coincided with the entry into Parliament both of Labour politicians determined 
to further the political aspirations of African peoples and of humanitarians and 
feminists equally determined to use British rule to "protect colored 
women””(Pedersen 1991, 648). This debate was not without consequences but 
succeeded to convince colonial administration to take steps. Thomas argues that 
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“colonial officials were more hesitant but interpellated by a call for moral base of 
colonial rule they started to offer tentative support to mission campaigns” (Thomas 
2003, 13)  
In addition to the imperial nationalist discourse of setting out to protect Kenyan 
women, on the Kenyan side, circumcision became a rallying point for nationalist 
groups. Concretely, it was the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) that played a central 
role in speaking out for support of FGC. Founded in 1924 and initially preoccupied 
with the return of appropriated lands and the release of a political prisoner, by the end 
of the 1920s the topic of female circumcision became the major point of political 
mobilization (Pedersen 1991, 652). The KCA’s letter of protest urged “all Kikuyu 
leaders to mobilize in defense of tribal customs” (ibid. 652-3). The escalating situation 
lead to the creation of a protest song. This song shows “how a defense of sexual order 
became entangled with a revolt of younger Kikuyus against the British and their 
African collaborators and with a political protest against the loss of Kikuyu land” (ibid. 
653). One of the KCA’s most important leaders, Jomo Kenyatta, wrote on female 
circumcision extensively in his book “Facing Mount Kenya”, establishing further this 
popular relationship between the defense of FGC as a traditional custom and 
nationalist patriotism (ibid. 663). The weight of this relationship would again become 
clear in another episode of controversy around female circumcision, when a legal ban 
was issued in the district of Meru in 1956. The local population reacted strongly in 
defiance of the ban and this situation reshaped the traditional understanding and 
practice of FGC. After the ban, adolescent girls attempted to excise each other, differing 
greatly from the traditional initiation rites (Thomas 2000a, 129) 129. These girls 
became known as Ngaitana, which means I will circumcise myself, as they were called 
by the elder women who were calling the legitimacy of their excisions in doubt. Also 
this generation of young girls defying the Meru ban came up with a song, calling on 
their elders to be recognized as circumcised and enjoying the traditional meanings of 
the practice. The Ngaitana girls and song conveyed a meaning of resistance and 
courage,  in the face of a highly repressive government (ibid. 130). 
Several authors have pointed out that some of the strategies developed by the 
British colonial administration and missionaries to counter FGC were similar to those 
used to stop foot-binding in China (Mackie 1996; Wilson 2013). Missionary schools 
for example offered “scholarships to unbound girls, later educating only unbound elite 
pupils under unbound Christian elite teachers” (Wilson 2013, 8) 8. In a similar vein, 
missionary churches in Kenya would suspend members for performing FGC and hence 
many African Christians left the Church “feeling that an ‘eleventh commandment’ was 
being imposed and, as women missionaries and Kikuyu were not involved, the 
campaign became associated with sexist and anti-colonial practices” (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998, 66-7) in (Wilson 2013, 8-9). While there were similar elements used in 
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the campaign to eradicate foot-binding (Chanzu) in 1895–1911 in China and to end 
FGC in the 1930s in Kenya, “popular responses and nationalism in 1900 China was 
different from 1920s Kenya” (Wilson 2013, 10). Indeed, the response by the general 
population and by Kenyan political leaders under colonialism to attempts to stop FGC 
lead to a large-scale reclaiming and politicization of the practice.  
2.2.1.2 Colonial feminism 
In both the Sudanese and Kenyan ‘female circumcision crises’ white women played an 
important role. The wives of British officials, English female parliamentarians and 
feminist and humanitarian groups became all involved in rallying support for the 
eradication of the practice (Pedersen 1991, 654-660; Thomas 2000a, 132). The 
practice of arguing for the improvement of women’s status or women’s rights in the 
non-Western world by white men and women under colonial power has been 
analyzed and described as “colonial feminism”. White representations of non-Western 
patriarchy has served to legitimate intervention and imperial rule by British and 
French imperialism (Ahmed 1992, 163; Lazreg 1994; Walley 1997, 347)  
Maybe the most significant example of colonial powers’ interest in the status of 
women in colonized societies is the case of the legislative prohibition of sati in India. 
The debate about this practice was primarily initiated by British colonial officials and 
was the most important case of the public debate on women’s status that originated 
in the nineteenth century (Mani 1987, 119). Sati is an ancient Indian cultural practice 
in which widows end their lives after the decease of their husbands. Lata Mani argues 
that this tradition became “reconstituted” by the debate initiated by colonial officials. 
The terms in which the debate was waged, the used criteria and discourse in favor and 
in opposition to the practice lead to a redefinition and a reworking of the practice. The 
case of sati became one prominent example of how society re-evaluates the due place 
of its “traditions” through a discussion of women and their bodies: “Women become 
emblematic of tradition, and the reworking of tradition is conducted largely through 
debating their rights and status in society” (ibid. 121-2). Equally important, this 
reworking was largely shaped by how the British rulers intervened and managed to 
set the terms of the debate. The colonizers’ attitudes, discourses and choices in 
approaching the debate on the Indian cultural tradition of sati became the dominant 
discourse in which to look at the practice because they had greater power than Indian, 
local contributors. As Lata Mani argues:  
“This greater power had several consequences. It meant that officials could 
insist, for instance, that brahmanic and Islamic scriptures were prescriptive 
texts containing rules of social behavior, even when the evidence for this 
assertion was problematic. Further, they could institutionalize their 
assumptions, as Warren Hastings did in 1772, by making these texts the basis of 
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personal law. Official discourse thus had palpable consequences , of which the 
constitution of personal law from religious texts is perhaps most significant from 
the point of view of women” (ibid. 122)  
British perceptions of the social status of Indian women as being embedded within 
and based on religious texts became institutionalized in the legal system. 
Consequently, Indian reformers and writers had to come to grips with this hegemonic 
discourse and “wrest these ideas to their own ends” (ibid. 122).  
The example of the sati debate is significant as it shows how external perceptions 
(white, colonial Western) on a non-Western cultural tradition have the power to shape 
the practice discursively and subsequently exert a further influence on how the 
practice develops, transforms or gets abandoned. The case of sati demonstrates how 
particular perceptions on the relationship between the tradition (of sati) and religion 
manage to materialize in legislation. In the next sections and throughout the chapters 
5, 6, 7 and 8 of this dissertation, I’ll argue that the study of such processes is 
particularly relevant to understand how FGC is debated and reshaped today, in this 
case in Egypt, by a confluence of international (rights-embedded) discourse and local, 
Egyptian opinion making.  
2.2.2 Second-wave liberal feminism and FGC 
Colonial attempts were largely ineffective in reversing the practice and most of these 
efforts were abandoned during the 1950s. For about twenty years, FGC would not 
receive major attention in the West. It was against the backdrop of  second wave 
feminism and the United Nations ‘Decade of Women’ from 1975 until 1985 that the 
practice of female genital cutting received worldwide attention again. It is a well-
known history how American feminists Fran Hosken and Mary Daly raised the issue 
of FGC as part of global patriarchal control over women (Daly 1978; Hosken 1979). 
Their accounts have been equally famously served as examples of a perpetuating 
colonial feminism, that victimizes, generalizes and homogenizes “Third-World 
women” (Mohanty 2003; Narayan 1997). In the words of Kenyan author Mary 
Wangila: 
“Feminists such as Mary Daly, Alice Walker, and Nancy Bonvillain have argued 
that female circumcision is a rite designed by men to control women’s sexual 
pleasure and thus is purely sexist and oppressive. Alice walker and her colleague 
Pratibha Parmar call female circumcision “the sexual blinding of women” to 
convey the notion that sexuality is literally destroyed” (Wangila 2007, 49) . 
These authors have therefore been criticized of discursively creating the category 
of “backward third-world woman” through their accounts of FGC and the cultures of 
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practicing-societies. Second wave feminism brought about new forms of feminist 
activism that largely focused on women’s sexuality and bodily rights. This shift of 
interests in Western focus and feminist activism, from political rights to sexuality, was 
also reflected in the way FGC was looked at and how it was criticized.  Anthropologist 
Janice Boddy, who studied colonial policies and contemporary attitudes toward FGC 
in Sudan, illustrates this shift in focus over the decades. She argues that “while in the 
late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, women’s essence was associated with 
childbearing and the womb; from the mid-twentieth century on, (…), it has come to 
focus on the clitoris as a site of sexual pleasure, signifying the unencumbered 
individual relative to the world” (Boddy 2007c, 56).  
Popular and activist discourse informing anti-FGC campaigns saw a similar shift in 
focus. Boddy states “Past and present campaigns, framed first in the discourse of 
civilizing, now of human rights, have been similarly caught up in an antiquated 
evolutionary teleology (…) They differ only as to the body parts deemed salient to the 
cause, parts whose physical effacement in African women furnishes a mirror for 
contemporary anxieties in the west” (Boddy 2007b, 403-4). In the colonial period, 
infibulation and its consequences for childbirth were targeted while starting from the 
1970s emphasis was placed on clitoridectomy and its consequences for sexual 
fulfillment. Attention for the womb had shifted to a focus on the vagina and the clitoris. 
Cultural changes and different perceptions of bodily experience in the West became 
reflected in different ways of astonishment and repugnance for the practice of FGC. As 
Eric Silverman puts it: 
(…)”most Western accounts of FC tell us far more about our own historically 
embedded sexual anxieties and subjectivities. Beginning in the mid-twentieth 
century, female selfhood entailed the capacity to experience orgasm (and, for the 
male, the ability to make this happen). From this point of view, the salience of FC 
in anthropology and wider public discourses is about our history, not their 
practices” (Silverman 2004, 432-3).  
What is left out in these accounts is the importance of social-constructionism in the 
experience of sexuality or the realization that the meaning  and experience of sexuality 
take place in a social-cultural context. In contexts where FGC is performed, women’s 
sexuality is generally perceived  and experienced in terms of community and not in 
terms of individual rights. Merry Wangila illustrates this with the words of Elizabeth 
Amoah, a Ghanaian feminist, who explains that: 
…”because a woman’s sexuality is part of her identity, it is intertwined with not 
only biological, physical, and socioeconomic aspects but also with the religious 
and spiritual dimensions of life” (Wangila 2007, 82) 82 
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Despite a shift in focus of body parts, however, the overall anti-FGC discourse as it 
developed in the 1970s bore many colonial reminiscences. Colonial discursive 
practices against FGC were re-invoked often despite good intentions by feminist 
writers and campaigners. The practice was mostly presented in an ahistorical and 
decontextualized manner and a sensationalist tone or “discourse of horror” was often 
employed (Shweder 2005, 198) . Anthropologists Claudie Gosselin and Vicky Kirby 
note how “particular meanings, beliefs and values associated with the varied genital 
operations are dismissed as ‘tradition’” and therefore easily “equated with ‘ignorance’, 
‘superstition’ – and one is tempted to read ‘backwardness’” (Gosselin 2000, 48; Kirby 
1987, 37). Gosselin and Kirby regret how the significance of culture is being cast aside 
or at best very naïvely understood (Kirby 1987). Gosselin describes this process as 
“the trivialization of culture in the political literature”, in an effort to ban the practice 
(Gosselin 2000, 48).  
The use of dichotomies such as between barbaric and civilized have long served to 
legitimate imperialist action and colonial rule. A common understanding of progress, 
development and social evolution undergirds both periods of anti-FGC discourse 
whereby ‘traditional practices’ clearly fall in the domain of uncivilized (Boddy 2007c, 
53; DuBois 1991). This ontological-epistemological background enabled Western 
activists to assume as self- evident that first “we” can know (what the practice is or 
means) and secondly that there is a natural right to intervene (either morally or 
politically). Vicky Kirby challenges the idea that we can know what FGC means by 
extrapolating Western women’s experience and instead emphasizes the importance 
of culture: “If, however, meaning and the subject/body are produced through a 
culture, then desires and pleasures must be specific to a particular significatory 
system” (Kirby 1987, 44) She continues: “If ‘woman’ cannot simply be added to 
masculinist texts to ‘fill in the gaps’, then neither can a Third world voice be 
recuperated to satisfy the Western listener that ‘difference’ can really be squeezed into 
a set of unified truths” (ibid. 44). This thinking, however, offers the conditions for 
assuming the right to action and intervention. It presumes a “non-reciprocal right of a 
‘civilized’ west to intervene in the (presumably backward) cultural practices of its 
Others” (Njambi 2007, 693).  
Second-wave liberal feminists subscribed to understandings of female human 
agency and female victimhood that are modern and secular by nature. In other words, 
they shared a characteristic secular viewpoint that necessarily divides between either 
agents or victims (Asad 2003, 79). Those voicing postcolonial critique refused to be 
caught in the binary structures of modern/secular/civilized opposing the non-
modern/religious/barbaric. By raising the issue, these early activists played a crucial 
role in determining hegemonic discourse about FGC and thereby raising it to the 
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negotiation tables of international institutions such as the World Health Organization 
and United Nations agencies.  
2.2.3 International Norm Production: the rise of FGC on the UN 
agenda 
The practice did not receive any attention for a couple of decades until the late 1970s 
when debate started anew. After entering the international arena, discussion of FGC 
has seen a shift in focus from health care and health risks to a discourse of rights and 
violence against women (Boyle 2002; Hernlund and Shell-Duncan 2007; Horn 2005; 
Shell-Duncan 2008). The embrace of liberal rights discourse was significantly aided 
by the specific historical political juncture of the 1980s and 1990s: the post-cold war 
era saw the dominance of economic neoliberalism and the spread of liberally defined 
human rights globally (Massad 2015, 125-134). 
Before this development took place, however, the topic was subject of debate within 
international agencies on whether or not to tackle the issue. Some agencies such as 
World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
were initially reluctant to even study the practice as they considered it outside of the 
scope of their competence (Berkovitch and Bradley 1994, 489). The question of 
disrespecting nations’ sovereignty withheld international institutions of studying or 
condemning the practice (Boyle 2002). It is only in 1979 at a WHO-sponsored seminar 
that the practices were condemned for the first time as a health hazard (Berkovitch 
and Bradley 1994, 489). Approaching the topic from a health perspective opened the 
door for discussion. 
As previously mentioned, Western feminists contributed to raising attention for the 
topic but it was the United Nations’ Decade of Women (1975-1985) that provided the 
structural and political framework in which the theme would become established as a 
global norm. Throughout this period, three major conferences were organized. The 
theme of gender violence at large was tabled only at the last conference in Nairobi but 
the topic of FGC was already raised in 1980 in Copenhagen. Until the early 1980s, 
women’s delegations at these UN conferences were roughly divided in three regional-
political groups or blocs (West/North, East and South). Each of these blocs attempted 
to raise issues that mattered most to them, respectively equality, development, and 
peace and disarmament  
“Women’s equality, particularly in terms of their legal rights, was being pushed 
by the West; women in development, calling for more resources and greater 
access to development programs, was added by the South; and, maintaining the 
position that women had already achieved equality under socialism, the East 
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sought greater participation by women in the promotion of peace and 
disarmament” (ibid. 144). 
In this period the women delegations were still largely reflecting the larger political 
preoccupations of their respective blocs and this contributed to the difficulty to define 
and compromise on a common agenda of women’s concerns. In the 1980 Copenhagen 
conference, feminists from the West/North showed a great concern for FGC and 
wished to condemn it as a form of violence against women. The topic made the rift 
between West/North and South very clear. Northern women condemned the 
operation as a “barbaric practice imposed on women by male-dominated primitive 
societies” (Toubia 1995, 232 in (Joachim 1999b, 145) and this was fiercely debated 
and refuted by Southern delegations who “defended it as a cultural practice” and 
considered this action an example of Western imperialist politics (Joachim 1999a, 
144-5). African participants in these meetings blamed those speaking against the 
practice coming from non-practicing countries of cultural insensitivity. A group of 
African and Southern representatives threatened to walk out of the conference 
(Walley 1997, 334). They rejected that the practice was being called backward or that 
it represented women’s subordinate position in society (Berkovitch and Bradley 
1994; Brennan 1989; Dorkenoo 1999; Koso-Thomas 1987). In other words, the issue 
of FGC proved to be “one of the most powerful fault lines, along which tensions existed 
between northern and southern women’s organizations” (Moser 1991; Walley 1997, 
348)  
In the third and last conference that closed the UN Decade of Women in Nairobi, 
1985, the theme of gender-based violence was officially tabled. This increased “the 
visibility of gender violence and as a result facilitated the spread of the issue to other 
agendas within the UN” (Joachim 1999a, 148) Following the Copenhagen conference, 
the theme of gender violence reached the agenda of the more prestigious UN 
institution of the Commission for the Status of Women (CSW), founded in 1947 as part 
of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The consideration of gender 
violence by the CSW signified a recognition of its importance and meant that the 
previously deemed private character of gender violence was no longer an impediment 
to think of developing international policy (ibid. 148-150). As gender and 
development scholar Ruth Pearson argues, the Copenhagen conference “was also 
notable for its success in persuading the UN to include on its agenda the issue of 
domestic violence and violence against women, which paved the way for the women’s 
tribune and subsequent changes at the UN Conference on Human Rights in Vienna” 
(Pearson 2005, 166). Indeed, the Copenhagen Conference, despite its heated debates 
between the different regional blocs on the issue of traditional practices as FGC, 
helped to further the discussion on gender violence and the mainstreaming of gender 
equality and women’s rights into development.  
 46 
Transnational feminist activism on violence against women and gender-based 
violence culminated in the UN Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, June 1993. At 
this conference, women activists succeeded in having women’s rights recognized as 
human rights. At the same time, female genital cutting became classified as a form of 
violence against women. A few months later, in December 1993, the Convention on 
the Elimination of Violence Against Women (VAW) was approved in New York. Both 
declarations are still celebrated as landmark achievements in the global commitment 
against inequality between men and women and particularly in fighting violence 
against women. In both these conventions, the theme of women’s rights and violence 
against women was no longer seen as belonging to the social-cultural sphere that falls 
under the scope of the authority of nation-states. Violations of women’s rights, by 
private and non-state actors, are henceforth considered as violations of human rights 
(Shell-Duncan 2008, 227). The importance of this double definition – women’s rights 
as human rights and FGC as a form of violence against women and thus a violation of 
women’s rights – for the creation of the global anti-FGC campaign cannot be 
emphasized enough. Bettina Shell-Duncan argues that  
“in response to the unintended and unanticipated consequences of framing FGC 
as a health issue, the global campaign to eliminate FGC has alternatively 
embraced a human rights framework for justifying intervention. (…) .. inclusion 
of FGC in this category [VAW] firmly aligns the international campaign to 
eliminate FGC with the global movement to fight VAW ” (ibid. 227).  
Thus, the agenda of human rights expanded to include harm done to women by non-
state, private, actors2. Berkovitch and Bradley argue that the link between genital 
mutilation and global action was enabled after this redefinition of the practice and of 
the notion of human rights within the world polity (Berkovitch and Bradley 1994, 
489). They argue that these redefinitions were necessary to fit the global project being 
set up in the early 1990s, centered on the modernist notions of universalism, liberal 
individualism and rationalism. FGC became reconceived as an obstacle to girls’ rights 
and education, and thus as an obstacle to national progress. In this manner, it was 
phrased consistent and compatible with the liberal individualist framework. This 
reconceptualization opened the door wide for global action.3 The Vienna Conference 
 
                                                     
2 For an elaborate discussion of how the term Harmful Cultural Practices has been developed and used in 
transnational governance on gender and sexuality and for anthropological discussions of the usefulness and 
possible meanings of this concept, see Longman & Bradley 2015 (Longman and Bradley 2015).  
3 This account of the UN deliberation and assessment of FGC is geared towards the overall treatment of the 
practice across the different organizational sections, agencies and commissions. There are also interesting 
examples of cultural-sensitive treatment of the subject in the late 1980s. See K. Brennan, ‘The Influence of 
Cultural Relativism on International Human Rights Law’. 
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was an important preparatory meeting in the lead-up to the International Conference 
on Population and Development (ICPD) meeting the next year, 1994, which was held 
in Cairo. It helped making the latter into what was widely seen as a big success and 
achievement for women’s bodily rights. The ICPD meeting in Cairo was also closely 
related to the first UN population and development ten years earlier in Mexico. 
Throughout this period, women’s organizations build their skills in addressing their 
issues on this international level. This process “brought feminist voices directly into 
the public debate regarding body politics” (Harcourt 2009) 41. Moreover, they 
succeeded to “shift the population paradigm from numbers to women’s sexual and 
reproductive rights” (ibid. 41).  
The common declaration of the ICPD in 1994, the Cairo Programme of Action, that 
resulted from the conference clearly positioned FGC as a sexual and reproductive 
rights concern. Looking at issues such as fertility and population control policies 
through the lenses of sexual and reproductive health and rights was celebrated as a 
landmark paradigm shift in the sphere of international and intergovernmental 
institutions (Harcourt 2009, 42) In the aftermath of the organization of the ICPD, the 
Cairo Agreement stipulated the goal of eradicating FGC and thus firmly established it 
as a global norm in following development discourse and practice.  
This became especially clear when in 1996 the United States Congress supported 
the global campaign against FGC and “passed legislation directing the U.S. government 
to oppose assistance to governments of countries where FC or female genital 
mutilation (FGM) is customarily practiced and where the government has not taken 
steps to implement educational programs to prevent and eliminate the practice” 
(Budiharsana, et al. 2003). Fighting FGC also became one of the components in the UN 
development policy of fighting poverty expressed in the Millennium Development 
Goals of 2000. In December 2012 the United Nations General Assembly for the first 
time passed a resolution against the practice of FGC that was widely celebrated as an 
important new step in the global campaign for eradication (2012). In addition, 
virtually all African states issued legislation that criminalizes FGC (Boyle 2002).  
2.2.4 Early African activists and Western-scripted discourse 
The final section of the first part of this chapter that traces the genealogy of global anti-
FGC campaigning looks at African feminist and activist contributions to activist 
literature and awareness-raising against FGC.  It does not intend to offer a conclusive 
discussion of African feminist contributions but rather discusses a selection of this 
literature within the frame of our overall goal: looking at how knowledge around FGC 
was produced historically and how this knowledge production and awareness-raising 
led to the creation of a global norm against FGC. With this in mind, a focus is put on 
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the work and figure of Nawal al-Saadawi, a well-known Egyptian feminist and 
psychiatrist who is often associated with the campaign against FGC. My discussion of 
how her work has been received and adapted in the West is highly indebted to the 
original work of Amal Amireh (Amireh 2000).  
The name of Nawal al-Saadawi is closely connected to feminist activism and 
especially the fight against FGC. She is one of the most translated Arab authors and 
often the only Arab author who makes it into anthologies of feminism and African 
literature (Amireh 2000, 216-8). Amal Amireh studied the reception and framing of 
al-Saadawi by Western audiences and within academia. She argues how the Western 
context partially rewrote al-Saadawi’s person and message as a consequence of 
stereotypical representations of Arab culture and women’s oppression (ibid. 215). Her 
first translated book from Arabic, al-wajh al-ᶜary li-l-marᵓa al-ᶜarabiyya (1977) 
appeared first in English on the European market in 1980 as “The Hidden Face of Eve: 
Women in the Arab World and in the United States in 1982. A critical analysis of the 
reception in the West of this first work demonstrates how al-Saadawi resisted certain 
Western representations. She disagreed that media and activists interpreted her work 
in a frame that emphasizes differences between Western and Arab women. The 
comparison between the first English translation, the reviews that the book received 
and the second – adjusted - English translation  shows how the text has been adapted 
and how the theme of FGC became represented differently than how al-Saadawi 
originally presented it.  
In the foreword to the first English translation (1980) and in different interviews 
al-Saadawi argued against the narrow Western focus on themes of sexuality and 
patriarchy at the expense of other themes such as socio-economic class and 
colonialism. She resisted “the sensationalizing of marginal themes in Copenhagen” 
(ibid. 220), referring to the FGC controversy between Southern and 
Western/Northern delegates at the 1980 Copenhagen conference. Al-Saadawi 
emphasized the commonalities between women worldwide and stated that all women 
are circumcised, “if not physically then psychologically or educationally” (ibid. 220). 
This initial resistance and critique lessened, however, over the following years. 
In the second English translated edition that was published for the American 
market in 1982 considerable changes had happened to the contents of the script. The 
anti-imperialist critique in the original foreword had disappeared, there was now an 
emphasis on how religion served as an instrument to oppress women and there was 
a major difference in her discussion of FGC. The initial condemnation of activists with 
a too narrow focus on “so-called barbaric practices” disappeared from al-Saadawi’s 
writing and instead she described the practice herself as barbaric. Other changes that 
had also already happened to the first English translation is the deletion of two 
chapters, one entitled “Women’s labour at home” which discusses the division of 
  49 
labour within the household and “Arab women and socialism”. Both of these topics are 
significant parts of al-Saadawi’s overall social analysis and critique but did not form 
part of the English editions. Instead, there was a different chapter added that was 
entitled “Female circumcision”, this in contrast to the original Arabic edition that only 
discussed FGC briefly in the opening paragraphs of the book. Amal Amireh argues that 
this added chapter has been particularly well received by Western audiences and 
academia, and was most cited and incorporated in American University courses (ibid. 
224-5).  
This evolution shows how al-Saadawi initially attempted to resist an unwanted 
appropriation of her thinking and writing (in the foreword of the first English edition 
of 1980 and in several early interviews) and how this was followed by gradually 
allowing a certain “framing” in the well-known dichotomies of us/them, East/West 
and traditional versus modern. Amireh suggests that we can see this as a conscious 
strategic action, as a compromise made by al-Saadawi in order to enable her to be 
visible and published worldwide. It serves as an example of how Arab and African 
intellectuals and activists inevitably grapple to find a balance between articulating a 
personal vision and appropriating the right tone, language and style that can be heard 
and fits within the dominant Western interpretative frame.  
Feminist sociologist and anthropologist Vicky Kirby points in the same direction as 
Amireh in her reading of early African activist literature against the practice of FGC. 
Kirby discusses the work of Asma El-Dareer (El-Dareer 1983) and Raqiya Abdalla 
(Abdalla 1982), respectively a Sudanese and Somali author. Both are medical doctors 
and published about FGC. While both books treat different countries, Kirby notes that 
they are “almost identical in their medicalised arguments, research methods and 
bibliographical material” (Kirby 1987, 38). It is remarkable that many of these works 
share common features and employ a similar style and language. She therefore argues 
that “books about genital excision written by African women carry a totalizing sense 
of national authenticity within the role of their author function” (ibid.). In this view, 
African authors are being received as authentic postcolonial voices and as authorities 
in representing the voice of voiceless compatriots. The reception of Nawal al-Saadawi 
(her initial voice and her compromising voice) can also be understood in this general 
process of translation and representation. As the history of the reception of her work 
in the West suggests, there was much willingness to see and recognize her voice as an 
authentic Egyptian voice describing the plight of women in Egypt and the Arab world. 
But in order to reach this position her initial voice needed to be adjusted by dropping 
certain themes (labor division within the household, socialism) and emphasizing 
others (FGC). She had to allow for certain framing in typical West-East differentiation 
while she initially resisted to focus on women’s differences and rather wanted to 
emphasize women’s commonalities worldwide.  
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This is not to be dismissive of African activist’s work, but rather to argue that many 
African voices could only be heard when being fitting within a hegemonic discourse 
that was taking shape.  My concern lies rather with discussing the politics of location 
in knowledge and norm production and the consequent resulting exclusion of possible 
alternative narratives. The history of the global campaign against FGC is 
predominantly written in the West in the sense that the narrative had to follow a 
certain logic and had to be expressed in a language compatible with hegemonic 
Western narratives. Writing in the late 1980s, Middle Eastern women studies scholar 
Marnia Lazreg argues about “Eastern” women writing about their own societies that “ 
”Eastern” feminists have simply adjusted their inquiry to fill the blanks in the 
geographical distribution made available to them by U.S. feminist liberalism. (..) More 
importantly, the themes defined by the French colonial or neocolonial discourse as 
significant for understanding Algerian women are the ones found today in Eastern 
feminists’ writings” (Lazreg 1988, 83). I agree with Lazreg where she argues that the 
available space for Eastern (or African for that matter) feminists over the last decades 
has been largely predetermined and already molded within a frame of liberalism, 
liberal feminism and modernist visions of development. While space may have opened 
up for more alternative visions since the rise of alternative social movements such as 
the World Social Forum and the alter-globalization movement since the mid-1990s, 
the predominant frame of international development agencies (UN, World Bank, 
IMF..) remains liberalism and concerning gender relations, liberal feminism.  
African discourse on FGC that is embedded within larger aims of modernization and 
(economic) progress by means of fighting against harmful/cultural traditions that are 
conceived as holding people back, has higher chances to be heard and to be visible and 
published than alternative visions that don’t fit within the modernization and 
development paradigm. In sum, the desire to stop FGC practices was certainly 
expressed by African and Arab voices but in order to be heard and understood, their 
discourse had to follow certain codes or scripts. The following chapter, chapter 3 on 
campaigning in Egypt, will illustrate this point further within the specific context of 
the history of Egyptian campaigning against FGC.  
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2.3 Critiquing transnationalism: from postcolonial 
feminism to “gender and development” and feminist 
advocacy  
2.3.1 Toward a critique of transnational feminism 
As demonstrated earlier in this chapter, activism against FGC can be considered as an 
excellent example of transnational feminist activism. Feminist writings spurred 
debate and led eventually to action on a global level, supported by the global 
community as represented by the United Nations. The transnational dimension 
remains highly visible after the action has been taken up by the global UN community 
as funds are mainly raised in the Northern/Western sphere and distributed and spent 
by local Southern organizations. Such actions fall therefore under the umbrella of 
development activities and can be studied as a form of transnational  feminism in 
practice. This constitutes an interesting subfield on the intersection of 
globalization/development studies, transnational feminism and postcolonial theory 
that came to be more developed over the last decades.  
Especially the crucial role of NGO’s in this configuration caught a lot of attention 
and critical investigation (Bernal and Grewal 2014). In this subfield, it has been 
studied how global gender politics is being formed on the transnational level by 
looking at debates and negotiations in the frame of international meetings and those 
leading up to international declarations and agreements (Harcourt 2009; Joachim 
1999a; Shell-Duncan 2008). Others looked at the global-local interactions and 
dynamics, the role of nation-states and local expressions of activism for gender 
equality and women’s rights (Boyle 2002; Gradskova and Sanders 2015; Merry 2001). 
Critical research into transnational feminism and its marginalizing effects have first 
been formulated from the angle of postcolonial feminism. Uma Narayan and Chandra 
Mohanty criticized well-known American second-wave feminists because of their 
representations of women, such as Mary Daly (see above). Both authors rejected 
essentializing and homogenizing women in the category of a universal womanhood. 
Narayan argues that a transnational or global feminism does not benefit from 
“historically inaccurate and politically dangerous pictures of ‘Third-World 
traditions’”(Narayan 1997, x) referring to Western feminist representations of the 
Indian sati tradition. Chandra Mohanty equally problematized universalizing 
assumptions by feminists and resisted the objectification and homogenization of non-
Western women (Mohanty 1988). In a later text, she aimed to write a cartography to 
trace the making of Third World Feminisms and outline their common features. She 
attempted to characterize so-called “Third-World feminism” as an inevitably political 
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project. The connections between a feminist, anti-racist and national liberation 
struggle are enormously tight and complex in the postcolonial context, in contrast to 
the Western context (Mohanty 2003, 52). In a 2003 revision of her original landmark 
text “Under Western Eyes”, she deepens her original critique and argues for a 
transnational solidarity expressed by an anti-capitalist feminist stance, in addition to 
de-colonisation of knowledge production.  
These authors have argued, in short, to respect the different contexts shaping non-
Western and postcolonial feminism. A transnational or a global feminism should take 
into account the diversity and dynamic processes that characterize women’s struggle 
and priorities worldwide. Such a project should allow for a “democratic” and diverse 
approach and not have on regional bloc univocally determine the agenda. The danger 
(or challenge) within this project of bringing feminism into the global agenda – and 
development agenda – is to repeat old stereotypical and colonial ideas about linear 
progress and development, defined in liberal, individualistic terms and to approach 
non-Western women as passive victims of patriarchy. As development scholar and 
practitioner Wendy Harcourt states:  
“… the attempts of the global women’s rights movement to bring women’s 
multiple needs and concerns into the development discourse became translated 
in the process of development body politics into an essentially passive 
productive, reproductive and sexualized female body. (…) In this sense the 
female body (…) was there to be measured, counted and compared across 
regions. (…) In this way development policy could predict, monitor and try to 
change and better her life with more education, better health, more solid 
investments and more advantageous markets and trade regimes. Women who 
lived in North America, Europe and Australasia (the Global North) were not part 
of this set of biopolitical strategies. Nor were migrants or indigenous women, 
who were self-defined as ‘Fourth World’ women and were largely outside official 
UN gender and development debates, as were transgender people and queer 
activists. Women from the ‘Global North’ were lumped together as the 
‘developed woman’ representing the wealth and values of the West. ” (Harcourt 
2009, 29).  
In sum, the traits and concerns of early postcolonial feminist critique flow into the 
concerns of more recent academic critical study of how gender issues have been 
included in the development agenda and secondly, the related question of how 
transnational feminism, and transnational feminist advocacy networks are translated 
in on-the ground-operations by implementing organizations, NGO’s.  
Feminist development scholars Andrea Cornwall among others have addressed 
critical points concerning the introduction of gender into development. Cornwall 
argues that discourse about gender equality, empowerment and democracy has been 
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reduced to light versions: empowerment-lite and democracy-lite (Cornwall 2007). 
The idea of advancing gender equality and the question of realizing this feminist 
objective in the real world has been reduced to simplistic answers and formulae. She 
argues that “it is almost a necessary condition for institutionalization for ideas to be 
blunted and reduced to slogans and ideals – they need to be domesticated to fit the 
exigencies of agency procedures and priorities” (Cornwall, et al. 2007a, 7). Therefore, 
it is necessary, argues Harcourt to scrutinize the discourse produced within the field 
and activities of gender and development critically. The scope of study of gender and 
development should go beyond the simplified and reduced measures as they are put 
forward in programs and projects. Harcourt argues “I include as subjects of 
development feminists like myself in the Global North who contribute to the theory 
and practice of gender and development and share responsibility of its framing, 
funding, success and failures” (Harcourt 2009, 35). She pleads, in other words, for a 
redefinition of gender and development that includes the Global North as subjects of 
development. This would entail a thorough rethinking of global development and 
justice and the role of transnational feminist advocacy therein.  
Margeret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink were among the first to focus on transnational 
advocacy networks, including the successful feminist networking concerning violence 
against women (Keck and Sikkink 1998). The following institutionalization of the 
transnational feminist movement – in a wider context of development and 
globalization – has then been analyzed by feminist scholars Inderpal Grewal and 
Frances Hasso. Hasso considers internationals criteria as the “Human Development 
Index” and the discourse of global women’s rights as part of “transnational feminist 
governmentalities” (Hasso 2009, 68). She draws on Foucault’s concept of 
“governmentality” (Foucault 2006) and adds “transnational” as first coined by James 
Ferguson and Akhil Gupta to analyze “transnational governmentalities” (Ferguson and 
Gupta 2005). Looking at the transnational feminist movement through this 
Foucauldian lens, Hasso argues that feminist transnationalism most of all resulted in 
forms of regulation, direction and normalization of inequalities among women. The 
many declarations, studies and measurement instruments common to the field of 
gender and development did not lead, according to her, to an improvement of the 
situation of women worldwide but are merely an attempt to regulate that unequal 
situation. Additionally, they promote some perceptions of freedom and change and 
discourage others (Hasso 2009, 68).  
Feminist political scientist, Niamh Reilly on the other hand, developed a more 
positive evaluation of the transnational feminist networks and successes. She focuses 
on the campaign of having women’s rights recognized as human rights. She considers 
this “global campaign for women’s human rights” as a truly – authentic global - 
campaign that has transcended the north-south and east-west divisions. This 
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campaign put the topic of violence against women – including FGC – central. Reilly 
defends human rights discourse as a truly emancipatory discourse that unites women 
worldwide. According to her, through the means of transnational feminist advocacy 
toward nation-states and intergovernmental organisations, progress toward more 
global gender equality can be achieved (Reilly 2008). In sum, where Hasso and Grewal 
see the political power at work in regulating declarations and centralizing global 
agencies and where they doubt the possibility of achieving progress in the situation of 
women worldwide, Reilly discerns exactly those possibilities in the processes of 
transnational dialogue and negotiation.  This scholarly critical focus on the political 
power at work in transnational operations of women’s rights has been most 
developed in the study of non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) that are 
implementing the transnational agreements in a local context.  
2.3.2 Beyond NGO-ization critique: The ambiguous role of NGO’s 
in gender and development 
So far, it should be clear from this discussion that the consequences of transnational 
feminist activism are ambiguous. Raising attention for the plight of women on the 
international level led to the recognition of women’s rights as human rights and a 
condemnation of violence against women. Both agreements offer important moral 
ground for local forms of women’s activism. A rights discourse carrying a universalist 
moral dimension has become the predominant frame for women’s rights activism. 
Critical voices, however, warn for the perpetuation of colonial legacies in the 
representation of non-Western women and in acts of political intervention on moral 
and civilizing – missionary – grounds, as they are expressed in the formulation of 
transnational feminist goals.  
This ambiguity finds just as much expression in the study of the implementing 
organisations of transnational feminist policy: NGO’s. This section will look at NGO’s 
from a critical perspective interrogating their place in a wider frame of global-local 
power relations and dynamics.  If “transnational gender politics operates as a mode of 
power that constitutes some women and some issues as deserving, excluding others” 
(Hemment 2014, 138) then this is reflected in how NGO’s operate and the kind of 
activities they engage in.  NGO’s became an important form of organization since the 
1980s and spread quickly on all continents. Additionally, the question of gender 
equality and women’s issues in particular became easily associated with this 
particular form of organization. Sabine Lang first used the phrase of “the NGOisation 
of feminism” in 1997 (Bernal and Grewal 2014; Lang 1997). Since then, a body of 
scholarship developed analyzing the complexities of promoting gender equality in a 
postcolonial context.  
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The phenomenon of NGO-ization of women’s organizations in the Arab region was 
brought under attention by Islah Jad, describing it as “a steady increase in the number 
of women’s non-governmental organisations (NGOs) dealing with aspects of women’s 
lives such as health, education, legal literacy, income generation and rights advocacy” 
(Jad 2005, 34). The NGO’s find themselves in a transnational location, funded by one 
(or more) state(s) but operating in another one, usually engaged in projects within a 
frame of modernization, development or democratization. Jad shows how this 
particular form of operation - NGO-isation - changed “structures and discourses of 
Arab women’s movements, in the context of a development discourse based in 
binaries such as West/East and state/civil society” (ibid. 34).  In the context of 
women’s organizations in Thailand, LeeRay Costa argues similarly: “My analysis of 
contrasting discourses and practices engaged in by Thai women suggests that NGOs 
structure power relations in ways that both reflect the processes of colonialism and 
development originating in the global North and reinforce the processes of social 
hierarchy and difference specific to Thailand” (Costa 2014, 186).  
The form of NGO’s operate differently from the form of social movements or 
grassroots women’s movements. Instead of taking for granted that any NGO-work self-
evidently promotes positive social change, Jad highlights “the limitations of NGOs in 
introducing genuine, comprehensive and sustainable development, and the social 
changes desired by local populations” (ibid. 34). Such limitations are especially 
pronounced within the context of rising neoliberalism and a dominant neoliberal 
vision on development. Jullie Hemment argues for the case of Russia that “(i)ronically, 
“NGO-ization” has demobilized social movements” (Hemment 2014, 124). Whereas 
social movements mobilize around larger issues of gender equality or social justice, 
NGO’s tend to select and focus on more particular issues, such as violence against 
women or FGC. Based on her study of Russian NGO’s and crisis centra working on 
violence against women, she argues that “the framing of violence against women not 
only screens out local constructions of events, but it deflects attention from other 
issues of social justice, notably the material forces that oppress women. This is a 
troubling outcome for a movement that intends to challenge the global inequities that 
contribute to women’s marginalization” (Hemment 2014), 120). NGO-isation, in other 
words, leads to the neglect of wider contexts and exclusion of larger mechanisms that 
cause inequality and injustice. Instead, working through NGO’s pushes women’s work 
to focus on concrete, clearly delineated issues.  
LeeRay Costa characterizes NGO-ization as “a complex and spatially varied process 
marked by one or more of the following: increasing professionalization (including 
emphasis on paid as opposed to voluntary labor) resulting in the creation of “experts” 
or “femocrats” (Lang 2000, 290), intensified hierachization, reliance on external (state 
and foreign) funding, the privileging of donor-driven (as opposed to locally-defined) 
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agendas, and an emphasis on policy advocacy” (Costa 2014, 168-9). The effects of 
NGO-isation thus vary according to specific national and regional contexts. Although 
there are cross-cultural similarities and structural characteristics, it is difficult to draw 
overall conclusions as to how it affects women’s activism for gender equality in terms 
of obtained successes and progress.  
In terms of achieving reforms toward more gender equality, NGO work may often 
play a more ambiguous role. NGO’s collaboration with states and transnational 
funders may lead to structural changes or legislation in favor of women’s status.  Saida 
Hodzic argues based on her work on Ghanaian women’s organizations: “I have seen 
Ghanaian activists in and out of NGOs get things done by working with, not against, 
the state. This is the case even when their work involves challenges to the state order 
or the ruling government” (Hodzic 2014, 233). Hodzic warns against an inappropriate 
generalization of the NGO experience and points out that the categories of NGO’s (civil 
society), state and social movements are not always clearly delineated. She argues 
that: “Opposition to the state, then, has a particular valence in the global North but is 
not a universally privileged form of feminism. (…), African feminists do not see 
collaboration with the state as a betrayal of feminist principles” (Hodzic 2014, 227). 
Moreover, “ a contextual analysis teaches us that an anti-institutional stance is not 
universal to feminism. In Ghana and indeed across Africa, the boundaries between 
movements and institutions are porous. African women’s movements are not always 
grounded in informal groups of loosely associated individuals but in various kinds of 
formal institutions.” (ibid, 233).  
The typical anti-institutionalism and critical stance by feminist social movements 
toward collaboration with the state are thus rooted in the Western European context 
and cannot be generalized. Hodzic argues that critiques of NGO-isation have become 
the new dominant paradigm itself and it relies on several strands of critical thinking: 
“The NGOization paradigm stands on the shoulders of three important strands of 
critical theory: critiques of the development apparatus, critiques of feminist 
affiliations with the neoliberal and masculinist state, and critiques of the 
institutionalization of women’s studies and the field’s concomitant failures“ (Hodzic 
2014) 225. The second strand is “… (i)nspired by Wendy Brown’s critique of 
“feminism’s turn to the state to adjudicate or redress practices of male dominance” 
(1995, ix),” and questions “feminist alliances with state institutions, and in particular 
the turn to legal reforms that do not challenge state order itself” (Hodzic 2014, 226).  
According to Hodzic, it is vital to keep the particular Western genealogy of this and 
other critiques in mind. Anthropological and historical research of women’s rights 
activism in Africa teaches us to re-evaluate the paradigm that is critical of NGO-isation 
and take a more balanced view. Hodzic argues:  
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“Ghanaian feminists see no value in being oppositional for the sake of taking a 
pure stance. Rather, they attempt to regender the state and further their political 
agendas through strategic collaborations with specific institutions and 
individuals. African feminists think critically about these alliances, considering 
them both dangerous and generative” (ibid. 233-4).  
In the Egyptian context of anti-FGC campaigning, questions of institutionalization 
and collaboration with the state are an equally important part of the narrative. The 
particular Egyptian narrative of how this configuration between grassroots feminist 
activism, state and NGO-work is ordered will be discussed elaborately in the next 
chapter. Answers by women’s rights activists’ to NGO-ization and forms of state 
incorporation of women’s issues (or state feminism) can indeed not be summarized 
and formulated uniformly. It will become clear in the next chapter that even in one 
national - Egyptian – case different ways of dealing with these processes are being 
expressed. Some women may evaluate them positively, others may feel disadvantaged 
and excluded. This is another consequence of the current system of women’s rights 
activism that seem to characterize other regions as well. LeeRay Costa states: “The 
challenges of exclusion and hierarchization faced by Thai women activists and 
intensified by NGOization are by no means unique. Feminist activists and scholars 
have long grappled with how to address women’s diverse and at times contradictory 
interests in emancipatory movements, locally, nationally and transnationally” (Costa 
2014, 188). She argues that more basic power structures led to exclusion and 
hierarchization, which are in current times  intensified by mechanisms of NGO-isation. 
In other words, not NGO-isation itself causes inequalities and divisions among 
activists but only exacerbates these already existing inequalities. Saida Hodzic agrees 
with this, arguing that “[feminist, grassroots] Coalitions are situated in the same milieu 
and are embedded in the equally problematic structures of capital, power, and 
inequality. It is these structures, rather than the institutional forms of feminist 
organizing, that shape the outcomes of feminist politics” (Hodzic 2014, 245).  
In sum, I argue in agreement with both Costa’s and Hodzic’s plea for a more nuanced 
view on the critique of institutionalization of women’s rights activism (by states and 
NGO’s alike). The challenges that women face are not caused singly by particular forms 
of institutionalization and many women succeed in using these institutions to their 
benefits. This point becomes particularly salient in the context of the campaign to 
abandon FGC in Egypt and will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. The following 
and final section of this chapter continues to look at the wider context of the global 
anti-FGC activism.  
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2.4 Conclusion  
In this chapter I have aimed at giving a genealogical review of global anti-FGC 
campaigning. It looked at underlying discourses and notions of the human subject-
agent in the production of fighting against FGC as a global norm. Colonial precedents 
of campaigning against FGC wrote a discursive script that endures in many places 
today. International agencies such as World Health Organization were initially not 
willing to intervene. They considered this an interference in nations’ sovereignity. 
Second wave liberal feminism was a crucial movement in launching FGC in the 
transnational sphere. The reformulation of FGC from a traditional practice to a 
violation of rights made anti-FGC campaigning acceptable and set it as a global norm. 
A discourse that is rights-based and a frame of violence against women was able to 
reconsider international intervention against FGC.  
Postcolonial theorists have argued against an international campaign as 
perpetuating colonialist dichotomies of backward and modern, barbaric and civilized, 
traditional/cultural/religious and modern secular. Postcolonial critiques have been 
complemented by critical studies of transnational activism and NGO-ization. Whereas 
postcolonial critique is most concerned with revealing epistemic violence in the 
imposition of concepts, dichotomies and representation of Others, post-development 
theorists and critical transnationalism looks more concretely at contemporary power-
laden structures. The latter attempt to reveal the perpetuation of colonialist principles 
within current development structures and look at how development work operates 
on the ground. Development projects have often ambiguous results and effects, 
reproducing certain power structures while challenging others. It’s in this latter 
exercise that I aim to inscribe my own research by looking at how anti-FGC 
campaigning operated on the ground and which discursive frames are used.  
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Chapter 3  
FGC, civil society and state in Egypt - 
Campaigning in Egypt 
3.1 Early interest and activism 
Early episodes of interest and controversy around FGC in Egypt date from the 
1920s, the late 1950s and the late 1970s. The first known public debate dates back to 
the 1920s, “when the Egyptian Society of Physicians issues a proclamation outlining 
the negative health effects of FGM/C and receives support from the Ministry of Health, 
the press and religious scholars” (United Nations Children’s Fund 2013, 10; Wassef 
1998, 10). Old Egyptian activist Nadia Wassef argued that there was “a plurality of 
discourses about FGM from the 1920s to the 1960s” that have, however, disappeared 
from “collective memory” (Wassef 1998, 6). This debate was waged in written media 
and particularly by medical professionals and in specialized outlets (ibid. 10-12). 
Under the Nasserist regime, it is argued by many writers that the Minister of Health 
issued a law criminalizing FGC surgery in any public hospitals (Abdel Hadi 2003, 25).  
Yet, this claim has never been substantiated as no evidence of such law can be 
found. What is evidenced is that an investigative committee was appointed by 
Ministerial decree that concluded with a resolution stating that the origins of FGC are 
Islamic, that only doctors were allowed to perform circumcision, and that the surgery 
should entail only partial and not total clitoridectomy (Wassef 1998, 14-6). Until the 
1970s, there had consequently been “the impression that there was a legal 
prohibition” while this was untrue (ibid. 16). In 1979, “the first scientific seminar on 
female circumcision was held in Egypt, in which, medicine and sociology scholars 
contributed their field research” (Abdel Hadi 2003, 25-6). This timing coincided with 
early international attention, notably the organization of a regional workshop on FGC 
in Khartoum, Sudan, by the Regional Office of the Middle East of the WHO (ibid.). 
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The earliest forms of “on the ground” activism were not yet organized by 
specialized organizations in FGC or children and women’s rights. It was rather part of 
overall development NGO’s that designed development projects that included a 
component against FGC. The director of Egypt’s largest national NGO, the Coptic 
Evangelical Organization for Social Services (CEOSS), looks back at “more than fifty 
years of practice in efforts to eliminate female circumcision” in 2003 (Abdel Hadi 
2003, 7). CEOSS is widely recognized by development workers for its early work and 
initiatives against FGC. The NGO believes that “capacity building of the targeted 
community (CEOSS methodology) is the only way for any development effort aiming 
to make social changes” (ibid. 11). Its approach is characterized by participation and 
involvement of the community as a whole and especially of so-called community 
leaders. CEOSS presents it as an “integrated methodology, which is not restricted only 
to health awareness in the field of female circumcision, but rather works for the 
empowerment of community members and specifically women” (ibid. 35). This 
approach became a model widely embraced by international NGO’s when 
international campaigning started.  
A much publicized early success story of the “CEOSS methodology” was the 
southern town of Deir al-Barsha, an all Coptic Christian village in Minia Governorate. 
In 1991, this town in Upper Egypt “publicly condemns FGM/C with assistance from 
the Coptic Evangelical Organization through a grassroots public declaration” (United 
Nations Children’s Fund 2013, 11). The founder of the NGO, Priest Samuel Habibi, was 
present in Deir al-Barsha with literacy classes and other educational activity since the 
1950s (Abdel Hadi 2003, 44; Abdel Hadi 2006, 113). Amal Abdel-Hadi, member of the 
1990’s task force against FGM, published on activities and social changes in Deir al-
Barsha in the 1990s. She argues that it were not FGC-specific programs that lead to 
the village’s proclaimed abandonment but a series of comprehensive development 
projects and changes to local gender norm dynamics. 
According to Abdel Hadi “development efforts in the village, combined with male 
labor migration to urban centers in Egypt and to oil-rich Arab countries, created an 
environment that enabled women to achieve greater autonomy in their household 
decision making and thus to abandon the practice of female circumcision” (Abdel Hadi 
2006, 106). CEOSS undertook large-scale development projects, from developing a 
water network, sewage system over literacy classes, the start-up of “women’s 
committees” and reproductive health education. “The promotion of development 
projects was probably the most significant factor influencing cultural transformation 
in the village”, writes Abdel Hadi (ibid. 113-4). Religious figures were interpellated 
and involved to speak out against FGC. They co-signed the village declaration and plea 
to abandon FGC, with “religious formula that ‘who-ever practices it from today 
onwards would be questioned before God’” (ibid. 121). Organizations as CEOSS had 
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started already in the middle of the twentieth century with local campaigns in rural – 
and mainly Christian – areas. In the 1990s the subject of FGC became widely discussed 
by women’s rights activists, medical professionals and politicians, this time connected 
to the transnational sphere of activism.  
3.2 The ICPD and its aftermath: from voluntary activism 
to state feminism 
The International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in 1994 led by 
the UNFPA (United Nations Fund for Population and Development) represents an 
essential juncture in both global norm-setting and in the particular genealogy of 
Egyptian activism against the practice of FGC. International public and political 
attention for FGC reached its peak during and after the conference in which the 
presence of female genital cutting practices in Egypt played a prominent role. In his 
address to the conference, the Egyptian Minister of Health stated that FGC was a 
waning practice in Egypt. One day later, however, CNN broadcasted a video of the 
circumcision of a 13-year-old girl in Cairo that was filmed in the same week. 
Consequently, the minister was pressured to declare his intention to confront the 
practice. The CNN screening was received nationwide as a public scandal and was felt 
as deeply humiliating. Both the film and the conference brought Egypt into the 
international limelight which embarrassed and put the Egyptian government under 
pressure (Seif El Dawla 1999, 113).  
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A widely-publicized screen-shot taken from the infamous CNN reportage that was broadcast during the 
IDPD meeting..  
 
FGC suddenly became publicly debated in the context of other controversial 
subjects that were addressed in the ICPD meeting, such as reproductive rights, gender 
justice, homosexuality and abortion. This sensationalist entrée exacerbated the  
politicization of the topic during the course of the task force’s activities and after (Seif 
El Dawla 1999, 128-136). The political momentum was kept when in 1995 the first 
Egyptian Demographic Health Survey (EDHS) for the first time included data on FGC 
revealing that 97% of women between the age of 15 and 40 had undergone some form 
of genital cutting (Boyle 2002, 41), 41. Soon afterwards, the American Congress 
pushed the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) to link 
financial aid to reform efforts in the field of fighting FGC by national governments in 
1996 (Boyle 2002, 41; Budiharsana, et al. 2003; Newland 2006, 395). 
The Cairo agreement, also known as the Programme of Action (PoA) was the formal 
compromise that resulted from the ICPD’s negotiations. The Cairo top is one of the 
most celebrated international events in development and population policy. It 
succeeded in confirming the earlier population control policies according to some, and 
in unsettling the old top-down population policies according to others (Harcourt 2009, 
40-41). It has in either case attempted to shift the population discourse paradigm from 
“numbers to women’s sexual and reproductive rights” (ibid. 41). It suggested to make 
a paradigm shift in language from family planning to reproductive and sexual health 
and rights (Reilly 2008). At the same time, there were conservative voices of 
opposition since the start of ICPD. General Egyptian media coverage during the 
conference discussed the ICPD themes as promoting “promiscuity, homosexuality, and 
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abortion” (Foundation 2009, 13). The Cairo Programme discusses slowing population 
growth, introduces and promotes the language of women’s rights to health and 
reproductive health care including topics as family planning, safe motherhood, 
management of the risk of unsafe abortion, prevention of sexually transmitted 
infections (STIs) and HIV/Aids and the elimination of harmful cultural practices such 
as female genital cutting. It further discusses the right to marry voluntarily and the 
right to be free from coercion and sexual violence (Foundation 2009, 1). The ICPD 
meeting was further celebrated because of its “unprecedented contribution of 
women’s civil society groups who joined together across a wide spectrum of interests 
in the face of concerted opposition from conservative religious states” (Harcourt 2009, 
43). The conference drew lots of enthusiasm particularly for activists and feminists in 
Egypt, many were able to attend because of the proximity of Cairo.  
One of the outcomes of the ICPD conference was the founding of a ‘National Task 
Force against FGM’, hereafter called the task force. This task force spearheaded and 
shaped Egyptian activism  from 1994 until 1999. The structure of the task force was 
set up in preparation of the ICPD and was led by Marie Assaad “with decades of 
experience in a range of local associations and locally, nationally, and transnationally 
through the YWCA” (Badran 2009a, 173). After the ICPD, it continued operating under 
wider structures that were headed by Aziza Hussayn, a renowned activist who had 
been active since the 1950s in the Family Planning Association. These wider 
structures were the National Commission for Population and Development (NCPD) 
established in collaboration with the Ministry of Health to follow up on the Cairo 
Agreement that resulted from the ICPD and the Egyptian Society for Population and 
Development (ESPD), under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Social Affairs (ibid. 
175). The NCPD had a mandate of five years and its goal was to work on the integration 
and implementation of the ICPD Programme of Action by civil society (Foundation 
2009, 8-9). 
The task force managed to set up local groups in many governorates throughout the 
country, which resulted in a collaboration of “Egyptian feminists, human rights 
activists and development workers, including some two hundred individuals and sixty 
NGOs, in what has been described as ‘a moment of exhilaration’” (Badran 2009a, 173). 
The NCPD also hosted a task force on gender and another on sexual health. It was the 
task force against FGM, however, that was most active, visible and which continued 
working after the activities of the other groups dwindled (Abdel Hadi 20-9-2012). The 
task force that started as a small group of professionals and activists thus established 
a nationwide network, having branches in five different cities. They were actively 
involved in advocacy work aiming to involve the government, in supporting research 
and conducting research themselves, and in supporting local small ngo activities 
against the practice (Foundation 2009, 34). The Ford Foundation Cairo Office played 
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a major role in providing grants for a number of organizations to prepare for the ICPD, 
including the NCPD and the group of activists and professionals that made up the task 
force (Foundation 2009, 6-7). The extensive preparatory meetings before ICPD 
connected task force members together with hundreds of other individuals from 
across the country.  
Part of my fieldwork consisted of interviews with task force members between 
September and November 2012 and two follow-up interviews April 2013. They are a 
group of health and family planning professionals, self-described feminists, political 
activists and researchers who became most identified with the cause of fighting FGC 
until the government started to develop a national policy in 2000. They all recognized 
the major impetus coming from the months-long preparations for the ICPD and 
recognized how this episode was also characterized by an unusual degree of state 
compliance in allowing this remarkable flourishing of civil society. In fact, Ford 
Foundation played an important role in lobbying the government to establish the 
institutions of NCPD and task force and to allow them to operate as intermediaries 
between the government and civil society (Foundation 2009, ix, 1,36).  
This openness to the participation of civil society proved successful as NGO’s 
obtained a position “as full partners with governments and the private sector in 
program development and implementation of the ICPD Programme of Action 
(Foundation 2009, 8). One interviewee pointed out, however, how quickly the state 
took back that freedom after the ICPD: ‘During the ICPD there was a relative freedom 
of movement that the government wanted to contain after the performance was over, 
of the conference. And that applied to all organizations, not only women’s 
organizations’. Civil society activists and scholars pointed out that “[t]he state had 
objected to the participation of Egyptian civil organizations in the conference but 
changed its position after the insistence of the conference organizers” (Fouad, et al. 
2005, 106). The state’s ambiguity resulted soon thereafter in new constrictions of 
freedoms for civil society. After the ICPD and during the preparation of the 1995 UN 
Beijing conference on women’s rights, “the state narrowed its scope of NGOs’ activity 
and attacked the human rights organizations and civil societies” (ibid. 107). It resulted 
in the state’s prohibition of feminist groups to participate in the Beijing conference 
(ibid. 108).  
The task force against FGM, however, was offered a clear structure and accepted 
embedment within the NCPD. This enabled the members to continue their work 
without concern about state sanctions, which was an important motive for many of its 
core members. The task force had taken a clear standpoint against any form of FGC, 
including its medicalization. Its 1997 position paper stated “[I]t is based on a strong 
belief  in a woman’s right to maintain the integrity and wholeness of her body and the 
freedom of her mind; to choose her life and to base her choices on her own evaluation 
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of what should or should not be done” (Badran 2009a, 176). The position paper used 
human and women’s rights language and endorsed international efforts for women’s 
rights. Or, as old member Nadia Wassef described it “[t]he task force today does not 
make compromises on women’s bodies: any violation of a woman’s dignity or body is 
totally is rejected” (Wassef 1998, 17). The group was passionate about the new 
language that the ICPD had introduced and inscribed its own voluntarism in those 
efforts by referring to the condemnation of FGM as a human rights violation at the 
Vienna Conference of 1993 and to the platform of action following the 1995 Beijing 
Conference.  
3.2.1 Voluntary activism and gender critique 
The task force was even more ambitious than merely placing FGC within transnational 
rights-based language, it placed the practice in an overall gendered societal analysis 
and made it part of a larger social and cultural critique. The following excerpt from the 
task force position paper illustrates this well:  
“We are also aware that the prevalence of FGM in our country shows that we are 
not dealing with an occasional practice, but a social phenomenon, a cognitive 
and behavioural construct, which has a social function of maintaining a 
patriarchal hierarchy of society. Our goal is to challenge this hierarchy and to 
work towards a reconsideration of the prevailing value system governing 
gender relations in general and women’s sense of entitlement in particular” 
(Badran 2009a, 176).  
“The challenge facing activists”, writes historian Badran “was to deconstruct the 
mesh of popular discourses of gender, sexuality, and honor that surround FGM” (ibid. 
177). Old task force member Nadia Wassef described it as a “developmental gender 
approach”, referring to the combination of “health, gender equity, human rights, 
culture and the welfare of the nation in the struggle against FGC”  (Wassef 1998, 19). 
In sum, “FGM ultimately serves the power relations and inequalities between the 
sexes” (ibid. 20).  
Badran notes similarities between early activists against FGC organized in and 
around the task force on the one hand and early twentieth century activists who 
argued against face veiling on the other: “FGM feminist/human rights activists used 
the same argument that feminists in Egypt had employed early in the twentieth 
century in combating face veiling. Female chastity and honor are protected by women 
and men’s own behaviour and not by external controls such as a piece of cloth or 
genital mutilation. They stressed the role of human will and discipline of both sexes in 
the maintenance of chastity and honor” (Badran 2009a, 177). It was clear, indeed, also 
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from my fieldwork interviews that the task force embarked on an ambitious plan of 
rethinking gender and sexuality norms and opening these subjects for a radical 
debate. Even when all members were not always aligned on desired changes, they did 
share a common collective vision, which was one open to radicality.  
Task force group members tried to connect as much as possible with Egyptian 
culture and society by dialoguing with women in different governorates and by 
emphasizing historical opposition within Egypt to the practice. They realized that the 
international campaign and the ICPD enabled much of their work by means of funds 
and moral support. This transnational link, however, also put them in difficult 
positions vis-à-vis the dominant civilizing discourse that often accompanied anti-FGC 
rhetoric. One of the interviewed members explains the following: 
“This is one of the things that was very strange to me when I was working on 
FGM, that when you talk to the women or the men involved [at home], you are 
unconditionally against FGM. You understand why they are doing it, and you are 
trying to address the arguments why they are doing it. Then you travel to 
international conferences and you find yourself almost defending the practice of 
FGM, you know, because there is this stereotyping you know, there is this 
reduction of the human being to savages yeah, and it is this attitude that drives 
you to defend something that you are actually challenging at home. It is this 
attitude that makes you also understand, that makes you agree with some of the 
arguments that your opposition inside the country is putting forward.” 
This activist experienced such a strong rejection of sensationalist and simplifying 
anti-FGC discourse that she heard at conferences in the 1990s, that it ironically almost 
led her to defend the practice. Civilizational discourse upsets her to the extent that it 
enables her to understand domestic proponents of the practice, and to mediate her 
feminist sensibilities. Feminist theologian Musa Dube characterizes this kind of 
challenge of engaging in feminist postcolonial practices, as confronting and rejecting 
indigenous oppressive practices, “without joining the colonizing discourse of rejecting 
or demonizing every aspect of indigenous cultures” (Dube 2002, 116). For these 
practices to be simultaneously decolonizing, Dube considers they ought to “arrest 
colonizing ideology packed in claims of religious conversion, Western civilization, 
modernization, development, democratization, and globalization” (ibid.). On the other 
hand, this discussion shows the complexity of engaging in feminist postcolonial 
practices through the reclamation of certain political-cultural positions that fall within 
the legacy of ‘colonizing ideology’. Task force members claim the abandonment of a 
cultural practice because it harms women without wanting to adhere to the colonizing 
legacy and ideology with which this position is associated.  
While task force activism has been created and enabled to carry out its activities 
within the framework of international rights activism and development discourse, 
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members have been limited by the same logic. While the group functioned as a semi-
independent movement, it relied heavily on foreign donor funds (such as Ford 
Fondation) to conduct research and to build their organization and nation-wide 
network. One interviewee explained that this change was initially not expected or 
aimed at but was rather imposed on them in order to receive funds: 
“The FGM task force did not want to become institutionalized, or to have a 
structure, or to become registered. It was an informal forum, where people came 
to and paid for their transportation with their own money and the donors were 
so impressed but they wanted a structure, they wanted an institution.” 
She expressed uneasiness with this necessary transformation. Another member 
recounts how the NGO-isation of the task force affected her personally and eventually 
led to her exclusion. The task force embraced a common vision against FGC (and 
against its medicalization) while members occasionally differed in opinion in matters 
of strategy or analysis, which was generally experienced as fruitful. In her case, 
however, her diverging opinion also clashed with funding donor’s expectancies. She 
supported the view that questioning FGC necessarily should go hand in hand with 
challenging male circumcision.  
Although she was not the only one who questioned male circumcision, she was most 
outspoken and vigorous about explaining and defending her views on bodily integrity 
and autonomy. She considers both male and female circumcision as part of gender 
constructions which she opposes. Opposing FGC for her necessarily entails opposing 
male circumcision as well: ‘Gender is about body politics, it’s one and the same thing. 
The patriarchal society aims to create an image of masculinity and femininity upon 
which gender roles are divided, and male and female circumcision are part of that’. 
This religiously controversial view that aims at abandoning both female and male 
genital cutting was, however, disliked by both Egyptian organizers of meetings to 
discuss FGC and by international donor agencies. Her deviant view gradually led to 
her exclusion from activities and ended her cooperation with the group after six years:  
“The exclusion happened gradually. I was often invited to panels and meetings, 
and then questions come from the audience about MGM [Male Genital 
Mutilation] and I would answer with the data that I know. Once, the organizers 
of the session, when I started to respond to the woman who asked [about MGM], 
said: stop, this is a session against FGM and it is financed to be against FGM and 
now you are taking minutes to speak about MGM, which is not ethical, what can 
we tell the funders? […] The stakeholders told me, ‘Ok fine, speak as you like but 
find other funders for your activity. Don’t come to our activities which are 
funded for FGM and give your information’.” 
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More can be said about the meaning of resisting both male and female genital cutting 
within a religious conservative society and the generally hostile feminist reception of 
this idea in the period of the task force (and today). Suffice to say here is that MGM is 
not part of the international discourse of anti-FGC funding institutions and that these 
propositions challenge the existing campaigning framework. During the period of task 
force activity, however, individual members were able to express their personal 
analysis and points of concern. The task force leadership or the NCPD structure did 
not stop them from expressing personal opinions. Its coordinator Assaad refers to 
these events by saying that certain members’ activities regularly ‘embarrassed’ the 
NCPD officials but that enough leeway existed that allowed regular upsetting of 
structures and individuals (Assaad 24-11-2012). 
This situation changed after the state co-opted the task force experience and 
initiated a national policy against the practice. Old task force members disagree about 
this final decision. While some define it as state-cooptation that should never have 
happened, arguing that the cause of fighting FGC should have remained within civil 
society, others see it as a natural and positive step forward to reach a national 
audience. The new state initiative by the National Council of Childhood and 
Motherhood (NCCM) headed by Suzanne Mubarak drew heavily on the expertise and 
activism that the task force had gathered but excluded several of its most fervent 
members. One interviewee expresses it as follows: 
“those women who have dedicated their time and efforts to volunteer to raise 
the task force for it to have a strong position, we were never invited to the 
national conferences by the NCCM. The feminists were not invited. They rid 
themselves of the feminists, to put it bluntly ….[The task force leadership] felt 
that the state coming in would give a real push, but I disagree. I don’t believe in 
this, the state does not give a real push unless someone is pushing them, that 
was what the task force was doing. You cannot guarantee a minister who is 
pro[banning FGC].” 
The new path that was taken by old group members was one of disciplined and 
skillful negotiation and entered more the sphere of diplomacy and civil service than 
that of activism. A patient continuation of their efforts in combination with support 
from crucial state-allied personalities would eventually lead to legislation effectively 
criminalizing FGC in 2008 and the involvement of Egypt’s official Islamic authorities 
in 2006. 
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3.2.2 The state against FGC: where have the feminists gone? 
The task force’s activities were ended and the group was dissolved by its coordinator, 
Marie Assaad after five years. In her opinion the group had reached its limits and the 
cause of fighting FGC would be better promoted when elevated to the level of national 
policy making. A new space was created for anti-FGC activism within the National 
Council for Childhood and Motherhood (NCCM) under the leadership of Mushira 
Khattab and presided by then First Lady Suzanne Mubarak. This happened by informal 
talks initially and then by the official participation of two old task force members in 
the NCCM. These experienced old task force activists started a process of negotiation 
with other NCCM members to embark on a national-level program, namely the FGM 
Free Village Model, launched in 2003. The incorporation of the anti-FGM campaign by 
the NCCM opened many doors and provided access to state media and official state-
appointed religious authorities. Subsequently, in the following years major changes 
were made, such as legislation that effectively criminalizes the practice in 2007. 
The village of Ishraq in Upper Egypt served as a model in the design of the FGM-
Free Village Model. The aim was to emulate the development of this village toward the 
public declaration against FGC and mainstream the activities of this model across the 
country. (Foundation 2009, 33).  In terms of funds, the FGM Free Village Model is a 
joint project between UN Volunteers (UNV) and UNFPA. It was led initially in 
partnership with Egypt’s National Council for Childhood and Motherhood and 
continued after the 2011 Uprising by the National Population Council (Post 28-5-
2015). Ghada Barsoum writes in a report of the Population Council that “[t]he 
objective of the project is to eliminate the social pressure on families to perform FGM 
on their daughters by fostering a socio-cultural environment conducive to the 
abandonment of the practice through the media messages, supportive policies, and 
community-based initiatives” (Barsoum, et al. 2010, 1). “The project adopted an 
innovative, multi-pronged approach by engaging community members and leaders, 
religious leaders, health professionals, lawyers, judges, government officials, the 
media, youth groups, and non-governmental organizations in efforts to abandon 
FGM”, continues Barsoum (ibid.). After being hosted by the NCCM, the FGM Free 
Village Model was run by the National Council for Youth from 2009 until 2011. 
The embrace by the Egyptian state of anti-FGC campaigning can be situated in a 
general opening to human rights and citizenship discourses in the years 2000. 
Especially in the period between 2001 and 2007, “international allies were pressing 
for political reform” (Elsässer 2014, 186). “There is little doubt that the regime was 
not really on a course of liberalization and democratization”, argues Elsässer, “but was 
nevertheless eager to appease and coopt those who challenged it with a liberal 
discourse” (ibid.). 
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International pressure to adopt human and women’s rights language mounted, and 
particularly, pressures to implement anti-FGC measures (Boyle 2002). What had 
started in the United Nations ‘Decade of Women’ from 1975 until 1985 led to the 
institutionalization of transnational feminism on a national level. Egypt ratified the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination  against Women 
(CEDAW) in 1981 with two major reservations. A National Council of Childhood and 
Motherhood (NCCM) was installed in 1988 and a National Council of Women (NCW) 
was founded in 2000, within the framework of the CEDAW agreement.  Developing a 
national plan against FGC fit well into the state’s turn to rights language. 
Critics argued that the official use of rights language does not necessarily reflect 
normative shifts: “Egyptian officials must now include concepts of gender 
empowerment and women’s rights in their discourses, because of the widespread use 
of these concepts at United Nations conferences (including the International 
Conference on Population and Development hosted by Egypt in 1994) […] The 
government inserts these concepts into the hegemonic discourse in such a ways as not 
to challenge it” (Pratt 2005, 127). Political scientist Nicola Pratt argues that the 
governmental use of rights language does not challenge the regime, but its recognition 
opens possibilities for civil society to reclaim and redefine this language. One of the 
task force interviewees indeed phrased this as the importance of civil society activism 
to pressure the state into action. With the incorporation of some old task force 
members and their expertise as anti-FGC activists into governmental development 
plans, this pressure mechanism was weakened. 
In a similar vein,  state feminism in postcolonial times, “in which many women’s 
organizations were co-opted by national governments and staffed by female relatives 
of male politicians” (Walley 1997, 348) is another point of critique. The association of 
the ruling authoritarian regime with women’s rights activism, in other words, affects 
the credibility of such plans and national strategies. I will give the example of popular 
attitudes toward the National Council of Women (NCW) to illustrate this point.  
The National Council of Women (NCW) for instance, had been blamed  repeatedly 
by civil society and public intellectuals for abusing its role as the international 
representative of Egyptian women and for neglecting their real  interests and rights 
as equal citizens. To critics, the NCW’s progressive gender  policies only sought to 
legitimize the authoritarian Mubarak regime as a  supporter of women’s rights (Hatem 
2011, 37). After Mubarak’s ousting, the NCW not surprisingly became a target for  both 
secular-liberal activists and Islamists. During the eighteen days of the  uprising in 
January–February 2011, the building in which the National Council of Women was 
housed—the same building as the ruling National Democratic  Party—was set on fire, 
which put the council’s activities on hold for a  year. In the wake of the eighteen-day 
uprising, a new, liberal-secular coalition, the Coalition of Egyptian Feminist 
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Organizations, comprising 16 women’s rights groups, was created. In its second 
statement of February 2011, the coalition “refuse[s] the illegitimate National Council 
of Women or its representation of Egyptian women and the feminist efforts in Egypt 
and confirm[s] the illegitimacy of its representation in international events.” It 
demanded  the immediate dissolution of the NCW and the establishment of an 
alternative Women’s Committee composed of women “well known for their 
independence, integrity and efficiency.”  
In sum, although some women’s  rights activists’ cooperated over the years with the 
NCW in a common struggle to further women’s position in society, after the uprising 
the newly founded coalition immediately rejected the NCW on the basis of its 
authoritarianism,  corruption and elitism (Elsadda 2011). 
Despite Egyptian activists’ critical attitude toward the state, and the problem of 
female relatives of male politicians “casting a shadow of authoritarianism on women’s 
rights” (Hatem 1992, 240), some legislation has been welcomed and applauded by 
women’s rights activists (Singerman 2004a; Singerman 2004b). Legislation that 
criminalizes FGC is such an example and the NCCM under the leadership of Mushira 
Khattab played a crucial role in this. In 2007, a ministerial decree by the Ministry of 
Health (No. 271 in 2007) was issued that banned FGC in all medical clinics, private and 
public. In 2008, the Child Law was amended so that the practice of FGC became 
criminalized (Barsoum, et al. 2010, 1). Working within the frame of children’s rights 
and phrasing FGC as a violation of the child’s rights was a crucial step in making the 
legislation acceptable to the political elite (Khattab 18-7-2015). Minister of Justice 
Mamduh Marᶜi defended it, saying that the law “was keen to respect the teachings of 
Islam and Christianity, not to violate the constitution or go against public morals and 
traditions" (El-Din 2008). Marᶜi declared “that FGM is a crime against children and a 
major objective of this law is to safeguard children against physical abuse" (ibid.).  
One of the critiques of criminalization and legal regulation of customary practices 
says that it does not necessarily alter people’s behaviour and that the judicial 
apparatus is only accessible for the higher classes and not for the working and middle 
classes. Feminist activist and social scientist Pinar Ilkkaracan showed for the Kurdish-
majority population living in Eastern Turkey that several “several customary 
practices, such as early and forced marriages, polygyny, and honor crimes, continue to 
shape the lives of women living in the region, despite legal reforms in Turkey 
prohibiting them since the 1920s” (Ilkkaracan 2002, 762).  
Indeed, some have argued about the Egyptian law say that the fines and sanctions 
are not high enough and that doctors who are performing FGC are not sued and rarely 
convicted. Rida al-Danbuqi, lawyer and director of the Women’s Center for Legal 
Guidance and Counseling (markaz al-marᵓa lil-irshad wa-l tawᶜiyya qanuniyya) argues 
that the state is not committed to truly abandoning FGC. He argues that the law is not 
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“deterrent” (ᶜAbdel Ghani 31-5-2016) and that the state provided legislation only “to 
please campaigners” (Inquiry 2016). In most of the lawsuits, doctors are found 
innocent or they are only convicted to paying a fine. The first and only case in which 
the 2008 law was applied was the case of the death of the thirteen-year old Suhayr al-
Bataᶜ, in Daqhaliyya governorate in June 2014. Here, the doctor was convicted to three 
months imprisonment while this verdict has not been implemented yet. What is 
unprecedented in Suhayr al-Bataᶜ’s case is that he performing doctor is convicted and 
her father was included as a defendant in the case (ᶜAbdel Ghani 31-5-2016).  
3.3 The interpellation of religious leaders: al-Azhar’s 
support 
Religious leaders have formulated opinions on FGC since the first debates and 
discussions in the 1920s (Wassef 1998). They have not been appearing as one clear-
cut coherent bloc, as is indeed only normal within Islamic tradition. Nevertheless, 
religious leaders have been called on to state clear opinions against FGC. The task force 
against FGM declared the following:  
“We believe the role of religion is to realize justice and equity between people, 
to promote happiness and welfare. Any use of religion to the detriment of that 
happiness is an abuse of religion based on interest, whether political or 
political… Religious interpreters have disagreed on many issues and FGM is just 
one of them. We are not in a position to interpret religious texts… It is the 
responsibility of those who set themselves the task of interpreting religious texts 
to dos in a way that promotes the well-being of mankind, women and men” 
(Wassef 1998, 18). 
The task force activists wish to remain within a secular discourse and not to couch 
arguments against FGC in religious terms. At the same time, they do invite religious 
leaders to interpret religion in such a way as to offer progressive opinions that 
demonstrate the undesirability of FGC. In my interviewees, task force members and 
current-day development workers that I met in the course of my fieldwork also 
showed this reluctance to advance theological arguments about FGC. Because they feel 
that they “lack the recognized authority that would strengthen their case” activists or 
development workers refrain from making arguments that rely on religious discourse 
(Badran 2009a, 178). They would rather refer to specific shaykhs and religious 
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opinions they endorse, although many remain personally pulled into religious 
discussions by trainees and attending women or project beneficiaries.  
The 1997 task force “Position Statement” encourages religious leaders to take a 
position and make the right kind of interpretation that condemns FGC. As mentioned 
earlier, conservative voices defending FGC were part of the public debate since the 
ICPD conference. In the context of the nineties, conservative responses were voiced 
by islamist shayhks as Yusuf al-Badry, conservative doctors like Munir Fawzy and 
most importantly, a conservative shaykh of al-Azhar, Jad al-Haq. A group of  task force 
members in combination with human rights and women’s rights organizations 
resorted to law suits and legal measures. Amal Abdel Hadi recounts that “[a]dvocates 
of abolishing FC/FGM took both the Minister of Health, Ali Abd El Fatah, and the Sheikh 
al Azhar, the late Jad al Haq, to court on charges of abusing their authority to the 
detriment of Egyptian women” (Abdel Hadi 2006, 110). 
The shaykh of al-Azhar during the ICPD was the well-known hardliner Jad al-Haq 
who had declared FGC a religious requirement and argued that speaking against FGC 
equals speaking against Islam (Badran 2009a, 180-1) A well-known conflict 
developed between the shaykh of al-Azhar and the grand Mufti, both state-appointed 
positions. Former president Husni Mubarak, in March 1982, had appointed a “shaykh 
whom he perceived as a quietist ᶜalim, Jad al-Haq, a former Mufti and minister of 
waqfs, who was already well aware of how to answer the needs of the regime” (Zeghal 
1999, 385). He soon distanced himself however from the regime and started a so-
called war on secularism and against Dar al- Iftaaᵓ (the state-appointed institution for 
fatwa issuing that is headed by the grand Mufti). The shaykh of al-Azhar thus “opposed 
the government-backed fatwas of the mufti with his own fatwas” (ibid. 388).  
Additionally, he “pronounced conservative fatwas regarding the status of women” 
(ibid. 388) and came to be known as a hard line religious conservative. Malika Zeghal 
writes “[t]his war ended only with the death of shaykh Jad al-Haq in March 1996 and 
the appointment of the former mufti, shaykh Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, as the head 
of al-Azhar” (ibid.).  
The shift from conservative al-Haq to more regime compliant Tantawi also 
indicated a shift in the dominant religious opinion on FGC. Whereas al-Haq was known 
for his staunch defense of FGC as an Islamic practice, Tantawi would undo this position 
and issue fatwa’s that dissociate FGC from an Islamic framework. Task force member 
Abdel Hadi’s and others’ juridical struggle against the shaykh al-Azhar were no longer 
needed under Muhammad Tantawi. The new shaykh “reversed the position 
articulated by the previous shaykh and publicly declared that female circumcision has 
nothing to do with Islam”, Abdel Hadi writes. “He issued a fatwa in support of the 
health minister’s decree prohibiting doctors from practicing FC/FGM” (Abdel Hadi 
 74 
2006, 110). Furthermore, he  admits “and announces publicly that he had not 
circumcised his own daughters” (Badran 2009a, 179).  
From within the NCCM opponents of FGC showed a focus on religious, Islamic, 
authorities to find support for their cause. Progressive fatwas have been collected in 
booklets and published underscoring that there is no textual basis within the Islamic 
legal tradition that supports female genital cutting. For instance, the collection by 
Egyptian intellectual, often referred to as a moderate Islamist, Selim al-Awwa brings 
together fatwas since 1904 that concluded that Islamic legal tradition does not 
support FGC (al-Awwa undated). Such fatwas essentially state that the practice cannot 
be considered an obligatory or an honourable act due to a lack of authentic textual 
bases within Islamic tradition (see chapter four for an elaborate discussion).  
The efforts for convincing religious authorities to throw their support behind the 
campaign culminated in 2006. This international conference on Islam and FGC 
initiated by the German NGO Target and held at al-Azhar University brought together 
an unlikely alliance of major governmental representatives, Target, a German NGO, 
Islamic clerics including the grand mufti and shaykh of al-Azhar Muhammad Sayyid 
Tantawi, international Sunni Islamic authority sheikh Yusuf al Qaradawi and 
representatives of the National Council of Childhood and Motherhood, among whom 
were two previous members of the task force. The conference’s final declaration, 
supported by grand mufti Ali al-Gomᶜa, the head of Dar al Iftaaᵓ,  strongly condemned 
the practice as harmful and therefore forbidden by Islam. Furthermore, it “urges 
regional and international organizations to exert efforts towards educating people 
and disseminating awareness of the health risks involved in this harmful practice”. It 
“calls on legislative institutions to enact a law prohibiting female circumcision and 
penalizing the perpetrator” and “calls on international organizations and associations 
to provide all forms of assistance to the regions where female circumcision is practiced 
with a view to eliminating it” (Conference 2006).  
The language that is deployed in the final declaration strongly resonates with 
international anti-FGC campaigning discourse as it is used by the international 
community of campaigners. It explicitly invites regional and international 
organizations to educate and to provide assistance to Egypt. The importance of this 
declaration is that its discourse was also endorsed by Islamic religious authorities, and 
this is considered a major success by campaigning partners, the NCCM and Target 
Group NGO. In the same period, Ford Foundation allocated a grant to the International 
Islamic Center for Population Studies and Research (IICPSR) at al-Azhar University to 
organize a conference on Islam and the notion of reproductive health. This resulted in 
an international conference in February 2008 which included among its 
recommendations the statement that “female circumcision is not required by Islam” 
(Foundation 2009, 10). 
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In this manner, the Egyptian national campaign against FGC managed to intertwine 
with the structure and discourse provided by international institutions. The state – by 
means of the National Council of Motherhood and Childhood – proved itself to be a 
loyal and successful supporter of the international campaign by recruiting these 
religious voices to the cause. It successfully made FGC un-Islamic, at least on a nominal, 
institutional level. It is remarkable that both activists, the state and the international 
campaign place emphasis on the importance of religious leadership and their 
authoritative voices. The prominent position of religious authority does resonate with 
Islamic legal and discursive tradition. At the same time, however, the understanding 
of religion that is advanced, also corresponds with secularized conceptualizations of 
religion, evident in the hegemonic international anti-FGC literature. Here, the 
predominant question whether FGC is Islamic or not – seemingly to be answered in a 
definite and timeless manner – attests to a static and restrictive conceptualization of 
religion, emphasizing belief, tenets, legal tradition and text. It precludes more dynamic 
understandings of religion in which one’s behaviour and conviction is shaped by social 
and cultural dynamics and individual interpretation of Islamic tenets and ethics. 
3.4 Post 2011: declining numbers and rising 
medicalization 
The result of recurrent public attention since the ICPD of 1994 and the design of the 
national FGM Free Village model has led to an overall decline in prevalence rates in 
Egypt. At the same time, FGC surgery has become more often performed by medically 
trained personnel. The trend of medicalization of the practice has been observed in 
many areas and received wide attention by development practitioner and scholars. It 
is here not the aim or the right place to review this global literature on medicalization 
(e.g. Newland 2006, 402; Shell-Duncan 2001; UNFPA, et al. 2010) although it forms an 
important component of current Egyptian discourses, also religiously framed 
discourses on FGC. One of the most dominant understandings of FGC as an Islamic 
practice phrases it precisely in terms of a religiously advised moderation in cutting. 
The sense that cutting should not be “too much” is underscored by a well-known 
hadith, a saying that is attributed to prophet Muhammad. How FGC is understood as a 
minor surgery of moderate cutting in relation to Islamic tradition is discussed at 
length in the following chapter four.  
The impact of campaigning interventions and religiously sanctioned 
understandings of FGC can be observed in recent statistics. I noted earlier that the 
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advice to have FGC performed by medical professionals (by both professionals and 
religious figures) is not new but was already present in the 1950s (Wassef 1998). 
There are, however, only noticeable changes reflected in statistics in recent decades. 
Indeed, while the desirability of shifts to less interventionist form of cutting and 
medicalization of FGC is debated, some consider these outcomes an indication of 
change and a sign of programme impact (Sedgh, et al. 2005). 
 
 
A sticker showing the logo of the women’s organization “Voice of Egyptian Women” (founded in 2012) 
states “No to FGM/C” (la lil-khitan). 
The rising numbers of medicalization have been documented by the Egyptian 
Demographic and Health Surveys (EDHS). In the first EDHS survey that included data 
on FGC (1995), the total number of women who underwent FGC is 97%, of which 17% 
of the cases was medicalized(EI-Zanaty, et al. 1996). Ten years later, the 2005 EDHS 
showed the number of FGC performed by medically trained personnel specifically for 
girls aged 0-17, showing a perecentage of 74%(El-Zanaty and Way 2006). The 2008 
EDHS says that 91% of women aged 15-49 underwent FGC (El-Zanaty and Way 2009, 
228) and that a majority (63%) reports that the practice was performed by a daya 
(traditional birth attendant). The remaining percentage (32%) was done by trained 
medical personnel, mainly doctors (ibid. 229). The 2014 EDHS survey shows that a 
total of 92% of the 15-49 age group underwent FGC. A total of 52% reported that a 
daya performed the procedure and 38% by doctors, nurses and other health workers 
(El-Zanaty and Associates 2015). In sum, according to EDHS, overall medicalization 
(accounting for all circumcised women aged 15-49) rose from 17% in 1995 to 38% in 
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2014. It is clear that the new generation is mainly undergoing FGC by doctors or 
nurses, reported as 74% of those aged 0-17 in 2005. The Egyptian Ministry of Health 
also released press reports indicating that medicalization of FGC reaches about 75% 
of the cases (Post 2-3-2015). 
After the 2011 Uprising, national planning against FGC shifted from the NCCM to 
the Egyptian National Population Council (NPC). Former NCCM president and staunch 
opponent of FGC Mushira Khattab was considered as too closely associated with the 
previous Mubarak regime and left her position. After January 2011, the core old task 
force members who represented the topic and coordinated the FGM Free Village 
model from within the NCCM continue within the frame of the NPC. According to an 
NPC statement in February 2014, it launched a remarkable and seemingly unrealistic 
program “to eliminate the practice FGM/C in five years in coordination with the 
Egyptian government” (Post 28-5-2015). In 2015, a new strategic plan was announced 
by the NPC that specifies its ambitions to reduce FGC prevalence among girls aged 15-
17 from 60 to 15 percent over 5 years (ibid.).  
What is sure are the indications that FGC prevalence in Egypt is in decline and that 
since the start of recent campaigning and the ICPD conference in 1994 transnational 
discourse against FGC is gaining strength. FGC becomes more and more understood as 
a “hard tradition that is inherited and that is better abandoned. Those who are 
doubtful often prefer to let medical professionals decide on whether their daughter 
“needs “ FGC or not. Such a measure that advocates carefulness and moderation in 
cutting, is also couched in religious, Islamic terms. It is to that connection, the relation 
between FGC and religion that I turn next. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Debate on FGC is not only an issue of recent decades. Especially in the 1950s and 
1960s there was a surge in public questioning and opinion formation. Under 
president’s ᶜ Abd al-Nasir  regime, an official committee was appointed that for the first 
time reached the conclusion of legally banning FGC, in the public sector. This ban was 
however not implemented and even activists and family planning workers in the 
1980s were unaware of such ministerial declaration. Grassroots activists in the 1990s 
were responsible for raising the subject again in public debate. The organization of the 
International Conference on Population and Development was a crucial event in 
mobilizing and organizing activists. At this event, transnational activism and the 
operations of donor funds fully deployed its potential. The latter largely contributed 
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to creating a vibrant civil society concerned with women’s rights and women’s bodily 
autonomy. Its intervention and lobbying to the state lead to the institutionalization of 
grassroots activism against FGC by feminists and family planning professionals.  
The most remarkable evolution in dominant discussion and practice of FGC is the 
medicalization over the decades. Talking about the need of circumcision “on ‘medical’ 
and ‘religious’ grounds” was already present in the 1950s  but it has gained more 
currency today. The practice today has become dominantly evaluated and discussed 
in medicalized terms. The question whether a girl “is in need of it”, then refers to 
anatomical, medical need such as genitals that are deemed too large. This vision is not 
necessarily in contradiction with religious points of view. Visions that expressed the 
confluence of medical concern with education and a religious framework also 
appeared as early as the 1950s, when they were one religious opinion among others.  
The current dynamics of transnational activism known by its dissemination of 
medical knowledge on the practice and its interpellation of religious authorities 
within the global campaign, seems to have made this religious point of view more 
dominant. Religious leaders are called upon to dissociate FGC from religion and lend 
their (religious) authority to the campaign. In Egypt, this attempt was not always 
succesfull. The shaykh of al-Azhar in the 1990s during the ICPD was a strong supporter 
of FGC as a religious practice. Its successor, however, Muhammad al-Tantawi did 
subscribe to the view that FGC is not sanctioned by Islam. As official state-appointed 
religious leader, his view then aligned with the state’s national strategies against FGC 
as implemented since 2002. Critiques of the interpellation and instrumentalisation of 
religious leaders by development initiatives point at the power and authority that is 
vested in calling on their support.  
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Chapter 4  
Interrogating the relation between FGC and 
religion 
4.1 Introduction 
Over the last decades, many scholars and activists  examined the relation between 
religion an FGC and more specifically between Islam and FGC. Religion has become a 
fixed component that is integrated in campaigns by international actors such as 
UNICEF, UNFPA and WHO to raise awareness and argue for the abandonment of the 
practice. The question whether respondents understand FGC to be related to religion 
has been included in the widely used Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) surveys and 
has since become more and more into focus for investigation and action, especially in 
the realm of development practice. The latest Unicef overview of the state of 
campaigning worldwide states that in Egypt half of the population (of men and women 
aged 15-49) “regards FGM/C as a religious requirement” (United Nations Children’s 
Fund 2013, 71).  
Involving and mobilizing religious leaders to speak and argue against FGC  has 
proven to be an effective and persuasive strategy in different national contexts 
(Gruenbaum 2005; Shell-Duncan 2008). For this reason, the same international 
institutions organizing campaigns against FGC have also been sponsoring and 
producing research into the relation between religion and FGC. The work done by 
actors and writers located within the field of development occupy a considerable 
share in what are the most dominant areas where knowledge about the relation 
between FGC and religion is produced. In this chapter, I will look at the most important 
fields of such knowledge production and situate the important role of development in 
drawing academic and activist attention to the role of religion in fighting what has 
been defined as harmful cultural practices, and especially FGC. I will argue that under 
the strong influence of development work and knowledge production, among other 
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factors, questioning the relation between FGC and religion has often been reduced to 
a one-dimensional question “Is FGC a religious (Islamic) practice or not”? Both 
writings and actual development practice often depart from this question and 
subsequently aim at delivering a definite and seemingly ahistorical (negative) answer. 
The convergence between activist writings, action-research and other scholarly 
research on the relation between FGC and religion while being supportive of the cause 
of eradicating FGC, emphasizes the complexities of situated knowledge and engaged 
scholarship (Harraway 1988). For example, one of the earliest and still one of the most 
comprehensive works that thoroughly investigates the relation between both male 
and female circumcision is by Sami al Deeb Abu-Sahlieh (Abu-Sahlieh 2001). His work 
appeared first in Arabic in 2001, published in Beirut and was translated to English one 
year later, published in the series of Marco Polo Monographs by Shangri-La 
Publications. As a scholar of Islamic and comparative law, he examined circumcision 
in the three monotheistic traditions while having an activist commitment to an 
abolitionist point of view.  
4.2 Dominant modes of examining FGC and religion: an 
outline 
4.2.1 The complexities of examining FGC and religion 
The difficulty of disentangling the social, the religious and the political will become 
most clear throughout the arguments in this chapter1. The boundaries delineating 
 
                                                     
1 Importantly, I will not discuss Islamic feminist theology and feminist interpretations of the Islamic textual 
tradition. Islamic feminists or simply female interpreters of Islamic texts who do not wish to identify with 
the label “feminist” have emphasized the difference between the revelation of the Qurᵓan on the one hand 
and the “patriarchal voice incorporating the social order” on the other (Ilkkaracan, 2002 p. 755). These 
scholars discern a message of egalitarianism in the Qurᵓanic revelation between men and women and let 
this core understanding guide their interpretation of religious ethics and all other more complex social 
phenomena. This basic egalitarian understanding is then put in contrast with interpretations by religious 
scholars and jurists in the established canon of the historical Islamic tradition. Several authors have engaged 
with historical research (e.g. Leila Ahmad 1991; 1992) or are more situated in feminist theology (Amina 
Wadud 1999; Fatima Mernissi 1987) or social science (e.g. Ziba Mir-Hosseini 2011) but none of them 
engaged directly with female genital cutting or with the broader category of Islamicate practices: cultural 
practices that have been associated with Islamic religion and have been practiced by people living in Muslim 
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these various categories become blurred when discussing prevailing discourses and 
perceptions of FGC practices. Religious and theological doctrine interweaves with 
questions of political legitimacy and authority in the circulating discourses and 
perceptions of FGC practices. 
In this chapter, I aim to look at the different ways in which knowledge about the 
relation between FGC and religions has been produced, structured, organized and 
disseminated.  In a first subsections (4.2.2.1-4.2.2.2), I will give an overview of relevant 
texts and discussions in Islamic scholarship concerning genital cutting practices, with 
a focus on female genital cutting. This heritage is most often drawn on by opponents 
of the practice to argue that the practice has no grounds in Islam, apart of pointing at 
the clear reality that FGC practices are absent and unknown in large parts of Muslim 
countries and communities. This is followed by a discussion of how religion is 
conceptualized in development activity and awareness-raising campaigns (4.2.2.3-
4.2.2.6) and a section on anthropological work that discuss the relation between 
religion (Islam) and FGC (4.2.3). These subsections together serve as an outline of how 
currently dominant public knowledge has been sought and produced concerning the 
relation between religion and FGC. They also show how the question into the relation 
between FGC and Islam has become predominantly posed in a reductionist fashion, 
represented by the one-dimensional yes or no question.  
Overall, this chapter critically reflects on these modes of knowledge production and 
the importance of the yes or no framing of the question. I aim to examine the overall 
emphasis on this question whether FGC is Islamic or not, and its emphasis on religious 
authorities, by arguing that this development can be seen as the result of multiple 
simultaneous developments on a larger scale: 1) the fragmentation and diversification 
of Islamic religious authority in a globalized world, 2) the employment and 
instrumentalisation of religious authorities in development work, 3) the contestation 
of authority between official state-appointed authorities and islamist shaykhs 
(situated within political islam) and the tendency toward authoritarian styles in 
Islamic law. It is against the backdrop of these confluent developments that thinking 
about the relation between FGC and religion has become reduced to the question 
whether FGC is Islamic or not and  accompanying yes or no answers. I finally look at 
the underlying conceptions of religion that also contribute and undergird the 
emphasis on this one-dimensional question and the central placement of religious 
leaders. These underlying conceptions of religion can best be understood within 
theorizing on secularism as a defining and regulating power of what constitutes the 
 
                                                     
countries. It can be argued, however, that according to Islamic feminist reasoning, FGC would not be 
recognized as an ethically rightfully Islamic practice but would rather be seen as a result of patriarchal 
culture and social order’s entwinement with Islamic practices and values.  
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religious and the not-religious, and thus also that separates the religious from the 
cultural.  
4.2.2 FGC in religious textual traditions 
4.2.2.1 FGC and religion historically 
Before looking at the relation between religion and FGC as it has been discussed in 
classical Islamic scholarship, I will look shortly at more general underlying historical, 
religious foundations for male and female circumcision. FGC has been practiced for 
about 2500 years and therefore predates any of the monotheistic religions (Slack 
1988, 443). In this section, I’ll look at how religion, and most specifically Islam the 
most defining religion in Egypt, has accommodated and incorporated FGC practices. 
Sami al Deeb al-Sahlieh argues that religious motivations for circumcision in general 
have a common origin in the three monotheistic religious traditions. Moreover, the 
original motivation that has been central in both male and female circumcision, is the 
curbing of what is called excessive sexual desire or concupiscence. A historical 
genealogy can be traced through a line of continuity that connects Jewish, Christian 
and Islamic argumentation.  
Starting with Hellenistic Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria (d. 50), medieval 
Jewish philosopher Maimonides (d. 1204) and passing by Coptic theologian Ibn al-
Assal and Christian theologian Thomas Aquinas,  al-Sahlieh concludes with Muslim 
jurists Ibn-Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350) and Al-Mannawi (d. 1622). In the writings of 
these figures the same central thought concerning circumcision figures prominently, 
namely that a correct religious lifestyle demands to curb excessive desire by means of 
circumcision. It is argued that uncircumcised men and women won’t ever find 
satiation and therefore waste their lives and brains. The uncircumcised would get lost 
in their own desires and carnal pleasures which take away their attention and 
dedication to God (Abu-Sahlieh 2001, 159-160). Female circumcision has been seen 
widely among Christian and Muslim communities but concerning Jewish communities 
Berkey argued that it was never widely practiced by Jews and was never mandated by 
Jewish law (Berkey 1996, 23) . Anthropologist Ellen Gruenbaum on the other hand 
stated that “followers of all three monotheistic religions – Christianity, Judaism and 
Islam – have at times practised female circumcision and considered their practices 
sanctioned, or at least not prohibited, by God.” (Gruenbaum 2001, 60).  
Maimonides wrote on male circumcision “This commandment has not been 
enjoined as a complement to a deficient physical creation, but as a means for 
perfecting man’s moral shortcomings. […] Circumcision simply counteracts excessive 
lust; for there is no doubt that circumcision weakens the power of sexual excitement” 
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(quoted in (Abu-Sahlieh 2001, 159). He continues with showing the relation between 
male circumcision and female sexual enjoyment: “It is hard for a woman, with whom 
an uncircumcised had sexual intercourse, to separate from him” (Ibid.). The idea that 
women would distract uncircumcised men because of their great desire for them, is 
for Maimonides the best reason for the “commandment of circumcision”. Maimonides 
and others after him reasoned that since male circumcision reduces male sexual 
endurance and enjoyment, both partners would spend less time having sexual 
relations and devote more time to leading a meaningful and moral Jewish (Christian, 
Muslim) life.  
The practice of female circumcision has been historically traced to Ancient Egypt 
and was witnessed and reported on by writers in the first centuries of Christianization, 
describing the practice as a complete removal of the clitoris for reasons of reducing 
women’s “desire for copulation” and avoiding that the clitoris increases in growth and 
“becomes unseemly and shameful” (Berkey 1996, 22). The twelfth-century Coptic 
Metropolitan of the Egyptian city of Damietta, Michael, is known for describing the 
Coptic Christian community as a people that circumcises both men and women and 
only marries “with those like us” (Berkey 1996, 23).  
In the case of female circumcision, religious supporters of this practice have relied 
on similar reasoning as Maimonides described. Several Islamic jurists in the middle 
ages argue for the need to curb so-called excessive or superfluous sexual desire, 
concupiscense. They often refer to specific hadith (narratives of sayings and acts of 
prophet Mohamed) to base their opinion on (see below). Other reasons among 
religious supporters concern enhancing sexual enjoyment. The interest and purpose 
of female circumcision according to Islamic scholars such as shaykh Shaltut (1893-
1963), shaykh Al-Sukkari and Al-Sayyid is twofold: it reduces concupiscence and this 
means that married women are less likely to be tempted to commit adultery and 
secondly, at the same time it enhances sexual enjoyment for both partners as the 
female genitalia are considered to be more clean and beautiful and orgasm is 
considered to be delayed due to circumcision (Abu-Sahlieh 2001, 163-5).  
The idea that FGC reduces female sexual desire in some cases led to the belief that 
FGC also reduces lesbianism (in Western writings as well as non-Western). This 
argument in favor of FGC is present in the official compilation of sunna (compilations 
of hadith, see more below)  published by the Egyptian Ministry of Religious Affairs: 
“Events demonstrate that the abandonment of female circumcision drives to the most 
dangerous of habits which is lesbianism. Figures prove that this habit only exists in 
countries where women are not circumcised” (Abu-Sahlieh 2001, 170). The 
compilation of sunna by the Egyptian ministry of religious affairs (al muntakhab min 
al-sunna, vol. 3, 96-97, note 1). 
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4.2.2.2 FGC and religion in Islamic scholarship 
In the following, I will look at traditional Islamic scholarship’s discussion on 
circumcision focusing on female circumcision or FGC. The reason for this overview is 
that contemporary opinions on the relation between FGC and religion rely on 
historical scholarship or at least often claim that they rely on this scholarship. Current 
opinions, both by religious leaders and Muslim individuals tend to base themselves, 
implicitly or explicitly, to different degrees on this heritage. This applies to both 
opponents and supporters of the practice. Traditional or classical Islamic scholarship 
is called fiqh [theory of law] or usul al-fiqh [sources of the theory of law], that is the 
legal theory that is developed and derived based on study of different Islamic textual 
sources, in the first place of the Qurᵓan (which has the status of God’s word). The 
second most important source is called the sunna, the exemplary biography of Prophet 
Muhammad, who has the status of God’s messenger. Acts and sayings of the Prophet 
have been collected early on after his death and serve as important references for daily 
moral conduct, as a normative ideal among others ideals and desires. The sunna is 
therefore an abstract notion, referring to exemplary conduct, while the more concrete 
examples in the form of narratives about the Prophet’s acts and sayings are called 
hadith (Hallaq 2009, 16). In what follows, I will look more specifically at the Qurᵓan 
and hadith.  
The Qurᵓan does not make any direct mention of circumcision, neither male or 
female circumcision, in contrast to the Bible where both the Old and New Testament 
refers to male circumcision (Abu-Sahlieh 2001, 99). The Qurᵓan itself differentiates 
between “straightforward” verses (muhkamat) on the one hand and ambiguous verses 
with multiple meanings (mutashabihat) on the other hand (Qur'an 5,3). Classic and 
modern Muslim authors have studied those ambiguous verses in an attempt to find 
textual presence of the commandment for male circumcision (Abu-Sahlieh 2001, 99) 
but this did not develop in classic scholars’ argumentation for female circumcision 
(Berkey 1996, 20).  
On the other hand, the Qurᵓan contains explicit verses stating the completion and 
perfection of God’s creation, the human being and the body she was given. These 
verses have often been read in a context of opinions on body modification or 
amputation and ablation of body parts. In fact, positions that are either in favor or 
against circumcision have both been made on the basis of these Qurᵓanic notions. 
Religious scholars such as the Egyptian Selim al-Awwa, Abdel Rahman Al-Najjar and 
Amin Da’ud among others condemned circumcision on the basis of a condemnation of 
any body modification in (Abu-Sahlieh 2001, 104). The qurᵓanic verses “we created 
man in the best design” (95:4) and “he designed you and perfected your design” (64:3) 
is a clear call according to these authors to condemn all forms of circumcision 
practices. Egyptian feminist physician Nawal el-Saadawi is among those authors who 
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wrote against male and female circumcision. She argued that the religious grounds of 
the perfection of God’s creation clearly entail a condemnation of cutting away healthy 
and functioning organs or body parts: “God does not create the organs haphazardly 
without a plan. It is not possible that He should have created the clitoris in a woman’s 
body only in order that it be cut off at an early stage in life” (Abu-Sahlieh 2001, 105). 
Others don’t see a contradiction between the Qurᵓanic representation of the 
perfection of God’s creation and the practice of circumcision. In this latter vision, 
circumcision is conceived as one of the specificities of Islam that ought to be followed. 
Circumcision in this case is thought of as an inherent part of God’s design, not an 
aberration of it (Abu-Sahlieh 2001, 104).  
While there is no doubt about the Qurᵓan’s explicit silence on both forms of 
circumcision, the second important source of Islamic law, the Prophet’s sunna and the 
canonized collections of hadith – i.e. narratives of sayings and acts of the Prophet - are 
more dubious on the subject.2 Islamic jurists have classified hadith in different 
categories ranging from holy, authentic, good, weak, apocryphal, disapproved, 
irregulars, invented, etc. There are different compilations of hadith that are 
considered as authoritative, and there are different judgments and evaluations of 
separate hadith between different schools of law and different scholars (Abu-Sahlieh 
2001, 107). Three categories can be differentiated: oral sunna (the sayings of the 
prophet Muhammad), factual sunna (the acts of prophet Muhammad) and approbative 
sunna (acts of which Muhammad had knowledge without disapproving them, and are 
therefore favorable). Sunni Muslims have different compilations of hadith than Shiᶜi 
Muslims. Importantly, Shiᶜi Muslims place the prophet Muhammad on an equal level 
with their imams with regard to infallibility (Ibid. 107).  
Based on the Qurᵓan and sunna, scholars make interpretations and formulate 
opinions by means of reasoning, a process that is referred to as fiqh, jurisprudence or 
shariᶜa law theory. Reasoning leads to the interpretation of human activity and this 
was crystalized in the establishment of five categories of legal/norm norms: forbidden 
(haram), obligatory (wajib/fard), recommended (mandub/mustahabb/sunna), 
neutral and thus permissible (mubah) and disapproved or discouraged (makruh) 
(Hallaq 2009, 19-20). Depending on the regional and local context, all of these terms 
have been applied to describe FGC. When taking a historically informed view on the 
subject that considers the traditional scholarship of all four Sunni schools of law, one 
must admit, however, that the dominant classical view ranges between obligatory and 
recommended (Ali 2006, 102). Jonathan Berkey points out that: “the consensus of the 
Islamic legal community never objected to the practice,and where, as in Egypt, it had 
 
                                                     
2 Apart of Qurᵓan and hadith, other main sources in Islamic jurisprudence are analogy (qiyas), personal 
reasoning (ijtihad) and concensus (ijmaᶜ) (Hallaq 2009). 
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deep cultural roots, attempts were made to invest the operation with all the authority 
of a religious obligation” (Berkey 1996, 24). The dominant view within the Shafiᶜi 
school of law is the most strict view on FGC, deeming the practice obligatory. The 
classic handbook of the Shafiᶜi law school, The Reliance of the Traveller, states that 
circumcision is obligatory for both men and women (Ali 2006, 100-102; Berkey 
1996).3 Abdelwahab Bouhdiba argues that FGC or excision is generally considered a 
noble or pious act (makruma) (Bouhdiba 2012 175). This historically widely tolerated 
act, according to Bouhdiba, consists of “the removal of the lower part of the cap”, which 
is “only the semi-prepuce , which covers only the lower part of the clitoris” and should 
therefore “not be confused with clitoridectomy” (p. 176).  
Concerning male circumcision, there are several narratives that concern 
Abraham’s, Muhammad’s and Hassan and Husayn’s (Muhammad’s grandsons) 
circumcision. It is a well-known part of sunna that Muhammad had his grandsons 
circumcised but not his own four daughters (Abu-Sahlieh 2001, 108-109; Asmani and 
Abdi 2008, 7). Secondly, the suna al-fitra is a set of ahadith concerning body care that 
is often referred to in relation to circumcision. There is no agreement about the exact 
number of authentic ahadith concerning suna al-fitra but the following practices have 
the least disagreement: cutting of mustaches, depilating of armpits, clipping of nails, 
rinsing mouth, snuffing water in nose, cleaning teeth, washing fingers, shaving pubis 
and cleaning one’s private parts in water (Abu-Sahlieh 2001, 109). The inclusion of 
circumcision among those bodily practices has been contested. One well-known 
hadith by the contested reporter Abu-Hurayrah has Muhammad saying said that 
circumcision was among the five practices that constitute the suna al-fitra, which has 
been suppressed in the Maliki school of Islamic law (one of the four law schools). 
Canonized hadith compilations have different narratives included in the suna al-fitra, 
with some compilations accepting the inclusion of circumcision and others not (Ibid. 
110).  
A hadith reported by al-Hajjaj Ibn-Ardaᶜah states that Muhammad said that 
“circumcision is a sunna for men and makruma (a meritorious act) for women” (al-
Bayhaqi, Maᶜrifat al-Sunan, vol. 13, p. 63 in Abu-Sahlieh, 2001, 111). Abu-Sahlieh notes 
that this hadith is the only one mentioned by the compilation of sunna issued by the 
Egyptian ministry of Religious Affairs, hereby offering religious recognition of female 
circumcision. (The compilation of sunna by the Egyptian ministry of religious affairs 
(al muntakhab min al-sunna, vol. 3, 96-97, note 1). Islamic scholars who are opponents 
 
                                                     
3 For Abu Hanifa and Malik (after whom the Hanafi and Maliki juridicial law schools are named) both male 
and female circumcision are noble acts but not compulsory. For Ibn Hanbal (initiator of the Hanbali 
school) circumcision is compulsory for males but only recommended for women and as mentioned before, 
for Shafiᶜi (initiator of the Shafiᶜi school) both types of circumcision are compulsory (Atighetchi 2007, 
307)  
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of FGC have argued that this saying has been deemed weak and inauthentic by a 
number of hadith scholars and therefore should not be followed (Asmani and Abdi 
2008, 9). 
In a number of hadith narratives both male and female circumcision can be 
interpreted to be associated with each other and mentioned together. These hadith 
are collected in several major hadith compilations and are therefore considered as 
authentic by proponents of the practice (Asmani and Abdi 2008, 10; Berkey 1996, 22). 
The first and most important hadith, collected in the Sahih Muslim compilation among 
others, features Aᶜishah, wife of prophet Muhammad. When asked whether it was 
necessary for men to wash after sexual intercourse in the case that there was no 
ejaculation, she reportedly answered “If the two circumcisions meet or touch each 
other, it is necessary to ritually wash [ghusl]”, implying that female circumcision was 
customary in the lifetime of Muhammad (Abu-Sahlieh 2001). This narrative and its 
exact phrasing can be found in different variations across the compilations, either 
“when the circumcision touches the circumcision” (wa massa al-khitan al-khitan) or 
“when the two circumcisions meet” (idha iltaqa al-khitanan) (Berkey 1996, 22). 
Berkey points out that the word khitan was clearly used at the time for both male and 
female circumcision and the casual reference to “the two circumcised” in a context that 
foregrounds the subject of ablution and not the practice of khitan itself, suggests that 
both practices were widespread and not contested. Opponents of FGC argue here it 
cannot be inferred that the female is circumcised while recognizing the authenticity of 
the hadith. Based on linguistic and grammatical analysis, it is argued that the subject 
of this hadith is ritual cleanliness (tahara) and that the word khitanan does not imply 
female circumcision (Asmani and Abdi 2008, 9-10).  
The second most famous hadith concerning female circumcision is a simular 
narrative referring to Umm ᶜAtiyya. In this narrative,collected in the hadith 
compilation of Abu Dawud, Muhammad spoke to a woman (called Umm ᶜAtiyya) who 
used to circumcise girls and he told her “cut little and do not overdo because it brings 
more radiance to the face and it is more pleasant for the husband”(Atighetchi 2007, 
306). This hadith has been much discussed and referred to by classic and modern 
authors. It forms the main support for popular and well-known conservative scholars 
such as  shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi and shaykh al-Shaᶜrawi in promoting the idea of a 
“light” circumcision (Atighetchi 2007, 310). Supporters of the practice find here 
legitimation in Muhammad’s description of how to practice female circumcision 
correctly. Others interpret it that the practice existed in the days of Muhammad but 
that he attempted to reduce it to a minimal procedure instead of prohibiting it in a 
straightforward manner (Abu-Sahlieh 2001, 112-3).  
Opponents of the practice argue that the hadith is weak and that there is conflict in 
the meaning of the words used, in other words, that this narrative does in fact not refer 
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to circumcision (Asmani and Abdi 2008, 8). In Egypt, the Umm ᶜ Atiyya hadith has been 
especially popularized by the late shaykh of al-Azhar Jad al-Haq, who was first 
appointed as grand mufti in 1978 by president Anwar al-Sadat, later became Minister 
of Religious Affairs and was finally appointed as shaykh of al-Azhar by Mubarak. Al-
Haq was known as a conservative and he has shown himself as one of the most vocal 
supporters of FGC in Egypt (see also section chapter three section 3.3). Although he 
was a very conservative voice he denounced wahabism and therefore his appointment 
was seen as a strategic choice by the al-Sadat regime who in this manner sought to 
limit the spread of wahabi and salafi thought in Egypt. Based on all of these discussed 
hadith, scholars have formulated opinions throughout history, opinions that “although 
differing in nuance, were overwhelmingly favorable to the practice of female excision” 
(Berkey 1996, 25).  
4.2.2.3 What is at stake in phrasing the question? 
As mentioned earlier, this basic overview of scholarship is informative of many 
opinions on the subject of FGC, by both religious leaders, policy makers, individuals 
and development workers and activists against the practice. I will argue, however, that 
the dominant question raised (and offered answers) are partial. When only textual 
sources and religious male authorities are examined, an array of other responses and 
experiences remains unseen, and more profound questions remain unanswered.  
Inquiring into the relation between FGC and religion raises questions of what 
defines a practice or experience as religious and Islamic. To what extent do the Qurᵓan, 
sunna or Islamic scholars determine what is Islamic or not and for whom? How to 
evaluate and discuss classical scholarship in relation to new hermeneutical 
methodologies, such as Islamic feminist, especially when one is committed to find 
strategies to end the practice? Scholars and activists fail to recognize the heritage of 
Islamic scholarship that predominantly speaks favorably about FGC. Kecia Ali argues 
that the scholarly study of the Islamic textual basis for FGC practices has often been 
“evaded” and “misdirected” for two reasons, because of the desire to abolish the 
practice and the desire to “combat negative stereotypes of Muslims”(Ali 2006, 98). 
One of the consequences of not recognizing this historical heritage that speaks 
favorably of FGC as an Islamic practice is that more profound questions are not being 
reflected on, such as to what extent is it (still) desirable to rely on classical opinions to 
think about controversial contemporary issues concerning gender and sexuality, or in 
what ways could this classical scholarship be complemented and adapted by 
contemporary innovative Islamic legal reasoning? While some schools of Islamic 
thought, such as the Sunni Shafiᶜi school of law or the salafist school, emphasize hadith 
as an exclusive source for legal norms, others de-emphasize the relevance of hadith. 
Islamic feminists, for example, generally advocate against hadith or employ a critical 
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hermeneutical method to examine the authenticity of the sayings. This often leads to 
“the rejection of certain traditions or particular transmitters, such as the allegedly 
misogynistic companion, Abu Huraira”, a transmitter who was mentioned in the first 
hadith in this overview (Halverson and Way 2011, 508-9).  
Such an (internal) Muslim debate over the evaluation of classic Islamic legal sources 
against the backdrop of contemporary social and ethical demands, is complicated by 
the general context in which these questions are raised. The question on the Islamic-
ness of FGC has been predominantly raised and answered by Western(ized) actors 
such as international agencies part of the global campaign against FGM/C and can 
furthermore be traced back to the colonial era when rulers and missionaries shaped 
and framed the debate (see Chapter 3). In this context, stereotypical imagery of Islam 
is ubiquitous. The desire to fight and correct stereotypes then becomes an impediment 
to honest recognition of Islamic heritage and internal questioning and reflection (Ali 
2006) and maybe also to a more efficient campaigning for social and cultural change. 
In sum, the question whether FGC is Islamic or not is reductionist because it does not 
recognize the inherent pluralism in classical Islamic scholarship, the heterogeneity of 
actual practicing communities, and the diversity of lived personal experiences.  
4.2.2.4 FGC and religion in development (awareness-raising campaigns): 
making FGC un-Islamic  
Religion has often been cited as one of the major reasons for practicing FGC by 
respondents in academic and activist social research questionnaires. At the same time, 
many NGO and state campaigners who are working to stop the practice focus on 
clarifying religious tenets in order to discourage the continuation of the practice.  In 
this section, I aim to look at the ways in which religion and religious authorities figure 
within international efforts to combat FGC and what these approaches tell us about 
underlying assumptions and conceptualizations of religion. I then look at 
anthropological studies of FGC and religion that discuss the constitution of moral 
personhood and processes of group identity formation. 
Religion is a prominent recurrent answer by respondents in studies investigating 
the perpetuation of the practice. For Egypt, a 2013 Unicef report documented that 
49% of girls and women and 52% of boys and men regard FGC as a religious 
requirement (United Nations Children’s Fund 2013, 71). According to the same Unicef 
report, Egyptian Muslims have generally higher prevalence rates (92%) compared to 
Egypt’s Christian Coptic minority (74%) (United Nations Children’s Fund 2013, 73). 
This is the first known study that differentiates between Muslims and Christians and 
indicates separate numbers of prevalence. Adherence to Islam, Christianity or 
indigenous religions does not correlate to prevalence rates of FGC.  In some countries 
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such as Tanzania, Niger, Nigeria predominantly Christians perform female genital 
cutting practices (United Nations Children’s Fund 2013, 71).  
The importance of the category of religion within international organizations 
involved in the global campaign against FGC has been on the rise in the last decade. 
This evolution corresponds with a larger interest and desire to involve religion within 
the field of development. Religion has come more and more to be perceived as an asset 
that can play in an important role in addressing issues of development (Clarke and 
Jennings 2008; Kirmani and Phillips 2011; Tomalin 2013). Concerning FGC, this is 
highlighted for example in the most recent standard Demographic Health Survey’s 
module on FGM/C where many questions about women’s decision whether or not they 
circumcise their daughters have been dropped while the question whether FGC is 
perceived as required by religion is preserved (United Nations Children’s Fund 2013, 
66). Religion has become one of the cornerstones of anti-FGC campaigning and this 
entails a turn towards religious leaders to assist in bringing about social and cultural 
change. The mobilization of religious authorities to speak and argue against the 
practice have been evaluated as very persuasive and effective in different national 
contexts (Gruenbaum 2005).  
4.2.2.5 Conceptualizations of religion in the global campaign  
The embrace of religion in campaigning efforts against FGC lead to strong statements 
in campaigns on international and local levels discussing Islam’s relation to FGC.  It is 
not my aim to give an exhaustive or representative overview of existing discourses on 
the relation between FGC and religion in documents of international agencies, but I 
will look at a selection of documents that have been considered as landmarks in the 
global campaign against FGC.  
One of the first interagency statements (World Health Organization (WHO), United 
Nation’s Children Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)) 
declaring  their joint efforts to eradicate FGC worldwide enumerates the reasons why 
communities practice FGC. It mentions among religious reasons the following:  
“female genital mutilation is practiced by Muslims, Christians, (Catholics, Protestants, 
Copts), animists and nonbelievers in a range of communities. It has, however, 
frequently been carried out by some Muslim communities in the genuine belief that it 
is demanded by the Islamic faith. However, the practice of female genital mutilation 
predates Islam and there is no substantive evidence that it is a religious requirement 
of Islam” (Organization 1997, 4). 
The text literally repeats an earlier text by WHO that was later published by 
Women’s Studies Quarterly and authored by Efua Dorkenoo, one of the earliest and 
best known activists and authors on women’s health, women’s rights and in shaping 
the global campaign against FGC. This piece also adds “Although female genital 
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mutilation is not mentioned in the Koran, it is frequently carried out in some Muslim 
communities in the genuine belief that it is part of Islamic tradition” (Dorkenoo 1999, 
89).  
Religious reasons are mentioned as just one category among other factors that 
contribute to the perpetuation of the practice. Islam is represented as an authoritative 
system that demands certain requirements of which FGC is not a part.  It is possible to 
establish that FGC is not part of Islam on the basis of a lack of evidence, such as the 
Qurᶜan and presumably other textual evidence. Muslims who in reality do practice 
FGC, perform this in the genuine belief that FGC is required by Islam.  Muslims are here 
then represented as  implementing what they belief are requirements in their religion. 
This discourse is representative of the general message and tone in many other 
campaigning documents as well as scholarly writing on the topic of FGC. A text that 
gives an in-depth overview of classical Islamic scholarship as part of a study by the 
Population Council and funded by USAid states the following: 
“It is our sincere hope that this booklet will make a significant contribution in 
clarifying the correct Islamic stand towards Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting, 
also known as FGM/C, and will benefit its readers in making informed decisions 
to abandon the practice.”(Asmani and Abdi 2008, ii).  
The conception of Islam is again one of an authoritative system that has a clear and 
unambiguous stand on the subject at hand, the correct standpoint however, needs to 
be revealed and clarified, which the authors set out to do. Muslims (the readers) are 
expected to adapt their religious agency accordingly. After being better informed 
about the classical scholarship and after understanding that this scholarship does not 
prescribe FGC, they are expected to abandon the practice.  The importance of 
distinguishing the correct from the false Islamic point of view, is often emphasized in 
declarations and policy making. In the following fragment, the representative of 
Burkina Faso addresses the UN plenary of the General Assembly after the adoption of 
the Resolution 67/146 “Intensifying global efforts for the elimination of female genital 
mutilations”: 
“Today, more than 100 million women and young girls are the victims of a 
practice that is justified under false cultural and religious pretenses. […] 
Resolution 67/146, which was just adopted, is not just a strong political message 
engaging the entire international community, but also a message of hope for 
millions of girls and women who each year risk suffering that odious and 
discriminatory practice in the name of tradition and, falsely, of religion.” (2012) 
(UN General Assembly Resolution 67/146, 2012) 
In December 2012, the United Nations General Assembly accepted its first 
resolution declaring its intention to stop the practice the worldwide. This resolution 
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was celebrated widely by activists as an important achievement as this commitment 
had not yet been declared on this broad UN level. The speech delivered by the 
representative of Burkina Faso shares the same understandings of religion as 
operating as an authoritative system that maintains definite positions and of how 
believers practice their religious agency, wrongly following religious precepts.  It 
corresponds with other documents of international agencies:  
“It has long been recognized that people’s behavior can be conditioned by a 
variety of factors. In the case of FGM/C, these factors include beliefs or 
knowledge about various aspects of the practice – for example, that it causes 
harm, which is a correct belief, or that it is mandated by religion, which is an 
incorrect belief.” (United Nations Children’s Fund 2013)  
These conceptions of religion and religious agency that are dominant in development 
and activist writing equally appear in academic scholarly writing on religion, gender 
and development:  
“Why is religion implicated? FGC is practiced across diverse societies, mostly but 
not always in Muslim communities. It is commonly linked to cultural tradition, 
and religious scholars at different levels and from different traditions have 
condemned the practice, asserting that it has no basis in religious teachings or 
texts. But many women and men justify FGC as required by their religion and 
some religious leaders, especially at community level, believe this to be true. […] 
By understanding what drives mothers and fathers to cut their girls and 
persuading religious and community leaders that the practice is harmful and 
unnecessary, communities are encouraged to agree, together, to end the 
practice. In short, a practice seen by many as intrinsically religious turns out not 
to be so.” (Marshall 2010, 38).  
In these discourses, the examination of the relation between FGC and religion 
becomes reduced to a narrow phrasing whether FGC is religious / Islamic or not. This 
reduction reveals certain assumptions and conceptualizations of what religion is, how 
“it works” and what religious agency is. The one-dimensional question whether FGC is 
Islamic or not already expects a one-dimensional and definite answer no, hereby 
dismissing any religious connection or sanctioning. Both the question and the answer 
are placed in a seemingly timeless and placeless framework, attributing  a  rigid and 
static character to Islam as a system of religious belief and experience.  Such 
characterizations resonate strongly with archetypal orientalist representations of 
Islam, as essentialist and static (Berkey 1996, 20). 
The local social and cultural frames in which religion is practiced seem to disappear 
from the analysis. Subsequently, religion becomes a universalized category and a 
“potentially meaningless term of reference” (Beattie 2005, 68). These documents 
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seem to not only represent religion as a universalist and decontextualized category 
but also what happens within that field or how it operates, obtains these 
characteristics. If “religion” evaluates a certain behaviour to be not a part of the 
religious realm, then this statement also takes on a similar universal and 
decontextualized truth. The statement and conclusion that there is no basis within 
“Islam” for the practice of FGC, indeed becomes a hollow universalized and 
meaningless statement because it is devoid of any historical and social context.  
Simultaneously with assessing the relation between FGC and Islam in a static and 
definite manner, an emphasis is being put on religious authorities and male scholarly 
elites. This trait has earlier been  identified from a feminist anthropological angle as 
predominant and defining characteristics within the field of religious studies. The 
tendency to focus on textual religions and elites that authoritatively interpret and 
shape religious belief effectively excludes (female) others, as has been strongly argued 
by Rosalind Shaw (Shaw 1995). 
A narrow conceptualization of religion precludes more dynamic understandings of 
the relation of FGC to Islam and subsequently it precludes more diverse strategies for 
working towards social and cultural change and transformation. An anthropological 
perspective that looks at personal lived reality and wider social-political dynamics 
sheds light on other aspects of the relation between FGC and religion, such as 
processes of religious identity formation and expression. Making FGC un-Islamic in a 
formal manner does not erase the religious meaning given and experienced through 
the practice of FGC. 
4.2.2.6 Employing religious leaders in the global campaign, the magic 
bullet? 
Religious leaders are commonly being invited to participate in larger coalitions 
consisting of a variety of national and international actors. The interest and incentive 
to involve religious leaders follows from the “social convention model” that has been 
serving as an underlying theoretical model for campaigning initiatives (Mackie 1996; 
Wilson 2013). This model is based on the historical experiences of ending footbinding 
practices in China. Female footbinding has ended successfully after small associations 
of parents pledged and declared publicly not to footbind their daughters “nor let their 
sons marry footbound women” (Mackie 1996, 999).  
The concept of organizing public declarations by entire communities that pledge to 
abandon this harmful practice became a model for anti-FGC campaigning. It relies on 
the idea of having a broad popular coalition in support of change and therefore 
involves  “all sectors of the public, including village and religious leaders, men, and 
young people” (Dorkenoo 1999, 95). Pioneering activists Nahid Toubia and Eman 
Sharief (and founders of RAINBO Research, Action and Information Network for 
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Bodily Integrity of Women) promote a community-wide approach that includes 
“negotiating with men, soliciting the approval of religious leaders and ultimately 
bringing pressure on the circumcisers to join the rising consensus” (Toubia and 
Sharief 2003, 256). Religious leaders have come to be seen as crucial stakeholders in 
this project for social change: 
“Without a firm stand by religious leaders, it is difficult to convince believers of 
communities that promote female circumcision to end it. This is why the role of 
Islam in promoting female circumcision cannot be underestimated, whether 
teaching is implicit or explicit. It is the moral responsibility of religious leaders 
to show concern for the welfare of the Muslim women and the community at 
large by clarifying the ambiguity that surrounds female circumcision” (Wangila 
2007, 118-9). 
Religious leaders are encouraged and called upon their responsibility towards their 
communities of believers to guide them toward doing the right things. They are 
assumed to have a certain power over their communities and should use that power 
wisely and if necessary persuade them, such as on the topic of FGC. Authors explicitly 
or implicitly state that leaders morally ought to take a stand against the practice: “It is 
unfortunate that religious leaders have not taken a firm stand to denounce this 
practice, even though they believe that it is not sanctioned by their founders” (Moges 
undated). The firm stand is then expected to be a definite no answer to the question 
whether FGC has a religious or Islamic ground. It goes unquestioned in such calls for 
religious leaders to get engaged publicly in the debate over female circumcision and 
take a firm stand whether such “methodologically problematic oversimplifications for 
strategic aims” are legitimate and productive (Ali 2006, 101).  
What is not considered in such calls is that leaders do not form a single homogenous 
bloc, that no Islamic religious authority possesses a conclusive authority, nor does a 
unified “Islamic answer” exist, as demonstrated in the previous section. Unlike the 
legitimacy question, which addresses the broad  Islamic community, we can question 
and examine to what extent religious leaders’ participation is productive in 
persuading citizens to abandon FGC.  Representing religious leaders as key actors for 
successful interventions because of their powerful authoritative status “poorly reflect 
the social realties and obscure the intrinsic complexity of power relations”, as Marit 
and Terje Østebø demonstrated for the case of Ethiopia (Østebø 2014, 90-91) and as I 
aim to demonstrate in this and following chapters.  
As anthropologist Ellen Gruenbaum pointed out for Sudan, it was a large 
configuration of international funders, the Sudanese government and local 
organizations - of which most are secular and led by feminist women and men – that 
was responsible for building awareness-raising programs and arranging the 
participation of religious authorities in Sudan’s national campaign (Gruenbaum 2005, 
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107). Critical anthropological work on the involvement of religious leaders in anti-FGC 
campaigns in Ethiopia shows the political and religious intricacies of involving 
religious leaders in large coalitions. Ethiopian initiatives that built coalitions and 
involve religious leaders - together with foreign funders, the national government and 
local NGO’s - seemed to act unconsciously of existing power structures (Østebø 2014). 
These authors criticize an unquestioned reliance on and mobilization of religious 
leaders and ask rhetorically whether they are really the magic bullet in the campaign 
to end the practice of FGC. I concur with Østebø and Østebø that the larger 
constellation of power structures is an essential parameter to evaluate initiatives 
against. This entails for example the observation that many religious scholars’ 
involvement in efforts to abandon the practice by dissociating FGC from religious 
doctrine would not have occurred without the larger secular setting that was made 
possible by foreign donors funds and with the support of national governments. In 
Egypt, host to a major center of sunni Islamic scholarship, education and authoritative 
opinion making, al-Azhar, a similar coalition of actors succeeded in having the 
country’s religious authorities condemn FGC most strongly in 2007. This initiative was 
the result of collaboration between a foreign NGO, Egyptian activists, government-led 
national campaign and progressive religious scholars within al-Azhar (see Chapter 3).  
The literature on FGC and its relationship to religion is an interesting case that 
shows “how the demands of advocacy and scholarship can clash” (Ali 2006, 98). It is 
true that advocates of abandonment of the practice resort to sweeping statements 
about FGC that does not speak truth to Islamic classical scholarship. Conversely, other 
literature can equally be seen guilty of offering distorted versions of the relation 
between FGC and religion out of a desire to demonstrate that FGC is inherently Islamic 
or highly connected to lived Islam. Van der osten-Sacken and Uwer for example 
consider the practice to be an Islamic problem because it is largely being practiced by 
Arabs and Muslims, referring to the central importance of Egypt in the Middle East:  
“That FGM is so prevalent in Egypt should arouse suspicion about the practice 
elsewhere in the Arab world, especially given the low appreciation for women's 
rights in Arab societies. But most experts dismiss the connection of the practice 
with Islam. Instead, they explain the practice as rooted in poverty, lack of 
education, and superstition” (Osten-Sacken and Uwer 2007, 3) .  
The question of the relation between FGC and religion is therefore important and 
in need of conceptualization that does not become part of the clash of advocacy and 
scholarship.  It is interesting to ask why dominant transnational activist discourse fails 
to recognize the fragmentation of religious knowledge on the one hand and the 
diversity of ways in which FGC connects to values and expresses underlying norms 
and sensitivities belonging to an overall religious ethics (such as female modesty, the 
importance of virginity or Islamic concepts such as “qiyama”, “wali”). By having a 
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strong focus on text and legal authorities, “the religious” is imagined in a constricted 
way. The relation between activism against FGC and religion is generally understood 
as one of conflict, whereby one aims at differentiating and separating the practice from 
the realm of “the religious”, which poorly reflects social reality. Richard Gauvain, for 
example, in a recent landmark monograph on salafism in Egypt, discusses the rejection 
of FGC by some salafi women based on their understanding of Islam in which “khitan 
[FGC] is irreconcilable with Islam’s fundamental kindness towards women, and, 
despite its appellation, should not really be described as an act of purification” 
(Gauvain 2013, 200-201).  
Kecia Ali argues that there are solid reasons for Muslims to abolish the practice 
“without making grandiose claims about its ‘un-Islamic’ nature, but such an approach 
requires a willingness to treat not only jurisprudence but also sunna and hadith as 
products of their time, with limited currency as formal rules for contemporary 
application”(Ali 2006, 98-99). This would move the discussion about the relation 
between FGC and Islam beyond the simplistic binary of “Islam forbids it” or “Islam 
allows it”. However, for immediate change and for those advocating abandonment of 
the practice in the field, “sweeping statements by authorities” may prove more 
effective (Ali 2006, 99). Moving beyond an understanding of Islamic classic 
scholarship as offering definite answers and hereby sidestepping a generally observed 
tendency toward authoritarian Islamic law-making opens up possibilities of 
reconnecting to ethical and moral concerns that characterize the early period of 
Islamic scholarship (Abou El Fadl 2001). The practice of FGC is not static and neither 
is theological interpretation. Innovative hermeneutics such as practiced by Islamic 
feminists enables a reinterpretation of hadith and fiqh that speak disapprovingly of 
FGC. Such hermeneutics make it equally possible to re-interpret other practices 
concerning gender and sexuality that are considered to disfavor women.  
4.2.3 Anthropology of FGC and religion  
Islamic canonical texts and theological interpretation are important to understand the 
current context of meaning-giving to the practice. Theological discussions and the 
heritage of Islamic scholarship have become of significant importance in anti-FGC 
campaigns within the development framework – as we have seen above –  and many 
opponents and proponents of the practice look for support within this scholarship. 
Circumcision, however, also obtains religious meanings and associations in ways that 
are far removed from literal, textual or dogmatic frames of reference or justifications. 
In other words, the relation between religion and FGC is often established by practices 
and rituals that are far less concerned with what “official religion” has to say about it 
(Silverman 2004, 428). For many women, religious practices that are performed 
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traditionally are part of an overall sense of what gives meaning in life. For the 
Sudanese women that anthropologist Janice Boddy encountered in her fieldwork, 
“religion is nothing less than an entire way of life, religion and tradition are not merely 
intertwined, they are one and the same” (Boddy 1991, 15). 
Anthropological work has shown through ethnographic study how FGC often forms 
part of larger worldviews in which the boundaries between the categories of culture 
and religion fade (Boddy 1991; Gruenbaum 2001). Unlike the tendency to categorize 
culture from religion separately as illustrated by development initiatives and by public 
discourse in Europe concerning male and female circumcision (Barras and Dabby 
2014), anthropologists point at the intertwined character of both categories of culture 
and religion.  
In what follows, my purpose is not to offer an exhaustive overview of relevant 
anthropological work but I will rather look closer at critical anthropological work on 
several national contexts in which the relation between religion and FGC is being 
redefined under the influence of anti-FGC campaigning. In the first place, this work 
illustrates how the constitution of moral personhood is embedded in a religious 
framework, and secondly it shows how colonial history, current global relations and 
the global campaign against FGC reshape people’s understanding of FGC. The practice 
figures as a central aspect of locally interpreted religion in West Java (Newland 2006) 
Guinea-Buissau (Johnson 2000) and Kenya (Wangila 2007). In these cases, 
simultaneous developments and disruptions of discursive oppositional pairs (e.g. 
West/global South, global/local, modernity/tradition) create a cultural dynamics that 
redefines meanings of FGC.  
4.2.3.1 Muslim moral personhood 
Newland’s study on West Java in Indonesia and Johnson’s on Guinea-Bisau in West 
Africa are ethnographic studies that show how FGC has been fully incorporated into 
local Islamic tradition and touches on essential aspects of what constitutes Islam, 
namely the acts of worship or ᶜibadat. Not being circumcised prevents women (and 
men) from being considered as Muslim and therefore also prevents them from 
entering mosques and being able to pray. The meanings of FGC center on the 
ontological equality of men and women (before God) and derived from this ontological 
equality circumcision indicates that men and women possess and equal capability of 
attaining ritual purity, which is necessary to pray.  
Newland argues that FGC is just “one of a range of practices that situates the child 
within the community as a moral person” (Newland 2006, 394). FGC is being practiced 
as part of a series of birth rituals (ibid. 397-8). One of the terms being used in West 
Java to denote FGC is the Arabic word khitan. In the Indonesian context this term has 
come to denote the notion of making a person Muslim. The practice as it occurred in 
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Newland’s fieldwork varied “from a symbolic act to the removal of a piece of flesh the 
size of a grain” (ibid. 396). In the case of a symbolic act no actual cutting happens. 
Instead, the midwife recites the confession of faith (the shahada) while cutting the 
umbilical cord  and this makes the newborn Muslim without any form of actual genital 
surgery(ibid. 400). Being ‘circumcised’, whether literally or symbolically, means being 
Muslim and this means that morality is being installed in this person, he/she has 
become a moral person. 
In the villages where Newland conducted her fieldwork, circumcision for boys and 
girls is a way of marking children as Muslims in preparation for the life of prayers, and 
of positioning them in a tightly knit rural religious community (ummat)” (ibid. 397). 
The practice “physically traces Islamic identity on the body” and this means on both 
the male and female body. The practice of circumcision is therefore essentially “an 
expression of the idea that both men and women are considered equal before Allah” 
(ibid. 399). In this understanding of Islam, both men and women are equal in the eyes 
of god and therefore have to meet the same requirements of purification before 
starting prayer. The requirements to reach a state of ritual cleanliness traditionally 
affect women stronger than men (for example occupation of space inside the mosque, 
dress code, the notion of modesty, the consequences of menstruation), while 
interestingly this is not the case with circumcision (ibid. 400).  
Circumcision of boys and girls is first and most of all associated with purification 
and cleanliness of the body: “circumcision does not limit women more than men and 
nor is it used to mark gender difference but rather it reinforces the idea that both sexes 
can attain equal purity” (ibid. 401). Just as FGC is not involved in establishing or 
marking gender difference, Newland shows that her informants neither practice it in 
order to consciously regulate women’s sexuality. On the contrary, the notion that FGC 
enhances or at least accompanies sexual enjoyment is widespread in Java (ibid.).  
Also in the case of  the Mandinga ethnic group in Guinea-Bissau, FGC is originally 
performed as part of initiation rites, the practices vary from symbolic ritual to actual 
cutting and they have become crucial for constituting Islamic moral personhood. 
While FGC practices have traditionally been situated within the larger frame of girls’ 
(and boys) initiation rituals as supported by many ethnographic accounts, the 
religious dimension strongly prevails and has come to determine the practice among 
the Mandinga. Just as in the case of Java, Indonesia, the underlying reasons for FGC 
were not the initiation into adulthood, nor part of a symbolic act of gendering that 
prepares initiates for a life as either “men” or “women”. Instead, Johnson’s informants 
explained that it is first of all “a cleansing rite that defines a woman as Muslim and 
enables her to pray in the proper fashion” (Johnson 2000, 218-9). Some form of 
clitoridectomy (the practices vary among the Mandinga from making an incision in the 
prepuce of the clitoris to excision of the prepuce or parts of the clitoris) is needed to 
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establish a basic cleanliness and purity that enables women to participate in religious 
rituals, which means in the first place to pray in mosques (Ibid. 219-220).  
Second to religion, the “cultural construction of personhood” is another important 
dimension of the initiation rites with FGC. During the initiation rites, children take an 
important step on their way to adulthood by being taught how to act respectfully and 
knowingly with other people and how to endure pain and suffering: “… stoically 
enduring the cutting – which is performed without any anesthetic – is one of the most 
culturally valued displays of strength and courage” (ibid. 223). Accepting and 
enduring suffering and pain is an essential characteristic of adulthood, as both men 
and women have to endure lots of suffering throughout their lives. The importance of 
enduring pain has been noted in many ethnographic accounts of FGC and in Egypt, it 
is an essential component of  what FGC represents (Malmström 2005).  
Wangila explains how FGC in Kenya is part of a larger constellation of practices that 
reflect visions of gender ideologies and how these are embedded within different 
religious frameworks. Stories, songs and folktales that are told among adherents of 
indigenous religions foreground the importance of “women’s fidelity in marriage (and 
widowhood), passivity during intercourse, and courage during initiation, especially 
where female circumcision takes place” (Wangila 2007, 87). Virginity, monogamy and 
sex for procreation were gendered value concepts promoted by Kenyan Christianity. 
The practice of female circumcision then connects with Christian-supported visions of 
the need for women for modesty, “submissiveness, the need to control sexuality, and 
the need for purity and fidelity” (ibid. 91).  
Similarly, FGC forms part of a larger set of gendered practices that express Kenyan 
Islam’s norms on gender and sexuality, such as virginity, prohibition of birth control 
and the institution of gender segregation (ibid. 95). In these cases FGC is not a 
fundamental practice that symbolically establishes moral and Islamic personhood in 
an individual but is rather one particular practice among others that reflect certain 
visions of moral gender norms, sexuality and the right religious life. In other words, 
here, the relation between FGC and religion (both Islam and Christianity) becomes 
established by underlying interconnected and interrelated socio-cultural values that 
express similar norms on gender and sexuality. This occurs across religious fields. Also 
in Egypt there is an association and interconnection of FGC, conservative gender 
norms and religious discourse. I will discuss this point further by means of 
ethnographic fieldwork of anti-FGC campaigning seminars. 
4.2.3.2 Anti-FGC campaigns, changes in practice and identitary responses 
Newland and Johnson demonstrate how FGC is originally embedded in initiation rites 
that symbolically transform boys and girls into men and women but how it has 
gradually become separated from it. This gradual dislocating of female (and male) 
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circumcision from its original embeddedness within initiation rites is thought to have 
occurred throughout history and across geographical areas (Slack 1988, 443-4). The 
link between FGC and initiation rites has become weak and the practice gradually 
became dissociated from marking gender difference and regulating sexuality. Instead, 
in the cases of West Java and Guinea-Bissau, FGC has taken stronger and more 
outspoken distinctly religious and identitary dimensions. Campaigning efforts to stop 
the practice or to encourage a lighter and more symbolic practice have reinforced this 
development toward FGC as a religious identity marker. 
In the 1990s – the period of Newland’s research - the practice was still 
“unproblematized”. The campaign discourse against FGC had already started to 
develop in the international sphere but nations had not yet been asked to develop 
policy against it (Newland 2006, 397). The international campaigning terminology 
“female genital mutilation” was not understood and often did not make sense to her 
respondents in the local context.  
She argues that the association of FGC with Muslim identity is so strong that it 
would be hard for any Indonesian government to enact measures against it. The 
context of East Asia and its specific socio-cultural and political history adds layers to 
the importance of the label of Muslim identity. After world war II, Islam became the 
foremost “militant ideology” against Dutch attempts of recolonization. In more recent 
history, the Islamic identity marker has been “used as a defence against certain forms 
of globalisation such as tourism, television and cinema, which are viewed as morally 
corrupt” (Newland 2006, 396). While she cannot attest to an increase of FGC practices 
- as some have suggested that it would be part of an overall Islamic revivalism - she 
points at the possibility of such response: “Indeed, any policy that is perceived as a 
foreign imposition helps contribute to local stereotypes of the Western world as rich 
and corrupt. Because of Sundanese colonial history, the rural Sundanese in my 
fieldwork area continue to view Westerners with suspicion since, in their eyes, 
Westerners have the power to perpetuate new forms of colonialism” (ibid. 401-2).  
Johnson argues that the religious dimension in the meaning of FGC practices among 
the Mandinga was essential in understanding the ongoing internal debate between 
opponents and supporters, partly as a consequence of the large attention given to 
religious meaning by the campaigns that aim at ending or altering the practice 
(Johnson 2000, 215-6). In Guinea-Bissau, informants kept arguing that FGC was part 
of initiation but in reality about half of the FGC interventions happened outside of the 
context of initiation (ibid. 223-4). This disconnection between initiation rites and FGC 
is partly caused by anti-FGC campaigns and growing resistance against FGC by the 
state and other political actors, and partly by consequences of urbanization and 
modernization (e.g the loss of traditional knowledge and skills to perform initiation 
rites and FGC practices). Campaigns started in the late 1990s encouraged women “to 
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retain the educational and ritual aspects of initiation and do away with the physical 
act of genital cutting” (ibid.224-5). While this form of alternative circumcision – that 
actually ends actual cutting – gains popularity on the one hand, other women resist it 
as they find that actual excision of the clitoris is essential. The latter group of women 
resort to a form of FGC that only involves genital operation and has thus become 
disconnected from the larger rites of initiation.  
Also in the case of Guinea Bissau, campaigns against FGC have been perceived by 
many as efforts by foreigners and non-Muslims to stop Muslims from practicing their 
culture and religion. Most non-Muslim informants considered excision a “bad practice 
that should be stopped” (ibid. 226-7) and reasons given in support of the continuation 
of the practice were usually religious (ibid. 229).  Johnson recounts that “[m]any 
women in the Muslim community told me that the current debate surrounding female 
“circumcision” is just a way for non-Muslims to make money working for non 
governmental organizations (NGOs) in Bissau” (ibid. 230). She witnessed how one 
community organized the “largest initiation ceremony” in the history of this particular 
region, in defiance and opposition of the voices calling to ban the practice (a 
combination of the government, foreign aid organizations and NGO workers) (ibid. 
231). 
This link between religious purity and Muslim identity is so tight and explicit that 
anti-FGC campaigning discourse (whether coordinated by the state, or other political 
and civil society actors) focused their attention on it and attempted to persuade 
women that Islam or the Qurᵓan do not prescribe it. However, Johnson “discovered 
that the relationship between female “circumcision” and Islam extends beyond what 
is explicitly stated (or not stated) in Islamic texts. Whether others claim that Islam 
does not advocate the practice for women is not the issue, since many Mandinga with 
whom I spoke are fully convinced that it does.” (ibid. 220). Johnson demonstrates that 
the official version of Islam and what is represented by canonized Islamic scholarship 
and by universal sunni religious authorities hardly seems to matter for her 
respondents. According to them, including a local religious scholar, there is no doubt 
that there is a passage in the qurᵓan explaining and prescribing female circumcision, 
even if we as humans cannot trace it and are not able to see it with our own eyes. She 
contextualized this opinion by pointing at the importance of the secret, the hidden and 
the deep in African society (ibid. 221).  
Again, we can see similar developments within non-Islamic religions and cultures. 
In Kenya, similar identitary responses occur in which official religious leaders and 
theology are easily discarded. FGC then becomes part of a larger cultural (and 
political-religious) movement that opposes dominant cultural patterns. The 
mainstream Christian churches in Kenya rejected practices such as “polygamy, female 
circumcision, and widow inheritance” but some African Independent Churches (AIC), 
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however, such as the African Independent Pentecostal Church and the Alorini 
churches allow polygamy and female circumcision (Wangila 2007, 91-2). 
Other social groups such as the Mungiki (Thaai Fraternity of Kenya) have a more 
defiant nature. This religious sect - created in the 1980s and combining Christian and 
indigenous religious aspects - is strongly politically opposing the government and 
Westernization while promoting female circumcision and polygamy in a perceived 
return to follow indigenous African values. Ngonya, the leader of the Thaai Fraternity 
of Kenya explains in the film The Day I will Never Forget:  
“Our organization is called Thaai Fraternity of Kenya. Our aims and objectives 
are very simple. We are bent on salvaging our sinking boat or ship of our African 
traditional religion through reviving the lost values of our forefathers. I am not 
propagating anything but I am saying what our forefathers were instructed by 
the almighty, the creator, so in our society we do not have mutilation. What we 
have and we still advocate for it is female clitoridectomy (ibid. 104).  
These cases illustrate how FGC can become part of a postcolonial – cultural, religious, 
nationalistic – reclaiming. The embrace of FGC happens in a deliberate effort of 
resistance against what is perceived as a Western cultural encroachment on local 
norms and values. A reclaiming FGC to designate national, ethnic or religious identity 
seems therefore remains an important reason why the practice persists or invigorates. 
Sally Engle Merry gives the example of the Darfur region in Sudan, where women 
“have been increasing the practice of FGC in an effort to create a more Arab identity 
for themselves” (Merry 2009, 128)  
It shows, in my view, the need for contemporary anthropology of FGC (and religion) 
to look at such processes of reclaiming and identity formation. Indeed, the ways in 
which FGC gathers support as identity markers has not yet received great 
anthropological attention (Walley 1997, 417).  
In sum, in the first years after African and Middle Eastern states gained 
independence the subject of “women’s status”, questions concerning women’s legal 
status and individual autonomy were strongly debated across these regions (Thomas 
2000b, 152) In these early stages of postcolonial independency, gendered social 
practices were often celebrated as “fundamental to a new, postcolonial nationalism”, 
as “a widespread reaction to criticisms about “backward” customs by colonial powers” 
(Merry 2009, 135). Colonial logic essentialized “tradition” and opposed it to 
“modernity”, progress and civilization, serving imperialist politics as it legitimates 
political rule through its civilizing mission. This colonial logic has subsequently been 
inverted by contemporary nationalist reclaiming of cultural practices. Equating 
national freedom and independence with the freedom to live traditional, national, 
customs and culture without interference or attempts of regulation. In this manner, 
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FGC practices can become markers of ethnic, cultural or religious identities among 
groups within post-colonial states, within specific political and historical contexts.  
4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to interrogate the relationship between FGC and religion and 
demonstrate the complexities of anthropological and academic study of this subject. 
Scholarship and activism are often deeply intertwined in literature. Recognizing that 
there is no neutral or objective scholarship, my interrogation aimed at examining how 
religion and FGC have been framed by what has now become the most dominant 
discourse supported by the transnational sphere. In this, I share the concern of 
postcolonial scholars who criticized static notions of culture and dominant binaries of 
modern versus traditional and its parallel of religious versus secular (as shown in 
chapter two). In line with this is scholars of religion’s concern of too great an emphasis 
on the textual corpus of religious traditions and its male authoritative interpreters. 
In scholarship, and in development campaigns against FGC, the relation between 
FGC and religion (and specifically Islam) has been mainly approached through study 
of Islam’s textual tradition, the Qurᵓan, sunna and hadith. Several ahadith can be 
interpreted as referring to female circumcision and on this basis FGC can be 
considered as a practice that is situated in Islamic tradition, norms and morality. Some 
hadith narratives are found in hadith compilations that are canonized and considered 
as “authentic”, which means hadiths of which it is deemed that there is no doubt of 
their historicity. In Egypt, the most well-known is the saying attributed to Umm 
ᶜAtiyya. In this narrative, Muhammad spoke to a woman (called Umm ᶜAtiyya) who 
used to circumcise girls and he told her “cut little and do not overdo because it brings 
more radiance to the face and it is more pleasant for the husband”. Former shaykh of 
al-Azhar, Jad al-Haq, particularly supported the authenticity of this saying. This hadith 
lays the religious basis for the much referred to principle of moderation in cutting.  
Opinons of scholars are sought who dissociate FGC from Islam and disqualify all 
hadits as unauthentic. Jad al-Haq’s successor, shaykh Muhammad al-Tantawi, was 
exemplary in stating FGC as an un-Islamic practice. I argue, however, that the manner 
in which the question is raised and answered is partial and avoids reflection on more 
profound questions about the nature of Islamic authorities, the weight of Islamic legal 
tradition, especially in relation to contemporary social and ethical questions. By not 
recognizing the Islamic legal heritage that spoke predominantly favorably about FGC 
and considered the practice within Islamic tradition, it is avoided to review this 
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heritage. Furthermore, supporting the reduction of the question to a single and 
absolute yes or no answer, reinforces authoritarian Islamic opinion making (Abou El 
Fadl 2001). In sum, dominant discourse that asks whether FGC is Islamic or not, does 
not recognize the inherent pluralism in classical Islamic scholarship, the 
heterogeneity of actual practicing communities, and the diversity of lived personal 
experiences. 
Anthropological scholarship that focusses on the relation between FGC and religion 
has shown how FGC has formed part of initiation rites that constitutes moral, and thus 
religious, personhood in the individual. Initiation rites that include FGC place the 
young adult as a full, moral, member of their community. Over time, the practice 
became more detached from the larger configuration of rites. In other cases, the 
relation between FGC and religion (both Islam and Christianity) becomes established 
by underlying interconnected and interrelated socio-cultural values that express 
similar norms on gender and sexuality. This connection cuts across religious 
differences and may be shared by both Christians and Muslims. What is clear in those 
contexts is how the religious and the cultural (or secular) are inextricably intertwined. 
A campaigning discourse against FGC then here intervenes and aims to separate both 
concepts. It first “clears” religion from culture, by making FGC unIslamic and secondly 
it seeks authoritative approval from religious leaders. In the next chapters, I will 
discuss how this relates to Egypt. Through ethnographic research I hope to show how 
also in Egypt FGC is connected through underlying norms and values that are both 
cultural and religious and that are shared by both Christians and Muslims.  
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Chapter 5  
Analysis of anti-FGC discourse in awareness-
raising seminars 
5.1 Introduction 
One of the main components of this research project was to look at how transnational 
campaigning is implemented and “being done” on a local scale. My focus hereby lies 
on the translation of discourse that has been mainly created and managed by 
international agencies and declarations (e.g. the Declaration on Violence Against 
Women of Geneva 1993, the Cairo Declaration following the ICPD in 1994, Unicef and 
UNFPA) into the local Egyptian context. This chapter aims to characterize these 
processes as processes of translation,  dissemination and vernacularization. The main 
departure point is here that we look at processes of local societies receiving and 
adapting to “externally induced values” (Harrison 1997). As was established earlier 
(in chapters two and three), the idea to abandon FGC has been mainly experienced as 
such an external demand coming from the transnational political community as 
symbolized by UN agencies. The ways in which this demand becomes accommodated 
is what I broadly call “translation”. My analytical framework then draws on different 
notions about “translation” concerning gender issues from within anthropology of law 
and human rights (Merry 2001; Merry 2006; Tsing 1997), critical development 
studies (Bernal and Grewal 2014; Cornwall, et al. 2007b; Harrison 1997). 
The transnational level to a large extent defines concrete campaigning discourse 
and largely shapes the style and colour of campaigning. As was shown in the two 
previous chapters,  international and Egyptian campaigning changed over the last 
decades and witnessed several shifts. The most important shift in the international 
genealogy of campaigning discourse is the shift from an emphasis on health and 
reproduction (and the related field of population politics) toward an emphasis on 
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rights, such child’s and women’s rights. Contemporary campaigning discourse 
remains strongly embedded in rights-based discourse. Concerning changes in 
Egyptian campaigning, we have seen a shift from a more activist-based grassroots 
form toward a state-led form of campaigning. Today, activities take place under the 
auspices of the Egyptian Population Council on the one hand, and by numerous NGO’s 
– Egyptian and international NGO’s – mainly sponsored by UNFPA and Unicef on the 
other.  
This chapter’s analysis is mainly based on presented discourse and recurrent 
themes in the series of awareness-raising seminars (seven seminars organized by the 
Coalition and three that I attended independently around Luxor). The themes were 
selected as well on the basis of interviews and informal talks with trainers of seminars, 
other NGO-personnel and participants of the seminars and includes study of grey 
literature such as organizational reports and currently used training-of-trainers 
manuals. The discussion is thus based on a selection of themes that were recurrent 
across the seminars and that were equally often brought up in a large number of 
informal conversations and casual meetings.  
In what follows, I will first situate myself in literature concerning constructions of 
gender in Egypt and will argue for the importance of an anthropology of gender and 
development projects. Secondly, I will explore some notions that have been advanced 
concerning “cultural translation” such as global norm diffusion, glocalization, 
vernacularization to set the framework in which I looked at the flow of information 
and educational campaigning discourse from the transnational to the national and 
local level. Third, I will examine the notion of awareness-raising and critical 
consciousness raising in a postcolonial context and which underlying assumptions are 
governing this work. Fourth, I will engage in a thematic discussion of what was said 
during awareness-raising seminars and how these themes connect to cultural tropes 
in the life worlds of attending women.  
This chapter thus looks at how transnational discourse promoting the 
abandonment of a cultural practice – FGC – becomes embedded in a local, Egyptian 
context. In this anthropology of gender and development by means of the case of anti-
FGC campaigning in Egypt, I engage with questions of cultural translation and 
vernacularization. I interrogate constructions and (re) productions of gender norms 
and will argue that the call to abandon FGC is a demand for accelerated social-cultural 
change that is answered by a  concern to preserve cultural values. This wish to 
preserve and continue certain cultural/religious transmission is most clearly 
expressed in the desire to maintain dominant gender norms and family values.  
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5.2 Exploring notions of cultural translation  
5.2.1 Norm diffusion, glocalization and vernacularization 
Before analysing concrete translations of discursive frames in the context of Egyptian 
campaigning against FGC, I will explore some main notions that have been formulated 
in terms of travelling ideas and norms or translation/vernacularization. Within the 
fields of political sciences and international relations, thought on travelling ideas and 
norms is most famously theorized by Finnemore and Sikkink in their concept of the 
norm life cycle. In this view, norms “evolve in a patterned "life cycle" and different 
behavioural logics dominate different segments of the life cycle” (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998, 3). By taking women’s struggle for universal suffrage as a case study of 
a local/global campaign, the authors theorize the emergence of international norms, 
their adaptation (“norm cascade”) at local/national levels and their internalization as 
a three-stage cycle (ibid. 9). The first stage of norm emergence is characterized by 
attempts to persuade, in the second stage a dominant majority accepts the norm and 
in the final stage the norm has been taken for granted. While this norm diffusion 
theory is also thought to be relevant to societies’ adoption of (new) norms, it refers in 
the first place to the level of nation-states and their negotiation and adoption of 
norms.. Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm diffusion theory can therefore be relevant to 
explain state behaviour and the processes of persuasion and acceptance of anti-FGC 
legislation by states, what sociologist Elisabeth Boyle has analysed within the frame 
of neo-institutionalisation theory (Boyle 2002).  
Another concept that aims to capture travelling ideas and norms across national 
contexts is “glocalization”. Glocalization can be seen as “the hybridization that can 
result from such an intense and increased cross-cultural contact” between the global 
and local. Sociologist Roudometof explains the use of this neologism as coming out of 
“the necessity of finding a linguistic expression capable of capturing the fact that cross-
cultural interaction does not lead to homogeneity but can also produce cultural 
heterogeneity” (Roudometof 2014, 22). He is among the first to theorize this new 
concept elaborately and uses it to differentiate between processes of globalization on 
the one hand and glocalization on the other: “.. (I)f globalization accounts for the 
cultural uniformity of the formal aspects of nationhood, glocalization is about realizing 
(and accounting for) the specificity and ‘uniqueness’ of each national experience” 
(ibid. 25). The term of glocalization is then used to denote the differences and 
particularities as opposed to the homogenizing mechanisms of worldwide integration 
that came to be identified with the term of globalization.  
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The term of glocalization has gained currency in the social sciences and humanities 
since the 1990s and is particularly widespread in fields of business, consumer culture, 
management/organization, geography and urban studies, study of popular culture, 
sports and music (Roudometof 2015, 4). While it is especially common in business and 
marketing discourses and popular press, also academic researchers in the above 
mentioned fields make increasingly use of the “glocal” terminology, hereby sitting 
along similar terms such as hybridization, syncretism, transculturalism etc.  
(Roudometof 2015, 2). 
In the awareness-raising seminars, trainers engage in processes of conscious 
transference of values and norms from trainer to attendees (or development 
beneficiaries). Sessions of awareness-raising seminars are therefore conscious 
attempts of norm diffusion/ transference on a small scale and in a short-term time 
frame, to other individuals. In the longer term and on a larger scale, these sessions aim 
to contribute to social and cultural reform of society at large, by abandoning the 
practice of FGC. Informative campaigning discourse travels between different levels 
and layers of educational activity, starting from training materials, over seminars until 
the receiving end of any participants and “beneficiaries.” Female circumcision is 
conceptualized in this entire chain of formation as a cultural – and not a religious - 
practice that is harmful to women’s sexuality.  
Processes of translation play therefore an important part in this traveling and 
transference of information. My understanding of cultural translation of anti-FGC 
discourse relates to both 1) levels on which knowledge is produced and disseminated 
and 2) the ways in which communities and individuals connect to these discourses. In 
the words of Sally Merry: “As ideas from transnational sources travel to small 
communities, they are typically vernacularized, or adapted to local institutions and 
meanings” (Merry 2006, 39) (emphasis original). Indeed, whereas anti-FGC discourse 
is primarily developed by international agencies, the campaigning discourse has 
changed drastically when it is presented in awareness-raising seminars to the women 
beneficiaries.  
Anthropologist Julie Hemment studied how internationally developed discourse on 
Violence Against Women was locally received and adopted in Russia. Her case study 
is the setting up of women’s crisis centers, a process that has been scripted 
transnationally. She problematizes the global standardization of information: 
“The transnational campaigns brought a key resource to Russian women’s 
groups – a model around which to organize. This model is accompanied by skills 
and methods that can be transferred and taught. For activists, the crisis center 
model offers a blueprint and a framework. Neat, easy to learn, it has become a 
kind of do-it-yourself NGO kit. Foundation support has financed the production 
of easy-to-use materials – brochures, posters, and handbooks, including one 
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titled “How to Create a Women’s Crisis Center”. The Moscow-based network 
offers trainings, assisted by foundation support. These teach not only crisis 
counseling and nondirective listening skills (the hallmark skill of crisis centers), 
but also management, NGO development, and public relations” (Hemment 2014, 
127-8)  
Hemment describes the impact of the international formula of crisis centers on local 
Russian women’s groups. The standardized packaged information facilitates the 
trajectory of setting up a center, creating activities, offering training that ensures 
continuation and expansion. She demonstrates however that this easiness and 
availability to set up centers that work on Violence Against Women, regularly conflicts 
with Russian women’s groups own perceived needs, priorities and understandings of 
violence. These features can be compared to some characteristics of anti-FGC 
campaigning: the transnational discourse is highly scripted and setting up activities 
and trainings easily unfold according to a kind of blueprint, a predetermined pattern 
and course of action. What is not accounted for, however, is that, “[i]n the process, 
projects and campaigns are transformed, not imported statically” (ibid. 128). 
Hemment’s work asks and echoes the concerns that shaped my own research 
questions: “How do these circulating discourses arrive, what are the processes of 
“translation” they undergo (Tsing 1997), and with what do they interact as they are 
“glocalized”? (Hemment 2014, 128).” 
Indeed, the ways in which local groups and individuals connect to transnational 
discourse through their own life worlds is one of my main approaches of cultural 
translation. This refers to how transnational discourse against FGC is transmitted and 
transformed through existing Egyptian cultural tropes and themes and therefore how 
it intervenes in existing cultural debates, which will be discussed in detail further on 
in this chapter. Secondly and related to this is the more abstract approach to cultural 
translation as the question how knowledge is produced, disseminated, circulated and 
continues to permeate society. This point of concern was equally shared and 
expressed by political scientist Sonia E. Alvarez in the larger context of women’s rights 
and NGO-work :  
“Feminist NGO products are also often used in educational and conscientizacion 
activities mounted by other (nonfeminist) social movements and civil society 
organizations, including many trade unions and grassroots groups. Moreover, as 
the vast constellation of knowledge products generated by NGOs wind their way 
through feminisms’ multilayered political-communicative webs, they also often 
cross over into other (overlapping) networks of social movements, civil society 
organizations, and social and political institutions. Feminisms’ discursive 
“baggage” thus sometimes travels “unaccompanied”, so to speak”. (Alvarez 2014, 
290).  
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The “unaccompanied” travelling of anti-FGC discourse from within NGO’s, passing 
through localities by awareness-raising seminars (in addition to debates and video 
clips on national television) and soaking into society at large is indeed another 
concern that is discussed in detail in the thematic analysis of anti-FGC seminars in this 
chapter. First, I elaborate further on the overall theoretical framework by looking 
closer at the meaning of awareness-raising activities. How have the terms of 
awareness-raising or conscientization become predominant in initiatives of gender 
and development? What exactly is meant by these activities and what are its 
underlying assumptions? 
5.2.2 Interrogating awareness-raising in the postcolonial 
context: Freire and conscientization 
This section draws attention to some forms of participatory educational activities and 
initiatives of awareness-raising that have been developed and/or implemented in 
postcolonial societies. By looking at “Participatory Action Research” (PAR) and the 
concept of conscientization, I aim to analyse some of the grounding principles 
underlying current day awareness-raising actions against FGC1.  
The origin of conscientization activity can be brought back to the development of 
Participatory Action Research that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s within the context 
of postcolonial – recently independent – societies. The overall aim of PAR was to 
“throw off the intellectual, social, and material shackles of colonialism” (Glassman and 
Erdem 2014, 207). This approach was simultaneously being developed and practiced 
in several places across the Global South. Glasmann and Erdmen argue strongly for the 
democratic roots and bottom-up nature of the PAR approach: “The evolution of these 
ideas was decentralized and international with scholars and activists collaborating 
across various countries, ranging from Tanzania to India, from Brazil to Peru, Chili, 
and Columbia. (..) In Tanzania, these ideas were described as participatory research, 
in Brazil and Chile the approach was named popular research, in India it became 
synonymous with initiatives of Gandhi and the poet educator Tagore, and in Columbia 
it took on the name of action research” (ibid. 207-8).  
These developments occurred from the 1960s on and found their most famous 
expression in the philosophy and pedagogy of Paulo Freire, who was in contact with 
 
                                                     
1 I limit myself deliberately to a discussion of grounding underlying principles of awareness-raising and so 
I will not discuss the (scant) literature of more concrete, action-oriented research into campaigning 
interventions and strategies for individual norm adaptation and behavioural change concerning FGC (Diop 
and Askew 2009; Johansen, et al. 2013). 
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and an inspirational influence on all of these local experiments of participatory adult 
education across the continents. Freire emphasizes the importance of education as a 
key basic starting point for individual and collective social change. He “was interested 
in establishing social change through adult education programs that increased 
autonomous behavior, allowing individuals to break away from the habits of thought 
developed and maintained by dominant groups through carefully defined everyday 
activities” (ibid. 209). Learning was thus considered and conceived as an essential 
mechanism for self-development that enables one to look critically at her cultural 
surroundings and social-political conditions. Since 1977, a network was established 
connecting different sociologists and educators with the aim of developing PAR 
methods and theory, Freire being one of the people who supported and tied the 
network together (ibid. 211).  
Awareness-raising, consciousness-raising or conscientization can be considered 
one of the most important underlying values and aims of PAR methods. Glasmann and 
Erdmen analyse the PAR acronym with participation as vivencia, action as praxis and 
research as conscientization. For this discussion, I will only focus on the meaning and 
role of what is called conscientization. In his Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Freire 
proposes that “a tipping point of change for oppressed populations is the time they 
begin to question and critique actions they may have once believed were critical to 
their survival” (ibid. 213). The process by which to reach this tipping point of 
increased insight is called conscientization, “conscientizagao”, or critical 
consciousness (Freire 2005, 33). 
Freire explains what he means early on in the Preface to Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed: “(B)y making it possible for people to enter the historical process as 
responsible Subjects,
  
conscientizagdo enrolls them in the search for self-affirmation 
and thus avoids fanaticism” (ibid. 36). His aim here is to dismiss claims that reaching 
a state of critical awareness and consciousness leads individuals to collapse or 
fanaticism. He wants to argue for the benefit and necessity of reaching critical 
consciousness in order to reach liberation from oppression. 
What is important for us, is the general humanist individualist background in which 
Freire’s highly influential pedagogy is embedded. Through the process of 
conscientization, individuals become subjects, and as the translator notes “The term 
Subjects denotes those who know and act, in contrast to objects, which are known and 
acted upon” (emphasis in original) (ibid. 36). For people to reach a status as a full 
human being that possesses full agency and responsibility, a process of 
conscientization of reaching “independent self-consciousness” (ibid. 36) is required. 
Indeed, Freire situates the pedagogical process of self-development and liberation 
within the larger historical struggle of what he calls “humanization”, which is people’s 
struggle to be free from oppression and thereby to be recognized as human beings.  
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“Because it is a distortion of being more fully human, sooner or later being less 
human leads the oppressed to struggle against those who made them so. In order 
for this struggle to have meaning, the oppressed must not, in seeking to regain 
their humanity (which is a way to create it), become in turn oppressors of the 
oppressors, but rather restorers of the humanity of both. This, then, is the great 
humanistic and historical task of the oppressed: to liberate themselves and their 
oppressors as well.” (ibid. 42). 
The struggle of humanization means the struggle against forms of oppression and 
it is through and by the creative effects of this struggle that one regains and creates 
humanity. The overall frame of Freire’s pedagogy is therefore a humanist worldview 
in which social change and transformation starts with a change in individual – rational 
- consciousness. He proposed a pedagogy for the oppressed to enable them to reach 
critical consciousness of the conditions of their cultural and socio-political oppression. 
This subsequently enables them to elevate themselves and others (including their 
oppressors) to a higher level of being human and to a fuller humanity. In Freire’s 
words: “The pedagogy of the oppressed, animated by authentic, humanist (not 
humanitarian) generosity, presents itself as a pedagogy of humankind” (ibid. 54).  
These underlying preconceptions of the individual and of struggles for progressive 
social change are given attention because of their importance for and lasting influence 
in contemporary development initiatives. While the format of awareness-raising 
seminars as we find them today within development projects is not implemented with 
an intention to be true to Freire’s vision and philosophy of the promotion of critical 
consciousness, it is clear that the educational form of awareness-raising seminars is 
associated with or inspired by aims and methods as expressed in the Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed. Training sessions that foreground active participation and collaboration 
with the aim of raising awareness and setting up future programs for social change 
are common components of contemporary development initiatives. Especially within 
the scope of gender equality, activities often aim to educate, to train, to raise 
awareness and critical consciousness to one’s cultural and social environment. 
Here it is important to differentiate between the overall history of teaching of 
gender as a new social theory on the one hand and the implementation of awareness-
raising around gender in a postcolonial context of development initiatives on the 
other. The former refers to the intellectual development of gender theorizing, 
education and knowledge production whereas the latter refers to the transfer of 
knowledge on gender theory and the transfer of gender equality values. Although both 
activities can take place in both the global North and South, the argument is that in a 
context of postcolonial societies and development initiatives the emphasis generally 
lies on the transfer – not the production - of knowledge and values. Over the last 
decades, gender training of development practitioners and the mainstreaming of 
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gender in development projects became a common and widely discussed activity. 
Consequently, gender theory and values of gender equality are commonly transferred 
by means of awareness-raising meetings within a postcolonial context  (Kabeer 1991; 
Sibbons 1998). Equally, the global campaign against FGC relies heavily on awareness-
raising as a means to transfer knowledge, norms and to change social behaviour. 
5.2.3 Awareness-raising against FGC: “accelerating social-
cultural transformation” 
The following section focusses on awareness-raising activities as they are organized 
within the frame of the global campaign against FGM/C. The belief in education, 
training and raising consciousness about the harmful effects of FGC has been key in 
the global campaign’s discourse and practice since the beginning. As early as the 
Copenhagen Conference in the mid of the UN Decade for Women in 1980  (see more 
in Chapter 3), “UNICEF announced that its support to anti-FGM activities was “based 
on the belief that the best way to handle the problem is to trigger awareness through 
education of the public, members of the medical profession and practitioners of 
traditional health care with the help of local collectives and their leaders” (UNICEF 
2005b, 2). Unicef is one of the main international agencies organizing and funding 
projects in an attempt to eradicate FGC and deems education and awareness-raising 
as the most important means to achieve this goal. In a 2005 report, it states that  
“Strategies to end FGM/C must be accompanied by holistic, community-based 
education and awareness-raising. […] In many ways, bringing an end to FGM/C 
requires changing community norms and societal attitudes that discriminate 
against women and subjugate their rights to those of men. […] Programmatic 
interventions must aim to promote the empowerment of women and girls 
through awareness-raising campaigns and increasing their access to education, 
as well as their access to and control of economic resources” (ibid. 32).  
Unicef emphasizes here the importance of a holistic and community-based approach 
to education and awareness-raising. Treating FGC as “a social convention”, strategies 
to abandon the practice started to focus to alter this social convention or norm (Diop 
and Askew 2009; Mackie 1996; UNICEF 2005a). Intervening on a community level by 
connecting different levels of the population became indeed a working model across 
African countries and regions where the practice is performed. A main example of 
“good practices” that was developed and emulated was the process of working toward 
a “village declaration” by means of years of awareness-raising activities and education 
among various groups of the community. In the final declaration that concludes the 
program, an entire community commits to abandon the practice. This model was 
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originally developed and spread by the Senegalese, international NGO Tostan. 
Tostan’s work served as an example in regions and countries and is promoted by 
international agencies as Unicef and UNFPA as a successful model of community-
based educational work (Diop and Askew 2009, 309) . 
Unicef describes Tostan as an NGO that is “specialized in non-formal education” that 
“developed and refined an approach that is based on the promotion of human rights. 
It embodies key elements necessary to change a social convention at the community 
level, including collective action, public declaration and organized diffusion [of the 
new knowledge]” (UNICEF 2005a, 23). Unicef values the participation of the 
community in developing the program and in defining its own problems and solutions, 
as was described earlier in the above-mentioned PAR (Participatory Action Research) 
approach. A 2005 report states that “The most successful [programs] are participatory 
in nature and generally guide communities to define the problems and solutions 
themselves. They harness positive village traditions to encourage people to speak out 
and engage in discussion. They equip families with knowledge on human rights and 
responsibilities” (ibid. 23). 
It is clear from these descriptions that the goal of such programs is social change by 
means of educational awareness-raising. While focusing on individuals and increasing 
their knowledge, the larger aim is the community and generating change on the social 
level. Moreover, the aim is more specifically to accelerate social-cultural change or 
transformation, as illustrated by a - now outdated - program in Sudan entitled, the 
“Programme for Accelerated Social Transformation (PFAST)”.  A Unicef report states  
“Prior to 2002, the Sudanese Programme for Accelerated Social Transformation 
(PFAST) had focused on providing information about the health consequences 
of FGM/C and on disassociating the practice from Islam. As it became apparent 
that this alone was insufficient to promote the abandonment of FGM/C, the 
programme began to shift its focus to the empowerment of women and the 
promotion and safeguard of human rights” (UNICEF 2005a, 24).  
According to this report, the shift to women empowerment and human rights had 
positive results: “… traditional beliefs about honour, shame, virginity and 
marriageability are being debated; and there are indications that many community 
members, including leaders, are questioning their deeply-held convictions and 
exploring alternative behavior” (ibid. 24). Social norms concerning virginity, 
marriageability, female modesty and decency are indeed values that are highly 
connected to FGC practices, also in Egypt. Further in this chapter, the treatment of 
these norms during the sessions that I attended will be discussed. 
The general goal of the global (and Egyptian) campaign against FGC is thus 
accelerating social transformation and the employed means are awareness-raising, 
information campaigns, or “advocacy and behaviour-change communication (BCC) 
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Programs” (Diop and Askew 2009, 307). More recently, over the last years, more 
attention has gone to methods of awareness-raising and the type of communication 
that is employed in such activities. Unicef states that “[t]he most effective 
communication initiatives for behavioral change engage community members as 
active agents who control their own development” (UNICEF 2005a, 25). The idea 
behind this style of communication is to be “non-directive” and “non-judgmental” 
(ibid. 25). Again, - as in the PAR approach - the aim is to let communities self-define 
their issues and  solutions and to move away from “focusing on social problems to 
appreciating cultural richness and facilitating a process of cultural change”; and to 
move away from “expert-driven solutions to community-driven solutions, which 
involves engaging communities in the identification of existing structures and 
appropriate solutions” (ibid. 25).  
The raising of critical consciousness, doing conscientization, or creating a “critical 
mass” (UNICEF 2005a, 13) of one’s social norms are key. In the context of Kenya, 
feminist activist and religious studies scholar Mary Nyangweso Wangila discusses 
awareness-raising in anti-FGC campaigning in terms that refer directly to Freire’s 
“Pedagogy”:  
“Conscientization through education is a strategy of educating and sensitizing 
circumcising communities about the possible consequences of female 
circumcision. Because it addresses the issues of cultural dynamism and the need 
to abandon outdated values and practices, this strategy seems most effective in 
changing attitudes toward the practice and eventually leading to its 
abandonment” (Wangila 2007, 74).  
Wangila adds: “There is also a fundamental need to integrate religious values in the 
conscientization process: religious ideals promoting female circumcision can be 
countered only by the use of religious ideals that demystify any religious links 
associated with this practice” (ibid. 76). In other words, the conscientization or 
awareness-raising model seems a perfect fit to persuade women for changing 
behavior and for addressing the relation between FGC and religion as one that needs 
demystification. Wangila pleads that the religious links that are associated with the 
practice need to be shown as invalid in the context of the seminars, which is indeed a 
common practice in the Egyptian seminars as will be shown in the thematic discussion 
of this chapter.   
In chapter three, we have seen how a community-based approach has been adopted 
in Egypt. The Egyptian NGO, CEOSS, worked since decades through community-based 
work, such as in the village of Deir al Barsha where a village-level declaration to 
abandon FGC was formulated. Later, the Free Village Model served as a national 
strategy by the National Council on Childhood and Motherhood. Through the national 
plan, awareness-raising activities were organized across the country . 
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Research that aims to document and measure the effects of awareness-raising 
efforts are scarce. Some existing research compares between groups’ attitudes and 
behaviours where one group was exposed to an awareness-raising program and 
another group did not. This research looks at Senegal and the Tostan NGO’s efforts 
particularly (Diop and Askew 2009; Diop, et al. 2004; UNICEF 2005a). These studies, 
conducted by Population Council researchers, are generally positive about the impact 
of campaigning efforts. Characteristic for these examined projects is a holistic 
approach, which means that initiated educational projects cover various spheres of 
life. Tostan’s nonformal education modules cover “democracy and human rights, 
problem-solving, hygiene and health, literacy, math and management skills” (UNICEF 
2005a, 23).  
Examining the impact of awareness-raising efforts, however, is beyond the scope of 
this research project, as my main focus was on understanding and mapping existing 
perceptions and authoritative discourses on FGC in contemporary Egypt, which 
includes international campaigning discourse. Therefore it does not question the 
impact or effects of campaigning discourse on women’s behaviour and whether they 
intend to abandon or perpetuate the practice. It rather attempts to show how 
transnational discourse becomes translated when formulated in the Egyptian context 
and how this discourse connects to existing cultural themes and debates that touch on 
gender issues (e.g. values of virginity and modesty, marriage, women’s role in society). 
Secondly, it looks at how this translated discourse further permeates society and 
intervenes in those cultural debates. It is to this thematic discussion that I will turn 
now. 
5.3 Representations of FGC as a Harmful 
Cultural/Traditional practice 
5.3.1 FGC as a cultural/traditional practice 
5.3.1.1 FGC as a “hard tradition”: ᶜadat wa taqalid 
The following analysis is based on what was presented and discussed in a series of 
awareness-raising seminars. I have elaborated on my used methods and the selection 
of discursive themes in chapter one. FGC is first and most of all described as an ancient 
tradition that Egyptians inherited from previous generations. It is argued that it is 
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passed on from mother to daughter without much thinking. It is simply part of Egypt’s 
“ᶜadat wa taqalid”, customs and habits, as presented by a trainer as follows:  
“It is an Egyptian tradition from the Pharonic era and Egypt is now one of the 
most highly classified countries in FGC prevalence. Local organisations 
(gamaᶜiyat) that work in this field say no, we have entered the twenty-first 
century. FGC is an Egyptian tradition that we inherited from our forefathers, 
many traditions later appeared to be wrong (ghalat) and we have the right to 
dislike them (wamin haᵓina inana nanfer minha) and it’s our right to address 
them (min haᵓina an ihna natsada litilka al-ᶜada) and to say no to all traditions 
that turned out to be bad (waniqul la likul al-ᶜadat illy baᵓit wihsha). Have we 
not inherited things that are not religious?” (6 2013) 
This trainer turns to the content of his talk by formally pointing out how FGC 
belongs among Egypt’s traditions that civil society organisations are fighting against. 
He emphasizes the traditional aspect of FGC, placing it in a past time frame and 
contrasting it to the current time that no longer should witness it. FGC is an inherited 
practice among others that we now understand after gaining the current knowledge 
that it is wrong and bad. Moreover, the practice is not religious, states the trainer, so 
therefore nothing prevents us from abandoning it. Another trainer equally shares this 
point of departure:  
“We have all been raised on the idea that it is necessary to circumcise, we [today] 
are giving you realistic information and something that is studied and very clear 
and in the opinion of religions (biraᵓi al-adyan) it is well-known whether it was 
right or wrong. You are free (antu ahrar). There is a difference between the case 
when I know the information [and the case when I don’t]. God will judge my 
actions (rabbina hayhasib ᶜaleha), but if I don’t know the information, then it’s 
ok, I’m just ignorant (law mish ᶜarfa khalas). I will clarify the subject to you and 
we take the decision” (2 2013). 
Here the offer of information and awareness is brought in connection with 
subsequent individual religious responsibility as to how to act and follow up on this 
new knowledge. Learning informed knowledge on FGC in the seminar is one thing, 
deciding on what to do with it entails a religiously responsible answer because the 
believer will be held accountable for his actions on the day of Judgment. If one is 
simply ignorant and does not possess the right information, one cannot be blamed or 
punished, but when one does possess the right information and chooses not act on it, 
he or she will be held accountable. This session continues by inquiring the women’s 
ideas of FGC, what they know about it and whether they think it is right or wrong: 
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“Trainer: Today we will talk about FGC in the context of traditions and customs. 
Before I start, you tell me what you know, look you can talk freely and clearly 
and tell your opinions without embarrassment.  
Woman 1: FGC is a tradition and we found ourselves practicing it like this 
Trainer: good, what is your opinion? 
Woman 2: I feel that I don’t have harm because I was circumcised in a proper, 
sound way (betariqa salima) 
Trainer: that is your opinion, who else gives me her opinion? 
Woman 3: I think that it is wrong 
Woman 4: it is not right 
Woman 5: what does the word FGC (khitan) actually mean?” (2 2013)  
This fragment illustrates the atmosphere in this and most other seminars, women 
are invited to speak freely and give their opinions, while the trainer will listen and 
then explain her answers and educate them on her views of the subject. Concerning 
the traditional aspect she states the following:  
“how did we as Egyptians take this tradition? […] A long time ago, even before the 
advent of religions (qabl al-adyan hata), convoys in Africa exchanged between and 
amongst themselves. This tradition was very well-known in Africa and we have taken 
it from those convoys, so it became a tradition of us, my grandfather and your 
grandfather, my mother and your mother performed it on us while they imagined they 
were doing right. So this became an inherited practice among Christians and Muslims. 
In Africa are the hardest and ugliest  people, if you saw how they circumcise you would 
slap your face with your hands (hatlatamu). They close the inner and outer pieces of 
the girl [labia minora and majora] and at the time of marriage they close her up, and 
this destroys the girl” (2 2013) 
Awareness-raising activity often involves a separate discussion dedicated to this 
dimension of tradition, referred to as “al-khitan from the perspective of customs and 
traditions”. Other fields or perspectives that are usually referred to in this manner are 
“religion”, “medical sciences”, and “law”. The following excerpt illustrates another 
start of a discussion of FGC as a tradition, and also traces FGC back to African origins 
while emphasizing “the hard and ugly” type of the practice “in Africa” or “in Sudan”2: 
“Let’s see from the perspective of customs and traditions (men nahyat al-ᶜadat 
wa taqalid) and our religions (adyanna). We have seen that this subject is not 
present in religion or in shariᶜa, and neither in medical science (tibb) but that it 
 
                                                     
2 With “the ugly type” reference is made to the so called pharaonic circumcision, or type 4 of FGC as 
categorized by the World Health Organization. This type entails the cutting away of (part of) the clitoris, 
labia majora and minora and the sewing of the vulva so that only a small opening is left for passage of urine 
and menstrual blood.  
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is rather a tradition. They said in the past that it was a Pharonic tradition because 
when we visit temples we find Pharonic drawings on the walls. They were 
drawing male circumcision only, not female circumcision (al-khitan bitaᶜ al-
wilad bass mish bitaᶜ al-banat). This movement (al-haraka di) comes from 
Sudan, that performs the hardest form of khitan” (1 2013).  
Starting the discussion on FGC as a tradition, it is pointed out that it used to be wrongly 
traced back to the Pharonic era in which representations of male genital cutting can 
be found on wall drawings. It is argued that unlike the male variant FGC is not 
represented in Pharonic culture but that this instead originates from Sudan. Sudan is 
often referred to as the original place from which Egyptians have learned and 
inherited FGC. What is at stake here is distancing oneself from those African origins 
and the conceived inheritance of an African practice. The South of the Egypt plays a 
significant role in this symbolic and literal distancing from what is perceived as 
African and backwards, in the anti-FGC campaigning rhetoric.  
5.3.1.2 “The saᶜid” as a mythical space  
Geographically bordering Sudan, the south of Egypt, known as Upper Egypt or the 
saᶜid, is usually described as the main place where FGC is said to be performed. This 
term covers the area stretching from the south of Cairo until Aswan, the last great city 
close to the Sudanese borders. This region is predominantly rural and sociologically 
characterized by low literacy levels, especially for women. The saᶜid plays a central 
role in the imaginery of where and how FGC is performed. When speaking broadly on 
the subject of FGC in Egypt, most of my interlocutors and virtually all trainers in 
seminars would immediately associate the practice with the saᶜid  and mention 
poverty and illiteracy as main explanatory factors. When looking at the statistics, 
however, the difference in prevalence between Upper Egypt and Lower Egypt (the 
Northern Provinces also known as the Delta region) is as far not as radical as is 
assumed. According to the Egypt Demographic and Health Survey (EDHS) 2014, the 
difference is even negligible. The report indicates a prevalence rate of FGC among 
ever-married women between 19 and 45 for Upper Egypt of 95% and for Lower Egypt 
of 92% (El-Zanaty and Associates 2015, 186). In fact, the highest differences in 
prevalence are marked by the urban-rural parameter and most of all the level of 
wealth, with a prevalence of 97% in the quintile of lowest health, and 81% among 
those in the quintile of highest health (ibid. 186).  
These factual differences are not well-known nor mentioned, as the saᶜid continues 
to play a major role as the foremost site where “backwardness prevails” and 
development is needed. Many characteristics associated with age-old popular and 
cultural traditions such as superstition, illiteracy, irrationality fit easily with the 
prevailing stereotypes concerning the the saᶜid region. In the series of awareness-
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raising seminars this feature was often clear through the telling of stories happening 
in an undefined time and space “in the saᶜid” or by people coming from “the saᶜid”. A 
woman in a seminar intervened to tell the following short anecdote : “Someone coming 
from the saᶜid [in Cairo] said he wanted to marry but she was not circumcised of 
course so he did not marry her and told her ‘I don’t want you, you are not circumcised” 
(5 2013).  Similarly, a trainer told the following story: 
“There is worse than this, I will tell you something that happened in the saᶜid. 
It’s about some woman who was not circumcised while everyone knew this. 
They scandalized her while she was walking but she was a courageous girl (hiya 
bint talaᶜit gadᶜa) and she stopped in front of them. Come and see this village, I 
tell you, now 99 percent does no longer circumcise their daughters. We have to 
stop and stand in front of those who say that you have to cut. Don’t let anyone 
influence you, don’t let your mother-in-law influence you” (5 2013) 
In this fragment the saᶜid again is represented as a place where the worst conditions 
are imaginable while at the same time the girl featuring in the story is spoken about 
as courageous and able of bringing about change. Only by her great courage and sound 
judgement, her entire village is said to have become convinced to abandon FGC. The  
saᶜid is portrayed as an area in which people are behind, in this case meaning that they 
still perform FGC, as opposed to Cairo or urbanized areas which supposedly no longer 
practice FGC. Opposing tradition and going against social-cultural norms is therefore 
seen as particularly hard in the saᶜid and requires courage and bravery, like the 
woman in the second anecdote.  
As Catherine Miller argued, “The Saᶜid, as an ‘internal other’, came to play a 
fundamental symbolic role in the Egyptian society, a role that was historically 
endorsed by the rural areas or the Bedouins in contrast to the Cairene urban society” 
(Miller 2004, 25). As an internal other, inhabitants of the south, saᶜidis, indeed 
symbolize those features that Cairenes prefer not to possess. By associating FGC  with 
backwardness and saᶜidi culture, one aims to distance oneself from the practice and 
encourage others to do the same. Through a combination of storytelling - or rather 
anecdote telling -  and mystifying places and people who still practice FGC (“in the 
saᶜid”) both trainers and attending women engage in rhetorical strategies to persuade 
others to discontinue FGC.  
5.3.1.3 Traditional reasons for FGC: “to calm her down” 
After establishing FGC as a hard tradition, with its origins in past and faraway places, 
trainers address a group of reasons that Egyptians have traditionally evoked for 
practicing FGC. Women are asked to give the reasons as they know them for practicing 
FGC and other traditional practices that are associated with it. The operation of FGC is 
for example sometimes followed by other traditional medical customs such as 
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covering the wounds with certain herbs: “In some places they place garlic, onion and 
artemesia and cover the wound with it, in other places they put vinegar, salt and 
onion” (1 2013). The topic is addressed by one trainer as follows: 
“-Trainer: because of which reason does the girl need to be circumcised, what 
does it mean to be circumcised/cleansed (titahar)? Does it mean that she is dirty 
and needs to be cleansed? (yaᶜni hiya aslan nagsa fabititahar)? 
-Woman 1: maybe in order for her to calm down?  
-Woman 2: the entire problem is that if the girl grows up, this piece [the cut 
pieces, clitoris and/or labia] causes friction (ihtikak) 
-Woman 3: I have circumcised my three daughters and they are all fine”(5 2013) 
First, in raising the question, the trainer refers to the association of the word tahara 
with ritual cleansing. Tahara in its broad meaning refers indeed to acts of ritual 
cleansing which are required under certain conditions before one can engage in acts 
of worship. In the specific context however, the practice of FGC is denoted. In her 
question, she connects the current colloquial usage of tahara as FGC with the meaning 
of tahara in a larger religious understanding of ritual cleansing and asks rhetorically 
whether FGC should be considered as an act of cleansing. Women generally do not 
conceive of FGC as an act of ritual cleaning as those acts are clearly delineated and 
well-known in the Islamic discursive tradition. Some women in the seminar offer their 
answers as to why FGC remains practiced and part of Egyptian customs.  
The most widespread understanding of FGC is that it “calms women down”  in the 
sense that it reduces their sexual desire or appetite. Understood is here the notion that 
uncut genitalia cause friction and excitement to women and this excitement puts her 
to test in maintaining modest behaviour. Experiencing sexual excitement may lead her 
to act on it and lose her chastity and virginity. It is a widely accepted idea that the risk 
of friction of the clitoris and/or labia is the major underlying rationale for why people 
practice FGC. Both in the awareness-raising seminars and in informal conversations 
and short casual talks I would usually hear friction brought up immediately, often in 
reference to hot weather and the hot climate especially in the south of the country. A 
trainer in a seminar tried to delegitimize this reason in the following way:  
“Many say that we circumcise because of that particular piece [organ], that when 
a girl wears tight trousers, rides a bicycle or mounts a donkey - as it happens in 
the south of the country (saᶜid) - that friction occurs and that she gets aroused… 
Do you really believe that when any girl wears trousers that friction occurs and 
she gets aroused? She will actually not get aroused. […] When we wear clothes, 
we first feel them and then we adapt to them and we don’t feel them anymore. 
Our bodies adapt to them.(5 2013) 
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The trainer tries to delegitimize the widespread idea that the clitoris is naturally 
too large and needs some form of adaption lest it cause friction and excitement. 
Experiencing friction and sexual arousal may lead to sexually loose behaviour and this 
needs to be avoided because chastity and virginity until marriage is a major ideal 
gender norm.  
A few other reasons related to the size or function of the clitoris have been 
traditionally mentioned as grounds for FGC. For example, the belief that the clitoris 
may expand and grow outrageously and would start to resemble male genitalia if not 
cut3. A woman attending a seminar stated: “but, some organs become large so they 
become in need of such thing like FGC and other ones happen to be small” (5 2013). 
Another traditional reason that is sometimes brought up relates to childbirth: 
“because they say that one if not circumcised will not be able to give birth and have 
children” (5 2013).  
The principal reason, however, is the idea that women need to be calmed down by 
FGC because their sexual desire would otherwise not be controllable. Here, it can be 
understood implicitly that women’s libido is greater than men’s. This comparison is 
usually not made explicitly and this idea seems to be less widespread as I didn’t hear 
it mentioned often and it was not dealt with it in the seminars. Rather, this explicit 
comparative reasoning seems to represent conceptions of older generations. 
Anthropologists Richard Antoun and Jacques Berques, for instance, noted this in their 
research of rural Jordan and Egypt in the 1960s and 1950s respectively (Antoun 1968, 
679).  
Similarly, other perceptions of FGC by urban lower-class Cairene women that were 
documented by anthropologist Maria Malmström point at a another conceptualized 
understanding between FGC and women’s sexual desire and enjoyment. These women 
differentiated between two types of sexual desire: superfluous – exterior - desire that 
is represented by uncut genitalia and the outer body and real – interior – desire that 
is represented by the vagina and the interior body. Only the second type is a correct 
and morally acceptable type of sexual desire that women experience after having 
entered sexual relations with their husbands (Malmström and Van Raemdonck 2015). 
According to these perceptions does FGC affect women’s superfluous desire only, 
which can also be understood as “calming her down”. As such, FGC is not considered 
to be harmful to her sexual desire or enjoyment.  
Also anthropologist Linda Newland’s argued that among Muslims of West Java, 
Indonesia “women do not perceive female circumcision as harming their sexual 
desire” (Newland 2006, 401). Newland debates the appropriateness to use the word 
 
                                                     
3 For more on cultural anthropological literature on FGC as rites de passages marking gender differences, 
see chapter 1.  
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harm in relation to female circumcision in her fieldwork areas: “If the issue of harm is 
questionable, the stereotype that female circumcision impairs sexual enjoyment is 
also undermined by an idea that the practice enhances sexual enjoyment, which seems 
to be widespread throughout Java (Berninghausen & Kerstan, 1992; Darwin et al., 
2002). While the impact of Indonesian forms of circumcision on sexual pleasure 
cannot be measured, such a response calls dominant and broadly Western notions of 
sexual embodiment into question” (Newland 2006, 395). 
In contemporary campaigning discourse in Egypt, however, it is argued that FGC 
does not affect sexual desire but that in contrast, it does harm women’s ability of 
sexual enjoyment.  It is exactly this focus on lack of sexual enjoyment that is 
represented as being harmful and as having a series of negative personal and social 
consequences.  
5.3.2 FGC and chastity: disconnecting FGC from sexual norms and 
morality 
The previous section discussed the main reasons why FGC has traditionally been 
performed, based on analysis of what was said and discussed in awareness-raising 
seminars, a large number of informal conversations and casual meetings. The 
principal belief that I encountered in my fieldwork is that female genitalia (clitoris and 
possibly the labia minora and majora) need inspection because they may be excessive 
and therefore need adaption. Their size may cause friction and arousal, putting the girl 
to test in maintaining correct moral sexual behaviour, namely keeping her virginity 
until marriage. The common belief is thus that FGC alters but also protects women’s 
sexuality by reducing her ability to feel desire. In this perception, circumcising girls 
ideally prevents them from being tempted into pre-marital sexual relationships. 
Campaigning educational efforts address this perception and attempt to disconnect 
FGC from sexual norms and morality by making a crucial distinction between 1) the 
effects of circumcision on sexual desire on the one hand and 2) sexual enjoyment on 
the other.  
In the following, I will first show how circumcision is explained in educational 
campaigning discourse as not affecting sexual desire, stating a negative relation 
between FGC and sexual normativity and hereby invalidating the principal reason and 
common belief behind the practice. Secondly, it is argued in the seminars that FGC 
does affect the ability to feel sexual sensations and to reach sexual enjoyment and 
satisfaction. This means that the practice is represented as harmful for healthy sexual 
relations, which are contextualized as marital relations. Marriage emerges as the 
major locus through which the problematic and harmful effects of circumcision are 
being  addressed and discussed.  
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5.3.2.1 “Circumcision Does Not Affect Female Sexual Desire” 
“Female circumcision does not control or diminish female sexual desire (ar-ragba al-
ginsiyya) before or after marriage. Female sexual desire is the same as male sexual 
desire. It is ruled by certain centres in the brain and is not affected by the presence or 
absence of the genitalia or by the increase or decrease in the size of those organs. 
Female sexual desire functions just like male desire through many stimuli among 
which the most important are: the basic human senses (sight, smell, hearing, touch 
and taste), external sexual stimuli, the mind, imagination, previous sexual experience 
and personal psychological and affective predilections” (Coalition of NGOs against 
FGM 2013). 
The text that is used to educate future trainers of awareness-raising seminars 
argues that circumcision does not affect female desire because it functions in a similar 
manner as male sexual desire, governed by the brain and the senses. Adjusting or 
cutting women’s genitals will not affect or diminish her sexual desire because the 
stimuli causing her desire are originating from the brain. Circumcision is therefore not 
helpful to guide a girl in her behaviour and secure conduct that is deemed proper, 
namely abstaining from sexual contact until the day of her marriage.  
“Circumcision does not affect female sexual desire, circumcised women have similar 
sexual desire like non-circumcised women as long as her mind and senses are sound. 
The brain is the sole organ in the female body that is responsible of governing sexual 
desire and behaviour, whether that [behaviour] is right or wrong. Partial or complete 
cutting of external female genitalia cannot control her behaviour. Education of the 
mind and its cultivation through religious education, human morals and correct 
scientific knowledge is the sole guarantee for the right female behaviour before and 
after marriage” (Coalition of NGOs against FGM 2013). 
The training material argues that circumcising girls will not and cannot affect their 
sexual behaviour. This means that the text disconnects circumcision from the girl’s 
ability to feel sexual desire and keep control over her sexual behaviour. In this way it 
refutes underlying motivations and meanings of circumcision and instead proposes 
different means to ensure behaviour that is deemed proper. Subsequently, the text not 
only delegitimizes the reasons for practicing circumcision, but also argues for the 
abandonment of the practice due to its harmful effects. The genital surgery that 
(partially) removes the clitoris and/or labia leaves the girls damaged and harms her 
capacities to experience sexual sensation. The theory that it is the brain that governs 
our sexual desire is expressed in one of the seminars in the following manner:  
 “trainer: if I have taken it away, will this keep the girl chaste? Will it keep the 
girl respected and well-behaved? (haykhally bint muhtarama webint al-nas). We 
are now in the month of Ramadan, what’s happening in this month? I have been 
fasting all day and after fasting I go home and find my mother preparing food. I 
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encounter the smell of garlic in heated oil in preparation of molokhiyya and this 
is the first thing that happens, I smell it.  
After that, before the canon shot [that announces the breaking of fasting], mom 
presents a piece of chicken with the mulukhiyya [Egyptian vegetable dish], so 
now I have also seen the chicken and the mulukhiyya. I have also heard mom 
praising the food, saying Allah to the smell of mulukhiyya, Allah to the meat and 
Allah to the chicken and how beautiful it looks…  
Then the call of the evening prayer sounds and mom keeps saying things that 
make me desire the chicken, so I have smelled and seen and heard of the 
chicken’s taste and smell  and just before the canon shot, I also touch the chicken, 
so the only thing remaining is eating it. So what have I been using all along, my 
five senses, and it is exactly the same when it comes to sex.  
Does it make sense that your husband approaches you while being among your 
kids and he says I want to do this and that now? Of course not, so where does 
this [sexual desire] originate from? From the brain. The final part is the part of 
ejaculation/satisfaction (qadf) and that [requires the clitoris] and that is the part 
of whatd you think that it excites everything. Well, on the contrary, I’m sorry but 
do I let the doctor cut off my breast, or my ear because of arousal? You have to 
use your brains, if we use our brains no one ever can fool us again. For these 
things it is required that all our five senses are working” (2 2013)  
This trainer explains the working of the brain as the sole responsible organ for 
sexual desire by means of the five senses. Emphasizing the use of our brain and senses 
in raising our desire she delegitimizes the point of view that female genitalia alone 
raise sexual desire and steer behaviour. Similarly, another trainer illustrates this as 
follows:  
“Trainer:  Someone here has mentioned ‘so that the girl does not get horny 
(hayga)’, no, we will use the scientific term and say, so that the girl does not 
become excited (mithara). We will explain where does excitement originate.  
When one sees a particular scene on television, or hears a word. When one hears 
talking about sexual organs, this could possibly cause sexual arousal.  So where 
does this originate? If you want that your daughter does not misbehave 
(matimshish ghalat) then you should cut her head off!” (1 2013) 
Sexual arousal is thus caused by use of the senses, by seeing or hearing things that 
the brain registers and processes. The complex interaction between mind and senses 
is used to invalidate the point that FGC has an influence on controlling women’s sexual 
desire. A final illustration: 
“Trainer: marital relations [engaging in sex] are more than just friction. There 
need to be roots to the marital relation. I need to mobilize my feelings first and 
feelings are not just situated in that part of my body. Because there are other 
parts of your body that excite, the lips, the chest, the act of touching excites, the 
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nice words that a man addresses to a woman excite. These things that excite 
enter me and what is it that mobilizes them? The brain, so in this case, if I don’t 
want my daughter to be like this, shall I remove her neck, because her neck 
supports her head and brain?” (5 2013) 
The next step in the seminars is to argue that FGC is in fact harmful because it 
reduces women’s ability to feel sensations.  
5.3.2.2 Conceptualizing harm: loss of sexual sensations  
A Training-of-Trainers course explains this as follows: 
“Concentrated in the clitoris are pellets of sexual sensation (kariyyat al-ihsas al-
jinsy), especially in its head, which is why it plays a crucial role in bringing the 
thrill of exaltation (ladhat al-irtiwaᵓ) among women and cutting it affects this 
occurrence significantly. […] Female circumcision is mutilation (tashwih) and 
not a cosmetic surgery of the external female genitalia. No girl is in need of 
circumcision. Cutting away a sound piece of the external female genitalia leads 
to blood clots and wounded fibrous tissue, distorting the genitalia” (Coalition of 
NGOs against FGM 2013)  
The training material underscores that cutting the clitoris causes severe pain to the 
girl and causes damage to the tissue. Circumcision causes her physical harm and 
affects women’s abilities to experience sexual sensation and reach high levels of sexual 
enjoyment. The manual then continues to conceptualize harm as both physical and 
psychological harm, expressed in medical terms. Additionally, these harmful aspects 
are being framed as infringements on the rights of women, men and children.  
A trainer has translated this into the practice of awareness-raising in the following 
way: 
“If I take away a small part of the female genitals, a very sensitive part, the part 
that is responsible for a woman’s feelings (ihsas). [Or, similarly] If I take away a 
part of my finger, will that be harmful or not?” (7 2013) 
Another trainer elaborates on this: 
“Trainer: concerning frigidity and so. So after I have received the message from 
my brain, what is getting started? My feelings are mobilized. After this, when the 
woman responds to this together with the man, then this part [the genitals that 
are cut] is needed, this part is the end not the beginning. We need this part at the 
end of the sexual relation, but the brain is what makes the woman use her 
genitals. So what happens when this part is taken away? The husband wants 
someone who is responsive to him and active but instead he finds a woman who 
acts as cold as ice. So he finds that he doesn’t feel what, that he doesn’t feel 
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enjoyment. So either he resorts to drugs, or he marries another woman, those 
men will get married again and you’ll find yourselves as second wives.” (5 2013) 
It is first pointed out that desire is governed by the brain, and that the performance 
of sex and enjoyment is governed by the genitals. When women are being cut, they 
experience consequently a lack of sensations and enjoyment. This causal relation 
between being cut and lacking sexual sensation and enjoyment is made in a very clear 
and unmistaken way, leaving no room for ambivalence or nuance. In this way, a 
gloomy picture is sketched of cut women as women who are inevitably experiencing 
problems of sexual enjoyment and satisfaction and who cannot hope for change 
because of the irreversible damage that happened by cutting. Another example 
illustrates how this train of thinking has become commonplace: 
“-Trainer: Now, let’s talk about the sexual relation after marriage. I am sorry but 
this is something that everyone knows. All problems in our homes can be 
brought back to this underlying issue. Does circumcision lead to good marital 
[sexual] relations?  
-Women: No!  
-Trainer: Why is this? Because those body parts that have been removed contain 
the sources of sensation (masad al-ehsas), these sources of sensation assist in 
making the relation well between husband and wife. Unfortunately, we take 
them away.” (1 2013) 
A continuing translation and elaboration of this discourse occurs when this 
understanding resonates with how people make sense of these subjects and interpret 
personal experiences. A young man in his twenties working in the tourist sector in 
Luxor and living in a village nearby the city, explained me the following: 
“Everybody knows this now. Sexual frigidity (al-burud al-gensy) of women 
occurs because of circumcision. I did not believe this until one of my friends told 
me his personal story. He had been married but when he slept with his wife she 
did not feel anything, nor did she have any desire. He told me that it was as if you 
were sleeping with a mattress. He divorced her after one week.” (R., male, 27 
years, unmarried)  
5.3.2.3 Psychological trauma  
That women have been harmed by the removal of body parts that enable them to feel 
sensations is an essential part of the talks in seminars. This harm is narrated as both 
physical and psychologically.  
“Trainer: even those who don’t want to tell, they remember the event of 
circumcision and even if they swear they don’t [I am sure that they do 
remember]. One cannot forget this day, it leaves an ugly trace in our lives, it 
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destroyed us and broke us (damarna, kasarna). Our fear let us feeling terrified 
even when we get married. This part [of her body; genitals] we always talk about 
that nobody can see it, but when I expose my daughter to a barber or doctor, 
what else do I do than exposing her [genitals]? I exposed her then and I let the 
girl be psychologically destroyed. […] Does it leave a trace in my life or not?” (2 
2013)  
The act of exposure to a stranger, especially to a man, is emphasized upon in this 
fragment. The harm that is inflicted on the girls is not only physically but it has a 
double psychological impact. Her private parts have been exposed while the 
importance of not showing them is often stressed to young girls. The act of exposure 
is therefore in itself a shocking experience. This in combination with the pain that 
follows from the operation has grave psychological consequences, according to the 
trainers and attending women: 
“Trainer: the girl remains terrified about her private parts because of this event 
of circumcision and when the wedding night arrives she will be terrified when 
her husband approaches her and touches her. Because of the psychological 
shock, she imagines that anybody who approaches her will destroy her. […] The 
first harm is the exposure of her private parts, the second one is the 
psychological shock (awil darar kashf al-ᶜawra tany wahid al-ᶜaqda al-nafsiyya) 
that will influence the rest of her life” (2 2013) 
“Woman: she is reminded that you have exposed her in front of the doctor, you 
have wounded her psychologically and so she doesn’t know how to live at peace 
with her husband” (3 2013) 
It has been clear from almost all previous excerpts that marriage and marital 
relations are put central in the discussion. Both trainers and women address topics 
related to FGC and its possible harms through the avenue of marriage. In the following, 
I will argue that this male-centered approach serves to reproduce and reinforce 
dominant gender norms around two central cultural tropes: 1) “the problem of marital 
relations” and 2) raising “good girls”.  
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5.4 Reproduction of Dominant Gender Norms  
5.4.1 Fighting against FGC translated into fighting for marriage 
The above excerpts illustrate attempts to dissuade women to perform FGC and to 
invalidate the main popular reason for the practice, namely that natural female 
genitalia need adjustment because their size and shape may be too large and cause 
friction and sexual arousal. By disconnecting FGC from sexual desire, trainers in 
awareness-raising seminars emphasize that the harm done by FGC is reducing sexual 
sensation. This harm (among other narrated harms such as psychological trauma) is 
conceptualized as harmful for the marital bond and sexual relations between spouses. 
Misunderstandings between the spouses concerning their sexual responses  is put 
central in this discussion of harm invoked by FGC. Cut women are portrayed as 
unmistakable victims of their condition.  
“Trainer: One of my friends told me recently that she thinks that she has become 
frigid (barda). She is circumcised and says that maybe the problem is because of 
that. Indeed, because if FGC happens, they remove a part that is important for 
feelings or excitement (lil-ihsas aw l-ithara)” (3 2013) 
Because of being circumcised and having experienced psychological trauma these 
women are represented as being “broken” and “destroyed” (kasarna, damarna; it 
broke us and destroyed us). It is assumed that their lack of feeling sexual sensation 
leads to misunderstanding, unhappiness and possibly – or quite likely - leads to 
problems of the marital bond. It may lead to divorce or drive husbands to look for 
polygamous arrangements: “So either he resorts to drugs, or he marries another 
woman, those men will get married again and you’ll find yourselves as second wives.” 
(5 2013). A strong link is thus established in local campaigning discourse between 
having undergone FGC and experiencing problems in sexual (and thus) marital 
relations. This discursive link has successfully found its way to society-at-large. As was 
shown above, young (and older) men repeat the perceived link between FGC, sexual 
problems and divorce.  
This link is also documented in activist-scholarly writings, Abu-Sahlieh, for instance 
who studied both male and female circumcision from an activist perspective argues 
similarly:  
“The amputation of a part of the tongue reduces the sense of taste and gustatory 
pleasure. In the same way the amputation of a part of the sexual organ reduces 
sexual pleasure. If a person does not reach pleasure naturally, he looks for non-
natural means, as drugs, anomalous sexual behavior, and recourse to other 
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sexual partners, with troublesome consequences to marital life. This will be 
explained in this chapter” (Abu-Sahlieh 2001, 158). 
Abu-Sahlieh reports on an “abundancy” of writings that establish a link between 
female circumcision and drug abuse. “The goal of the recourse to drugs, or even to 
alcohol, is to satisfy women by prolonging sexual relation because of the elevated rate 
of frigidity due to female circumcision” (Abu-Sahlieh 2001, 168). Another fragment 
from the seminars illustrates the link that is made between FGC and sexual 
dissatisfaction from a female perspective. Cut women are represented as looking 
desperately for sexual satisfaction: 
“Trainer: When she gets married, will problems arise or not? I will tell you 
something and this is based on facts and experience (wa da ᶜilmiyan), the girls 
who are staying in prostitution houses – and they are far removed from you – 
the majority of them is circumcised and I will tell you why. When those parts of 
the genitals are taken away from the girl, these parts are partly serving the 
function of exciting the woman. When she enters into sexual intercourse with 
her husband, the man will not be bothered [to know about her experience] (al-
ragil yibᵓa mukabir dimaghu) and she will be totally left to herself (wa hiya 
tikhbat dimaghu al-hit). She will not feel him and it enters her mind that this 
husband of hers cannot offer her anything and she does not connect this problem 
with her circumcision. She tells herself that it is her husband who is not able and 
after a while she will look and search for houses of prostitution because she 
imagines that this problem is her husband’s fault” (2 2013) 
While previously men were shown to “be looking outside” of  marriage because of 
sexual – marital – problems, in this fragment women are represented as suffering from 
a similar quest for sexual satisfaction, leading them to go to “prostitution houses”. In 
both cases, FGC is the cause of these problems leading marriages to split up.  
Marriage and marital problems have become the main avenue for Egyptian activists 
(trainers) to approach the troublesome and harmful consequences of having 
undergone circumcision. Focusing on the institution of marriage facilitates connecting 
to the life worlds of the attending women in the seminars. Trainers foreground  the 
ideal of marriage and the idea of a happy and sexually satisfying marriage as this 
connects to the already existing concerns about this major social institution that many 
deem to be in national crisis (high and rising divorce rates in Egypt over the last 
decades)4. Such concern is also in line with conservative - often religious - voices that 
 
                                                     
4 According to the official Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), divorce 
rates have been rising spectacularly over the last decades. The divorce rate would have increased in 2015 
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emphasize the importance of the family unit for social peace and cohesion. 
Conservative voices portray a sound family unit as the cornerstone of the nation. They 
perceive broken marriages and split families as endangering the security and strength 
of the nation in its entirety (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989; McLarney 2015; Van 
Raemdonck 2015a).  
The importance of a good marriage thus becomes prioritized over other concerns 
that women who have undergone FGC may have. The topic of women’s lack of sexual 
response or al-burud al-ginsy (“frigidity”) is relegated to a discussion of the 
problematics of a successful marriage. (If the seminar would enable discussion in the 
manner of a more typical feminist consciousness-raising meeting on the contrary, this 
topic could be an independent topic of discussion or to be a road into discussing 
women’s sexual experiences or frustrations. Such a talk could possibly lead to 
meetings where women can share and learn from each other’s experiences.) In the 
awareness-raising seminars however, women’s lack of sexual response is attributed 
to having undergone FGC and only the latter is consequently problematized. This 
problematization then serves the primary goal of dissuading the attending women to 
abandon the practice of FGC and not to pass it on to the next generations.  
“Trainer: I just wish that after the extent that we have been exposed to abuse 
and have been hurt and the extent in which the relation with our husbands 
suffered, that we don’t repeat it with our children. Every one of us wants that her 
son or daughter to have a better life” (3 2013) 
In sum, the goal of persuasion to abandon FGC is central and the discussion of 
related issues concerning women’s sexuality is geared rhetorically to that goal. Cut 
women are unambiguously represented as broken or destroyed and there is no 
discursive space that allows to contemplate on their plight or to raise suggestions for 
healing or growing closer within marriage through mutual understanding. On the 
contrary, in this process, dominant conceptions of gender norms within marriage and 
family values are reproduced and maybe reinforced. The discussion addresses the 
subject from a strong male-centered perspective. The loss of sexual sensations for 
women as such is not treated as an independent topic of discussion, this (presumed 
inevitable) loss is rather understood as a loss of sexual pleasure for the couple and a 
threat to the strength of the marital bond. Women who are cut are then rather 
understood as not being able to “adequately” respond to her husband’s desires and 
not being adequate wives. In this sense does the blame of responsibility of an eventual 
failure of marriage rest with women. Men’s search for other women by seeking divorce 
 
                                                     
by 83 percent compared to 1996. Capmas’ studies also argues that there was a 10.8 percent increase in 
divorces in 2015 compared to the previous year (Masriya 2016). 
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or entering polygamous arrangements are uncritically presented as normalized 
realities. The fight against FGC has then become translated into a fight for marriage.  
5.4.2 Raising “good girls” 
A second trope that is embedded in dominant gender norms and that trainers in the 
seminars connect to, is that of the “good girl”. The notion of the “good girl” (bint 
kwayisa) was central in virtually all seminars and relates directly to the girls’ sexual 
morality and the importance of chastity. The centrality of chastity and virginity in 
Egyptian moral cultures  is long standing and well-documented (Abu-Lughod 1999; 
Abu Odeh 2010; Antoun 1968; Inhorn 1996). A good girl or a good woman is 
considered well-raised and is respectful of those values that underscore women’s 
modest behaviour towards men. A good woman for instance “never asks for a divorce, 
even if her husband mistreats her” (Inhorn 1996, 121). Lama Abu Odeh discusses the 
central importance of virginity in regulating other gender norms, arguing that such 
restrictive norms not only aim at “the preservation of actual virginity but the 
production of the public effect of virginity. […] Each of the above borders, the vaginal, 
the bodily, and the social, is enforced through a set of regulations and prohibitions that 
the woman is not supposed to violate” (Abu Odeh 2010, 917-8) (emphasis original). 
Abu Odeh presents the hymen as a symbolic border that women need to respect: this 
is at the same time a biological, physical and social boundary that guides women’s 
behavior in an ideal-typical society in which modesty and virginity are central.  
It is especially with reference to the context of religious understandings and 
teachings that the notion of good girl seems to be employed. In the context of 
Bangladesh and women’s activism in Islamic NGO’s, the same notion is used by women 
to refer to “the piety, modesty in dress code and behaviour” (Salehin 2016, 158). 
Islamic NGO’s are differentiated from secular NGO’s by offering microfinance 
programs and moral education in an explicit Islamic frame. The seminars presents and 
promotes the spheres of upbringing and education as the main sites for shaping 
women’s moral behavior as an alternative for performing FGC. One of the trainers 
considers whether girls will respect the norm of virginity until marriage: 
“The subject goes back to education, how have you raised your daughter? There 
is no relation to whether you have circumcised her or not. Have you raised her 
on values and principles at home? Those who are in prostitution houses, 99,9% 
of these women are circumcised. And there are women who are not circumcised 
but who are married and living a happy life” (3 2013) 
The aim of the trainers is, again, to persuade women to abandon FGC. Therefore they 
try to disfavour FGC as a guarantee to modest sexual behaviour and instead privilege 
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the importance of a good upbringing based on values of modesty. The goal to 
disconnect FGC from modest behaviour, however, is not always reached as seminars 
sometimes rather reinforce the idea that FGC by itself is insufficient. The idea that 
“FGC is not enough” to ensure modesty and chastity is a popular understanding that is 
sometimes implied or explicitly stated by trainers: 
“our seminar meeting today aims to tell Egyptian society that FGC alone does not 
protect a woman’s chastity (mish bikhitan al-inath bass tiᶜaff al-marᵓa), that FGC 
alone does not protect your girl, no there are other things” (6 2013) 
In these cases, the seminars not only attempt to reduce the practice of FGC but 
reinforce the importance of social observation and strict education of girls. The 
widespread understanding that “FGC is not enough” was also observed in previous 
earlier studies. In preparation of the International Conference on Population and 
Development (ICPD) that was held in Cairo in 1994, Egyptian activists conducted field 
research asking mothers for reasons to perform FGC. These mothers “reported that 
FGM on its own was not sufficient to protect their daughters from ‘sin’. In addition to 
FGM, they took their own measures and made rules which their daughters had to 
follow, which included dress codes and limits on mixing with the opposite sex” (Seif El 
Dawla 1999, 129).  
Within the frame of a discussion concerning the role of FGC as a practice that keeps 
girls “walking on the right path” and ensures their morally and sexually correct 
behaviour, a trainer addressed the importance of growing up in a mixed environment 
for children: 
“when you restrict [your daughters] now in the elementary and middle school 
they will go to university afterwards and meet the other sex which you don’t 
want them to know – [while you tell them] don’t touch them or approach them - 
he will get to know her and it is beyond your control. Instead [it is better] that 
he gets to know her while they are both still small so that they understand that 
this is a natural thing and that everyone [male and female] in society has a role 
to play (walina fil mugtamaᶜ risala binaqdiha). But if you prefer to restrict them 
then she will throw herself onto the first stranger that she meets, because no one 
has raised her awareness and only told her what she was forbidden to do (kul 
al-waqt ᶜayb wa haram)” (2 2013) 
In this fragment, the trainer develops the notion of raising good girls and goes more 
into depth of what this entails. Overprotection will not be beneficial to raise your 
daughters well, she argues. Raising her on fear and distrust of boys will not be helpful 
for her to become a confident woman who knows how to operate in society. When 
being aware of boys and interacting with them from a young age, she will gain better 
knowledge of herself and her environment and she will be less susceptible to boys’ 
 134 
invitations. If she’s only brought up on notions of what is forbidden, on the contrary, 
she is likely to be tempted to find out and to transgress acceptable social boundaries.  
“as much that we educate our children fear and horror, our children will get lost 
when they grow up and learn outside. There is a difference between teaching my 
daughter right from wrong and scaring and intimidating her. With FGC, we 
generate fear and violence among the kids and is that what makes her into a good 
girl (bint kwayisa)? (2 2013) 
The trainer discourages to raise girls only on notions of what is forbidden and also 
to use methods of intimidation and fear as pedagogical strategies. She argues that FGC 
is part of the latter. It intimidates and scares her and cannot be seen as a good method 
for raising children. So apart of the fact that FGC cannot be considered as an effective 
means to make girls value modesty and virginity, another argument is here presented, 
that of good and appropriate child rearing.  
5.4.3 Modesty: a national Egyptian value 
The importance of raising girls properly in order to instil values of modesty, as an 
alternative to FGC, were strongly emphasized in all meetings. These values are 
represented as encompassing overall Egyptian concerns. Trainers appeal to both 
Muslim and Christian sentiments and backgrounds and connect hereby to women’s 
overarching concern with behaviour rules of modesty and virginity that transcend 
boundaries of defined religion. 
Both Christian and Muslim trainers and attending women equally stress the 
importance of education and upbringing in becoming a good girl or woman. Referring 
to conservative students’ opinions in the American context, Donna Freitas (2008) 
notes, “A woman begins to fulfill her role as a good Christian woman when she 
becomes a wife. Until then, she is simply waiting” (118, emphasis original) in (Irby 
2014, 1275). These values are echoed in the words of the seminars:  
“-Trainer: let’s think about this further. If I raise my daughter on fear of the 
Qurᵓan, and I made her memorize the Qurᵓan [or] I made her memorize the 
gospel and she is always in church [or] in the mosque. She sees her father look 
at me, she sees that her mother never lies. She sees that her father never does 
anything wrong and she understands what is right and what is wrong.. Do you 
expect that my daughter will then do something wrong? 
-Women: no 
-Trainer: Religious education and a good education, this is the fundamental 
factor. You can take everything away down there and see how they will behave 
if these girls are not well raised and not raised to know what is right and wrong 
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(mish mitrabiyyin ᶜal-haram wal-halal) and not knowing that God is present, not 
seeing her mother praying or her setting the right example in behaviour, 
knowing that there are body parts that no one is allowed to see, that this is my 
flower that no one can open or see except for my husband. In this way will they 
be preoccupied by sex? Is this not the part that will make sure that they are 
respected girls? ” (2 2013) 
In this excerpt, the trainer emphasizes the importance of exemplary behaviour by 
parents. Children learn from parents’ behaviour and will imitate them is the 
underlying reasoning. To embody and practice this exemplary behaviour as parents is 
how one can offer the right education to their daughters. Religious education and good 
education are referred to interchangeably. Raised well means being able to distinguish 
between right and wrong which refers directly to religious discourse and terminology 
(haram wal-halal). Knowing that one needs to have her private parts unexposed until 
the day of marriage is part of having had the right education. In this manner, modesty 
has become a virtue that is located in the interior and can be taught and cultivated by 
good upbringing and education. A shift of location thus occurred from a focus on the 
exterior (the body and the genitals) to the interior (upbringing and self-work) to 
realize modesty. The presentation of modesty and virginity as national values that 
overrides religious differences will be taken up again in chapter eight.  
5.4.4 Debating gender and sexuality norms: introducing rights 
discourse 
The expectations of how women and men behave properly and what distinguishes 
women’s behaviour from men’s comes up from various angles in the framework of 
debating FGC. In the following excerpt, the question of widows remarrying comes up. 
It is debated whether circumcision will affect her behaviour when a woman is 
widowed. A woman attending raises the point that FGC is being performed precisely 
to avoid that a woman starts to behave like a man after her husband deceased. 
-Woman: “they put it like this in Egypt, [FGC is needed] so that she can be content 
and easily satisfied (qanuᶜa). If she is not circumcised she will be like a man 
concerning the subject of sex. Egyptians, for example when a woman’s husband 
deceased, she may become like a man.  
 
-Trainer: “What does this mean that uncircumcised Egyptian women would not 
be content and not easily satisfied? She is just like women everywhere else. If 
her husband dies, it is rare that she will remarry. When a man’s wife deceases, 
however,… - this is natural for women that the first thing of concern in their lives 
are her children” (5 2013) 
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In this interaction, the trainer aims to dissuade the women that uncut women 
would not be easily satisfied and that they would be focussed more than others on 
finding sexual satisfaction. She argues that Egyptian women, in the case their 
husbands deceased, uncut or not, are primarily focussed on taking care of their 
children and are not looking to remarry and staying sexually active. She states that 
Egyptian women are like all other women not likely to remarry but to focus on their 
children, unlike men, who are more likely to look to remarry for both sexual reasons 
as for the sake of raising their children.  
At this point, a second woman joins the conversation explaining her own personal 
situation and arguing against the trainer that children are not everything for women 
and that widows retain their sexual desires as well: 
Woman 2: “Not every woman’s priority are her children, I mean, me for example, 
my husband has died and I wish to remarry when I meet a suitable candidate. I 
believe this is better than being exposed to sin for the sake of my children”  
 
Trainer: “if you want to remarry that is not wrong, if I want to live for my kids I 
live for them, if I want to remarry and take care of the children, this is what I’ll 
do. I am not talking about this type of point, we are talking about it [to refute the 
argument that] we circumcise our daughters so that when one’s husband dies 
she will do whatever that she desires (hatimshy ᶜala shaᶜarha)” (5 2013) 
This woman explains how remarriage does not sound strange to her, on the 
contrary, she prefers and wishes to remarry when possible. Dedicating herself to her 
children only and ignoring her own needs may lead her to be seduced into sin, into 
entering illegitimate relations. In her judgement it is better to remarry and have a 
legitimate relation, instead of devoting herself entirely to her children. The trainer 
argues that she is free to do as she wishes and that she only intended to refute the 
argument in favour of FGC.  
The discussion is noticeably not argued in terms of rights but rather in terms of 
social acceptability and custom. The discussion on whether to remarry or not only 
obtains its meaning against the background of social acceptability and respectability. 
In fact, the discourse of rights is markedly absent in most meetings, as is the discourse 
of violence against women, that are nonetheless the two major discursive frames that 
are used in transnational campaigning. Some trainers, however, introduced rights 
discourse and argued how rights is a salient category that is relevant to improve 
women’s lives. 
“We are talking about FGC and early marriage as a part of our work in civil 
society as to how to enable and implement those articles [in the Child law] so 
that we protect girls from sexual and physical abuse. And for boys as well; that 
we give him his rights and protect him from being scolded at in school, from 
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discrimination, that [we ensure that] boys are like girls. So that we do not 
discriminate between boys and girls, or among girls, or between a disabled and 
not disabled boy, or a disabled and not disabled girl” (3 2013) 
The trainer takes the amended Child Law of 2008 as a general background against 
which to discuss practices as FGC and early marriage (child marriage before the age of 
18). The 2008 Child Law criminalized both practices. She explains the importance and 
the meaning of those articles, that is meant to protect from abuse and to prevent 
discrimination between children. Wanting to engage the attending women in the topic 
from a legal perspective, a dialogue unfolds showing women’s thinking about both 
issues: 
“Trainer: What lies at the basis of the modification of the Child’s law is the issue 
of FGC and early marriage. Why is the law preoccupied with these two issues? 
Why FGC and early marriage? Does anyone want to raise her hand? 
Woman 1: Because some things have happened, like the girl who had heavy 
blood loss and died. And in early marriage there is harm as well for the girl. It 
affects them (biyᵓathar ᶜalayhum).  
Trainer: Right, how does it affect girls? What does FGC affect? Does anyone else 
want to raise her hand? 
Woman 2: Sexual frigidity (al-burud al-ginsy).  
Trainer: What else?  
Women 3: When they marry early, they are likely to have kids early when they 
have a small income  
Women 4: They are not able to carry the responsibility of raising a child 
Trainer: Exactly, she does not know yet what to do, she is not ready for marriage 
yet 
Woman: They will not understand each other at all 
Woman: She is still small, so she doesn’t know the responsibility 
(3 2013) 
In this exchange, the trainer aims to address the case of FGC from the perspective 
of law and legal consequences. In her introduction, she reminded the attending 
women of the Child’s law and that it criminalizes both FGC and early marriage. She 
stresses on the fact that those who keep performing these practices will be punished 
by law. When asking why the law is focussing on these issues according to their points 
of view, women immediately think of the harms that both practices cause women. 
They mention how FGC negatively affects women’s health and well-being or how it can 
greatly endanger their health. They raise how early marriage equally affects women’s 
reproductive abilities and health negatively. In other words, answers are formulated 
in terms of harms, the negative consequences that they perceive to women’s health 
and marriage.  
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Whereas a rights discourse is equally available and introduced by the trainer, the 
attending women seem to more closely relate to understandings of harm. A rights-
based discourse would formulate answers in terms of FGC and early marriage as being 
violations of women’s and children’s rights. Such answers would raise the injustice of 
being denied rights and the need to claim then. Contrary to rights discourse, the 
women in the seminar think spontaneously of harm and damage done to women and 
of their ability to function as a responsible wife and mother.  
The trainer then summarizes the topic of early marriage: “the girl does not have 
knowledge and her body structure does not support pregnancy, and as someone said, 
there is the point of [lack of] mutual understanding, also of what it means to raise 
children, since she is still a child herself. It is her right that she lives her age. […] If I 
marry her off as a child, I deprive her of her right to live her childhood. These are all 
harms of early marriage” (3 2013). To summarize, the trainer interweaves the 
discursive frames of rights and harm together, presenting the child’s deprivation of 
rights as harms. By connecting to women’s points of view first and then interweaving 
their answers with a new rights discourse, she familiarizes and teaches 
understandings of rights. Through this rhetorical method, she brings rights discourse 
closer to the realities of women’s perceptions and viewpoints.  
5.5 Narratives of national progress 
5.5.1 Abandoning tradition through education and information 
It is argued that Egyptian women should discontinue FGC since we possess better 
knowledge today. Scientific medical knowledge has advanced and we need to adapt 
socially to these understandings, is the reasoning. It is by means of education and 
gaining new understanding and insight that one ought to decide to abandon the 
practice: “Now we have education, in the past we had ignorance (jahiliyya)” (5 2013). 
The term jahiliyya translated as ignorance additionally carries a particular Islamic 
understanding. In Islamic history the term jahiliyya refers to the era that preceded 
prophet Muhammad and the start of Islam. Once this understanding is gained, it is 
suggested that one should promote this new information and insight among their 
family, friends and neighbours. “We do not only raise awareness among the mothers 
who are sitting here today, you will go home and then raise awareness among your 
neighbours” (6 2013).  
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In most occasions, I was welcomed and introduced to the group of women who 
gathered for the seminar. While I attempted to introduce myself carefully as a 
researcher and not as an NGO-worker, it seemed inevitable to be considered as 
someone promoting the cause of FGC eradication simply by being present as a 
foreigner in an NGO-context in which foreigners may visit in the frame of the ongoing 
project, for financial follow-up, or as volunteers and interns. In one session I was 
introduced and associated with the aim of supporting the Egyptian campaign against 
FGC, despite my efforts in an earlier personal talk with the trainer to explain my non-
campaigning position.  
“We welcome miss An and mr. Abdel Aziz [representative of the Coalition of 
NGOs against FGM]. She has come here today to sit together with you after the 
seminar to learn about certain topics related to FGC, without any 
embarrassment. She inquires on the Egyptian people, or whether the area we 
are living in here is convinced about the subject of FGC or not, and what your 
thoughts are on this subject. 
The people who have attended with us before and those who are attending for 
the first time, the subject receives attentions, the entire world is concerned 
about Egypt and sends us representatives of the United Nations, representatives 
of the National Population Council to consider the status of women. The goal is 
the protection of Egyptian women and the fight against violence against 
Egyptian women and children. These people come to us and say we want to 
protect Egyptian women (ihna ᶜayzin nihafiz ᶜala l-marᵓa al-masriyya) whose 
rights are in vain from the moment she is born until she marries. These people 
come to raise awareness on the basis that the awareness is sound and that 
people are truly convinced. The National Population Council and civil society 
organisations do many activities while the people are not convinced, and the fact 
that people are not convinced make the programs fail. (6 2013) 
In this session, the combination of better access to information and the 
establishment of a global norm (as supported by representatives of UN organisations) 
should compel women to stop and reflect and abandon FGC, according to this trainer. 
The argument of increased understanding converges with the argument of globally-
backed support and becomes expressed in a language of modernization and progress-
oriented vision of society and culture.  
“Our people (families and forefathers) did not have television or satellite dish, 
they did not have any of these things. Today there are people traveling 
thousands of miles to raise our awareness. Mr. Abdel Aziz comes in order to raise 
our awareness. We have learned from foreigners all sorts of good things, mobile 
phones, cars, factories, airplanes, all these things we have taken from them. Now 
they have issued this concerning FGC (tayyib, humma biyisdaru lana da). When 
they come to tell us that this is wrong, this means that they know better because 
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in Europe there are no such things [as FGC], in Saoudi Arabia they don’t have it, 
neither does Algeria or Libya. This practice is only present in Africa, in Sudan, 
Congo and Angola. These people come and visit us to say that this is wrong, ok, 
so how did they know that it is wrong?” (6 2013).  
This excerpt shows how the social struggle toward abandonment of FGC is framed 
in a narrative of modernization and national progress. Abandoning FGC becomes part 
of “the politics of national progress” and the pursuit of the goal of modernity 
“exemplified by the ‘West’” (Asad 2003, 15). It is argued that the nation-state leads 
this process and that states can be ranked hierarchically on the map of modernity and 
progress. The trainer appeals to women’s sense of wanting to be modern and wanting 
to be among states that are considered as advanced and not backward. The Coalition 
of NGOs and myself are considered as representatives of the more advanced states 
who possess better knowledge and travel to Egypt to spread that knowledge and 
awareness. Once possessing this knowledge ourselves, through TV or radio, or by 
means of our visiting, the only rational choice to make is to stop FGC, is concluded. In 
this imaginary, Europe represents the states who are ahead and who’s example should 
be followed. Saoudi-Arabia is often referenced and juxtaposed to Europe as another 
place where FGC is not performed. By mentioning the birth place of Islam and the 
prophet Muhammad, the aim is to offer a strong example that shows the compatibility 
of stopping FGC and being Muslim. This juxtaposition serves to show that abandoning 
FGC is not merely a European demand, and that it is not un-Islamic to stop FGC. On the 
contrary, it is FGC that is made un-Islamic.  
5.5.2 Making FGC un-Islamic 
Above it was demonstrated that campaigning discourse against FGC becomes 
associated with narratives of modernization and national progress in which the 
nation-state becomes the main framework articulating and guiding that progress. This 
section addresses a related line of discourse, one that promotes progress by 
abandoning tradition through what is presented as a better of understanding of 
religion. This entails a re-evaluation of the relationship between FGC and religion and 
a conclusion that this relationship is faulty. An increased understanding thus means 
that the link between FGC and religion should be cut. The arguments surrounding this 
relationship are discussed here as they were represented in the awareness-raising 
seminars.  
A first common argument against an understanding of FGC as Islamic is that by 
performing FGC one interferes and alters God’s creation: 
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“Trainer: Question, if one were to cut off his finger, will another one grow in its 
place? No, because the Lord has created it in this manner, and don’t we know 
what exactly we do when we circumcise our daughters? The Lord’s creation did 
not please us and so we tell him, oh Lord you did not know how to create us 
properly so we will correct it” (5 2013)  
Practicing FGC is as much as saying that God’s creation of the human body was not 
done well and needs adaptation, in this representation. It asks the question “Has our 
Lord created for us pieces of our bodies that are not necessary? (2 2013). The logical 
answer to this question is of course no. This reasoning, however, also would prohibit 
male circumcision and it can therefore easily be dismissed. A more important line of 
argument inquires into the presence of FGC in the Islamic textual tradition: 
“-Woman: Is this actually present and mentioned in the Qurᵓan? 
-Trainer: we are not going to talk about it from a religious perspective today but 
I will answer your question anyway. Look, “No harm nor inflicting of harm” (la 
darar wa la darar). […] When I take the girl to the doctor and I ask him, does she 
need circumcision or not (al-bint di titkhatin wala matitkhatinsh) and he tells 
me yes, ok then so it will be, the most important thing is that she is not harmed 
(al-muhim mayigish darar lil-bint).  Now we are talking of FGC from a religious 
perspective, the Prophet (peace be upon him) ordered us to do male 
circumcision, why? We remove the extra skin that boys have, if that extra skin is 
not removed, there will be diseases in the urinary blatter and his immunity 
system will be lessened, so we remove the extra skin, that is whose sunna? The 
prophet’s sunna. Does religion tell me that circumcision is sunna for girls?  
-Women: No.  
-Trainer: it is not sunna for girls, if it were sunna for girls we would circumcise 
them all immediately (law sunna lil-bint nikhkhatin ᶜala tul)” (7 2013)  
Islamic texts tell us that male circumcision is mandatory, sunna, i.e. that it is 
included in the reports on the words and actions of the Prophet. FGC, however, is not 
part of this corpus and is therefore not mandatory, argues the trainer. Another trainer 
argues along a similar line that since the Prophet did not circumcise his daughters, one 
ought to do the same. She is unsure about another hadith, a saying attributed to the 
Prophet, that would even prohibit FGC:  
“Trainer: What is important to us is the opinion of religion (raᵓy al-din) because 
we live in an Arab state and we care about these things. There is a hadith but I 
don’t remember it, does anyone remember? This hadith prohibits circumcision 
(biyharram al-khitan), I will look it up and tell you in the next session. The 
Prophet (pbuh) did not circumcise his daughters, so you follow the Prophet and 
the sunna is the example of whose words?  
Women: the Prophet’s.” (3 2013) 
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Establishing that FGC is not part of the Islamic tradition first of all means that it is 
not part of the corpus of the Prophet’s sunna that is accepted by the community of 
Islamic legal scholars. The lack of textual support in hadith then leads to the conclusion 
that there is no textual evidence for FGC in Islam. This is illustrated by the following 
excerpt: 
“Trainer: Is FGC in the Qurᵓan?  
Women: no.  
Trainer: Does the gospel recommend it?  
Women: God knows better. 
Trainer: If God knows better as you are saying, if it were in the Qurᵓan, the 
Prophet would rather have practiced FGC to his daughters, if it were sunna or if 
it were a personal duty (fard), [he would have done it then, but he hasn’t]. There 
is a hadith of Umm ᶜAtiyya but the scholars of al-Azhar have proven that it is not 
authentic, so FGC is not present in the Islamic religion. So let’s see and look at 
the country that abides to Islamic shariᶜa more than any other, Saoudi-Arabia. 
Does Saoudi-Arabia circumcise their girls?  
Women: No. 
Trainer: So it is neither sunna, nor personal duty (fard), and neither is it present 
in Islamic shariᶜa. But the people who wish to circumcise, they turn back to this 
hadith [of Umm ᶜAtiyya] and use it to circumcise their daughters. In the holy 
Gospel that we have, there is no FGC. We only have male circumcision and this 
was part of the covenant between God and Ibrahim, which is also something 
authentic (sahiyya) in the Qurᵓan. (1 2013) 
The hadith of Umm ᶜAtiyya is mentioned as one hadith that has been referred to in 
order to show the relation to Islamic tradition by supporters of FGC. This hadith and 
others will also be looked at closely in the next chapter. Suffice it here to point at the 
manner of reasoning by the trainer of the seminar. This particular hadith is shown to 
be not authentic by some authoritative voices within Islam (al-Azhar scholars). 
Consequently, “FGC is not present in the Islamic religion” (mish mawgud fi-l din al-
Islamy). The lack of textual evidence (at least as accepted as authentic by the 
community of authoritative Islamic scholars) means that there is no relationship 
between FGC and Islam all together.  
Finally, it is clear from the seminars that the notion of ᶜadat wa taqalid, or custom 
and tradition, is set in contrast to knowledge (both medical knowledge and increased 
knowledge of religion). I started this analysis with showing how FGC is first of all 
established in the seminars as a custom (ᶜada) that is inherited from generation to 
generation. It is argued there that FGC is done in a thoughtless and uninformed 
manner. Only by gaining more insight and knowledge of FGC and how it “really” relates 
to religion can we understand it and draw the conclusion to abandon it. Gaining more 
knowledge means, in other words,  understanding this very distinction between ᶜada 
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and what Islam actually entails and prescribes. FGC becomes disconnected from 
religion and is clearly shown as an ᶜada that deserves re-evaluation and abandonment 
in order to make social progress.  
Through the emphasis on culture and tradition (ᶜada ) FGC becomes un-Islamic. The 
step of characterizing FGC in the realm of “culture” is a crucial step in global 
campaigning against FGC. The fluid boundaries between custom and Islam need to 
become visible. Anthropologist Linda Newland shows for West Java in Indonesia that 
“the law of the courts is not always consistent with village teachings of Islam, often 
referred to as adat (culture)” (Newland 2006, 397). Here, official Islamic law is 
differentiated from village Islam which is equated with culture and is referred to with 
the same Arabic term for custom, adat. She points out that the cultural negotiation of 
what belongs to the realm of custom and what belongs to the realm of religion has 
been historically determined by the colonial administration: “While the Dutch colonial 
administration conceptualised adat and Islam as mutually exclusive, in the mountains 
of West Java, adat is often used to mean locally interpreted Islam. (…..) Thus, at the 
time of my fieldwork, female circumcision remained unproblematised: it was simply 
part of the habitus (Bourdieu, 1977; Mauss, 1973)” (ibid.). In other words, FGC in West 
Java remained unproblematised as long as adat and local interpretations of Islam were 
accepted as being in the same spectrum of lived experience. In other words, this 
parallel hints at the continuation of global power structures in different forms and 
shapes. Whereas previously the colonial administration held the power over 
definining and separating culture from religion (in the case of Indonesia), this effort is 
reflected today in the seminars and transnational discourse more generally.  
A consequence of making FGC un-Islamic and locating it firmly in the sphere of 
custom or culture/ tradition is a “hardened” conceptualization of “culture”. This refers 
to “the assumption that cultures are bounded, discrete units defined by ahistorical 
“traditions” or “customs” (Walley 1997, 348). Christine Walley wrote that “[m]uch of 
the Western-oriented literature opposing female genital operations also constructs 
“culture” and “tradition” in problematic ways” (ibid. 345). This observation seems to 
remain valid in the practice of the awareness-raising seminars I attended. The exercise 
of disentangling culture from religion (or FGC from Islam) involves conceiving 
culture/ tradition in an essentilized, “hardened” fahsion. Here tradition is attributed 
with characteristics of timelessness, backwardness, irrationality, or that what inhibits 
progress (as represented by the internal Other of the saᶜid).Development and 
progress are then understood as a consequence of better understanding of what Islam 
is and what it is not. This observation is in line with more studies on NGO-work and 
women’s rights in a development context, where “culturalism” served as “the 
dominant governmental framework for organizing knowledge about gender 
inequality”(Hodzic 2014, 240)  
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5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter aimes to discuss representations of FGC in Egyptian campaigning efforts 
to ban FGC through ethnographic study of awareness-raising discourse and activities. 
It focuses on the cultural translation of campaigning discourse that has been mainly 
developed and formulated on the transnational level into a local Egyptian context. 
Campaigning discourse against FGC becomes embedded in and is in dialogue with 
local debates of gender and cultural norms. Framings of FGC as a violation of women’s 
and children’s rights and as a form of violence against women –prominent in 
transnational discourse - is not popular in Egyptian campaigning. Rights-based 
discourse and violence against women is not used to persuade women to abandon 
FGC. Instead, emphasis is put on conceptualizing FGC as a traditional and a harmful 
practice.  
Just as in transnational campaigning discourse, traditional reasons for practicing 
FGC as curtailing female sexual desire are revealed as incorrect. Medical and 
anatomical explanation differentiates between sexual desire and sexual sensations. 
Women are told that sexual desire is located in and governed by the brain and not in 
the clitoris or female genitals. Female genitalia only serve to perform sex and reach 
sexual enjoyment and satisfaction, after the brain and the five senses set in motion 
desire. Dissociating FGC from sexual desire delegitimizes main popular reasons for 
performing the practice. Popular understandings that are talked about are the idea of 
the need to control or reduce female excessive sexuality and to enable female 
adulthood and womenhood. Reference to scientific knowledge is invoked to correct 
these popular views. Other discursive strategies invoke the notions of a hard tradition 
to be differentiated from religion and dominant norms of gender and sexuality and 
threatened family values.  
Through representing FGC as a harmful “hard” tradition, a discursive register of 
othering is employed. FGC and those who perform it are depicted as backward and 
traditional. By locating the origin of the practice in Africa or Sudan and pointing at 
modern European and Arab countries, the practice and their practitioners become 
raced. Trainers appeal to women’s desire to be part of the modern and advanced and 
not of the backward. Representing FGC as a hard and “ugly” African tradition relies on 
a raced hierarchical imagery and calls on women’s desire not to be considered as 
belonging to Africa and its traditions. This imagery often invokes southern Egypt, saᶜid 
as its own internal Other, being that what one not wishes to be.  
Demonstrating that FGC is traditional and cultural at the same time emphasizes its 
disconnect with religion. The separation and disentangling of the cultural from the 
religious thus involves an essentialist take on culture. In this effort, the fluid 
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boundaries between what is experienced as custom (ᶜadat wa taqalid) and as Islamic 
are rendered visible and fixed. Disentangling Islam from culture is then understood as 
reaching a higher and better level of understanding of Islam. 
After establishing FGC as a practice that cannot regulate sexual desire, its dangers 
and harms to sexual enjoyment are highlighted in the light of dominant norms of 
gender and sexuality. In this manner the fight against FGC becomes translated as a 
fight for marriage. It is argued that having undergone FGC is probable to cause women 
to experience sexual problems. They may not want to engage in sexual relations or on 
the other hand may become promiscuous when desire cannot be satisfied, in these 
views. Having unsatisfying sexual relations are harmful for the stability of the relation, 
and thus for marriage. Alluding to the perceived social crisis of high divorce rates and 
the threat to family values, not performing FGC is therefore framed as beneficial to 
social stability. While discouraging to perform FGC, the values of virginity, modesty 
and raising “good girls” are being reinforced. FGC does not protect girls against 
licentious sexual behaviour, only education and instilling religious values is able to do 
so, in these representations.  
This chapter thus argues that the translation of transnational discourse to abandon 
FGC- practices into the local Egyptian context - in the form of awareness-raising 
seminars – can be read as ambiguous and as presenting a paradox. Raising awareness 
to abandon a conservative practice, FGC, is couched in terms that emphasize exactly 
those underlying conservative norms. The demand for accelerated social-cultural 
change, in other words, seems to be balanced by a concern to preserve dominant 
cultural values, in which conservative gender norms are predominant. Awareness-
raising initiatives against FGC are then characterized by pragmatism rather than a 
desire for in-depth social transformation and interrogation of social-cultural gender 
norms  
 
  
PART 2 
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Chapter 6  
The Muslim Brotherhood: “Trade in religion” 
… and in female genital cutting 
6.1 Introduction  
This and the following chapter on al-Azhar and Egyptian salafism set out to investigate 
dominant discourses on the interconnectedness of FGC, gender norms and religious 
values. Both the Muslim brotherhood (MB) and Salafist groups have become powerful 
actors in the new socio-political landscape after the 25th of January 2011 Uprising. 
Representatives of both groups have challenged the legal status-quo concerning FGC 
and formulated standpoints against a criminalization of the practice.  
The debate around the Islamicness of FGC can be traced to the mid-nineties, when 
the rise of transnational feminism as a movement that formulates women’s rights as 
human rights condemned FGC as a form of violence against women. It is indeed against 
the background of transnational and Egyptian activism against FGC using a rights-
based discourse that “highly visible ‘re-Islamizing’ moves regarding FGC” need to be 
situated (Badran 2009a, 180). Historian Margot Badran argues that “[a]lthough weak 
or questionable hadiths carry no authority, Islamist advocates have used these to 
‘prove’, or to create the impression, that circumcision for girls is Islamic” (ibid. 180). 
In these chapters I will ask what exactly is meant by such re-islamizing moves and how 
we can further contextualize them. Whereas former shaykh of al-Azhar Jad al-Haq 
stated in the 1990s that FGC was a religious requirement, today proponents of FGC 
rarely make explicit claims. I will look closer into Islamist cultural politics by 
examining how islamist groups and religious leaders approach FGC today as an 
Islamicate practice.  
In its report on the Beijing +20 agreements concerning women’s rights, the National 
Council for Women (NCW) reported that “the Muslim Brotherhood succeeded in 
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mounting the ship of the revolution and leading it to the opposite of what the 
revolution was calling for” (NCW 2014, 4). Referring to the Brotherhood’s electoral 
gains, the NCW deplored the course that the country had taken under islamist rule, 
particularly concerning the status of women. The report mentions that the MB aimed 
for the legalization of FGC (ibaha khitan al-inath) while they were in power, among 
other examples of policies carrying negative consequences for gender equality such as 
lowering the legal age of marriage and lowering the age of children that remain in 
custody of the mother after divorce (ibid.).  
In this chapter, I will look at the Brotherhood’s discourses, attitudes and policies 
toward FGC, and toward gender roles and family politics at large. In contradiction with 
the above-mentioned report, the Brotherhood did not officially attempt to legalize or 
de-criminalize FGC but was rather ambiguous, self-contradicting and depicting a 
laisser-faire attitude toward FGC (ambiguity being a major trait of the one-year 
Brotherhood islamist rule). The National Council for Women, NGO-workers in the 
field, and others expressed concern that the trend of a decline in FGC prevalence was 
threatened by the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood has been popularly reproached of 
doing “trade in Islam” (tigara fil-Islam). This was being articulated as a disapproval of 
its “instrumentalization of Islam for political gains”. Political opponents, including 
salafists, easily suspected the Muslim Brotherhood “of neglecting religion in favor of 
political aims” (Kreil 2012, 141). 
After the MB was deposed from power by then general al-Sisi on 3 July 2013, a co-
traveller I met on the train interpreted his deposal as a kind of divine intervention or 
sign that god had taken care of the country and its citizens (Allah tifhaz al-balad) by 
removing this group from power and ending its “reprehensible trade in religion”. In 
the short time that the Brotherhood was in power, press revealed movement members 
offering FGC surgeries for sale in a mobile medical caravan in Middle Egypt, organized 
by a local Brotherhood division. The group accused of trading in religion was revelead 
of trading in FGC as well. The incident sparked a new wave of public interest in FGC 
and a condemnation of the MB’s conservative ideology by progressives. 
In this chapter, I will first situate the Brotherhood in the Egyptian political and 
social landscape, before and after the 2011 uprising. Secondly, I’ll discuss how the 
MB’s gender and family ideology, including FGC, translated politically in the short 
period that they were in power (30 June 2012- 3 July 2013). In the final part, I discuss 
how we can interpret the Brotherhood’s islamist gender and family ideology and 
vision on FGC through the lens of Islamicate practices, among which FGC can be held 
as a prime example.  
My methodology relies on literature and press reports to analyses the 
Brotherhood’s Islamism and its vision on gender ideology and religious conservatism. 
Apart of literature, I rely on conducted interviews with two prominent members Huda 
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ᶜAbd al-Munᶜim and Makarim al-Deiry; with Egyptian activist of women’s right Fatma 
Khafagi, with a representative of the National Council of Women and with two 
representatives of UNFPA and UNICEF. The interviews with Brotherhood 
representatives were started as part of research on islamist family and gender politics 
(and its relation to FGC) during president Mursi’s reign and could unfortunately not 
be continued after Mursi’s deposal from power on 3 July 2013. The dramatic political 
change meant that further research and meetings with Brotherhood members would 
be unsafe. Since these interviewees are well known political personalities and widely 
publicized, I have not anonymized them.  
6.2 Situating Egyptian Islamism and the Muslim 
Brotherhood 
6.2.1 The Muslim Brotherhood as a political opposition group 
The Muslim Brotherhood formed the largest national political opposition group both 
before and after president Jamal ᶜAbd al-Nasir banned the group in 1954. The 
movement was founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. In this early period, the 
movement played a major role in opposing the British colonial ruler. Economically it 
supported a state-driven economic development and the struggle against colonialism 
and imperialism formed the general political background against which the 
Brotherhood came into being. The anti-colonial and anti-missionary stand in the 
beginning of the twentieth century was expressed in a rejection of foreign controlled 
governance. Resistance against missionary activities was one of the main motives for 
the foundation of the Brotherhood.  
The combination of political anti-colonial stances, a commitment to making society 
more Islamic (and implement shariᶜa) and organizing social welfare activities that 
emulated the Christian missionary activities became a major characteristic of the 
Brotherhood (Meuleman 2011, 239) The legacy of political resistance against colonial 
rule and imperialism survived in the discourse of the contemporary Brotherhood, as 
will become clear throughout this chapter. In the last decades however, the anti-
colonial stand was less expressed  in political terms of resistance against neoliberal 
economic powers and governance but has instead persisted in a rhetoric against 
perceived Western social, cultural and moral encroachment on Egyptian culture. 
President Jamal ᶜAbd al-Nasir banned the movement and arrested many of its 
leaders and members. This period is known as one of harsh repression and changed 
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the organization drastically. In the 1970s, under Anwar al-Sadat’s presidency, leaders 
were released from prison and a “new Brotherhood” arose (Sameh 2009). Members 
of this new Brotherhood were initially mainly elite groups that were supportive of 
Sadat’s liberal economic policies, known as infitah or “opening” of the country.  The 
movement’s membership was enlarged by groups from the middle class and student 
organizations. The Brotherhood student organizations were to be of significant 
importance for the redefinition of the movement at large, especially the young leaders 
ᶜEssam al-ᶜErian and ᶜAbd al-Munᶜim Abu l-Futuh who were to become prominent 
figures in the years 1990 and 2000. The integration of the student organizations 
helped the movement to develop again into a mass movement while enjoying strong 
support of the highly educated elite. At the same time, as a consequence of the new 
liberal economic policies started in the 1970s, the Brotherhood developed a discourse 
that emphasized equality, social justice, moral renewal, critique of corruption and the 
neglect of the general interest (Sameh 2009, 113). As the state retreated, popular 
demand for basic social services grew and the Brotherhood began to fill in that void. 
Supplying social services was one way to show political Islam as a viable political and 
cultural alternative to the regime. During the 1980s, the movement became strong 
within the boards of professional syndicates (lawyers, medical doctors, pharmacists, 
etc. ), many of the winning Muslim Brotherhood representatives were old leaders of 
the student groups.  
The Muslim Brotherhood gradually grew more dissatisfied with al-Sadat’s policies, 
especially because of the 1979 peace agreement with Israel. It had consciously 
redefined itself, however, as a peaceful Islamic reformist movement and was 
committed to follow a path of non-violent political opposition. It aimed at political 
change through focus on the nation state (Wickham 2011). Other groups had chosen 
to resist the regime by violent means, such as Islamic Jihad and Gamaᶜat Islamiyya. 
Members of Gamaᶜat Islamiyya assassinated president al-Sadat in 1981. Although the 
movement had been officially banned under president ᶜAbd al-Nasir , they were 
largely considered as the most important opposition group and especially as “the only 
organized alternative” to the ruling regime under al-Sadat and Mubarak (Shehata 
2010, 52). Starting from the years 2000, the Brotherhood became more visible in the 
national political arena. They participated in parliamentary elections by fielding their 
candidates on electoral lists of other parties and while forming coalitions with other 
parties.  
The political repression of the Muslim Brotherhood - particularly fierce under the 
Mubarak regime – also contributed to pushing the organization toward following the 
rules and procedures of democracy. In several time frames, the movement sought to 
build alliances with secular political forces (Shehata 2010). In the years before the 
2011 uprising, they had joined the larger political and social groups calling for more 
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democracy and against the widely perceived attempt of Mubarak passing on power, 
the presidency, to his son, Gamal Mubarak. The Brotherhood was a crucial participant 
in the pro-democracy movement that was a precursor to the 2011 Uprising. The 
second Palestinian intifada in 2000 inaugurated a new period of Egyptian activism and 
protest. The solidarity movement with the Palestinians and in 2003 with the Iraqis 
united otherwise ideologically different groups (seculars, liberals, Marxists, Islamists) 
(El Mahdi 2009, 95).  
In 2004, the opposition group Kifaya (“enough”) came into being and united 
Islamists (especially youth MB members) again with other political groups. This new 
broad coalition building was essential for gaining confidence for the 2011 protests 
that succeeded in overthrowing the Mubarak regime. The cooperation during protests 
not only gave renewed confidence, also new organizational techniques and leadership 
was developed and this led to mass mobilizations due to the large following and 
grassroots support that the Brotherhood enjoyed (Sameh 2009, 117). In 2005, the 
Muslim Brotherhood – within the constellation of alliances with left-wing and secular 
groups – called for Mubarak to step down and resign.  
A first political program was drafted in 2007 which prepared for when the 
Brotherhood’s would be legally allowed to contest the elections. A continuous feature 
since its foundation is its explicit goal to strive towards an Islamic society that lives 
according to the shariᶜa. While this fundamental goal was reaffirmed, the 2007 party 
program, however, did not address criticism of its ideological ambiguities, for example 
in matters of democracy, economic and foreign, and visions on the status of the 
Christian, Coptic, minority (Brown and Hamzawy 2008). The Muslim Brotherhood 
was well-known to maintain many ambiguous standpoints on a range of sensitive 
subjects. These include visions on gender norms and female genital cutting, as will be 
discussed in the following sections. The brotherhood’s regular controversial 
statements concerning the occupation of Palestine and the state of Israel in 
combination with oppositional statements concerning domestic politics served the 
ruling regime to direct repressive politics against leaders and members of the 
movement. Enduring suffering, arrest, torture and repression are characterizing 
features of the organization.  
The 2007 draft party program caused a rift between members and leaders of the 
Brotherhood. Some of its propositions (e.g. to install a High Council of Ulama, religious 
scholars, in addition of the government, the exclusion of Copts and women of the 
presidency) was not accepted by whom were described as the liberal fraction with the 
Brotherhood, such as ᶜAbd al-Munᶜim Abu l-Futuh and Gamal Hishmet. Secondly, the 
internal elections in 2009 for the Guidance Bureau, the most powerful organ of 
decision-making within the Brotherhood, were a grave disappointed to this more 
progressive and liberal fraction. The internal division was aggravated again when 
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hardliner conservative Mohammad Badie was elected in 2010 as the new leader of the 
organization. Badie was a strong proponent of focusing on daᶜwa and less on political 
strategy and participation (Brown and Hamzawy 2008). Against this background, the 
revolutionary protests of 2011 were met with mixed responses and participation by 
the Muslim Brotherhood.  
6.2.2 The Brothers, Sisters and gender  
The Brotherhood’s view on gender relations had been outspoken conservative since 
its creation in 1928. Over the decades, it has shown itself to be a staunch supporter of 
regulating women’s attire, it has originally opposed gender mixing in education and at 
the workplace and opposed changes to the Personal Status Law that promoted 
women’s individual rights, notably the above-mentioned reforms in PSL of 1979 and 
2000 (Tadros 2012). The movement has a long tradition of  arguing against 
international treaties concerning women’s and children’s rights and any national legal 
changes that comply with an international rights discourse. It has fought progressive 
reforms of the Personal Status Law and has offered fierce resistance against the 
introduction of reproductive health rights since the United Nations International 
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) of 1994. Some female 
Brotherhood members managed to obtain important lobbying positions within a 
prominent al-Azhar committee concerned with women and children that gained 
consultative status to the United Nations in 2003 (Tadros 2012, 124-5).  
The Brotherhood found support throughout the last decades for its conservative 
agenda at times among the authoritative religious establishment of al-Azhar and 
secular nationalist politicians. Its argument that international declarations are not in 
accordance with shariᶜa law is supplemented with an anti-imperialist de-colonizing 
rhetoric. It is argued that Western powers behind treaties such as CEDAW and the 
Child’s Rights Convention, force Egyptian society to adhere to values which are alien 
to Egyptian citizens. The treaties, in this view, have not been created through 
democratic procedures but rather resemble foreign dictates and applying them at 
home leads to social decay and moral deterioration (al-Deiry 2013; al-Munᶜim 22 June 
2013; Tadros 2012), which could endanger national security (Hesham 16 July 2008) 
and the safety and integrity of the umma, the religious community (Ikhwanonline 3 
July 2008). Since the mid-1980s, however, a reformist trend emerged within the 
Brotherhood that spurred an internal debate on issues of pluralism, citizenship and 
democracy (Wickham 2011, 208). Carrie Wickham and others identified a trend 
among some Brotherhood leaders in recent decades to accept women as full and equal 
partners in the country’s development, not only and necessarily as a feature of 
democracy but also as originating from within Islam (ibid.).  
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In 2000, when the National Council for Women was created, the Muslim 
Brotherhood for the first time fielded a female candidate for the parliamentary 
elections, Jihan al-Halafawy in Alexandria. The results were cancelled, however, after 
winning against the rival candidate of the then ruling NDP party. In 2005, Makarim al-
Deiry, a lecturer in Arabic literature at al-Azhar University and a high profile (and old-
guard) Muslim Sister, was fielded as a candidate for the parliamentary elections but 
lost against her NDP rival (Osman 2010). These steps sparked a long debate within the 
organization about the role and representation of the Muslim Sisters, the structure of 
the female members of the Muslim Brotherhood. An often-heard argument was that 
the Sisters had the same voice in the organization but that they were kept from public 
mandates, such as in the executive Guidance Bureau, only for safety reasons (as 
Brotherhood leaders were regularly subject to intimidation during elections or 
arrests) (ᶜAbd al-Munᶜim 2013; Osman 2010).  
Huda ᶜabd al-Munᶜim, women secretary of the FJP party, explains in an interview at 
the FJP offices, how some of their activities are different from the main organizations. 
She organized courses for example that prepare girls to marriage, or courses on 
motherhood (ᶜAbd al-Munᶜim 2013). ᶜAbd al-Munᶜim is lawyer and member of the 
National Council for Human Rights and women’s secretary (aminat al-marᵓa) of the 
FJP party. She became an activist member of the Muslim Brotherhood since her 
student time as a law student and was trained with other young women to become 
leaders within the movement. Zaynab al-Ghazali, a well-known and influential activist 
and intellectual in political islam, taught them “two days a week on religion, culture, 
politics and journalism” (ᶜAbd al-Munᶜim 2013). In 2013, she proudly presents herself 
as the first veiled woman and as the first MB member to be part of the National Council 
for Human Rights.  
The Sisters had long been making major contributions to the Brotherhood’s 
political struggle but they had become more and more visibly and crucially involved 
in electoral campaigning, street protests and media campaigns since the 2000s 
(Abdel-Latif 2009; Abdel-Latif 2011; Abdel-Latif and Ottaway 2008; Gehad 2013; 
Tadros 2012). During this period, the Muslim Sisters had grown increasingly restless 
with the imbalance between their actual contributions and their absence in the 
internal power structures of the movement, especially the Guidance Bureau (Abdel-
Latif and Ottaway 2008, 12-3). Women’s augmented activism within the Brotherhood 
coincided with a general rise in street politics and protests in 2000 and with the failure 
of the NCW to represent and defend the interests of all Egyptian women, including the 
many assaults on female protesters of both Islamist and secular affiliations. After the 
2011 Uprising, the MB and its Sisters became catapulted in the public and political 
sphere. For the first time in their history, they were able  - and were forced - to define 
and shape national policy, including matters of gender and family. 
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6.3 Post-2011 Islamist victories: challenges to 
(inter)national gender politics  
The uprising that began in January 2011 offered fresh hope for political  change, 
democratization and social justice. This revolutionary hope also passed through 
women’s rights organizations and strengthened aspirations of opening up the public 
debate on  gender norms and starting a democratization of national policies on gender 
and women’s rights. The national institutions that have been most involved in creating 
gender policies are the National Council for Women (NCW) and the National Council 
for Childhood and Motherhood (NCCM).  Although the law on the criminalization of 
FGC falls within the scope of child care and health (and was developed within and 
promoted by the NCCM) (see chapter three), the theme of FGC and the debates 
surrounding it are strongly connected to the larger debates on state’s policies toward 
girls and women’s rights. This connection with official gender policies by the state 
means that political resistance against the criminalization of FGC needs to be situated 
within the frame of previous policies concerning gender and women’s rights on the 
one hand, and opposition against the old al-Sadat and Mubarak regimes, on the other 
hand.  
In this section, I continue to look at the Muslim Brotherhood and the nature of its 
policies on gender norms, women’s rights and FGC during the first elected parliament 
after January 2011 (that was islamist-dominated) and under the reign of islamists 
until president Muhammad Mursi’s deposal. A discussion of this episode shows the 
interconnectedness of legislation on gender and family and the national institutions 
developing those policies. I will look closer at 1) a discussion of the institutions 
shaping state gender policy before and after the 2011 uprising, 2) Islamist challenges: 
attempts to destabilize national gender policy institutions and international 
arrangements concerning women’s rights and gender equality  
3) the controversy around the Constitution of December 2012 drawn up under 
president Mursi and 4) the initiatives to change the legal status-quo concerning FGC 
and to repeal the criminalization of FGC.  
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Protests in central Cairo and Tahrir Square on 30 June 2012, leading to the deposal of 
Islamist president Muhammad Mursi 
6.3.1 Institutions of national gender policy and its critiques 
In post-Mubarak Egypt, the so-called “woman question” has been much debated since 
the first elected (and short-lived) parliament of (January 2012 - 14 June 2012) brought 
an overwhelming majority  of Islamist parties’ representatives. The political arm of  
 158 
the Muslim Brotherhood, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), won 127 seats out of 
508. The salafist al-Nour party obtained 96 seats, together the two islamist parties 
won 223 seats out of 508, or 43 percent of all seats (al-Sinhury 2012).  Interestingly, 
nearly all political parties except the Muslim Brotherhood had given female candidates 
positions on election lists where it was almost impossible to win (Ashwal 2013, 7) . 
One of the FJP leaders and member of the conservative wing of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, Muhammad Mursi, was elected president six months later, 24 June 2012.  
Many observers and activists  feared conservative outcomes in post-Mubarak 
politics. Concern about the implications of these political  shifts for the legal status quo 
of women’s rights and gender equality soon  proved legitimate after a series of highly 
mediatized controversial statements  by high-profile members of parliament 
belonging to the FJP ((ECWR) 2012; Emam 2012). The FJP and other Islamist members 
of parliament questioned progressive  reforms of Personal Status Law that were made 
since the 1970s, the  so-called “Gehan’s laws” and “Suzanne’s laws”. Both expressions 
refer to the wives of previous presidents al-Sadat and Mubarak respectively.  
President Anwar al-Sadat’s (1970–1981) era of openness (infitah) and 
internationalism meant a retreat of the state and its abandonment of commitment to 
gender equality in combination with an increasing embrace of social  and religious 
conservatism. The new constitution expressed a remarkable  new emphasis on 
religion, family and safeguarding the family’s genuine  character, values and traditions 
(1971), art. 9, 12, 19). Al-Sadat’s wife, Gihan al-Sadat, began to play a crucial role in 
reviewing and  reforming Personal Status Laws (Family Laws) to the benefit of equal 
rights for women. These laws were popularly dubbed “Gihan’s laws.” The president’s 
wife  thus set a precedent of playing an instrumental role in progressive family law  
reform and “casting a shadow of authoritarianism on women’s rights” (Hatem 1992, 
240).  
Gender issues and family law reform began to play a larger part in national and 
international politics in the period from the mid-1970s onwards. With the  beginning 
of the UN Decade of Women in 1975 and an authoritarian regime  seeking support 
from European, American and supra-national institutions  such as the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund, women’s  rights began to gain currency in Egypt’s 
international and national politics (Al-Ali 2000, 75). The withdrawal of the Nasserist 
state and its explicit commitment to women’s issues led to an increase in the number 
of formal and informal organizations and women’s groups, among Islamist and secular 
women separately. Secular groups were first created within political parties and 
professional organizations (of journalists and lawyers) and followed by the creation 
of non-affiliated NGOs. 
It was the organization of the International Conference on Population and 
Development (ICPD) in Cairo in 1994 that spurred state institutions and former first 
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lady Suzanne Mubarak into more action concerning gender equality. Between 2000 
and 2005, a new series of progressive law reforms were passed, this time popularly 
called “Suzanne’s laws”, among which the famous khulᶜ law that enables women to 
initiate unilateral divorce. Formally the law is called the Law on Reorganization of 
Certain Terms and Procedures of Litigation in Personal Status Matters (2000). This 
law grants women the right to divorce without the consent of their husbands on 
condition that they give up certain financial rights (khulᶜ means literally to take off or 
to strip [one’s rights]). It also established new family courts and reformed alimony 
provisions and divorce regulations in case of customary marriage (ᶜurfi) to the benefit 
of women. Political scientist Diane Singerman and Hoda el-Sadda, among  others, have 
commented that these achievements are the results of a many years long  
collaboration that began in the 1990s between women’s rights activists, NGO workers, 
lawmakers, academics, the NCW and religious scholars who  advocated and lobbied 
parliament successfully to demand reform of family law (Elsadda 2011; Singerman 
2004a; Singerman 2004b). The broad coalition of activists and advocates of reform 
actively sought support from the official religious establishment and within the 
executive branch with the Minister of Justice and the business elite. By seeking such 
wide collaboration between feminist secularists and religious authorities, the khulᶜ 
law became an important example of how Egyptian gender politics transcends the 
secular-religious binary. The late shaykh Muhammad Sayed al-Tantawi, the former 
shaykh of al-Azhar, attended the opening session of parliament when the law proposal 
was tabled and declared the conformity of the reforms with Islamic shariᶜa. Singerman 
states that the coalition of women’s rights activists who supported the new family law 
“muted the liberal rights discourse favoured by many women’s rights activists and 
instead emphasized religion as an asset” because they believed that if this new “law 
were founded on religious principles, it would be difficult for opponents to reject it as 
anti-Islam” (Singerman 2004b).  
While the strategic and pragmatic work done by the coalition of activists was crucial 
to the law passing through parliament successfully, the NCW, as the official body 
representing Egyptian women, under the leadership of former First Lady Suzanne 
Mubarak, prided itself on this achievement. Hoda Elsadda recognizes the former First 
Lady’s stake in the legal success but deplores that “the role of the ex-First Lady as the 
foremost champion of  women’s rights was foregrounded and celebrated.” In her view, 
the achievements of women’s rights activists were being “appropriated and 
manipulated by state representatives” (Elsadda 2011). The episode of the khul’a law 
exemplifies the discontent with state gender policies. The NCW had been blamed 
repeatedly by civil society and public intellectuals for abusing its role as the 
international representative of Egyptian women and for neglecting their real interests 
and rights as equal citizens. To critics, the NCW’s progressive gender policies only 
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sought to legitimize the authoritarian Mubarak regime as a supporter of women’s 
rights (Hatem 2011, 37).  
After Mubarak’s ousting, the NCW not surprisingly became a target for  both 
secular-liberal activists and Islamists. During the eighteen days of the uprising in 
January–February 2011, the building in which the National Council of Women was 
housed—the same building as the ruling National Democratic Party—was set on fire, 
which put the council’s activities on hold for a year. In the wake of the eighteen-day 
uprising, a new, liberal-secular coalition, the Coalition of Egyptian Feminist 
Organizations, comprising 16 women’s rights groups, was created. In its second 
statement of February 2011, the coalition “refuse[s] the illegitimate National Council 
of Women or its representation of Egyptian women and the feminist efforts in Egypt 
and confirm the illegitimacy of its representation in international events.” It 
demanded the immediate dissolution of the NCW and the establishment of an 
alternative Women’s Committee composed of women “well known for their 
independence, integrity and efficiency” (Egypt 20 February 2011). In sum, although 
some women’s rights activists’ cooperated over the years with the NCW in a common 
struggle to further women’s position in society, after the uprising the newly founded 
coalition immediately rejected the NCW on the basis of its being part of 
authoritarianism, corruption and elitism.  
6.3.2 From gender to family politics 
Not only secular feminists wanted to dissolve the National Council for Women, the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the movement’s political party equivalent, the Freedom and 
Justice Party, also expressed the wish to disband it. Members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the post-uprising FJP party demonstrated on multiple occasions 
their opposition to the institution of the NCW and the goals of the CEDAW declaration. 
Makarim al-Deiry, in an interview in the FJP offices, condemned the NCW for 
implementing a foreign policy. She believed that the Council’s policy and activities 
after the uprising had not changed and pleaded for “a thorough reform, a new council 
that serves the real priorities and needs of Egyptian women, which are the 
disintegration of the Egyptian family, spinsterhood and [female] illiteracy (al-Deiry 
2013). She stated that “family is the cornerstone of society and the nation and it is 
being threatened by the UN agreements that they make us sign” (al-Deiry 2013). 
In the period between the ousting of president Mubarak and the deposal of 
president Muhammad Mursi in July 2013, several conservative and Islamist political 
actors attacked institutions of women’s rights and the NCW-backed reforms in the 
Personal Status Law of 2000. Huda ᶜabd al-Munᶜim proclaimed that the NCW “never 
expressed the Egyptian woman, not even after the revolution” (ᶜAbd al-Munᶜim 2013). 
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She argues that the council never defended veiled women when they were excluded 
from occupying professional positions because of their dress and veil. And after the 
revolution “they stood with the ancien régime (fulul) against the elected civil president 
[Mursi]” (ᶜAbd al-Munᶜim 2013).  
The FJP’s election program for the 2011 parliamentary elections contains the 
following statement concerning the national councils:  
“Let’s look at the outcome of the previous decades of exposure [and] systematic 
corruption implemented by several parties, especially the National Council for 
women, the National Council for Motherhood and Childhood, and a whole list of 
civil society organisations that receive foreign funds from suspicious sources. 
Those were helped along down that slimy slope with a package of corrupt laws 
passed not due to public demand, but were the result of international dictates 
imposed on us by international conventions signed under the previous regime” 
(Party 2011, 24). 
The program continues with a proposal for short-term measures including the 
immediate abolition of both the NCW and the NCCM, “which acted as the intelligence 
arm of the international players in Egypt” (Party 2011, 25) in order to replace them 
with a unified National Council for Family. This to-be-created National Council for 
Family would aim to provide a “healthy climate for making good balanced families and 
takes into account family affairs and security” (ibid.). The FJP’s program is in line with 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s well-known anti-imperialist decolonizing rhetoric, as 
illustrated by the following proposed long-term measure:  
Developing a road map to achieve complete independence for the Egyptian state, 
in all matters pertaining to family, women and children, beginning with a review 
of the CEDAW and CRC [Convention on the Rights of the Child] international 
conventions, and ending with a popular decision on those, so that Egyptian 
policy, in this regard, stems from the inherent pure values of the Egyptian 
people, not from some international agenda (ibid.).  
As long as Egypt abides by international conventions regulating women’s rights, 
agreed to in a perceived non-democratic manner, the FJP considers the country not to 
be fully independent. “The pure inherent values” refer to the family unit that provides 
social strength and represents the cornerstone of the nation. Makarim al-Deiry further 
explains the necessity to safeguard the family unit for a variety of reasons. The family 
unit needs to be well-maintained and protected as it addresses basic socio-economic 
needs for which the state does not offer sufficient solutions through social security.  
Additionally, the family needs to be protected following from a deliberate political 
choice that is based on a different gender ideology. This ideology does not allow 
women similar rights to men. In this view, allowing women all individual rights, 
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including sexual rights, leads to social destabilization and decay, a view that, according 
to al-Deiry, is a widely-shared view among Egyptians. She argues: “we, Muslims and 
Christians are close to each other and we find ourselves united against this secular 
Western system” (al-Deiry 2013). She rejects this western ideology that she connects 
with French feminist Simone de Beauvoir, “who claimed that marriage means that you 
allow rape. This is not true and we reject this reasoning” (al-Deiry 2013).  
Efforts were made indeed to develop an alternative conservative gender politics 
when FJP president Muhammad Mursi was elected. Several female FJP members were 
appointed to high profile positions, for example Camelia Helmy who became a 
member of the FJP Executive Bureau and Manal abu-l-Hassan took up the newly 
created position of FJP Secretary for Women. Umayma Kamel was appointed 
presidential advisor on family and women’s issues and was charged with developing 
a new national plan concerning women’s issues, together with the National Center for 
Social and Criminological Research. The aim was for “scientists to provide us with true 
statistics on the reality of women and these [scientists] should not be politicians” 
(ᶜAbd al-Munᶜim 2013).  
A national congress leading to the formulation of new policies based on these 
findings concerning Egyptian women and families was planned to be held in July 2013, 
under Umayma Kamil’s leadership. It is well known, however, that these plans never 
came to fruition as president Mursi was deposed on 3 July 2013 by the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces following mass civil protests. The FJP party and president 
Mursi’s policies had been criticized and opposed by a wide spectrum of political and 
societal actors, including the military and the “deep state” (i.e. bureaucratic and non-
democratic powerful factors) associated with the Mubarak regime (Kandil 2013).The 
National Council for Women maintained its position and was never replaced by a new 
National Council for the Family. Moreover, it regained its position as a national 
institution following the the Brotherhood’s attempt to change it and following the 
continued public debate on violence against women in the public sphere. I will turn to 
this now.  
6.3.3 Violence against Women, the Brotherhood meets the 
transnational 
Women’s groups began lively discussions after the uprising about how to commit to 
progressive gender politics and what the role of the state and a National Council 
should look like (Hatem 2011). A reformed NCW was eventually put in place in 
February 2012 under the presidency of former Minister of Social Affairs Mervat al-
Talawy but remains the subject of debate and criticism. Two new members of the 
council are religious scholars and professors at al-Azhar University, Amna Nusayr and 
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the late Mahmud ᶜAzab (d. 2014). Their presence was intended to enhance the 
council’s credibility as respecting religion and not contradicting Islamic shariᶜa. 
As mentioned above, president Mursi was deposed on 3 July 2013 after the creation 
of a wide alliance against his policies and massive popular protests. Many 
demonstrations were held in protest against Mursi’s policies and the increasing level 
of violence against women. This violence often had a clear political character as it 
targeted female demonstrators, but at the same time a new awareness grew of the 
daily forms of violence that women suffer. Paul Amar identified a recent focus on 
women’s safety in the public sphere and places this within a larger framework of UN 
policy shifts. Over the last ten years, he sees a shift of focus from “a private space and 
cultural backwardness model” toward a “public space and social deviance model” 
(Amar 2011, 303). While this shift refers to the level of transnational policy consensus 
making, I would argue that Egypt’s post-uprising discussion of gender norms 
correlates with this shift. Post-uprising Egypt witnessed a growing resistance against 
sexual harassment, intimidation and violence against women in the public space 
(following the many instances of ever-increasing violence against women during 
protests).  
Moreover, the transnational level became most closely interwoven with the 
Egyptian local debate on the occasion of the UN meeting of the Commission on the 
Status of Women (CSW) in 2013. Before the CSW meeting of 2013, Egyptian women’s 
growing protests against violence and harassment is best illustrated by the largest 
women’s demonstration since 1919, held in central Cairo on 20 December 2011. This 
demonstration was held in support of women who fell victim to violence from the 
ruling military council (SCAF) and its main slogan was “women of Egypt are the red 
line” (banat masr khat ahmar) meaning the red line that cannot be crossed; women’s 
bodies cannot be violated.  
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Women’s demonstration in Cairo on 20 December 2011 
 
It was an extraordinary event because of its size and evident growing awareness of 
and resistance against political and public violence against women (Hatem 2011). Acts 
of violence against women increased throughout 2012 but these were met with 
greater awareness and activism as plenty of new activist groups sprang up in defence 
of women’s rights and safety (Langohr 2013). 
According to Singerman, the call for “dignity” (karama) that was heard so loudly 
during the eighteen days of the revolution seemed to resonate with women’s widely 
perceived need for dignity in the public sphere (Singerman 2013, 21). The grave 
circumstances of violent political repression and street harassment added to the 
resentment of conservative Islamists’ attempts to alter the status quo in gender 
politics. The concomitant dynamic of social protest centering on women’s safety in the 
public sphere contributed to a newly discovered social support for institutions such 
as the National Council for Women and for symbols such as International Women’s 
Day This resulted in a collaborative drafting of a law stipulating and penalizing all 
forms of violence against women and supported by the NCW, several NGOs and three 
different ministries, in February 2013.  
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Women’s demonstration in Cairo on 20 December 2011 
 
The public debate on violence against women and the Brotherhood’s conservative 
stances was only invigorated on the occasion of Egypt’s participation in the United 
Nations Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) in March 2013. The 57th session 
of the CSW at the UN headquarters in New York was held from 4–15 March 2013 and 
focused on the prevention and elimination of violence against women. The CSW is a 
functional committee belonging to the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC). It was established in 1946 and is one of the main international bodies 
developing global gender policy. The resulting common declaration in 2013 built on 
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previous UN agreements and condemned different forms of violence against women, 
including rape, sexual harassment, murder, honour killings, female genital cutting, 
domestic violence, and incest and child marriage. UN CSW declarations are solely 
morally binding and are not to be ratified by parliament.  
The Egyptian delegation was headed by the president of the NCW, Mervat al-
Talaway, while Pakinam Al-Sharkawi, Special Assistant to the President for Political 
Affairs and a member of the FJP/Muslim Brotherhood, was assigned by the President 
to deliver Egypt’s speech during the inaugural session.  
Tension and conflict occurred within the Egyptian delegation as the group, made 
up of NCW members and representatives of civil society, disagreed strongly with Al-
Sharkawi’s official address to the meeting. Al-Sharkawi’s official address to the 
meeting stressed the importance of the new constitution that “enabled the Egyptian 
woman to gain more political and intellectual independence”. This means that she 
“stands ready to contribute more effectively in formulating the international discourse 
on women and in developing visions that are more in tune with the values and culture 
she shares with millions of women in the Arab and Islamic worlds”. The statement 
continues “this will ultimately support the goal of the United Nations and its 
specialized agencies to truly embody the world with its diverse races, religions, 
peoples and cultures” (Al-Sharkawi 3-4-2013). Other delegation members, of the 
NCW, strongly disagreed with this analysis and the beneficial effects of the new 
constitution. A disagreement that according to Huda ᶜabd al-Munᶜim can be explained 
by the fact that “not everything that befits foreign culture, befits Eastern culture” (ᶜAbd 
al-Munᶜim 2013).  
The situation escalated when, near the end of the meeting, the Muslim Brotherhood 
rather unexpectedly issued an early statement on its English language website, 
Ikhwanweb that starkly condemned the CSW draft declaration, stating that it 
“contradicts principles of Islam and destroys family life and entire society. It 
continues: 
This declaration, if ratified, would lead to complete disintegration of society, and 
would certainly be the final step in the intellectual and cultural invasion of 
Muslim countries, eliminating the moral specificity that helps preserve cohesion 
of Islamic societies.  
The Muslim Brotherhood’s statement stirred controversy and was met with 
outrage by several activists, politicians and intellectuals who condemned the 
statement in the media. The Brotherhood’s statement was criticized for falsely 
attributing articles to the CSW draft declaration concerning the promotion of sexual 
freedom, adultery and promiscuity, promoting LGBT rights, equalizing inheritance 
rights between men and women and replacing the social norm of wilaya (guardianship 
of a family male over women) with partnership. Critics argued that the CSW draft 
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statement did not address any of these subjects, which had been falsely evoked by the 
Brotherhood to discredit the institution of the CSW. This demarche by the Muslim 
Brotherhood exposed their strong conservative views unambiguously to a large 
national and international  audience. It caused resentment among wide segments of 
the population and angered women’s rights activists who lamented that the 
Brotherhood’s gender ideology seemed to debate basic and well-established women’s 
equal citizenship rights (Elsadda 2013; Badran 2013). 
Simultaneously and ironically, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s (OIC) 
envoy to the UN issued a statement on 11 March 2013 in praise of the CSW’s efforts. 
Contrary to the Brotherhood, the OIC argued for a clear separation between cultural 
practices considered to be harmful and violent towards women and Islamic religious 
teachings. This controversy did not prevent the Egyptian delegation from continuing 
its work at the meeting. Fatma Khafagi, Ombudsperson for Gender Equality in Egypt 
and a member of the delegation led by the NCW, stated that the Egyptian delegation 
played a crucial role in steering the diplomatic negotiations towards consensus 
(Khafagi 2013).  
According to Khafagi, Egypt has gained great leverage at UN gender politics 
meetings after a long experience of negotiating and reconciling different geographical 
and ideological “blocs” in order to reach the necessary consensus. In particular under 
the leadership of Mervat al-Talaway, Egypt positioned itself over the years as an 
important actor during previous UN meetings such as the International Population 
and Development Conference (ICPD) held in Cairo in 1994 and the Fourth World 
Women’s Conference held in Beijing in 1995. Al-Talawy’s strong personal reputation 
and career as a diplomat (she was the first woman to join Egypt’s Diplomatic Corps) 
“aided the delegation in keeping resolute in expressing and promoting the NCW’s 
vision and even contesting the official FJP address” (Khafagi 2013).  
The tumultuous episode of Egypt’s passage at the 2013 CSW left the members of 
the delegation and activists at home feeling sour about the Brotherhood’s 
exclamations, while at the same time realizing that embodied experience in 
transnational feminist activism cannot be erased so soon. The Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood stood not alone in its disagreements with the consensus-reaching 
process but found allies with the Vatican and Russia in its aim to insert language on 
religion, culture and tradition in opposition to rights discourse (Hopgood 2013, 155-
161). As such, this particular instance of conservative alliance-making on the 
transnational level is to be located within the larger conservative movement that 
opposes women’s rights advocacy (and especially reproductive rights advocacy) since 
the ICPD and Beijing Conferences. 
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6.3.4 The “islamist” constitution of December 2012: conditional 
equality between men and women 
The most far-reaching changes concerning national gender policy under Brotherhood 
rule was arguably the constitution drawn up under president Mursi’s government. 
The National Council for Women lobbied against this constitution and collected a 
million of signatures to protest against it (ᶜAbd al-Munᶜim 2013). The drafting process 
and the moment of approval of the draft happened in a general tense and much 
criticized atmosphere. The islamist factions who formed the majority in the 
constitution drafting assembly were criticized for not compromising to other political 
factions and persisting on controversial articles concerning the role of religion in state 
affairs (HRW 2012).  
One of the long-debated clauses stated that equality between men and women 
would be conditional on the conformity with Islamic law or shariᶜa, a clause that was 
particularly defended by the Salafist members. Special advisor to president Mursi, 
Umayma Kamil defended the clause with the shariᶜa condition on the grounds that this 
was needed for Islamic rights not to become inverted by gender equality provisions. 
In a state television interview, she explained that this related only to “firmly 
established” Islamic rights, “with no controversy around them”, referring to polygamy 
and inheritance rules (AP 2012). Adding this clause would help protect the country 
from international women’s rights agreements that would “impose complete equality” 
and “strip us of our character as a people who are religious and respect Islam” (AP 
2012). Kamil reportedly added:  
"Just like people on the left fear that someone on the right will one day say 
women have to stay in the home, there are people on the right - the conservatives 
and Islamists - who fear that one day Egypt will be forced to carry out what's in 
international agreements, like complete equality."  
Eventually this clause was removed from the final draft, but the stipulation that 
discrimination based on sex was prohibited was also no longer included (as no specific 
grounds for discrimination were mentioned) (HRW 2012). The positions of female 
Brotherhood members were particularly criticized by human and women’s rights 
organisations. Bahy Eddin Hassan, director of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights, 
said the Brotherhood's female members "don't believe in the concept of basic 
women's rights ... We don't have illusions about how much progress we can make with 
them."(AP 2012) 
The clause (article 10) that was introduced in the constitution under president al-
Sadat concerning enabling women to combine familial obligations and professional 
occupation became reformulated again in favor of family responsibilities. It read in the 
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December 2012 constitution: “The state shall provide free motherhood and childhood 
services and shall balance between a woman’s obligations toward the family and 
public work”. This received criticism from Human Rights Watch arguing that “the 
state’s role should be confined to ensuring equality and non-discrimination, without 
interfering with a woman’s choices about her life, family and profession or justify 
discrimination on that basis” (HRW 2012).  
6.3.5 “They want to bring it back”: the Brotherhood’s trade in 
FGC 
The Brotherhood became not only known for the stirred controversies on reversing 
policies concerning women’s rights, they were also under national and international 
spotlights with statements and actions that hinted at their rejection of the law 
criminalizing FGC. Throughout the course of my fieldwork, I heard the idea frequently 
that the Brotherhood approved of FGC and that “they want to bring it back”. NGO 
workers were particularly apprehensive about “the situation of FGC” if the 
Brotherhood had stayed in power. Eva, an NGO director in the Northern outskirts of 
Cairo explained to me that she had been working for many years in raising awareness 
about the practice in her district. Over the years, many had abandoned the practice, 
she said, but a minority, especially Brotherhood supporters who were numerous in 
the area, were persistent: “Because of them we need to repeat and continue our work, 
because of them we experience a setback now, so it’s important to keep up the work”.  
The fact that ex-president Mursi was deposed from power, however, meant for 
many of my interlocutors a celebration that an end was made to the political and 
cultural ideology that emphasizes conservative gender norms of which FGC seems to 
be part. Hanaan and René, two NGO directors in the Northern outskirts of Cairo, 
claimed that with the end of MB rule, Islamism also had failed in the eyes of citizens 
and that therefore support for practices such as FGC also drops. In interviews with 
program coordinators of anti-FGC campaigning of UNICEF and UNFPA Egypt  
(Darwish and Salabi 2015) it was estimated that the episode of MB in power would 
not have created drastic changes in the villages. As mentioned in chapter 3, 
campaigning activities were halted after the January 2011 uprising and were roughly 
resumed in the summer of 2013, after president Mursi was deposed from power. 
These UN workers did not detect a setback of campaigning efforts but emphasized 
however, the importance of the current ruling government (of al-Sisi) and its support 
of these efforts.  
In the following, I will look at which statements and actions by the Brotherhood 
concerning FGC caused uproar in the last years. In the next section of this chapter, I 
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will discuss how we can interpret and understand the Brotherhood’s attitude toward 
FGC as an Islamicate practice, within the frame of a conservative agenda.  
In 2008, parliament voted amendments to the so-called Child’s law that 
criminalized FGC in Egypt, whether the practice was performed in private or in 
(private or public) hospital. This law for the first time provided a clear and 
unambiguous legal framework to ban the practice entirely (see chapter 3 for more on 
Egyptian activism and legislation). The law was approved after a long and heated 
debate in Parliament, in which members of the Muslim Brotherhood argued against 
the criminalization of FGC (Tadros 2012). 
These members accused the National Council of Childhood and Motherhood 
(NCCM), the main sponsor of the law proposal headed by former first lady Suzanne 
Mubarak, of “seeking to impose Western social values” and claiming that these 
amendments “contravene Islamic shariᶜa” (El-Din 2008). The same law amendments 
addressed marriage of minors and established the legal age for marriage at 18. This 
rule was fought by MB members saying that “the ban would open the door to moral 
corruption and push young couples into ᶜurfi (common law) marriages or extra-
marital sexual relationships” on the one hand and arguing that Islam allow couples to 
marry “when they become sexually mature at the age of 15 and 16” (El-Din 2008). In 
both cases of FGC and early marriage, MB members referred to Islamic tradition and 
sharia as the true arbiter in these cases and Western social values being imported into 
Egypt and the moral corruption of Egyptian youth as a consequence. Egyptian morals 
are endangered, in other words, by confrontation and importing of liberal Western 
morals concerning gender and sexuality. 
A few years later, after the Brotherhood formed the majority in Parliament in post-
2011 Egypt and Muhammad Mursi won the presidential elections, the movement’s 
rejection of the anti-FGC law was debated again. Azza al-Garf and Umayma Kamil were 
among the most prominent Brotherhood women expressing their opinions on FGC, al-
Garf as an elected member of parliament, and Kamil appointed by president 
Muhammad Mursi as advisor on women’s issues. In an interview with Associated 
Press, al-Garf explained her vision on gender norms and marriage: “the first role of 
women in Egypt is inside the family, as a wife and mother” and politics or work comes 
second (AP 2012). Both roles can be balanced together but the second one ought not 
to be at the cost of the first one.  
Both have been quoted as being in favor of the practice of FGC in Egyptian media, 
but each has denied it in later comments (AP 2012). The Egyptian Center for Women’s 
Rights, however, reported that in May 2012 Azza al-Garf submitted a proposal of 
amendment of article 242 of the Penal Code law no. 126, 2008, concerning the 
criminalization of FGC. The amendment stated “that it is not allowed to have female 
genital mutilation outside hospitals without consulting a doctor” ((ECWR) 2012, 7). 
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This amendment would thus alter the law and legalize FGC under certain conditions, 
namely within the conditions of a medicalized environment. The proposal of 
amendment was not officially endorsed by the movement and al-Garf had to retract 
earlier statements favorable to FGC, blaming media for reporting incorrectly. The 
following cartoon mocks this particular episode, featuring Azza al-Garf and Salah 
Abdel Maqsoud, the FJP Minister of Media:  
 
 
- Azza al-Garf: We are not fools to listen to official Egyptian media broadcasting 
- Egyptian Minister of Media (belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood): What’s 
wrong with you, silly woman? 
- Two members of the MB curse each other and we don’t care hahahhah 
There is a repeated pattern among members of the Brotherhood and other islamists 
when asked about FGC to state that this practice is not and should not be a priority for 
policy makers and that it is not a priority for the general population either. This results 
in often ambiguous statements, neither calling for its straightforward abandonment 
nor recommending it. Umayma Kamil stated to AP that FGC is “a bad practice” that 
should be addressed through awareness campaigns (AP 2012). Acclaimed journalist 
and activist against FGC, Shahira Amin reported: “When I asked dr. Sabbah al-Sakkary, 
a prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, about 
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her views on FGM, she said “only a doctor can decide whether or not a girl is in need 
of the surgery” (Amin 2012). 
Apart of ambiguous statements, another episode of public debate and controversy 
followed when leaflets were published announcing a medical convoy sponsored by 
Brotherhood volunteers:  
 
 
This leaflet was distributed in the town of Abu ᶜAziz in southern Egypt and 
announces the organization of a “medical convoy”. It carries the FJP party emblem and 
announces the yearly medical convoy that offers medical check-ups in different 
specializations for a symbolic price of five Egyptian pounds per examination, to be 
held on 20 April 2012 at the Azhari Institute in Abu ᶜAziz. The columns present the 
different medical specializations of participating doctors. At the bottom a remark is 
mentioned, encircled in red: “we welcome cases of male and female circumcision at 
the price of 30 EGP per case”.  
The news about the FJP’s dealing in FGC and the publication of this leaflet in social 
media sparked outrage and debate in printed and social media. The events were raised 
in public debate when the National Council for Women accused MB cadres in an 
address to the Attorney General and called for an investigation (ᶜAbd al-Jawad 2012). 
Both the national Brotherhood leadership and the Ministry of Health consequently 
denied that such events had taken place. The initiative was said to be organized by the 
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local Brotherhood members without consent by the national leadership. Media outlets 
report that the Ministry of Health and the Directorate of Health in the province of 
Minya denied that this convoy had been organized and that FGC had not been 
performed on the announced day (al-Rawy 2012; ᶜAbd al-Jawad 2012). According to 
Masrawy news, the Directorate of Health was informed the day before (19 April 2012) 
through the national telephone hotline for child protection. In this manner, the 
Directorate managed to send inspectors to the village and to contact FJP members of 
parliament representing the region of Minya to demand their respecting the law that 
criminalizes FGC. The convoy was thus effectively prevented to perform any practice. 
Instead the Directorate of Health “organized a meeting of the rural volunteers 
(raᵓidat) to raise awareness about the harms of FGC among the women of the 
province”, according to Masrawy (al-Rawy 2012). Media were contacted to declare 
that no cases of FGC had occurred in Minya and that everything was being done “to 
permanently follow-up and to spread awareness-raising among the people in order to 
change the misconceptions [concerning FGC]” (al-Rawy 2012).   
Not only state officials quickly attempted to assure the population that they had 
managed the situation and succeeded in preventing the medical convoys offering FGC. 
The secretary of FJP of Minya himself denounced that a medical convoy offering FGC 
was organized and condemned the news as rumours that are part of a media campaign 
to slander the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Rawy 2012). Also Huda ᶜabd al-Munᶜim 
proclaimed in a personal interview that the movement had “strongly and vigorously 
resisted as soon as the information was received that a banner in Minya announced 
free male and female circumcision” (al-Munᶜim 22 June 2013). In the meanwhile, 
many voices had joined in the choir of condemnation, including the “Coalition of Coptic 
Egypt” (Ittilaf aqbat masr) calling it a “severe violation of human rights” and that “the 
medical convoy targeted ordinary people to perform FGC illegally” (ᶜAbd al-Jawad 
2012). 
6.4  “The return of FGC”? FGC as an Islamicate practice 
6.4.1 A revival of Islam or of conservative culture? 
How can we understand the Brotherhood’s attitude toward FGC? We saw that the 
organization of the MB does not take an official stance against it but rather leaves the 
topic covered in ambiguous terms. Some Brotherhood representatives and FJP 
members of parliament embrace the practice as legitimate and others do not. Some 
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show an ambiguous attitude that does not condemn it as harmful or as un-Islamic. 
Why did the FJP in the run-up to elections offer FGC for sale in its medical caravans 
passing through southern Egyptian villages? There is the immediate expectation of 
winning votes through the initiative but offering FGC also practically endorses it. How 
can we understand a hesitant ambiguous endorsement of FGC, without claiming it as 
an explicit Islamic practice that ought to be followed?  
Islamist conservativism focuses on civil society and broadly aims at the islamisation 
of culture and public life. Movements associated with Islamism have followed various 
ways to reach this goal across time and geographical regions. In Egypt, this variety of 
strategies is generally differentiated between radical groups that don’t shun violence 
and conservative groups that solely operate within the existing social and political 
establishment. Conservative political actors are not always in roles of political 
opposition. Ideologues, intellectuals and other supporters of a conservative Islam 
occupy a wide spectrum of positions within and in opposition to the state. Some form 
part of the official sunni Islamic establishment of al-Azhar institute. Such actors can be 
considered conservative “because of their willingness to work within the established 
order and because they promote hierarchical and patriarchal values reinforcing the 
status quo” (Ismail 1998, 200).  
In political opposition or within power bastions, conservatives share an interest in 
issues of culture and morality and often attribute Islam a central role. As Salwa Ismail 
phrases it: “[c]ulture and morality constitute the grounds upon which the 
problematique of the time is articulated: a cultural conflict with the outside and the 
struggle for the preservation of public morality inside” (ibid. 202). By analyzing texts, 
press and statements of conservative and islamist actors in Egypt of the 1990s, Ismail 
demonstrated that in shaping a “problematique of cultural confrontation, [this 
discourse] displaces the social and national struggle and produces an identity 
totalized in religious and moral terms”(ibid. 203). In her view, the idea of cultural 
confrontation is built and developed by two main discourses: the confrontation with 
the West and how this confrontation represents a cultural invasion and “a cultural 
attack on Islam” (ibid. 204-5) and the idea of Islam being of superior value and 
possessing distinctive characteristics that are to be defended. Whereas the West is 
seen as fragmented, divided and mutable, Islam is given the properties of 
completeness, comprehensiveness, and unity (ibid. 206).  
Conservative discourse has been analysed as being an inherent part of “religious 
revivalism” in the region of the Middle Egypt and in Egypt. The conceptualization of 
revival goes back as far as debates in the late nineteenth century, it has been known 
as nahda, (renaissance) or sahwa (revival) in Egyptian colloquial and is also referred 
to as Islamic modernism (Hirschkind 2006; McLarney 2015, 1-34). Whether couched 
in terms of religious revival or Islamic modernism, such movements share a rethinking 
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of society and religion within a frame of global, modern transformations (Masud and 
Salvatore 2009; Sinanovic 2012). Central in these efforts is to take Islam as a departure 
point.  
In contrast to Islamic modernism, political scientist Salwa Ismail characterizes 
Islam since the 1970s as an orientation in which the “West” and “Islam” are cast “in a 
relation of contradiction with each other” (Ismail 1998, 210).In other words, an 
essentialisation of the Other takes places on “both sides” of the transcultural space 
(Salvatore 1997). Consequently, proponents of Islamic conservatism and those 
rejecting equal gender norms as Western imports are practicing “a form of selective 
repudiation that depends on significant occlusions” (Abu-Lughod 1998, 243). 
Anthropologist Lila Abu Lughod argues: “what is characteristic of the Islamists is that 
they stigmatize sexual independence and public freedoms as Western but much more 
gingerly challenge women’s rights to work, barely question women’s education and 
unthinkingly embrace the ideals of bourgeois marriage” (Abu-Lughod 1998, 243) 
Islamists conservatives in the last decades tend to select sexual morality and gender 
norms in the public sphere to rally against as Western imports that are in 
contradiction to Islam, while women’s education, participation in the labour market 
and the idea of companiate marriage are equally indebted to Western/modern 
concepts and are generally accepted.  
In other words, the general call for a more Islamic society is accompanied with a 
call for a more conservative society that includes traditional gender roles. An Islamic 
way of life is thus intertwined with a conservative and traditional vision on gender 
and family, in which women are perceived to belong in the family sphere in which they 
can fulfill their proper role. The idea that “women’s proper place is in the home with 
their families” is part of conservative sentiments that have circulated in Egyptian 
visual and printed press since the late 1970s (Abu-Lughod 1998, 250-1) Such 
propositions have been characterized as calls for the ‘“retraditionalisation” of 
women’s status and roles’ (Abu-Lughod 1998, 255). This shows that perceptions of a 
“return to Islam”, and a return to the “culturally authentic” can hardly be separated in 
the writings and ideas of many conservatives. An understanding of the Islamic revival 
solely as a combination of social, cultural and political actors which aim it is to “re-
establish and re-institute Islamic teachings, in their broadest sense, into the societies 
in which they live” (Sinanovic 2012, 3) falls therefore short to grasp these actors’ 
concern with the “retraditionalisation of women’s roles” In these views , a return to 
Islam signifies installing conservative gender and family norms. The realm of religion 
and culture / tradition are intertwined and hard to disentangle for its proponents. 
From this perspective, it becomes easier to understand why FGC is not outwardly 
rejected nor explicitely reclaimed by Brotherhood members. FGC is a gendered 
cultural practice that has historically been associated with Islamic teachings. 
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Moreover, it has predominantly been considered as a favorable Islamic practice (see 
chapter four). Occupying this in-between position where the cultural and the religious 
are entangled defines FGC as an Islamic practice. Precisely because of their obfuscated 
in-between nature, such practices are a preferred terrain for the focus of islamist 
politics.  
6.4.2 Islamicate – and gendered – practices as preferred terrain 
of conservative politics  
Let’s look further into the question why issues of morality, culture and gendered 
practices such as FGC are often subject of islamist, conservative politics In Egypt, the 
Brotherhood as a conservative movement is an important part of the larger Islamist 
conservative revivalism. Earlier in this chapter, I argued that the Brotherhood does 
not form a coherent visionary block that follows one particular political or ideological 
line, but is rather “associated with positions and individuals who are seen to represent 
various lines of Islamism” (Ismail 1998, 200). The Brotherhood’s conservative policies 
on gender and family were translated politically during the first and only year of 
islamist governance in Egypt. The movement’s visions were strongly articulated in 
opposition to and contradiction of Western gender policies and ideology. The FJP 
party, the political party that emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood movement after 
the 2011 Uprising, aimed at transplanting the National Council of Women with a 
National Council of Family and at abandoning international agreements of gender and 
women’s rights policies.  
Also for the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic vision goes hand in hand with a 
political anti-Western vision and a call for a “retraditionalization” of society. The 
Islamic revival is therefore about reinvigorating conservative gender and cultural 
norms as much as it focuses on Islamic discursive traditions and historical legacies of 
Islamic teachings. The result is that “family life and the domestic sphere constitute a 
private space with public or political importance” (McLarney 2015, 7). The general 
transformation toward a society that becomes more preoccupied with religion and its 
place in the public sphere, has been well studied, but the gendered aspects have caught 
much less attention, “even though debates over women’s rights, roles and 
responsibilities have been a cornerstone of revivalist writings on religion” (McLarney 
2015, 8)1 Contemporary revivalist women’s writings theorize how women’s role in 
 
                                                     
1 Mclarney shows how there is a parallel between the manner in which Western discourse – “early colonial 
and missionary (and orientalist) discourses” – has approached Islam, namely “as a religion (and as a form 
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the family, in mothering and in nurturing is connected to a sense of liberation and how 
these activities are “the site for the cultivation of religion” (McLarney 2015, 9).  
This means that in the Egyptian revivalist conservative movement, the “politics of 
motherhood” (Werbner 1999) are interconnected with a cultivation of Islam. 
Motherwork and traditional gender roles combine with Islam in a manner that is 
political. Motherwork and women performing their proper family role become ways 
of “nurturing Islamic community outside the reach of the secular state, military 
intervention, and foreign ideologies, even though these practices are clearly 
conditioned by the politics of domination within which they are proscribed and 
against which they mobilize” (McLarney 2015, 9).  
Makarim al-Deiry, a high-profile Muslim Sister, explained in an interview in her 
office how her vision on gender and family policy connects seamlessly ideas of Islamic 
womanhood with an anti-Western stance. In her narrative, an Islamic vision is 
naturally going against Western concepts of gender and the political power that is 
behind those Western concepts. She argues that:  
“the values that stem from international conventions are in contradiction with 
Islamic shariᶜa and with Christian regulations and are only the reflection of 
western values. […] The West uses gender instead of sex in order to encompass 
homosexuals and we don’t accept this. Islam respects motherhood and 
femininity and biological differences.”(al-Deiry 2013) 
Indeed, al-Deiry explicitly rejects Western concepts of gender (“I’m in favour of ‘sex’ 
not ‘gender’”) that she connects with French feminist Simone de Beauvoir, “who 
claimed that marriage means that you allow rape. This is not true and we reject this 
reasoning” (al-Deiry 2013). This rejection of the concept of gender as social constructs 
of masculinity and femininity and the emphasis on biological sex difference is contrary 
to other ‘motherist’ movements or societal actors engaged in a politics of motherhood 
that rather “deny dualistic theories of gendered opposition between male and female 
as embodiments of exclusive qualities” (Werbner 1999, 221).  
Al-Deiry sees a direct conflict between Islamic teachings and understandings of 
family and gender norms on the one hand and Western gender policies on the other. 
This conflict appears equally in the case of internationally agreed upon 
understandings of what constitutes Violence Against Women (VAW). In her view, the 
definition of violence is “physical beating, but not for instance, inheritance 
 
                                                     
of politics) through its private practices – focusing on women, their bodies, sexuality and family life” (p. 8) 
and the focus that the revivalist conservative writings put on the family and gender roles as a political space. 
In other words, how the longtime lenses through which the West looked at Islam parallels the current lenses 
and efforts of the revivalist and conservative movements. (McLarney 2015) 
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[legislations] or qawwama”. Qawwama is a concept of Qurᵓanic orgin that is 
dominantly understood as referring to male leadership, male headship or male 
superiority over women. Huda ᶜabd al-Munᶜim agrees that domestic violence and 
violence between spouses should be about litteral beating (al-darb) and that this is 
not how VAW is described in UN agreements.  
Both Muslim Brotherhood sisters feel compelled to defend Qurᵓanic concepts 
relating to marriage and marital relations against, perceptions of behaviour that is in 
their view wrongly seen as constituting violence against women. ᶜAbd al-Munᶜim 
underscores that the concept of qawwama is positive, as it is an inherent part of the 
Islamic value system, and that any faults or mistakes are human. Opponents of the 
concept of qawwama “think that it is a lessening of the woman’s cause (taqlil min shaᵓn 
al-marᵓa), we on the other hand see that it comes from “qawwam”, as “strength” and 
“foundation”, standing at my service” (ᶜAbd al-Munᶜim 2013). For her, the concept of 
qawwama is properly understood as the readiness of the husband to be of assistance 
to his wife. Similarly, the concept of wilaya in marriage, in her view, means that “you 
have a custodian (waly) behind you to defend your rights”, while the dominant 
interpretation refers to the hierarchical relationship installed between husband and 
wife, wherein the husband acts as a custodian or care-taker and therefore the highest 
decision maker.2  
According to al-Deiry, it are Western women who suffer from violence and it is 
commitment to religion that will protect women. Marital relations should be based on 
mercy (rahma) and compassion (shafqa) and the life and behaviour of the Prophet 
should serve as an example to emulate, keeping in mind that “he took decisions in 
consultation with his wife”. The shariᶜa should be guiding society and not 
international conventions. In arguing against abortion, however, al-Deiry adopts a 
rights-based discourse. In her view, abortion is disallowed because of the unborn 
child’s rights. The principle of children’s rights “should be a priority” and a child 
should also “have the right to know her father and mother and to live in a healthy 
family”. She prefers that children’s rights are made a priority over women’s rights in 
international policy. 
Of utmost importance for both Muslim Sisters and the Brotherhood at large, is 
protection of the family unit, as “the family forms the solution for all social ills” (al-
Deiry 2013). This belief in family as a social basis is associated with an Islamic vision, 
as al-Deiry argues: “Islam does not look for the right of individuals but for the right of 
 
                                                     
2 Both concepts have been subject of debate by feminist scholars who hermeneutically review orthodox 
exegesis of the Qurᵓan in favour of more gender egalitarian understandings, e.g. Amina Wadud, Asma Barlas, 
Ziba Mir-Husseyni. Remarkably, Huda ᶜabd al-Munᶜim’s understandings of these concepts seem to closer to 
feminist Islamic interpretations than to the dominant orthodox ones.  
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the society”. Concern with the collective well-being over the individual is associated 
with an Islamic vision on society. This narrative aligns with revivalist writings in 
which family represents “the very basis (cell or unit) of political community – and its 
ethics of duty, self-sacrifice, care, and compassion, the basis for an ethical politics” 
(McLarney 2015, 12). It points at a cultural politics of gendered practices concering 
raising girls and boys, gender norms and sexual morality in private and public sphere. 
As these are favoured topics, they “exemplify a strategy among Islamists to regulate 
family life as a means of exercising national political power and of asserting a distinct 
Muslim national identity” (Yount 2004, 1086) 
This ideology is described by Walaᵓ ᶜAbd al-Halim as the Brotherhood ‘s reformist 
methodology: “Shaping a righteous individual leads to shaping a righteous family, and 
by shaping a righteous family, you get a righteous society that can choose a righteous 
leader” (al-Naggar 5-9-2012). Walaᵓ ᶜAbd al-Halim is the coordinator of Family House 
(Beyt al-ᶜAᵓila), a charity organization that belongs to the Brotherhood and organizes 
counseling workshops, in addition to offering financial support to youth, households 
and couples to enable them to get married. Al-Deiry emphasizes the importance of 
family values as it is demonstrated for her that “in the West, there no longer is a family 
and therefore Western values have failed”. The ideology of the family as the basic unit 
and political unit of the Islamic community (umma) has been most famously theorized 
by Egyptian scholar Hiba Raouf Ezzat, a well-known female revivalist writer and 
intellectual3. The Brotherhood’s vision as expressed by Makarim al-Deiry and Huda 
ᶜabd al-Munᶜim is largely indebted to intellectutals of revivalism such as Ezzat.  
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter looked at how the Muslim Brotherhood, a conservative islamist 
movement relates to FGC in public discourse and policies. The last few years have been 
unique in that Egypt was governed by islamist rule for the first time in its history. The 
Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party won a majority in Parliament and 
 
                                                     
3 An essential step in turning family matters and gender roles into a religious, Islamic, space occurred 
through the establishment of Personal Status Laws (PSL) or Family Law as “religious law’s proper 
jurisdiction in the private sphere”. These laws established “the family as the sphere of religion, in which 
religion is both concentrated and confined” (McLarney 2015, 17). It would lead us to far to go further into 
the genealogy of the politics of PSL laws and how secular understandings of religion contributed to shaping 
the private – the family sphere – as a religious sphere (Asad 2003, .  
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its presidenitial candidate Muhammad Mursi was elected June 2012. This period thus 
provided a unique occasion to look into the Brotherhood’s politics on gender and 
sexuality in practice. Based on literature study and interviewing I discussed the 
development of the Brotherhood into a political party and then into a ruling regime. 
Its policies quickly became known and criticized for promoting gender 
conservativism. Rights activists, NGO workers and feminists shared a concern about 
their politics and the consequence for anti-FGC campaigning.  
Concerning gender (or women’s rights), the movement aimed to undo the legacy of 
the National Council of Women. Depicting it as an instrument of the previous regime 
and of foreign and transnational donor funds, it wanted to replace the Council with a 
Council for the Family. The name change symbolizes the Brotherhood’s prioritization 
of family values.In transnational women’s rights fora , the Mursi regime opposed 
transnational conceptions of women’s rights and violence against women. Instead,the 
Brotherhood aims for a policy that reinforces the family unit, which represents the 
nation and symbolizes its strength.  
The movement was critiqued in the public debate for doing “trade in religion”, 
especially after president Muhammad Mursi was deposed from power, July 2013. The 
phrase blames the movement for instrumentalizing religion for the sake of power 
politics. Depending on the background of those who criticize, it was blamed that 
religious political demands were being outweighed by more mundane and secular 
demands or that a discourse of religion should not be entered into the political field. 
The result of the Brotherhood’s pragmatic politics is that it reflected the political 
analysis proposing that Islamism has become less interested in introducing Islam and 
shariᶜa into governance than in obtaining or maintaining cultural and social hegemony 
(Bayat 2013).In this post-islamist ideology, political successes are subjugated to the 
hegemony of Islamic culture and social practice is. The Muslim Brotherhood as a 
movement contributed in shaping religious revivalism in Egypt since the 1970s. A 
prominent Brotherhood and former FJP member, ᶜ Azza al-Garf, states consciously “we 
speak on behalf of the street. Egyptian people are very religious, devout people. If (the 
liberals) continue to separate religion from normal life, people will not listen to them” 
(AP 2012).  
This chapter attempts at contextualizing why the Brotherhood remained formally 
ambiguous toward FGC, an Islamicate practice that is deeply embedded in 
conservative gender norms. It asked why the Muslim Brotherhood and the FJP party 
did not claim FGC as an Islamic practice, a practice that is sunna or that is noble to 
perform, as the predominant Islamic tradition of fiqh scholarship tells us (see chapter 
4).Maintaining an ambiguous position that leaves the practice as both a cultural and 
religious can be understood as part of its cultural politics. The movement was 
reluctant to evaluate and define FGC as a practice that is sunna, or possibly honorable, 
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recommended or simply allowed but not beneficial. Instead, the issue is left 
ambiguously unresolved. This ambiguous treatment of FGC as neither an Islamic nor 
as an un-Islamic practice, as something to be encouraged and endorsed but yet 
without explicitly belonging to traditional Islamic norms, is a typical characterization 
of a gendered Islamicate practice. 
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Chapter 7  
Al-Azhar, Salafism and the politics of religious 
speech on FGC  
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will discuss religious discourse on FGC by two predominant 
tendencies in contemporary Egypt. Within the sociology of Islam and Western 
scholarship on Islam there has traditionally been great attention for religious 
authority and leadership. Questions of who and which institutions represent Islamic 
doctrine played a central role, in addition to the - often essentializing and therefore 
criticized as orientalist - questions of what precisely constitutes Islam (Berkey 1996, 
20)  
A common departure point today, however, is the widely documented 
fragmentation, diversification and pluralization of religious authority in Muslim-
majority countries, as a consequence of mass education and the easy access to Islamic 
texts and religious interpretation through mass media (Eickelman 1992; Mandaville 
2007; Volpi and Turner 2007). This chapter looks at two competing and interacting 
interpretative streams of Islamic doctrine and law: the historically formed group of 
religious scholars of sunni Islam, ᶜulamaᵓ, and their main educational institution, al-
Azhar University and mosque and secondly, salafi schools and preachers, who form 
part of political Islam and characterize themselves as rejecting the classical training of 
ᶜulamaᵓ in al-Azhar.  
Over the last decades, al-Azhar has attempted to demand implementation of shariᶜa 
and more recently in the post-Mubarak time, Salafists attempted the same. Both aim 
at offering authoritative understandings of Islam. I will give more attention to the 
salafi trend due to the significant developments that occurred over the last few, post-
Mubarak years that radically redefined Egyptian salafism and impacted on the entire 
 184 
religious-political landscape. Moreover, Salafists representatives of parliament plead 
for a review of the 2008 law that criminalizes FGC and were in general stirring 
controversy because of proposals revealing highly conservative gender and sexuality 
ideologies.  
There is a multitude of opinions and discourse on FGC available in media, TV and 
radio shows, on the internet, You Tube, in awareness-raising infomercials on national 
TV and awareness-raising seminars organized in local communities. The ubiquity in 
mass media of Islamic religious opinions and interpretation that don’t necessarily go 
into depth but rather touch subjects superficially and tend to focus selectively on a 
small group of popular topics, is what Volpi and Turner called “background noise” 
(Volpi and Turner 2007, 13). This “background noise” forms the major type of 
information on Islam that is readily accessible in mass media. The omnipresence of 
this particular sort of information tends to block out or hide other types of information 
that involve original religious interpretation or original hermeneutic methods. When 
questioning what constitutes religious authority today or which religious voices and 
opinions are powerful, - which is part of what this chapter aims to do – this reality 
should not be underestimated because the background noise, “as much as traditional 
factors such as charisma or institutionalization, becomes a determining element in the 
construction of contemporary forms of Islamic authority. Too much information 
produces too little knowledge” (Volpi and Turner 2007, 13). The background noise 
has become a determining factor just as, or maybe even more than, knowledge 
characterized by innovative methods or scholarly rigor.  
After introducing a general framework against which to analyse religious opinions 
(of institutions and authorities) about social-cultural change, discussing the legacy of 
al-Azhar and situating contemporary Salafism in Egypt, this chapter looks at four 
religious opinions in detail. All four could be seen as voices within the larger 
“background noise” that is produced around FGC, although these voices may be among 
the loudest ones. Two of these opinions belong to shaykhs, graduated from al-Azhar, 
who were invited to deliver a talk in an awareness-raising seminar against FGC, one 
in Luxor and one in Cairo. The other two opinions belong to widely known salafi 
preachers, Muhammad Hassaan and Abu Ishaq al-Huwayni. Individual opinion making 
and the question whether FGC plays a role in collective religious identity formation, 
between Muslims and Coptic Christians, will be discussed in chapter eight.  
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7.2 Al-Azhar: from the center of sunni orthodoxy 
toward the provider of moderate Islam 
7.2.1 Al-Azhar and its precarious monopoly of religious authority 
This first section briefly discusses the institution of al-Azhar in order to contextualize 
the statements of Egypt’s official religious authorities and imams. The collaboration of 
religious leaders is being increasingly sought in the global campaign against FGC. In 
Egypt, these efforts became successful in 2008, when the shaykh of al-Azhar and the 
Great Mufti of Egypt declared their commitment to eradicating FGC in an international 
state-supported conference. In order to grasp the meaning of the collaboration of 
religious authorities, I will situate their position in the larger religious and socio-
political field.  
Al-Azhar is the official institution to receive formal education in the classic 
historical study of Islam, including theology and Islamic law. Graduates are considered 
(religious) scholars (ᶜalim – pl. ᶜᶜulamaᵓ) and they are qualified to work in public 
mosques as imams. Observers and academic scholarship on modern Islam and the 
Middle East have long considered the group of ᶜᶜulamaᵓ to be “entirely submitted to 
the state” (Zeghal 1999, 371). Although their relation to state power and political rule 
and the public has varied throughout history, since the modern period  the idea of 
them being passive observers rather than active contributors to social change 
predominated. Zeghal summarizes: “Considered neither as men of action nor as 
intellectual innovators, the Egyptian ulema educated at al-Azhar were portrayed by 
historians and social scientists as traditional actors, unable to deal with social change, 
especially as secularization emerged in Egypt” (ibid. 373).  
The ᶜ ulamaᵓ historically formed a separate class of religious scholars through which 
knowledge of the Islamic tradition is transmitted. Al-Azhar is therefore considered 
one of the most important old institutions “that survived the changes of the twentieth 
century” (Voll 1994, 183). The recent history of al-Azhar university places them 
squarely in the position of conservatism as conceptualized by Voll. Its modern history 
shows a great flexibility in the balancing exercise between adaptation and reform on 
the one hand, and protecting the existing order on the other. Where books on Islamic 
reform would be burnt by the rector of the university at one point, the author of those 
books would become rector himself and his reformist thought would become 
established a few decades later (ibid. 182-3). Al-Azhar’s style of conservatism in the 
first half of the twentieth century meant protecting “the consensus of liberal 
nationalism and modernism, and then, the dominant Arab socialist perspective” (ibid. 
184).  
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President Gamal ᶜAbdel-Nasir’s regime reformed the institution of al-Azhar 
drastically in 1961. The reforms nationalized al-Azhar and its consequences were felt 
in Egypt’s social and religious landscape at large. They represented a key moment 
shaping the relationship between religion and politics until today (Zeghal 1999, 373). 
New secular courses were introduced in the curricula, new faculties were set up and 
the administration was reorganized and brought under the head of state. The reforms 
resulted initially in submission to the political rulers and in installing al-Azhar as the 
only institution embodying religious authority: “In order to deprive any other groups 
or institutions of independent religious authority, ᶜAbd al-Nasir  had to give a 
monopoly on legitimate religious interpretation to a group of specialists he could 
control by reshaping them into a bureaucracy” (ibid. 374). Both these effects, however, 
would undergo great changes in the following decennia.  
Al-Azhar, political Islam and peripheral ᶜulamaᵓ 
Since the 1970s and 1980s, al-Azhar’s monopoly on religious authority was 
challenged by the growth of political Islam. The monopoly of al-Azhar in religious 
interpretation that Abdel-Nassir had given to it, became explicitly questioned and 
contested. Because of this, it attempted to re-emerge as a political actor and position 
itself vis-à-vis radical, political, Islam that contested al-Azhar’s legitimacy and position 
as superior sunni religious authority (Ibid. 371-2). Islamist groups accused al-Azhar 
of “being unable to give more than an official interpretation of Islam that answered 
the needs of those in power” (ibid. 382). The shaykh al-Azhar attempted to position 
his institution against both the state and the islamists as the only legitimate religious 
interpreter. While these attempts failed under president al-Sadat, they were more 
successful under president Mubarak. Al-Azhar regained its role as an active 
contributor to the political public debate by pushing “Mubarak's regime to accept an 
increasing Islamicization of society” (ibid 384).  
Radical, violent, Islam had come to dominate the political-religious scene and the 
state needed al-Azhar to provide answers. At the same time however, the group of 
ᶜulamaᵓ did not succeed in coming out with a unified response. Growing 
disagreements and ideological divisions became more apparent in the mid and late 
nineties of the twentieth century. Some ᶜulamaᵓ, educated at al-Azhar, had gone their 
own path after graduation and specialized in preaching. These particular individuals 
developed their career by preaching and teaching in “private” or “independent” 
mosques (i.e. mosques that were founded by private donations and enjoy more 
independence over religious speech than the public – state founded – mosques).  They 
gained widespread popularity by combining their own style and religious opinion 
with their Azharite status as classically trained scholars: “Even though they never lost 
their Azharite status and identity, the public never perceived them as supporting the 
official ulema at the top of al-Azhar's administration” (ibid. 386).  
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In other words, a process occurred of  “growing political diversification within the 
body of ᶜulamaᵓ”, leading to the creation of what Islamic studies scholar Malika Zeghal 
called “peripheral ᶜulamaᵓ”: "Peripheral ᶜulamaᵓ" emerged and distanced themselves 
from the official voice of al-Azhar through their practice of daᶜwa (the call to religion, 
especially by preaching) and introduced the different colors of Islamism into al- 
Azhar” (ibid. 372). Their differentiation from the larger body of ᶜulamaᵓ contributed 
to the growing diversification or pluralization of religious authority (Kreil 2012; 
Mandaville 2007; Volpi and Turner 2007). Not only Islamists challenged al-Azhar’s 
religious authority, but the “peripheral ᶜulamaᵓ” introduced dissident thinking as well 
within al-Azhar institution.  
Well-known “peripheral ᶜ ulamaᵓ” are shaykhs ᶜ Abd al-Hamid Kishk, Muhammad al-
Ghazali, Ahmed al-Mahallawi, and Salah Abu Ismaᶜil (Zeghal 1999, 386). They gained 
prominence as individual shaykhs and as part of the daᶜwa movement and played a 
crucial part in the social and culture transformations that characterize religious 
revivalism (Hirschkind 2006). Zeghal captures this historical transition as follows: 
The liberalization led by Sadat in the middle of the 1970s and the political 
participation of the Muslim Brothers gave the peripheral ulema the opportunity 
to get involved in public debates on the function of Islamic law in the Egyptian 
society and to reappropriate the language usually spoken by the Muslim 
Brothers (Zeghal 1999, 387) . 
This means that they reshuffled Egypt’s socio-ethical-religious landscape. The earlier 
rough divide of the religious landscape between 1) the Azhari trend, representing 
sunni orthodoxy as legitimated by the state and its main challenger 2) the islamist 
trend consisting mainly of the Muslim Brotherhood and salafi groups, became 
significantly blurred as the Egyptian society as a whole absorbed the ideas of daᶜwa 
and Islamic resurgence. Just as the peripheral ᶜ ulamaᵓ carried both Azhari and islamist 
affiliations – often to the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood – the growth of the figure 
of daᶜy (pl. duᶜa), preacher of Islam, was able to penetrate through and interconnect 
different layers of Egyptian society. 
Anthropologist Charles Hirschkind studied this particular rise of daᶜwa preachers 
and the means through which they found their ways to their audiences, in the first 
place by recorded sermons that circulated on cassettes. Speaking of shaykh ᶜAbd al-
Hamid Kishk, he argues that Kishk addresses and criticizes the political context as one 
“wherein religious institutions have been harnessed to the task of authorizing national 
policy” (Hirschkind 2006, 166). Kishk challenges “the nation-state as the primary site 
of collective identity and affective investment” but this discontent is only one aspect 
of the great attraction that preachers as Kishk had for millions of Egyptians (ibid. 167). 
These peripheral ᶜulamaᵓ or revivalist shaykhs radically altered the form, style, 
language and subject matter of the traditional sermon that follows the historically 
 188 
stipulated rhetorical format. (Today, this type of classic sermons can still be heard in 
al-Azhar mosque and state television) (ibid. 148).  
From 1989 until 1996, al-Azhar was led by shaykh Jad al-Haq, a well-known 
hardliner because of his regular alignment and close involvement with peripheral 
ᶜulamaᵓ associations. Under his leadership a so-called fatwa war emerged between 
him and the Great Mufti of Egypt, shaykh Muhammad Sayyid al-Tantawi, the head of 
Dar al-Iftaa, the House of Fatwa issuance. Both state-appointed figures differed greatly 
on a number of issues concerning economy, foreign policy (such as Egypt’s relations 
with Israel), and transnational declarations and initiatives such as the ICPD 
conference and its final declaration condemning FGC (see also Chapter 4)(Skovgaard-
Petersen 1997, 286-290). As already mentioned, shaykh Jad al-Haq was closely 
involved with associations of peripheral ᶜulamaᵓ. He aimed to wage his struggle 
against secularism by reviving a group of religious scholars under the name of ᶜ ulamaᵓ 
Front in 1992. One of the first actions of this Front was to criticize the ICPD conference 
of 1994. In this occasion, “[t]he front echoed the protests of the Muslim Brothers 
against a conference they both perceived as anti-Islamic, especially in its platform on 
sexual relationships and abortion rights” (Zeghal 1999, 390).  
Al-Haq “started a war against secularism” which lead him to oppose “the 
government-backed fatwas of the mufti with his own fatwas” (Zeghal 1999, 388-9) 
The fatwa war only ended with the death of Jad al-Haq in 1996 and the appointment 
of shaykh Muhammad Sayyid al-Tantawi as the head of al-Azhar, which led to a 
reconcilement between al-Azhar and the state regime (ibid. 389). In addition to the al-
Azhar leadership, the diversity and plurality of religious opinion, and hereby the 
acceptance of a plurality of religious authority became a fact: from the state-backed 
fatwa’s by the Great Mufti, to the shaykh al-Azhar himself, to peripheral ᶜulamaᵓ 
leaning towards political islam, to the Azharite daᶜwa preachers and proponents of 
violent jihadist Islam.  
Today al-Azhar is commonly understood to represent “moderate Islam” among 
other tendencies and ideologies of Islam. Ahmed Ragab, Professor of Reproductive 
Health at the International Islamic Center for Population Research and Studies, an 
institute that is part of Al-Azhar University, illustrated this in in an interview: “Azhar 
gives moderate Islam. Everything is okay unless there is a text that prohibits it. We do 
not make it hard like salafism, everything is permissible except if there is a text”. 
Indeed, among the different understandings and authoritative interpretations of Islam 
that are present in Egyptian society, al-Azhar has taken the position of representing 
moderation. In contrast, Salafism has a particular understanding of Islam that tempts 
to make it difficult and hard for believers: “[t]o ensure the purity of Islam as they 
define it, contemporary Salafis articulate a very demanding interpretation of 
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monotheism, which has the consequence of making unbelief more likely” (Lauzière 
2010, 370).  
In sum, al-Azhar lost its status as the sole legitimate provider of religious 
interpretation. Their authority was being contested by political Islam since the 1970s 
on the one hand and it was being limited due to their close ties to the political 
leadership since president Gamal Abdel-Nassir on the other. Additionally, other 
universities offer education in Islam of which graduates equally qualify and act as 
“specialists of Islamic fiqh” (Zeghal 1999, 383).  
7.3 Salafi, daᶜwa and the slow transformation of the 
ethical-religio-political landscape 
7.3.1 Situating salafism in Egypt 
All Islamic groups in Egypt that are involved in proselytizing are somewhat entangled 
with each other because their members often move from one movement or group to 
the other and because they share ideological features. Among them the salafists and 
the Muslim Brotherhood form only two but the most important and large sections. The 
main salafi groups maintain a close relationship to al-Azhar university and a 
significant minority of them feels sympathy towards the Muslim Brotherhood 
(Gauvain 2013, 33). Many Egyptians active in one of the many factions of Islamic 
religious civil society may have entered the field and joined one group before moving 
on and joining another group.  
The beliefs that connect salafi groups to one another is that they share a self-
perception of possessing the only true understanding of Islam and living Islam in the 
most pure and true way. In this sense, there is a sense of self-awareness as “chosen 
ones” who are able to lead the society at large toward a more authentic Islam. The 
combination of feeling to be an avant-garde while aiming to persuade the public at 
large often paradoxically results in sharpening distinctiveness from mainstream 
society and therefore requiring “an ever-growing need for dogmatic bordering against 
others” (Kreil 2012, 136). Apart of salafi’s sense of selected distinctiveness, the socio-
religious reality of co-existing and competing interpretative and authoritative 
religious pluralism also encourages continued doctrinal refinement. As Volpi and 
Turner state it:  
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The competitive claim to legitimacy and authority between an infinite number 
of voices has an inflationary impact on the claims to superiority. To demonstrate 
my orthodoxy against your claims, I must increase the stakes, and the most 
promising route to such a claim is to demonstrate that my interpretation of the 
Law is more comprehensive, more demanding, more exacting and more all-
embracing. (Volpi and Turner 2007, 11).  
Salafism is closely related to the ideology of wahabism - named after Ibn ᶜAbd al-
Wahhab - which is the defining Islamic school of interpretation in Saudi-Arabia since 
the eighteenth century. The characteristic features defining Salafism as a set of ideas, 
beliefs, practices and methodology can be traced back historically to different times in 
Islamic history. This needs to be differentiated from the history of the concept of 
“salafiyya (Salafism) as a typological category”. Salafism as a concept is modern and 
became only widely visible and used in the early twentieth century (Lauzière 2010, 
370-1). Historian Henri Lauzière drew attention to the fact that in much Western (and 
Eastern) scholarship this concept has been used in an unsubstantiated manner to 
denote a modernist, reformist trend in Islam that stresses on the importance of the 
doctrine of the forefathers (i.e. salaf). The association with modernism and reform, 
however, proves unsubstantiated and the concepts of salaf and salifiyya only referred 
to the doctrine, the theology and dogma’s of the forefathers (i.e. madhab as-salaf) (ibid. 
372).  
The crucial role that is allocated to as-salaf al-salih, the “pious ancestors” , i.e. the 
first three generations of Muslims, continue to be a main defining feature for 
contemporary adherents. Anthropologist and Islamic studies scholar Richard Gauvain 
discerns certain characteristics that virtually all self-defined Egyptian salafists share, 
notably:  
“the idea that a Muslim must strive to imitate the salaf al-salih in terms of his/her 
doctrine and practice” and the perception of salafism as “a particular way of 
thinking” with specific attitudes to ᶜaqida (doctrine, belief) and law (Gauvain 
2013, 34-5).  
The beliefs and practices of as-salaf al-salih are held in high esteem and play a 
central role in the educational curricula of salafi schools across the world (ibid. 5). The 
second feature refers to the importance of ᶜaqida and law and the typical salafi 
attitudes that differentiate them from the dominant Sunni tradition. The ᶜaqida of 
salafism follows a particular selection of scholars in Islamic history, such as Islamic 
jurist Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855), the arguments of the thirteenth century Islamic 
scholar Ibn Taymiyya and the eighteenth century Ibn ᶜAbd al-Wahhab (Gauvain 2013; 
Lauzière 2010, 371)  
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What differentiates the salafi Islamic school from the dominant Sunni Islam 
tradition is its “antirationalist theology and heavy reliance on hadith literature” 
(Lauzière 2010, 371). It also typically rejects the traditionally maintained divisions 
between domains of Islamic scholarship. Scholars and students who are specialized in 
hadith for example, should also be knowledgeable about other areas such as the 
ᶜibadat (rituals of worship) or matters of ᶜaqida. While the dominant Sunni Islamic 
tradition, as taught in major institutions such as al-Azhar University, maintains 
disciplinary divides and encourages specialization, modern salafi schools across the 
globe encourage students to master all disciplines (Gauvain 2013, 11). Gauvain 
attended series of lessons and lectures in various places of salafi educational activity 
in Cairo in the years 2006-2011 and found certain themes repeatedly brought under 
attention, regardless of the actual topic of the lesson of the day. These recurrent core 
themes include: “ “true tawhed” (God’s oneness – true monotheism), a return to the 
Qurᵓan, the dangers of innovation in the ritual and moral sphere, the necessity for the 
“purification of the heart” through prayer and dhikr, the threat of Westernization and 
the ethical and spiritual weakness of modern Muslims (ibid. 11).   
Organizationally, the Salafist current is characterized by a more loosely, 
decentralized networking structure, in contrast to the Muslim brotherhood that has a 
centralized and more rigid hierarchical internal organization (Ashwal 2013, 2). It 
typically places a high importance on the relationship between the shaykh and his 
followers (ibid. 4). There are three main Salafi schools or associations in Egypt that 
are also geographically defined. The historically most important and largest salafi 
organization in Egypt is called the Ansar al-sunna al-Muhammadiyya, with its 
headquarters located in Abdin district, Cairo. This association is not only the largest 
but also the oldest salafi organization, dating back to 1926. It was founded by a student 
of Islamic reformist intellectual Rachid Rida in a spirit of spreading knowledge of the 
doctrine of tawhid and fighting what it perceived as heretical movements such as 
Sufism. They established warm ties with Saudi Arabian wahhabi shaykhs and there 
was a reciprocal chain of doctrinal exchange and inspiration. They built their own 
educational tradition and produced their own scholars, who are considered as well-
established and highly respected across the country (Gauvain 2013, 38)  
Other groups  are also usually called by its geographical, regional reference,  the 
more recent “Alexandria school” and the “Shubra school” (another district in Cairo). 
From the Alexandria and Shubra schools more recent groups developed, some of 
which have become highly visible after the 2011 uprising. Gauvain emphasizes the 
great importance of these geographical and local lines of affiliation that determine an 
individual salafi’s educational circles: “More than anything else, Salafism in Egypt 
comes down to who one learns from and socializes with” (ibid. 35). Ethnographic 
research into the everyday perceptions of salafis by mainstream Muslim society shows 
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that there are certain similarities with how traditional religious scholars, ᶜulamaᵓ, are 
perceived. Visible adherents of salafism are perceived as “particular Muslims 
compelled to exemplarity, a category that matches up with shaykhs as specifically 
religious men” (Kreil 2012, 136). Many young men and women seem to think of 
Salafism as an exemplary way of living Islam, while paradoxically not feeling inclined 
to follow up on this belief in practice. One may “consider salafi preaching as the true 
expression of Islam” without feeling the desire to dedicate one’s life to religion in the 
way that Salafism prescribes (ibid.138). These observations tell us important things 
about how people reflect on religion and how it may or not may impact their life 
choices. Upholding certain beliefs does not necessarily reflect back on one’s personal 
choices concerning religious practice or moral choices (see also (Schielke 2015)). It 
also shows the complex workings of religious authority. As Kreil concludes “claiming 
the truth of Salafi interpretations does not mean abiding by its principles. For many 
Cairenes, these are true opinions about Islam, not a way of life they claim ” (Kreil 
2012).  
7.3.2 Salafism and its position within political Islam 
After the January 2011 Uprising, Salafist groups surprised many observers when they 
joined in the revolutionary tide and entered the political arena as a political player. 
The impact of Salafists’ entry in the formal political sphere on other political players 
and other Islamic actors within society was widely considered as one of the most 
important and significant developments in post-2011 Egyptian society. Salafist groups 
before the 2011 Uprising have often been described as apolitical or traditionally 
quietist, as not showing any desire to actively involve themselves in politics or taking 
political stances (al-Anani and Malik 2013, 57; Ashwal 2013, 2). While it is correct that 
salafist groups appeared in the national political arena only after the 2011 uprising, 
this does not imply that all salafi groups were inherently apolitical and quietist. 
Therefore, describing Egyptian Salafism before 2011 as an essentially apolitical pietist 
movement does not accurately reflect the ideological and political diverse reality 
among Salafist groups.  
On the contrary, most salafi environments before the 2011 uprising were already 
highly politicized because discussions of positioning oneself vis-à-vis the 
contemporary political ruler and the society at large have always been central 
(Gauvain 2013, 39-41). This politicization can best be explained in terms of 
differentiation between two “camps”, namely of  being either “Qutbi” or “Madkhali”. 
These are self-designated labels to differentiate between followers of a more deviant 
Qutbi current or of a more normative Madkhali current. Both terms refer to a basic 
perspective on Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) on the one hand and they reflect a 
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perspective on the question of political legitimacy on the other. The Qutbi current has 
borrowed its name from the Egyptian Islamic scholar Sayyid Qutb (1906 – 1966) and 
represents a more politically disobedient perspective, while the Madkhali current is 
named after the Saudi Arabian scholar Rabiᶜ al-Madkhali and represents a more 
quietist, politically obedient perspective.  
Egyptian salafis before the uprising conceived the movement to be torn and divided 
by one major question that gave shape to the two camps: to what degree was the 
Mubarak regime (or any other regime that is not governed by shariᶜa) legitimate 
(ibid.)? When denying Mubarak’s legitimacy, one was to some degree or other a Qutbi. 
Being Qutbi therefore does not depend that much on being an adherent of the scholar 
Sayyid Qutb and his writings but has to do with the dividing question of political 
legitimacy of Egypt’s ruler and how to strive for an Islamic society based on shariᶜa. In 
a similar vein, those leaning toward the Madkhali current do not literally follow the 
scholar al-Madkhali and his writings but rather oppose political activism and defended 
the legitimacy of the previous Mubarak regime. Theologically, they appealed to 
qurᵓanic verses and the doctrine of “la khuruj ᶜala al-hakim”, i.e. not abandoning the 
ruler and being obedient to the political ruler in any circumstances (Ashwal 2013, 2; 
Gauvain 2013, 41). 
The various existing Salafist affiliations, associations and adherents of particular 
preachers before 2011 can be understood according to this fundamental division, 
although this may not be taken too strictly. The oldest salafi presence in Egypt, the 
Ansar al-sunna al-Muhammadiyya, headquartered in Cairo and those groups more 
closely connected with Saudi Arabian Wahhabi Salafism can be seen as predominantly 
Madkhali, while the more recent Salafist groups are mainly Qutbi. The more recent 
groups emerged in the 1970s and formed important educational circles in the city of 
Alexandria and in the Shubra district of Cairo. The Alexandria school (al-Daᶜwa as-
salafiyya) is generally considered moderately Qutbi while the Shubra school is seen 
somewhat “more aggressively” in their Qutbism (Gauvain 2013, 40-41). The groups 
and shaykhs with an explicit apolitical or quiescent approach and belonging to the 
Madkhali trend were subject of debate and contestation, as these figures were often 
understood as being brought there or being supported by the regime (ibid. 41). In 
contrast to the Alexandria and Shubra schools, the oldest salafi group of Ansar al-
sunna, became generally known as the most regime obedient. Their Salafism easily 
blends together with voices of  al-Azhar institution and Saudi Arabian salafi shaykhs, 
all sharing the characteristic of unquestioning obedience to the political authorities, 
even if these authorities do not apply shariᶜa. However, this trend should not be seen 
as one coherent bloc as diverging opinions with al-Ansar are regularly manifested, just 
as they may read or invite scholars known to be more “Qutbi” (ibid. 42).  
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Behind the veil of apolitical pietism is therefore the more complex reality, made up 
of ideological/ theological differences and an authoritarian repressive state politics. 
The Mubarak regime succeeded in securing support among many salafi branches 
known as Madkahli while at the same time brutally repressing those known as Qutbi. 
The regime sanctioned salafist leaders of the Alexandria based al-Daᶜwa as-salafiyya, 
seized groups’ assets and imprisoned dissident shaykhs who openly challenge the 
regime (al-Anani and Malik 2013, 59; Ashwal 2013, 2; Gauvain 2013, 2).The debate 
about political legitimacy waged in terms of Qutbi and Madkhali gives an indication of 
how entire groups and shaykhs are roughly ideologically divided. Interestingly, 
Gauvain argues that virtually all the salafi women respondents in his research across 
different educational circles belong to the Madkhali type of vision (Gauvain 2013, 43). 
This division in trends is therefore not a strict system of categorization but rather a 
general sketch to be seen as the background against which to read later developments: 
the 2011 uprising, the following politicization in terms of the formation of political 
parties and their subsequent electoral success and activity in parliament.  
7.3.3 The 2011 Uprising: al-daᶜwa al-islamiyya gives birth to 
Nour party 
The so-called Alexandria school refers mostly to itself as al-Daᶜwa al-salafiyya (the 
Salafi call) or al-Daᶜwa al-islamiyya (the Islamic Call). Al-Daᶜwa was founded in the 
1970s by university students who broke away from the radical (and violent) al-
Gamaᶜa al-Islamiyya, that was being persecuted by the state. While most of the leaders 
of al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya decided to join the Muslim Brotherhood, others preferred to 
shun away from active politics and to focus on religious education. It this second group 
that joined al-Daᶜwa (al-Anani and Malik 2013, 59).  
Al-Daᶜwa was founded in political and ideological response to positions of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in that period. The Brotherhood was perceived to be too loose in 
their Islamic doctrinal commitment and their friendly reception of the Islamic 
revolution in Iran was not appreciated (Ashwal 2013, 3). It positioned itself as more 
truthful and authentic supporters of an Islamic politics than the Brotherhood and this 
vision included a clear rejection of the Iranian shiᶜa Islam as a heresy. The organization 
rejected institutionalized politics as Western models inadequate for the Egyptian 
context and therefore adopted a quietist position, which would rapidly change after 
the 2011 uprising. These original rationales underlying the establishment of al-Daᶜwa 
- defending Egypt’s Islamic identity by urging the implementation of shariᶜa law and 
resisting shiᶜa Islam - became widely shared central tenets held among diverse Salafi 
shaykhs and networks (Ibid. 3).  
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While both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists aim at reaching a more 
Islamic society, with reference to Islamic shariᶜa and jurisprudence, their 
contemporary ideological focus differs slightly. Since the years 2000, the 
Brotherhood’s political platform supports more entrepreneurship and private 
property rights and their Islamic discourse focusses on the implementation of shariᶜa. 
Salafists on the other hand, focus more on social justice and social demands and are 
mostly active in disadvantaged areas (Ashwal 2013, 2). As much as this development 
reflects an ideological shift within the Brotherhood, it is also partly instigated by the 
previous Mubarak regime itself. The state tolerated many Salafist networks and 
activities and succeeded in securing itself from their support, in an attempt to curtail 
the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Anani and Malik 2013; Gauvain 2013). 
Consequently, this growing visibility of Salafism, especially in suburban and informal 
settlements, over the last decade has been called the “salafization” of the religious 
sphere (al-Anani and Malik 2013, 58).  
During the January 2011 uprising a few factions among the Salafist trend openly 
called to join the protests and express opposition to the Mubarak regime, the so-called 
“movement Salafists” (salafiyya harakiyya). These factions later organized themselves 
in the Islah (reform) Party and Asala (authenticity) Party but failed to become an 
electorally meaningful political force (Ashwal 2013, 3).The major political party that 
grew out of Salafist groups and networks and became an important political player, is 
the Nour party, born out of al-Daᶜwa al-salafiyya group also known as the Alexandria 
school. The decision to found the Nour party was largely motivated by concern over 
the possible elimination of article 2 of the constitution that states shariᶜa as the 
principal source of law (ibid. 4).  
The first major Salafi public ‘coming out’ was on 29 July 2011, when salafi groups 
succeeded in mobilizing masses to protest in the first Islamist leaning demonstrations. 
For many observers, this signalled the popular strength of Egyptian Salafism, which 
became demonstrated in the first post-Mubarak parliamentary elections. Their strong 
capability to mobilize supporters and attract adherents was repeated in the 
2011/2012 parliamentary elections, when the combined Salafist parties became the 
second largest bloc in parliament (27,8 % of the votes), after the Muslim Brotherhood 
(37,5% of the votes). The process of politicization entailed a necessary moderation of 
their ideological program and increased pragmatism in their approaches of 
attempting to realize it. Salafi political discourse underwent dramatic changes, not in 
the least in its account of the 2011 Uprising itself. After first having condemned the 
demonstrations against the Mubarak regime as khuruj (disobedience), the Daᶜwa 
leaders later reversed their position and applauded the actions of the salafi youth who 
had participated in the peaceful protests (Ashwal 2013, 5).  
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Although Salafist visions often do not embrace liberal democratic principles, their 
integration in the political game contributed to the inclusion of otherwise militantly 
non-democratic forces, according to political analysts (Ibid, 1). Equally, they learned 
to collaborate with secularist parties and form alliances with them. Instead of 
perceiving secularists as “atheist working against Islam” as in the pre-2011 period, the 
parliamentary mix of ideologies lead salafists to treat secularists as sometimes 
political opponents and sometimes political allies. Once in parliament, salafists’ 
political and ideological opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood appeared to be more 
determining than reservations against secularists (ibid. 6). Before and after 
participating in the 2011/2012 parliamentary elections, several parties found 
themselves with internal disagreements concerning visions on how to combine a 
religious and a political agenda (MEMRI 2011). Competing visions emerged within the 
Nour party about how the party should be organized, how its relationship should be 
with its founding basis of al-Daᶜwa and to what extent the party should be open to all 
ideas proposed democratically as opposed to keeping decision-making a more 
controlled, elitist and closed affair (El-Sherif 2012). Examples of shaykhs who stressed 
more on openness and innovation include the former presidential candidate Hazim 
Salah Abu Ismaᶜil and the Salafi Front. Some of these shaykhs and small parties 
succeeded in attracting large crowds supporters but didn’t create political traction 
(Ashwal 2013, 3). Proponents of a strong hierarchically organized party with a strong 
centralized national structure often refer to the electoral success of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The Brotherhood’s political party activities (before and after 2011) 
remained firmly entrenched in the structure, vision and leadership of the larger and 
original Brotherhood Movement. 
Apart of political factional positioning, a major discussion was how the Salafists 
would translate their previous activities and the co-existing plurality of visions into 
the political sphere. El-Ashwal discerns a major distinction in the discourse of al-
Daᶜwa following their entry in the political scene and their multiple and various 
interactions with the public sphere. On matters of social, economic and political 
concern, the movement developed a pragmatic discourse. On issues that relate to 
doctrinal matters, the margin of compromise was minimal (ibid. 7). Indeed, some of 
the earlier mentioned core themes that were recurrent in the salafi study circles 
attended by Gauvain, continued to be important for Salafist politics as well. “The 
dangers of innovation in the ritual and moral sphere” and “the threat of 
Westernization and the ethical and spiritual weakness of modern Muslims” continued 
to be core interests (Gauvain 2013, 11). Salafist parties, and particularly Nour Party, 
drew attention to issues related to gender equality and sexuality and for a few months, 
for the term of the parliament, monopolized the public debate.  
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7.3.4 Salafism, gender, sexuality and FGC  
The female candidates of Salafi electoral lists had list positions that did not enable 
them to win any seats, as all other political parties had done (with the exception of the 
Muslim Brotherhood). The Nour party and associations close to al-Daᶜwa, however, 
have active women committees (El-Ashwal, 7)  
Salafists’ view on sexual relations and sexual pleasure is more straightforward than 
traditional social viewpoints. Sexual desire is considered natural and God-given and 
therefore should be enjoyed and satisfied. Sex is not a taboo and matters of sex and 
desire are discussed openly in public classes as well as privately, when students (or 
locals) consult the shaykh for advice. Richard Gauvain explains this relative openness 
partly by the particular salafi viewpoints on ritual purity and the status of genital 
secretions and male and female semen within salafi legal understandings of ritual 
purity. These are not considered to be impure and are not considered in a hierarchal 
level, this means that both male and female secretions share the same status (Gauvain 
2013, 143-4) This equality in terms of ritual purity is unlike the traditional sunna 
understanding in which there is a hierarchical difference between male and female 
bodily secretions.  
At the same time, the Salafist worldview on gender relations, is one that is highly 
controversial because of its profound male-based departure points. In other words, 
the presence and status of women in society is exclusively dealt with from a male 
perspective. Women and gender related matter are discussed in terms of how women 
affect men, and not on their own terms. Questions of how to engage in marital relations 
and how to manage relationships with female relatives or women who are not 
relatives in the public sphere occupy a dominant place in salafists’ writings and 
preaches. Women are highly encouraged not to appear in the public sphere, so as to 
reduce the possibilities of bringing men in states of moral impurity. The mere 
presence of women, and male glances of them, can induce feelings of lust that are not 
legitimate /licit and therefore morally impure and incorrect (ibid. 145).  
Despite the evident explicit male-based worldview shared by the main salafist 
ideologues and their adherents, anthropologists Richard Gauvain and Saba Mahmood 
have both demonstrated how the idea of personal / individual empowerment plays a 
central role in both men and women’s embracement of salafi doctrine. In addition to 
finding personal empowerment in their different experience of Islam, these authors 
also clearly see the potential within the salafi school of thought to contest male 
hierarchies and certain established gender role.  
In his discussion of his salafi women respondents, Gauvain states that Mahmood’s 
general conclusions are upheld in his analysis as well, “given that so many of 
Mahmood’s respondents seem to have been Salafis” (Gauvain 2013, 186). His 
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respondents agreed that the best way to work on their ethical conduct and standards 
of piety is to perform the rituals of worship according to the exact technical 
requirements to reach the moral virtues they are striving at. Women’s attraction to 
Salafism and their relationship to salafi circles develops over time. They are 
sometimes attracted to learn and master the knowledge produced by salafi scholars, 
or develop a highly personalized style of salafism that does not put central the 
particular salafi rulings and understandings of Islamic law. Gauvain asserts how the 
notion of purity, tahara, is essential in salafist women’s self-definition and description 
of their identity. This notion refers to the required conditions and regulations to fulfil 
in order to obtain the state of ritual purity that enables one to perform ritual worship 
(ᶜibadat). The notion of purity and its high importance in salafism is often exactly why 
women have been drawn to it, not the least because salafist scholars are widely 
recognized to be outstanding in scholarship of tahara, the first book in all legal 
manuals (ibid. 65).  
In Salafism, the value and practice of moral and ritual purity is what can distinguish 
a true Muslim; the more a Muslim strives to become more pure, the closer he/she 
comes to the ideal of being a true Muslim. Tahara in its large meaning of ritual purity, 
is therefore a great “device to contest Western/secular practices and values”, in this 
view, tahara is put in contrast with the notion of tabarruj, “a word used in Salafi 
parlance (and beyond) to convey the opposite qualities” (Ibid. 176).  Tabarruj is a term 
that does not originate from purity law but means “the brazen or wanton display” of 
one’s body (ibid. 189). The wanton exposure of the female body to the public is 
perceived as manifesting a wrong emphasis on the exterior and the surface. By 
covering the body with a niqab, the emphasis is rightfully put on the interior and focus 
is on the purity of the heart. Moral purity or ‘purity of the heart’ takes on a very high 
importance among the salafi women, more than among the men. The niqab thus 
becomes a symbolic marker between those with purity of the heart, and those without 
(Ibid. 190-1).  
The term to refer to ritual purity, tahara, is the same term that in colloquial Egyptian 
Arabic is used to refer to FGC. Gauvain states in his study of ritual purity among 
Egyptian salafists that: “modern Salafi explications of purity law – and all other areas 
of ᶜibada [worship] – are characterized by a systematic use of particular literatures, 
and particular interpretations of these literatures, by the “correct” scholars, both past 
and present”(Ibid. 47). As mentioned earlier, the importance of educational circles, 
intellectual genealogies, the use of particular literature and interpretation by 
particular scholars is essential in salafism. The particular salafi tradition of 
scholarship is deemed to  do away with the mistakes and unclarities that are present 
in the Islamic legal tradition and to provide “superior knowledge” (Ibid. 176).  
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This particular approach results in unusual legal understandings concerning purity, 
tahara at large. Rulings deviate from the commonly followed sunni schools of Islamic 
law and are considered to be more correct. Characteristic for the salafi school is that 
shaykhs approach tahara through a clear focus on the study of hadith texts. Gauvain 
argues that “articulated through the same hadeeth sources, both ancient and modern, 
the contents of tahara laws are almost identical in Cairo’s salafi schools” (ibid. 48). 
Another general observation of the salafi approach of fiqh is that students generally 
do not involve themselves with the intricate history of differences between the four 
different sunni juristic schools (madhab, pl. madhahib). In salafi canons and works of 
scholarship, the inter and intra-madhab debates are not mentioned to the benefit of 
clarity and simplicity. Instead, they find it more important to go to the core of hadith 
studies on which the scholarship of the madhahib is based (ibid. 48). Neglecting the 
difference between the Islamic juristic schools and moving beyond those differences 
in order to look at the shared common heritage of hadith is also a core value within 
global salafism (ibid. 59). The aim is not to limit oneself to established rules and 
knowledge but to expand and deepen our knowledge of the essentials of Islam.  
On the matter of ritual purity, tahara at large, Gauvain points out two essential 
characteristics: (1) the intrinsic connection between moral and ritual purity. This is 
represented forcefully in Ibn al-ᵓUthaymin’s major work “al-mumti’”, in which the 
concept of tahara is defined as having two meanings: purity of the heart (taharat al-
qalb) and the second, subordinate meaning is purity of the body (taharat al-jism/al-
badan) (ibid. 49).  And secondly, (2) the fact of de-emphasizing the strength of ritual 
impurity. The qualities and conditions of ritual impurity seem to be play a minor role 
and seem to serve mainly as a means to draw attention to the more grave forms of 
impurity, which are those of impurity of the heart (ibid. 50-51).  
In salafists’ perspective, moral purity or purity of the heart can be maintained 
through the means of ritual purity. This especially involves wuduᶜ, i.e. the ritual 
cleansing of particular parts of the body (hands, arms, feet, face) to purify oneself. The 
moral conditions that make someone impure and that are most particularly referred 
to among Gauvain’s respondents and in the context of the study circles that he 
attended, are forms of deceit, dishonesty, immodesty and illicit sexual desire or 
immodesty: “..of all the sins to perturb Shubra’s salafis, perhaps the most commonly 
mentioned are those associated with deceit (of all kinds) and illicit sexual desire” (ibid. 
71). 
Those dangers or challenges to moral purity correspond to certain social realities, 
namely the negatively perceived influence of Western culture on Egyptian society, 
especially on the youth, and the high levels of political corruption. The notion of  good 
morals, or purity of the heart, is certainly not new to Egyptian society or within the 
Islamic historical tradition. The innovation of modern salafism however, lies first, in 
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how they connect this notion of moral purity with practices of ritual purity (such as 
wuduᶜ). Secondly, it lies in how the purity relation is defined not only between the 
believer and God, but also in terms of the Muslim community as a whole and its moral 
standards (ibid. 74-87, 112).  
7.3.5 Members of parliament challenge gender norms and the 
FGC law 
As mentioned earlier the status of women in Egyptian society became a highly debated 
topic of discussion in Egypt after January 25 2011, both inside Parliament, in media 
and public discourse and on the street (Sami 2015). This debate was largely instigated 
by conservatives and Islamists who raised several issues that centered women’s role 
in society while challenging norms and ideals of gender equality. The success of both 
the Muslim Brotherhood and the salafist parties in the first parliamentary elections 
after Mubarak’s deposal gave conservatives confidence and the political opportunity 
to voice their viewpoints (Sami 2015, 91). The salafist alliance obtained a considerable 
share of vote in 2011-2012 parliamentary elections, which made them the second 
largest bloc. During the six-months lasting parliament, salafist members of parliament 
regularly stirred controversy with opinions concerning gender and sexuality including 
FGC practices.  
In May 2012, Nour party proposed a bill to decriminalize female genital cutting. 
This proposal was led by Member of Parliament Nasser al-Shaker. Al-Shaker defended 
the practice as part of prophetic sunna and relied on well-known and respected 
religious leaders who had authorized the practice in the past, namely Imam 
Muhammad Sayyid al-Tantawi, Abdel Halim Mahmoud, former Islamic Research 
Academy member Shaykh Attiya Saqr and former Egyptian Mufti Nasr Farid Wasil 
(Egypt Independent 2012). Shaker reportedly blamed former first lady Suzanne 
Mubarak of having imposed the ban on FGC on Egypt. In an telephone interview 
broadcasted in the television program “Your morning with us” (Sabahak ᶜandina) on 
Mihwar Channel, Shaker said that his proposal “aims to abolish the criminalization of 
FGC so that these operations take place in public at the hands of medical doctors in a 
sound and healthy manner” (Hamdy and Gamal 2012). 
In a media report, director of the Coalition of NGOs against FGM and medical doctor, 
Randa Fakhr Eddin, responded to Shaker’s statement. She replied stating that there is 
“no consensus on the law by senior scholars or Islamists” and that former Imam Sayyid 
al-Tantawi considered FGC practices as a cultural habit rather than a religious practice 
(Independent 2012). Fakhr Eddin argued that “there exists no consensus on the 
subject among religious scholars referring to other scholars who have rejected the 
practice (for example Imam ibn Bandhar in the eleventh century, Rachid Rida in Manar 
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newspaper in 1904, shaykh Sayyid Sabiq in “Fiqh of the sunna” and shaykh Shaltout” 
(Hamdy and Gamal 2012).  
Shaker’s proposal was not only challenged by civil society opposition that fights for 
the abandonment of the practice. His own political party, Nour, distanced itself from 
the proposal, although agreeing with its vision and contents. A press article reported: 
“The official spokesperson of Nour party, Yusri Hammad, stated that Shaker hadn’t 
notified the party before presenting the law proposal on FGC to the party but that he 
presented it in parliament in personal capacity. The question of FGC -  according to 
Shariᶜa law and in line with the decree (fatwa) issued by The Islamic Research 
Academy -  is voluntary and not forbidden (haram)”  (Hamdy and Gamal 2012).  
Al-Wafd newspaper reported that Nassir Shaker’s law proposal aimed to 
decriminalize the practice of FGC, arguing that “Al-Nour Party adopts an islamic 
ideological theoretical ground (marjaᶜiyya islamiyya), according to which, there is a 
consensus among all scholars, historical and contemporary, that FGC is not prohibited 
or forbidden” (Hamdy and Gamal 2012). Nour party spokesperson Hammad 
confirmed that “FGC is part of the sunna of the prophet and that a large number of 
fatwa’s by the Dar al-Iftaᵓ and a group of scholars of al-Azhar have converged on this 
point of view (for example Ahmed ᶜOmar Hashem, Muhammad Raᵓfat Uthman and 
shaykh ᶜAli Abul Hassan, consultant to the shaykh of al-Azhar and Abdel Halim 
Mahmud)” (Hamdy and Gamal 2012). His draft proposal received comments from 
other parliamentarians that his proposal as not urgent or relevant to society’s 
problems today. He rejected this comment saying that “we do not have to follow one 
path, we work on parallel tracks and we discuss all problems of the citizens” (Hamdy 
and Gamal 2012).  
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The comments on the proposal to decriminalize FGC was just one episode among 
several that revealed the highly conservative nature of Salafist representatives. In the 
run-up to the first post-Mubarak parliamentary elections, Salafist leaders started a 
public debate about the women’s veil (hijab) and the appropriateness of women 
candidates for parliament membership.  
Initially, Salafist parties were hesitant to nominate women candidates while 
electoral law stipulates that at least one woman per list has to be slated. Yasser 
Burhami, one of the founders of al-Daᶜwa al-Salafiyya and Nour party leader in 
Alexandria resolved the dilemma by issuing a fatwa stating that while “nominating 
women is negative, it is less negative than allowing into parliament those who wish to 
change Article 2 of the constitution” (Faraj 2013). Article two of the constitution 
stipulates that all legislation takes shariᶜa law as its main source. Consequently, 
women were slated but their pictures were not shown but replaced by party logos or 
a red rose. This in turn lead to criticism and mockery on social media and sparked 
angry responses by salafi leaders in television talk shows. In these debates, Salafist 
guests insisted on the necessity of women to wear a veil (Rahman 2011).  
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A few months later, controversial preacher Ahmad Mahmoud Abdullah, known as 
“Abu Islam” and owner of the private television channel of “al-Ummah,” spoke in a 
video about the reports of rape in Tahrir square during the commemoration of the 25th 
of January. In this video, Abu Islam justified the rape of these women because there 
presence is not legitimate, they are rather “crusaders” and “widowers” who in fact 
“want to be raped” (Arabiya 2013; Faraj 2013).  
Another important episode in which Salafist leaders attempted to change general 
dominant gender norms concerns the drafting of constitutions. After president Morsi’s 
deposal from power July 3rd 2013, the 2012 Constitution that was drafted by a 
majority of Islamists was temporarily suspended and a new 50-member committee 
was appointed to amend it. Nour party objected against an article stipulating the 
equality between men and women and proposed to amend the articles that stipulate 
women’s rights (article 11) by a repetition of the conditions of article 2. In this way, 
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the definition of women’s rights would unambiguously follow under the general 
provision to be in accordance with Shariᶜa law (Al-Bawaba 2013).  
7.4 The politics of religious speech on FGC  
In this final section I look closer to concrete cases of Azhari and salafi religious speech 
on the subject of FGC. The first two cases are invited shaykhs to speak in the frame of 
awareness-raising against FGC. The other two are speeches that can be found on You 
Tube by renown salafi preachers and personalities Muhammad Hassaan and Abu 
Ishaq al-Huwayni.Concerning the origin of FGC, one invited shaykh in an awareness-
raising seminar in Luxor offers an explanation that traces the origin of the practice 
back to tribal Arab culture:  
“What is the scandalous thing that we have inherited from our old generations, 
that is the subject of FGC (khitan al-inath). When we have a small baby girl, do 
we leave her and let her grow up or do we let her grow up and then we go to 
have her circumcised and cause her psychological trauma? Let’s have a look at 
this circumcision, is this Islamic (huwa min al-Islam), did God almighty impose 
this duty on us or did the Prophet, peace be upon him, impose it? What is the 
story? No, FGC is not a duty (fard), or part of the Prophet’s (pbuh) sunna, but 
what has happened to the Arabs? The Arabs were riding camels in the past, then 
there were no cars or planes, all movements were by camel. From their wisdom 
they invented that a woman needs to be circumcised before mounting camels, 
because camels swing back and forth in their walking, so they adopted FGC and 
it became one of the customs that they followed” (Luxor, 2 Jan 2014) 
The shaykh situates the practice in ancient tribal culture and demonstrates the 
underlying rationale and motivation for Arabs to embrace it: the practical need of 
transportation on camel requires the operation on women. While not saying it 
explicitly, he refers to possible easy sexual excitement that uncircumcised women 
would experience. This historical contextualization offers then a good departure point 
to dissociate the practice from religious rationales.  
“Is the lord not more knowledgeable than us, has He not created us? Does he not 
know what our bodies are? He, the Almighty, has not ordered us in the noble 
Qurᵓan to circumcise women but it is one of the Arab customs that we acquired 
and followed until today and now since more than five years we combat this bad 
habit” (Luxor, 2 Jan 2014) 
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When turning to Islamic doctrine, it is clear that the Qurᵓan does not mention the 
practice and is therefore not mandated. The shaykh’s position on the hadith, however, 
is more ambiguous:  
“What is the position (mawqef) of the Prophet (pbuh)? The Prophet (pbuh) saw 
Umm Ayman passing by on one of the city streets and he said: “Umm Ayman, 
where were you?” She responded “I was circumcising a girl, Prophet” and he said 
“You circumcised her?” She said yes. He said “Umm Ayman, reduce but do not 
destroy (ikhfidy wa la tunhiky)”, if it is completely necessary to the highest 
degree, for example when the woman mounts the camel and travels with it. In 
these cases and when it happens like this, it should not be a complete 
circumcision (idha kan kadhalika al-khitan mabiyibᵓash khitan kamil), it is a part 
of khitan that she undergoes when she is a little girl (yibᵓa hitta min al-khitan 
titᵓakhid wa hiyya bint sughayyara). But this has no roots (asl) in the Qurᵓan nor 
in sunna, but rather causes most of the problems. Which problems? (Luxor, 2 Jan 
2014) 
When discussing Islamic tradition of hadith, the shaykh centers one hadith that he 
attributes to Umm Ayman. This is the most well-known and most widely circulated 
hadith and usually refers to Umm ᶜAtiyya (see chapter 4). The shaykh explains this 
hadith again in the context of tribal Arab society and the necessity of women to mount 
camels when travelling. While narrating the hadith as a valuable, or authentic hadith, 
he contextualizes the message within historical conditions and concludes that “[FGC] 
has no roots in the Qurᵓan nor in sunna”. His message remains ambiguous, validating 
the hadith to cut and adding a condition of necessity on the one hand, and arguing that 
is not a foundational hadith on the other. Most of his talk is spent on outlining the many 
problems that women and men experience as a consequence of FGC. Concerning the 
relation between Islam and FGC, he stresses that only the hadith of Umm ᶜAtiyya (in 
this case referred to as Umm Ayman) is a valid reference. 
“If one tells you this is Islamically legal (sharᶜa) or not, what evidence does he 
bring from the noble Qurᵓan that says to circumcise girls or what hadith of the 
Prophet (pbuh) does he bring that says to circumcise girls? [the Prophet] said to 
Umm Ayman reduce but do not destroy which means do not cut the clitoris 
completely.” (Luxor, 2 Jan 2014) 
To conclude, his viewpoints about the relation between Islam and FGC remain 
ambiguous, stating at the same time that the practice has no roots in the Qurᵓan or 
sunna while upholding the validity of the message in the hadith of Umm ᶜAtiyya telling 
to “reduce but not destroy”. This position stands in stark contrast with another invited 
shaykh of al-Ahzar at a seminar organized for high-school attending youth in the 
South-Eastern district of Giza, Cairo. In this example, the relation between Islam and 
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FGC is unambiguously denounced as invalid. The shaykh starts with pointing at, the 
importance of inquiry and obtaining correct knowledge  
“The first thing that someone says who doesn’t know anything about religion is 
“don’t do this (haram ᶜalayk)” or “no, religion does not say this”. What causes 
you to know that religion says this or that?” (Giza, 21 Nov 2013) 
To emphasize the importance of knowledge and doing the right thing even when 
you find yourself to be in a minority position, he gives the example of Ibrahim and how 
he produced idols but did not worship them himself. He recounts the Qurᵓanic 
narrative of Ibrahim to illustrate how he fought against traditional practices (ᶜadat 
mawrutha) that were also harmful such as idolatry. This narrative is taken as an 
example of how one should fight against harmful practices in any time as our 
knowledge grows and we understand that such practices are wrong and should be 
stopped. “In their time, they did not know. Harmful inherited practices (hagat 
mawrutha sayᵓiyya), God protect us from that (wal-ᶜayadh bi-llah)” (Giza, 21 Nov 
2013).  
He references the two most widely circulated hadith and disqualifies them both 
after a detailed discussion. Concerning the Umm ᶜAtiyya hadith, he invites his listeners 
to check the hadith collections considered as authentic (sahih) and concluded “you 
will find that this hadith is weak (daᶜif) and has an interruption in the chain of delivery 
(laysa lahu silla)”. This viewpoint corresponds with the common opinion among 
opponents of the practice (as expressed in chapter 4).  
The hadith referring to “when the two circumcisions meet”, however, is considered 
authentic (sahih) by the shaykh but he believes it does not factually treat the subject 
of FGC. He argues that although the word “two circumcisions” is indeed present, it does 
not refer to the actual circumcision. Instead, it is a style figure in which the 
grammatical dual from is employed only to serve the purpose of rhetoric. Rhetoric 
rhythm and style here requires a dual form to appear, not the actual content of the 
word is of matter.  
Relying on a number of progressive shaykhs who equally condemned the practice, 
the shaykh maintains that the practice needs to be stopped and that this is the only 
valid religious opinion.  
“And al-Qaradawi, who said, “there is no authentic text on this issue”. And 
Muhammad Salim al-Awa “who spoke with strong words in his study and said: 
“there is no doubt that a human should act according to what he knows and there 
is no doubt that a country needs to establish laws and that it should criminalize 
who does this” This is the opinion of religion (da raᵓy al-din)”” (Giza, 21 Nov 
2013). 
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The formula “this is the opinion of religion” recurs throughout his talk, disqualifying 
the possibility of conflicting opinions as legitimate. In his efforts to embed his 
condemnation of FGC in a tradition of Islamic scholarship and opinion making, he 
reassures that this opinion is not informed by external pressures to condemn FGC, 
possibly alluding to my presence in the meeting: “Concerning FGC there is not an 
authentic text from the prophet. This is not a courtesy (mugamala), I mean, we do not 
pay lip service to these people”. In sum, he argues that there is no textual basis for FGC 
in Islam and knowing that these practices are harmful and simply inherited, we now 
ought to do the right thing and abandon it.  
The first shaykh suits best the role of mediation and moderation that al-Azhar as an 
institution has come to embody. By not discarding the widely popular hadith “reduce 
but do not destroy” but yet placing it in its historical context and providing a cultural 
historical rationale for the existence of the practice, he seems inclined not to uphold 
the practice in contemporary society. His opinion remains ambiguous but seems to be 
say that if the necessity exists (e.g if a girl’s clitoris or labia are what is considered as 
excessively large), however, this hadith needs to serve as a guideline to perform it. His 
attitude to the idea (or imperative) of immediate social-cultural change is therefore 
conservative, in John Voll’s scheme (see chapter 1) of Islamic religious responses to 
external changes brought about by modernity, secularity or in this case, globalization 
and transnational rights discourse.  
The second shaykh represents a more strict point of view in its clear rejection of 
the practice and any Islamic associations. His analysis fits perfectly within the larger 
narrative upheld by the global campaign against FGC that rejects the notion of any 
relationship between religion (Islam) and FGC. He clearly underscores that “the” 
opinion of “religion” says that there is no relation. This opinion can be considered as 
“adaptationist” in John Voll’s scheme. The shaykh’s attitude is to argue to embrace the 
recommended change to abandon FGC and to adapt to the new knowledge that such 
practices are harmful by abandoning it.  
In what follows, the previous will be discussed in comparison with two salafi 
opinions on FGC, by Muhammad Hassaan and Abu Ishaq al-Huwayni, that are available 
as You Tube videos. Both are well-known salafi scholars with a large following and are 
“household names” in Egyptian salafi circles and beyond. Muhammad Hassaan being 
“nothing short of a media phenomenon across the region” of the Middle East (Gauvain 
2013) 44. On matters of purity, “tahara”, these shaykhs’ opinions have been 
particularly listened to and considered authoritative. From before the 2011 uprising 
both men were considered to be leaning to the Qutbi affiliation, and thus rather 
strongly oppositional figures to the Mubarak regime (ibid. 39).  
Both figures- and Egyptian salafists in general - are greatly indebted to the globally 
well-known Albanian salafist shaykh Muhammad Naseru-den al-Albani (1914-1999), 
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who is widely recognized and praised as a hadith expert and ideological father of 
modern Salafism. Egyptian scholars rely mainly upon al-Albani’s methods and findings 
for hadith verification (Gauvain 2013) 102). Following al-Albani (in addition to Ibn al-
Uthaymin, and Ibn Baz who form all three together a famous trio of ground-breaking 
salafi scholarship), Cairene Salafists speak of “sunna” as a “science”, different from 
traditional sunni scholarship (ibid. 127).  
Muhammad Hassaan has his personal background in common with many salafi 
scholars, namely the combination of having a humble family background and a lifetime 
of disciplined study. He is professor of ᶜaqida at the daᶜwa institute of the Ansar al-
sunna’s branch in the city of Mansura and founder of the satellite channel al-Rahma 
(ibid. 44-5). He is most heavily criticized by the more Makdhali type of scholars that 
his main work on tawhid (God’s oneness) does not leave any room for secular aspects 
of life. His great emphasis on tawhid and his resulting desire to bring all aspects of life 
under the governance of shariᶜa makes him into an extreme Qutbi, in his case also in 
the literal sense of being a follower of Sayyid Qutb’s writings. This means that Hassaan 
considers collaboration with an illegitimate political regime as deviating from true 
Islam, making this ruler no longer Muslim, a process that has been called “takfir” and 
is a central concept in Sayyid Qutb’s writings (ibid. 45).  
In the mentioned You Tube video, Hassaan responds to a question from a TV 
listener about the topic of FGC. First of all, he encourages listeners to review the 
Islamic textual sources themselves and have an overview of the existing opinions: 
“Brother, FGC, we have spoken on this topic repeatedly! I advice any Muslim on 
earth, and I advice any Muslima on earth, brother, make some effort and open a 
book of jurisprudence (fiqh). Just make a little effort for God, exactly five 
minutes, any book that you have. (…) Don’t take the words of Muhammad 
Hassaan, or the words of shaykh X and Y. Go back to any book of fiqh of our 
community (umma), our teachers and our religious scholars (ᶜulamaᵓ) that we 
read. You will find that some of our scholars said that FGC is mandatory 
(biwujub), and some who said that is recommended (bistihbab) 
[recommendable, desirable. Said of acts whose neglect is not punished by God, 
but whose performance is rewarded]. Others say that FGC is a pharaonic custom 
that doesn’t have a foundation in the sunna.  
In his listing of the range of existing opinions he not only mentions the opinions that 
are favorable to FGC but includes the ones saying that it does not have a foundation in 
sunna, the reported sayings and acts of the prophet. This last opinion he will refute by 
focusing on one particular hadith: 
“So let’s go back to the words of the Prophet: “When the circumcised meets the 
circumcised” Well, that’s good news! This is a hadith with the highest degree of 
authenticity, dear listeners. “When the circumcised meets the circumcised, then 
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ritual cleansing (al-ghusl) is required”. These are the words of the righteous 
Prophet. Now I don’t understand, what is this language, if a circumcised man 
meets a circumcised man? Does this make sense? No, “When the circumcised 
meets the circumcised” means when the man’s circumcised organs meets the 
female’s circumcised organs.”  
Hassaan relies on the authenticity of the hadith in which Aᶜisha, wife of prophet 
Muhammad, reportedly asked whether it was necessary for men to wash after sexual 
intercourse in the case that there was no ejaculation and the answer was “If the two 
circumcisions meet or touch each other, it is necessary to ritually wash [ghusl]”. This 
hadith is collected in the authentic collections but has been refuted by opponents of 
FGC to not carry the meaning that FGC was advised by the prophet. What does this 
authentic hadith imply for the contemporary practice of FGC, according to Hassaan? 
“Now, the Muslim medical doctor decides whether a girl needs FGC or not. Maybe 
the girl does not need circumcision, the situation [of her genitals] is very natural, 
and if she would become circumcised, this surgery would spoil it with her 
husband afterwards, it would spoil her marital life. The Muslim doctor decides 
whether the girls needs circumcision or not. This [reasoning] does not mean that 
I subject legal evidence [the mentioned hadith] to an examination of medical 
sciences, that I would review the legal evidence against medical science, I rather 
review medicine in order to realize the focus of legal evidence. Brothers, I want 
to draw attention to what I’m saying here. [repetition]” 
“(…) in order to realize the focus (the goal), we have to turn toward the 
specialists, [our] sister, doctor, [who is] virtuous and Muslim, if she says she 
doesn’t need it, it is fine, great. If she says that she needs it, also fine, not a 
complete removal, just a reduction.” 
Hassaan describes the value of this hadith and its righteous implementation today 
by referring to and recognizing the need of medical specialist knowledge. The fact that 
this hadith suggests that both men and women were circumcised in the prophet’s time 
does not mean that all women today should be circumcised, according to Hassaan. He 
suggests to use medical knowledge and a professional’s opinion as a means to reach 
the goal of implementing what we learn from the sunna. Based on this argument, his 
reasoning appears to imply an endorsement of the “reduce but do not destroy” hadith, 
which he does not mention in this occasion. His main aim in this video is to point at 
the available knowledge at hand; the authentic hadith mentioning FGC and developing 
ways to implement it in a righteous way by reliance on Muslim medical assistance. In 
this manner, he addresses and rejects others sources of knowledge and opinion on the 
matter of FGC: 
“(…) the German delegations, or American, or English, why do they come to 
decide on the circumcision of our girls? What is wrong with them, and with our 
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girls and women? We read our religion by the words of our Lord and the words 
of our beloved Prophet, and of our scholars. (…) I’m only saying that if we review 
the question in any book of our fiqh books and we read the words of our scholars 
(..) because the question is not new.” 
The point of dealing with this topic within the Muslim umma is of central concern 
to Hassaan. A similar underlying political tone can be found in Abu Ishaq al-Huwayni’s 
opinion on FGC and this question becomes more outspoken in his analysis. Abu Ishaq 
al-Huwayni is equally considered Qutbi while being different from Mohammad 
Hassaan in showing less interest to be working with the Muslim Brotherhood. He is 
similar to Hassaan in the sense that he too, has been criticized for his extremist 
qutbism and his easiness to apply “takfir”, to consider certain Muslims as apostates 
because of their willingness to comply with the political regime and their 
abandonment of the project of striving for a truly Islamic society that is governed by 
shariᶜa (Gauvain 2013, 46). Al-Huwayni is a well-known and well-respected salafi 
scholar partly because of his study time with the globally renowned salafi scholar al-
Albani, who considers al-Huwayni among his favourite students (ibid. 48). In a You 
Tube video, al-Huwayni responds to the recently issued fatwa that condemned FGC as 
un-Islamic: 
“A brother asks about FGC and the bleak (salᶜaᵓ) fatwa that recently appeared 
saying that FGC is haram. Of course, this fatwa is not an Islamic legal fatwa 
(hadhihi al-fatwa laysat fatwa sharᶜiyya), this is a political fatwa (di fatwa 
siyasiyya). It does not have any relation to Islamic legal law (sharᶜa). FGC is a 
duty (wajib), a duty as it is the word of al-Shafiᶜiyya. Who wants to review it, 
goes to the book (collection) of Imam al-Nawawy, God almighty has mercy on 
him. And shaykh Jad al-Haq, God has mercy on him, issued a fatwa also with 
obligation of FGC (biwujub al-khitan). He adopted that position, and that is the 
true word on the subject. There is no other unambiguous evidence (wala dalil 
sarif).” 
According to al-Huwayni, declaring FGC as un-Islamic does not have any Islamic 
grounds. He sees this fatwa as a political gesture only, and not a solid opinion based in 
Islamic scholarship. Islamic opinion is clear to him, and says that FGC is a duty for 
women, just as it is for men. He relies on the classic school of sunni fiqh, Shafiᶜiyya and 
shafiᶜi scholar Imam al-Nawawy in addition to the shaykh al-Azhar Jad al-Haq, who 
leaned strongly toward daᶜwa and salafi trend. As shown in chapter 4, the shafiᶜi law 
school is the most outspoken on the topic of FGC and is the only one that considers the 
practice as an obligation. He continues his talk to elaborate on this statement: 
“I am honestly surprised of the people who say that FGC is tolerable (mubah) 
and that the political ruler (waly al-amr) may restrict what is tolerable. And 
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those who say that it is not right to make an analogy between female and male 
circumcision. We have never made this analogy and no one among the fuqaha 
has used analogy to say that FGC is an obligation because of its analogical 
character with MGC. Who has said this?  
If we say that FGC is an obligation and that he is a sinner who does not 
circumcises the girl – of course it is not necessary that every girl is circumcised 
-, no. Maybe the clitoris is acceptable (mumkin yibᵓa al-bazr maqbul) and is it 
not in need of circumcision.  
But, speaking of the clitoris, if it were excessive, then the entire community of 
Islamic fuqaha agrees that it is legally accepted (mashruᶜ). No one has ever said 
– and it is not necessary that a scholar says it – that FGC is forbidden (haram). At 
the same time, we have not issued fatwa’s saying that FGC is an obligation in 
analogy with men, no. We have only said that women have an equal position in 
the basis of the Islamic legal evidence (yashtarakna maᶜ al-rijal fi asl al-din).  
We have not used analogy. He who says that FGC is tolerable will then also say 
that the political ruler may restrict what is tolerable? This premise is false (al-
muqadimma fasida) and subsequently what is built on this premise is also false”. 
He refines the meaning of ‘the duty of FGC’ to explain that only if the clitoris has 
excessive forms, that the Muslim community of fuqaha in this case deems it as a duty. 
Finally he recounts the hadith stating that male circumcision is a duty: 
 “’then we have revealed you to follow the sect of Ibrahim (mallat Ibrahim) and 
he was not one of the idolaters’”. And the hadith: “Ibrahim, peace be upon him, 
he got himself circumcised and he is the son of an eighty year old, by means of a 
sledge hammer”. The sledge hammer is the well-known instrument. So FGC came 
forth out of the sect of Ibrahim, of which we are ordered to follow. This is the 
legal proof of obligation of MGC and this is also the proof for FGC”.  
Al-Huwayni’s own personal reasoning about the legal Islamic grounds of FGC shows 
that he traces this back to those Qurᵓanic verses and hadith that ground male 
circumcision. He argues that he does not make any analogy between male and female 
circumcision – by rational reasoning – but instead, he shows the textual presence of 
verses asking us to follow the example of Ibrahim, and hadith relates how he has been 
circumcised. Hence, circumcision becomes for all his followers, both men and women. 
Hassaan and al-Huwayni can be considered as ‘fundamentalists’ in John Voll’s 
categorization of Islamic responses to social-cultural change. This means going back 
to the essential basics of the Islamic tradition to find answers to contemporary 
questions, in this case the question of external transnational pressure on Egyptian 
society to abandon FGC (which is also supported by Egyptian voices). Understanding 
and reviewing the differences between the four law schools is less important for them, 
but an original examination of the hadiths is. Surprisingly, hadith analysis leads 
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Muhammad Hassaan’s opinion on FGC to be not far removed from the standpoint of 
shaykh of al-Azhar al-Sayyid al-Tantawi (see chapter 4).  
In contrast to al-Tantawi, Hassaan recognizes Islamic grounds for the practice. In 
al-Tantawi’s opinion, religious men need to leave the final judgment to medical 
doctors to decide on the necessity of the procedure. Hassaan, as a major 
representative of contemporary Salafism, here aligns himself with this vision of 
relying on medical specialists, which is also the most widespread and dominant 
opinion about the relation between Islam and FGC. 
While both religious leaders argue positively about FGC and either see it as religious 
duty (Al-Huwayni) or as something that at least needs to be considered for every girl 
and decided upon by a Muslim doctor (Hassaan), it is difficult to understand to what 
extent these opinions shape popular opinion. Earlier in this chapter, the importance 
of educational circles and intellectual lineages in Salafism was emphasized. One tends 
to educate and inform oneself based on their teacher’s reasoning. This, however, does 
not mean to blindly follow religious leaders’ opinion. The salafi women respondents 
in Gauvain’s study on ritual purity for example, maintain different opinions 
concerning FGC. Several of his female respondents indicated that they believed that 
women should not be circumcised and neither should “suffer the unduly harsh 
restrictions typically associated with menstrual and lochial bleeding” (Gauvain 2013, 
176). Gauvain states that the salafi women respondents showed opposition to 
traditional customs and perceived them to be in conflict with the demands of true 
islam: “A recurring theme in my interviews with the Salafiyyat is the idea that 
traditional Egyptian customs are often both inaccurate, from the perspective of “true 
islam”, and disrespectful in their treatment of women” (ibid. 200). Most of his 
respondents (significantly, virtually all belonged to the upper-class) opposed FGC 
practices in terms of harmfulness to women. They indicated that the harm this 
practice often causes does not align with the spirit of Islam that they perceive as kind 
towards women (ibid. 200-1).  
Such reasoning by the salifiyyat is also in line with the priority that Salafist purity 
concepts give to moral purity (or ‘purity of the heart’), over the physically caused 
forms of impurity. These concepts favor what is present in the inner over the outer 
influences, concerning matters of maintaining purity. This line of thinking, however, 
is only found among the salafi female students, and not by the great salafi preachers. 
An overall salafi opinion is therefore not possible to formulate.  
A final point that characterizes both salafi opinions, is the great importance of 
authority and the question of who has the right to speak (on the case of FGC). Hassaan 
most explicitly criticizes foreign opinion and intervention: “(…) the German 
delegations, or American, or English, why do they come to decide on the circumcision 
of our girls? What is wrong with them, and with our girls and women?”. If all answers 
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can be found in Islamic knowledge, then one does not need to look abroad to find 
answers. Also al-Huwayni discards an Azharite fatwa straightforwardly as political 
and not Islamic. He rejects foreign external influence to denounce FGC and in contrast 
states strongly that FGC is Islamic, placing the political external influence in opposition 
to the correct Islamic knowledge and attitude. Also one invited Azhar shaykh alluded 
to external pressure and reassured his listeners that his opinion is not molded by that 
pressure, that his opinion is not a courtesy to foreigners (like me). From this, a pattern 
emerges that centers the question of who has the authority and power to define and 
decide over what is the nature of FGC, or what belongs to the cultural and what to the 
religious. The overwhelming response by the international campaign on FGC is that 
FGC is not religious but a cultural practice, forgoing intricate cultural and religious 
nuances. This clear-cut categorization of FGC as cultural stands in contrast to the much 
more ambiguous response to MGC as a religious practice (Barras and Dabby 2014). 
The dominant framing on the level of the transnational of FGC as cultural and MGC as 
religious raises and invigorates the question of who has authority to define over what 
constitutes the religious and the cultural.  
7.5 Conclusion 
Looking at Egyptian salafism together with al-Azhar institution may seem like an odd 
choice at first glance. Showing their interaction over the last decades, however, points 
out how they have been influencing each other and shaping Egypt’s religious 
landscape together. After the Brotherhood, Islamic revivalism has been most 
characterized by salafist movements. Unlike the Brotherhood, salafism is mostly 
decentralized and harbours a plurality of different schools of thoughts, or madahib. 
Before the 2011 uprising those different tendencies have been most divided on the 
question of legitimate (political/religious) leadership and whether or not to oppose 
an authoritarian secular leader.  
Whereas al-Azhar long enjoyed the status of being a stronghold of Islamic education 
and authority, this changed since the 1970s and their position has especially been 
challenged by to salafism leaning shaykhs. Azhari graduated scholars and imams 
developed opinions challenging to the institution and its status as official state-
approved interpreters of Islam. This evolution led to a repositionoing of al-Azhar as a 
moderate and mediating voice, between a secular state and rebelling competing 
preachers.  
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After 2011, the salafist landscape transformed radically by developing into political 
parties and obtaining significant numbers of parliament seat. As with the 
Brotherhood, salafist gender politics was subject of much public attention and 
concern. Salafist views on gender and sexuality are differentiated from traditional 
sunni perceptions as they are also based within particular salafist theologies. While 
morality and social matter is discussed from an unmistaken male-based departure 
point, there is a recognition of male and female basic equality in terms of ritual purity, 
a concept of central importance shaping other social and cultural visions.  
This equality in terms of ritual purity is unlike the traditional sunna understanding 
in which there is a hierarchical difference between male and female bodily secretions. 
For many, both men and women, the embrace of salafism signals a desire to find 
personal empowerment through discipline of body and mind. Working toward moral 
and physical ritual purity is what draws particularly many women to salafism. The 
translation of maintaining such sophisticated theologies and worldviews into the 
political arena revealed to be a difficult exercise.  
Nur Party distanced itself from the law proposal that was tabled by one of its 
members in parliament to revise Egypt’s law against FGC and to decriminalize the 
practice. The proponent of the proposal and the Nur party drew both on arguments of 
authority and the principle of Islamic grounding (marjaᶜiyya islamiyya), rejecting an 
imposed formal law and instead insisting on personal discretion and freedom whether 
or not to have FGC performed. 
Looking at religious speech on FGC by Azhari and salafist shaykhs in practice shows 
the diversity of religious opinions and different politics. Two Azhari shayksh I heard 
during fieldwork gave different views. While one confirmed Islam’s heritage and 
considered the validity of favorable hadiths, he attempted to disqualify this heritage 
by placing it in an other historical and tribal epoch. A second shaykh took an 
outspoken stance against it, aligning himself with the official line of al-Azhar. Salafist 
shaykhs Muhammad Hassan and Abu Ishaq al-Huwayni showed a preoccupation with 
the politics of religious speech on this topic. Insisting that all answers are to be found 
within Islamic tradition is the dominating tone of their talk. In this gesture, they turn 
to the question of who has the authoritative voice and right to speak over this subject, 
implying the question who is allowed to determine what is Islamic and what is not, 
what is religious and what is not.   
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Chapter 8  
FGC through the lens of Christian and Muslim 
relations  
8.1 Introduction 
“I will tell you something, Christians do not circumcise”, I heard frequently in random 
conversations with acquaintances and friends when the topic of conversations had 
moved to my work. Wanting to help me out and clarify things to me, more than one 
pointed out that it was a Muslim habit, that Christians do not practice anymore 
because they either were never greatly involved, or they stopped the practice over the 
last fifteen years.  
The narrative that Christians have entirely abandoned the practice became 
particularly more salient in the south of the country. In rare cases, it was stated that 
they simply do not do it, implying that the practice is alien to their community. In 
Luxor and its surrounding villages, I would hear the same ideas not only in informal 
talks but also from development workers with years of experience in awareness-
raising among both Christians and Muslims. The perception that Christians have 
stopped FGC was thus more outspoken in the places around Luxor than in greater 
Cairo. Moreover, development workers also expressed more explicit understandings 
of differences between Christians and Muslims concerning gender and sexuality 
norms.  
Some scholars suggested cautiously that the practice of FGC may have become a 
symbolic marker of religious identification between Muslims and Christians. Coptic 
and Muslim communities would have developed different attitudes towards the issue 
of FGC and toward the heightened international efforts for eradication (Fernea 1998; 
Yount 2004) In my fieldwork, I aimed to investigate these cautious hypotheses by 
looking into the different ways that FGC plays a role in religious community boundary 
keeping on the one hand and in the imagery of the unitary nation on the other.  
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8.2 Defining boundaries and Othering 
8.2.1 Difference (sectarianism) or sameness (national unity): an 
outline of opposing discourses 
This is not the place to discuss the Coptic community extensively in terms of what 
defines them as a sociological minority group or to narrate the important history of 
what defines them as a Christian community but I will touch on some of these aspects 
in order to clarify the context of this part of my fieldwork and my research questions 
and findings1.  
Studies of contemporary Coptic life are scarce but the subject has been drawing 
increasing attention over the last decades, especially since the years 2000. Studying 
the Coptic community as a national minority politically has been controversial. 
Historian Paul Sedra was the first to show how identifying and referring to the Copts 
as a minority interpellates the politics of recognizing their minority status and 
therefore minority rights under international law (Sedra 1999, 219). Similarly, 
defining Copts as a separate community, based on either religion or ethnicity equally 
touches on sensitive questions with political consequences.  Some Copts self-define 
themselves consciously as Copts in order to stress their separateness while others 
avoid the word Copt and prefer Egyptian or Christian (Scott 2010, 65).  
Copts were often studied for their symbolic role in national politics for these 
reasons, namely as a political actor standing in between the secular state and Islamist 
challengers of the state. In Sedra’s words, “The image of Copts as trapped  between the 
hammer of the Islamists and the anvil of the government has developed into the 
standard journalistic shorthand to describe their ‘plight’” (ibid. 220). Copts are spread 
across the social spectrum of classes, represented both in the highest and poorest 
strata of society. Therefore it is more meaningful to speak of different Coptic 
communities instead of “the” Coptic minority or community (ibid. 220).  
Egyptian Copts are the largest Christian denomination in the Middle East but form 
probably about 6% of the Egyptian population(Hulsman 2012). Typically they have 
 
                                                     
1 The Coptic Orthodox Church was separated from Byzantine Christendom after the schism caused by the 
Council of Chalcedon in 451 (A.D.) Aside from the Coptic Orthodox Church, there are also Coptic Catholic 
and Coptic Evangelical Churches as Western missionary activities succeeded in converting members of the 
Coptic Orthodox Church rather than Muslims (van Doorn-Harder & Vogt 1997, 10). Other denominations 
include Episcopal, Greek Orthodox (the earliest Christian Church in Egypt) and Armenian Orthodox, which 
typically do not use the term “Coptic” in their self-description (Iskander 2012, 12-3). When referring to the 
“Church” in this dissertation, the Coptic Orthodox Church of Alexandria is meant, understood to start with 
the preaching of the apostle Mark in Alexandria in the first century.  
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been characterized as a kind of “beleaguered minority” (Ibrahim 2011b, 1-10; 
Iskander 2012, 11; Shenoda 2010). Representations of (tensioned) relations between 
the Christian minority and Muslim majority society often suggest or imply that the 
Coptic community is victim to “systematic persecution” in Egypt (Ibrahim 2011b, 1) . 
Such popular representations of Copts as a monolithic group of mainly victims 
obliterates the diversity of Coptic political activity and civil society activism and the 
diverse experiences and opinions of individual Copts. Following from the victim 
narrative, modern Copts have often been depicted as rather passive entities rather 
than as actors and makers of their own history (Sedra 1999; Sedra 2009).  
In the following I will discuss this representation as a master narrative that 
circulates socially. This is to demonstrate the power of this discursive construction 
and how it contributes in shaping a sense of Coptic community and belonging. Copts 
are in the facts indeed often victims of violence, of which I will talk more in the next 
sessions. My aim for now is, however, to outline the nature and strength of a discourse 
of difference, victimhood and persecution. The victim narrative can indeed be 
subsumed analytically under a larger “discourse of difference”. It speaks of 
persecution and stresses distinctiveness of Christian historical and cultural 
particularities. It includes narratives of oppression that Copts suffer “under the 
Muslim yoke” (Sedra 1999, 222).This narrative considers Coptic history as one of 
subjugation and of having a second-rate status since Egypt became a Muslim-majority 
country. The persecution discourse centers on this basic inequality and injustice and 
regards other current social and political issues such as lack of political representation 
and social segregation in that light. 
The persecution discourse - or the broader “discourse of difference” - is 
diametrically opposed to a “discourse of sameness” that stresses national unity. The 
latter is a nationalist narrative of unity that stresses on Copts’ being an inherent part 
of the Egyptian nation. It emphasizes how Christians and Muslims have remained 
united as one people defending their homeland against foreign aggressors (Sedra 
1999, 223). The state, the traditional religious leadership and clergy and Coptic elites 
since the twentieth century have been endorsing and promoting a nationalist 
narrative of unity. This is characteristically symbolized by the image of an intertwined 
cross and crescent, an image that dates back from the 1919 revolution when Christians 
and Muslims protested together and brought about Egypt’s semi-independence in 
1922, when the British unilaterally declared Egypt independent while keeping certain 
privileges (Ibrahim 2015, 2589).  
The crystallization of these  opposing discourses can be traced back to the 
nineteenth century when the Ottoman millet system (that was religion-based) was 
being dismantled and the notion of citizenship developed and took root in the 
Egyptian context. Coptic elites at the turn of the century mobilized around citizenship 
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as a means through which to reach equality. These elites considered the traditional 
religious leadership and clergy as incompetent and their proposed reforms as 
insufficient. They used a radical discourse that portrayed Copts as victims of 
persecution and rallied around the notion of citizenship to combat inequality. Until 
today, the political struggle for equal citizenship continues and a rhetoric and 
discourse of persecution continues to be used to reach that goal. What has changed, 
however, are the main groups supporting and leading that struggle. Sedra argued that 
while elites were once at the forefront of it, they have turned toward a discourse of 
unity that is non-confrontational to the national political leadership. In the present 
day, it are members of the middle classes who are using a discourse of difference and 
persecution to rally around notions of citizenship (and rights) whereas the elites have 
become predominantly non-confrontational and in support of the ruling regime by 
endorsing a national unity narrative (Sedra 1999, 223,227).  
8.2.2 Coptic difference: Coptic religious revivalism 
In addition to the elite after the turn of the twentieth-century , the Church leadership 
also made major shifts in its politics and endorsement of either a difference or unity 
discourse. The Church in the twentieth century has gone through a major 
transformation that is referred to as the Coptic religious revival or Coptic renewal. The 
origins of this renewal lie in the lay sectors of Coptic society, most notably by those 
were educated in missionary evangelical schools. A new initiative of Sunday Schools 
was set up to the example of Western Protestant missionary schools (Elsässer 2014). 
Many members and leaders of the Sunday School movement later entered monastic 
life and then moved on into clerical structures (van Doorn-Harder and Vogt 1997, 10-
11) . Thus, although the revival started in lay circles it was carried through after 
reformist figures had become clergy and succeeded in bringing about overall change 
in the Church and redefined its relation to its lay members and activities (van Doorn-
Harder and Vogt 1997, 9).  
Several scholars have pointed out that the roots of the Coptic revival – or Coptic 
Renaissance (al-nahda al-qibtiyya) – and those of the Islamic revival are to be situated 
in the same time period of the early twentieth century (Elsässer 2014). It was 
especially noted that the flourishing of both religious revivalisms occurred 
simultaneously from the 1970s onwards (Elsässer 2014; Heo 2013, 1119; Shenoda 
2012, 479)  
The successful merging of reform initiatives occurred largely under the guidance 
and leadership of Patriarch Kirillus  VI (1959-1971) and was then strengthened and 
continued by patriarch Shinuda III (1971-2012) (van Doorn-Harder and Vogt 1997, 
9). Characteristic of the Church reforms is the reaching out to laymen and exerting 
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conscious efforts to incorporate former lay institutions (e.g. councils, servant 
positions that individuals can take up to assist in the church) into the scope of clerical 
organization (El-Khawaga 1997). A central aim of the reforms that make up the revival 
movement is to reconnect with the Coptic historical tradition and place it central in 
contemporary Coptic faith practices. This reconnection with the distinctively Coptic 
history led to a reinforcement of a discourse of difference.  The Church leadership thus 
brought about strong voices that stress Coptic difference and represent Coptic 
nationalism. Patriarch Shinuda III was known – that is, during the first term of his 
tenure - for promoting the idea of Copts as a distinct group by popularizing the phrase 
“the Coptic people” (al-shaᶜab al-qibti) (Iskander 2012, 14). His relationship to the 
regime altered radically, however, by the end of al-Sadat’s regime (1970-1981). Pope 
Shinuda III was politically sanctioned for his defense of Coptic rights which led him to 
change radically and embrace a national unity discourse during the Mubarak regime 
(1981-2011). Despite Shinuda’s turn toward a state supportive discourse2, he 
strengthened the reforms that were started by the revival movement. He successfully 
constructed “the Church as a nucleus for Coptic historical consciousness and identity 
as well as social life” (Shenoda 2012, 479).  
The Church leadership made the clerical structures into the center of Coptic social 
life and religious-cultural identity, aside of playing the role as the political 
representative of the Coptic community vis-à-vis the state. The Church’s role as the 
sole legitimate political representative in exchange for loyalty to the presidency was 
the result of an agreement between Patriarch Kirillus VI and president Jamal ᶜAbd al-
Nasir , and was initially resisted and then continued by Patriarch Shinuda’s tenure 
(Ibrahim 2011b). Shinuda’s commitment and abidance to the ᶜAbd al-Nasir -Kirillus 
agreement is shown most poignantly in his rejection of a 2011 law proposal to unify 
legal procedures for the construction of religious worshipping buildings. The 
difficulties in obtaining permits for church construction and repair have been a long-
standing concern of Christians. Discontent with unequal arrangements for the 
construction of churches and mosques symbolized Christians’ dismal attitude toward 
state policy. In 2011, however, the church leadership herself refused to accept a law 
proposal that would have made an end to this treatment. As Ibrahim states: “in 
 
                                                     
2 The turn towards a discourse of sameness and national unity can be called radical when it leads to a denial 
of the structural political problems that Copts face as a community. In a 2008 interview for example, 
Patriarch Shinuda said about communal violence that it should be understood as “a lack of civilization”, 
rather than using a terminology of “communal violence” or “sectarianism”, that implies the recognition of 
structural discrimination/ violence against the Copts as a religious minority (Iskander 2012, 101). 
Ironically, while Shinuda shunned away from using a “difference discourse” in the national institutionalized 
political arena and public sphere, he kept promoting a communal politics of difference, in which the Church 
hierarchy operates as the political, religious, cultural and social leading force.  
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rejecting the proposal, the church wished to consolidate its monopoly over communal 
affairs”(Ibrahim 2015, 2588). While the church leadership turned to an endorsement 
of a national unity discourse in official national politics, it simultaneously 
strengthened ideas of Coptic difference and separatism, built around the church as the 
leading force. The belief in a separate Coptic community with its distinctiveness is also 
manifested culturally in expressions of Coptic nationalism, such as the above 
mentioned formulation of young Patriarch Shinuda’s “the Coptic people”. It is common 
for Coptic nationalist thought to consider “the Coptic people” as the original 
inhabitants of Egypt and therefore being the authentic heirs of ancient Egyptian 
civilization. Consequently, Muslims and Arabs have been seen by some as “guests” of 
the Coptic earlier inhabitants, while others consider both Christians and Muslims as 
Copts as they are all descendants from ancient Egypt (Iskander 2012, 15-6).  
8.2.3 The cross and crescent vs. minority politics 
The national unity discourse is not only one used by the ruling groups. In times of 
national political uproar and protests, it reappears as a crucial political tool that unites 
and mobilizes protesters. Nationalist rhetoric and imagery characterized the 1919 
revolution and the surrounding years of the struggle for independence. It are those 
years that form “the foundation for the collective social consciousness framing the 
understanding of Egyptian national unity today” (Iskander 2012, 97-8). The memory 
of the common political struggle of 1919-1922 has then been “objectified as an idea to 
be commemorated collectively” (ibid. 98). This period is characterized by a united 
fight of Muslims and Christians against the British Protectorate and led to success 
when the British declared Egypt independent unilaterally in 1922. Because of the 
successful struggle, the lived inter-faith brotherhood of this period came to exemplify 
“the true nature of Muslim-Christian relations in Egypt” (ibid. 98). Harmonious 
brotherhood is the authentic way of being for Egyptians  as this was illustrated in the 
success of their common struggle for national independence. The image of the 
intertwined cross and crescent and the slogan “religion is for God and the nation is for 
all” (al-din lillah wa al-watan lil-gamia) became central in nationalist rhetoric and they 
remain so until today3.  
The central idea of harmonious Muslim-Christian relations in the national unity 
discourse remains the dominant representation in media today. This discourse of 
harmony addresses individuals and is instructive in following the right (nationalist) 
 
                                                     
3 For a detailed historical discussion of the emergence of nationalist imagery revolving around Muslim-
Christian relations, such as the cross and the crescent, see Vivian Ibrahim 2011.  
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behaviour. Iskander argues that in these representations “the duty to protect Egypt is 
summarized as a duty to protect national unity” and subsequently how “the 
maintenance of national unity is a duty to perform individually” (ibid. 99). Media tells 
stories of people’s experiences of living together and of individuals enjoying inter-
faith friendships to suggest that this forms inevitably part of “each individual 
Egyptian’s character and lived experience” (ibid. 99). This, however, does not match 
with the many Copts who “see themselves as portrayed negatively, inaccurately or 
insufficiently in the media” (ibid. 100). In other words, the discourse of sameness / 
national unity discourse is the hegemonic discourse used by the state, church 
hierarchy and large segments of the Coptic elite. As such it is also the dominant 
discourse in mainstream media with which many Copts cannot entirely identify or feel 
offended by for not being represented in the ways they wish4.  
Discussion of concepts of difference or “minority rights” based on Copts’ being a 
numeric religious minority should therefore be held against this background of the 
dominant national unity discourse. The state, the Coptic Orthodox Church hierarchy 
and religious clergy and Coptic elites have been promoting a national unity discourse 
and this implies not to recognize Copts as a minority (ᶜaqaliyya) (Mahmood 2012). 
Usually when Egyptian media refer to the Copts with the term “minority” it is done in 
a way as to refute the label for Egyptian Christians (Iskander 2012, 105). Talk about 
minority rights is treated as antagonizing and hostile to the national unity narrative. 
Such perceived hostility is not always imaginary. It is well-known that the argument 
of protection of Christian minorities in Egypt and the Middle East has been used by 
colonial forces and remains present (either as a threat or reality) in more recent 
international politics. For all of these reasons have “Copts and secular Muslims been 
extremely cautious of adopting international discourses regarding ‘minority rights’” 
(Ibrahim 2015, 2591). Whether or not to endorse a minority rights discourse has 
therefore been a political question. The decision to use a minority language may easily 
be seen as an attack or complot against the national state. It involves therefore 
considerations of power relations between the state, church, Coptic elite and the 
middle classes and civil society that has become more vocal and visible, especially 
after 2011.  
 
                                                     
4 Despite the hegemony of a national unity discourse, debate on discrimination against Copts have become 
more visible and accepted since the years 2000s, especially in the new media (Guirguis 2012). 
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8.2.4 After 2011: breaking away from the binary discourse 
deadlock? 
The 25 January Uprising and its aftermath projected both discourses forcefully back 
into the air. A full-blown national unity discourse immediately resurfaced during the 
January 2011 Uprising. Although the church hierarchy did not support the call for the 
national protest on 25th of January, many Christians participated on the first day and 
remained. Chants that celebrate the Christian-Muslim unity of protest against the 
ruling regime reverberated through the streets and squares of Cairo. Ibrahim 
describes it follows:  
“civil and political activists were heard across Egypt’s urban centres challenging 
existing social orders by chanting the slogan: ‘‘Ul ya Hassan, ‘ul ya Bulus, bukra 
Masr hat hasal Tunis’ (Say oh Hassan, say oh Bulus, tomorrow Egypt will follow 
Tunis). The names in the chant are noteworthy: Hassan and Bulus (Paul) served 
as markers of Egypt’s two main religious faiths (Hassan the Muslim and Bulus 
the Copt) that make up ‘authentic’ Egypt (Ibrahim 2015, 2591).  
The nationalist unity discourse was embodied yet again by the many protesters in the 
street by chanting together and by praying in each other’s proximity. Images of Copts 
holding hands and forming a chain of protection around Muslims praying on the 
streets appeared regularly in international media throughout the months of heavy 
street protest. In marches and rallies, copies of the Qurᵓan and the cross were raised 
together.  
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All three pictures were taken on 11 March 2011. The day of protest was called “Friday of National Unity”.  
In the same period, however, sectarian tensions and violence from Muslims to 
Christians and vice-versa also peaked. Such sectarian violence was historically often 
instigated by concrete incidents related to church building and repair and alleged or 
real conversions. In 2010-2011, Egypt witnessed a series of unseen violence against 
Copts (e.g. Alexandra Cathedral, Sul, Imbaba, Manshiyyat Nasr, at Maspiro in Cairo…) 
but the most violent eruptions happened during the Morsi presidency and 
immediately after his deposal on 3 July 2013. The Muslim Brotherhood was reported 
to inflame sectarianism by stating that opponents of the Morsi  government were 
Christians and that political protesters were instigated by Christians (Sirgany 9-4-
2013). In the run-up to the national protests of 30 June 2013 that lead to the deposal 
of Morsi, a coalition was built of civil society groups and political opposition that 
included supporters of the old Mubarak regime.  
When the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) announced the deposal of 
Morsi, they appeared in a coalition with the church hierarchy and salafi factions as 
well. The church’s support of the military coup against the democratically elected 
president Morsi backlashed against ordinary Christians in the second half of 2013. 
Christian citizens, their property and churches were attacked gravely in several cities 
in middle Egypt, especially in the province and town of al-Minya. In 2014, incidents 
were reported of Coptic families being prevented by salafist protesters to travel to 
other villages where they were headed to pray in church (Fouad 26-9-2014). Since 
many villages in the south don’t have their own church, many families travel to 
another village or to a nearby town to pray in church.  The changed climate of 
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heightened insecurity, unsafety and sectarian tensions also led to changes among 
salafi political factions in their orientation toward Christians. Shayks affiliated to al-
daᶜwa salafiyya in Alexandria also intervened  in a bid to sooth and calm down 
Muslims involved in local skirmishes. Some of them taking  “the significant step of 
declaring that Egyptian Christians were citizens with full rights and autonomy in 
spiritual and personal status matters” (Ashwal 2013, 6).  
In recent decades and especially after the 2011 Uprising, the discourse of difference 
has been developing in new directions, notably one of a politics of recognition and 
public visibility, argues historian Vivian Ibrahim (Ibrahim 2015). The use of the 
persecution / difference discourse that Sedra described referred mainly to the 
political goal of challenging formal inequalities and injustices. Ibrahim on the other 
hand argues that “Copts have moved beyond a debate over equality of citizenship and 
rights to one of freedom to difference, a discourse that does not subordinate Egyptian 
minorities to the national unity debate but encourages specific minority rights and 
pluralism” (Ibrahim 2015, 2586). She argues that already since the mid-1990s, Coptic 
activists have been contesting the authoritative role of the church and the 
organization of the church-state relation while forming part of a broader expansion of 
human rights work and civil society activity in Egypt. After 2011, particularly youth 
groups have been opening up space for change and dissent by challenging the church 
hierarchy and the state at once, and by being highly visible in the streets. The most 
prominent group is undoubtedly Maspiro Youth Union (MYU), named after the 
Maspiro building (that state television building) in central Cairo where a Coptic 
protest was violently and brutally attacked by the Egyptian military on October 9, 
2011, resulting in the killing of twenty-eight Coptic protesters. 
According to Ibrahim, youth activists “have organized religious, social and political 
demonstrations that invoke a unique lay-led Coptic identity, distinct from a shared 
Egyptian experience of the cross and crescent” (ibid. 2592). These relatively new civil 
society activists seek to establish a Coptic lay identity, differentiated from the existing 
frame of a national unity discourse on the one hand and the Coptic nationalist 
discourse of difference as exemplified – and monopolized - by the church hierarchy on 
the other. Their demands are not as much about secularization, Ibrahim argues, but 
rather about “the public expression of plural identities” (ibid. 2593). The new activists 
indeed differentiated themselves from previous protests by literally shifting locations 
for expressing protest. Usually protests were held in front of the Patriarchate building 
in the district of Abbasiyya or inside particular churches’ courtyards, but MYU brought 
protests of Coptic dissent into the heart of central Cairo’s public space (Maspiro) and 
in districts where many Copts reside (Ibrahim 2015; Shenoda 13-5-2013). In its use 
of symbolism, MYU consciously avoided the cross and crescent imagery and used 
instead “pharaonic symbolism used at the turn of the twentieth century” and thus 
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relying on and invoking an “ethnonationalist” narrative referring to Copts as “the 
Coptic people” as the authentic inhabitants of the land (Ibrahim 2015, 2593-4)  
One of the unmistakable consequences of the 2011 Uprising and the following 
Coptic protests is that “overt public confession of Christian religiosity has become 
commonplace” (Shenoda 13-5-2013). Ibrahim analyzes MYO’s actions 
sympathetically for their leaving behind of a national unity discourse symbolized by 
cross and crescent and reacting against the church’s authoritative hold on Coptic civil 
and political life at the same time. MYO and others may indeed challenge the existing 
long-standing opposing pair of discourses by introducing new ideas of recognition of 
difference  and  of visibility of religious identity within a larger frame of pluralism and 
national belonging.  
In sum, in this section I suggested to differentiate between two major discourses: 
one of “difference” and one of “sameness”. Both discourses should be understood as 
situated at both ends of a continuum. This continuum stretches from a language of 
persecution and historical victimhood on the one end (difference) toward discourses 
of historical unity and national belonging on the other end (sameness). It was shown 
above that both common discourses can be drawn upon by the same groups of people 
across time (as Coptic elite classes and the Church papacy shifted from relying on a 
difference discourse to one of sameness and unity). The meanings that Copts give to 
being Copt also involves relying on both discourses, drawing upon a separate religious 
tradition with distinct creed and faith practices and upon a national history of sharing 
the land that makes up Egypt and the territory that has been defended against foreign 
aggressors (Iskander 2012, 17). Thus, it should be kept in mind that both discourses 
are not absolute or reified, but may be reified by some at certain moments and in 
certain contexts. Recent scholarship on contemporary Coptic society argued indeed 
for the necessity to understand the diversity of what constitutes present-day 
“Copticness” (Iskander 2012, 11). Some stereotypical narratives of Copts portray 
them as passive and submissive supporters of the ruling regime or as persecuted 
victims. Let’s look further into the narrative of persecution and victimhood, as this 
forms the inner core of the difference discourse.  
8.2.5 A theology of persecution, a politics of faith and the Muslim 
Other 
The Coptic Orthodox Church herself has been using narratives of persecution and 
victimhood. The Church leadership has used persecution language in their positioning 
against the political leadership of Egypt, in an effort to reach equality and end 
discrimination. At the same time, persecution discourse has also a place in Coptic 
theology as understandings of persecution have shaped Coptic creed and practices of 
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faith. Many scholars argued that “the Coptic Church sees itself as a historically 
persecuted Church” (Iskander 2012, 13; Shenoda 2012; van Doorn-Harder and Vogt 
1997). The Egyptian Christian community was not only crucial in the development and 
spread of the Christian faith globally, it had to endure outsider attacks since the very 
beginning. Defending their faith and territory is therefore an important part of the 
collective memory and consciousness. As van Doorn-Harder and Kari Vogt note 
“’When we were fighting against Arius’ or ’when we went to Chalcedon’ are remarks 
one regularly comes across during discussions with Copts about their faith, church or 
history” (van Doorn-Harder and Vogt 1997, 9). Until today, historical events belonging 
to the Coptic faith tradition and memories of survival are being recounted and 
repeated in concrete stories in addition to recent stories of struggle against an 
obstructive Egyptian state (for example the administrative and political struggle that 
is involved when applying for a permit to construct or repair churches).  The 
juxtaposition of recent stories with old stories relating to the struggle of the early 
Christian community serves to  “underline the ability of the Copts to survive by 
sticking together” (Iskander 2012, 13).  
The Coptic Church’s origin is brought back to the arrival and preaching of the 
apostle Mark in Alexandria in the first century. Egypt was a province of the Roman 
Empire (30 B.C) until (Muslim) Arabs came to control the country in 642, which 
caused the Copts to become a numeric religious minority by the tenth century (van 
Doorn-Harder and Vogt 1997, 10). This period as a Roman province is known in Coptic 
tradition as the hardest one, characterized by heavy persecution by some Roman 
emperors. This period “left the Coptic Church with an abundance of martyrs who died 
for their Christian faith” (van Doorn-Harder and Vogt 1997, 9). In the theological 
disagreement of early Christendom between so-called monophysites and dyophysites, 
the Coptic Church was on the side of the monophysites and thus considered as heretics 
by those churches who accepted the dual human-divine nature of Christ as defined by 
the Council of Chalcedon (451 A.C). Copts understand the nature of Christ as “two 
natures – divine and human – mystically united in one, without confusion, corruption 
or change” (van Doorn-Harder and Vogt 1997, 10). The Church remained isolated from 
the rest of the Christian world until the beginning of the twentieth century (ibid.).  
The Coptic tradition is thus one that emphasizes the continuation between the past, 
present and future, by means of storytelling as much as in theology and faith practice. 
For Copts, “the formation of their tradition is an ongoing process of teaching and 
learning that not only entails remembering but also re-discovering, renewal and 
innovation” (van Doorn-Harder and Vogt 1997, 11). Events and ideas from the 
historical tradition continue to play an explanatory or complementary role to 
understand events today. A fascinating case in point is the radical change in 
apparitions of the Virgin Mary from rare individual apparitions to collective 
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apparitions that are shared by both Christians and Muslims. In the Coptic liturgical 
tradition, apparition of the Virgin Mary occurred historically only “to select individuals 
so as to intervene in moments of danger and distress” (Heo 2013, 1122) However, 
since the second half of the twentieth century, apparitions are also experienced by 
large groups of people and are witnessed by both Christians and Muslims together, 
often at the sites of church buildings (ibid. 1121).  
Anthropologist Angie Heo argues how this phenomenon entailed a new 
methodology by the Church of verifying and confirming the apparitions in which the 
Muslim view weighs more than the Christian one. The Muslim seeing is considered 
less biased because it is not desiring to see an apparition and is therefore more 
objective than the Christian seeing. She argues that “such an emphasis on ‘Muslim 
versus Christian’ is part and parcel of a mass politics of recognition, one in which the 
majority affirms a minoritarian point-of-view through the increase in numbers” (ibid. 
1123). This remarkable shift in the clerical evaluation of apparitions indicates the 
increased importance of a politics of recognition: the minority’s desire for affirmation 
by the Muslim majority.Through a detailed analysis of reports by apparition witnesses 
and of official religious leadership’s responses, she further shows how modernized 
ideas of visuality and sainthood draw the limits and possibilities of a shared (Christian 
and Muslim) sainthood. It is in the defining of “what it means to view the Virgin that 
religious differences are also shaped, evaluated, and negotiated” , both among 
Christians and between Christians and Muslims (ibid. 1132). The importance of 
recognition and the ongoing dynamic of religious revivalism among both Muslims and 
Christians lead in other words to a sharpened sense of defining and distinguishing 
what is precisely Muslim and what is Christian.  
Similar to Marian apparitions are miracle narratives taking place and evolving in 
particular social and historical contexts. The configuration of Coptic faith, experiences 
and practices seen in its dynamic relation to social issues, notably everyday Muslim-
Christian interactions, sectarian violence and the relation between the Coptic Church 
and the state was termed a “politics of faith” by anthropologist Anthony Shenoda 
(Shenoda 2012). Miracles may be experienced by saints as much as by pious Copts.  
Whereas most miracle narratives revolve around healing, some relate to social issues 
such as Muslim-Christian relations and the relation of the state to the Church. The 
Coptic tradition has a long history of miracle narratives relating to social-political 
hardship and persecution and this continues until the present day including narratives 
directly involving former president Mubarak, or most recently revolving around the 
Maspero violence when twenty-eight Coptic protesters were killed (Shenoda 13-5-
2013). Moreover,  
“miracles are among the facts of Coptic religiosity that are strongly 
foregrounded among contemporary Copts, especially through Sunday School 
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lessons and visits to monasteries where monks and nuns frequently tell tales 
about the wonder-working powers of their monastery’s patron saint” (Shenoda 
2012, 479).  
Through narrating miracles that stress social-political hardship and persecution and 
therefore raise skepticism “toward the Egyptian state and the Muslim Other”, 
contemporary Copts ultimately experience feelings of empowerment and reassurance 
of their capacity for survival (ibid. 483). Shenoda argues that “a skepticism of the 
Muslim Other on the part of Copts is an important aspect of keeping Christian faith” 
(Shenoda 2012, 478). The skepticism directed toward the wordly – and hard – aspects 
of life, in other words, reinforces belief in the divine and divine intervention. In 
conclusion, it is through this process of miracle narration that “pious Copts secure a 
sense of moral superiority to their Muslim counterparts, make sense of the society in 
which they live, and secure their own faith” (ibid. 479). Through this process, the 
Christian faith and the Christian God appear stronger than the Muslim ones. In this 
way, the political and social marginalization of Copts, their precarious existence and 
hard living conditions is accommodated for and mediated through the belonging to 
the Coptic Christian faith. The Muslim Other here can be either “individual Muslims, 
an imagined group of Muslims, or the State” (ibid. 491).  
8.2.6 Cultural and religious boundary keeping through not doing 
FGC: a hypothesis 
Gendered norms and practices are an important site for symbolic demarcation of 
group boundaries. Whereas anthropologist Fredrik Barth laid out the cultural logic of 
ethnic and group boundary making (Barth 1969), feminist anthroopologists and 
sociologists discussed in equally landmark studies the central importance of gender 
norms, women’s status and women’s bodies in processes of imagining the nation and 
boundary making by collectivities (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989; McClintock 1993). 
Women’s status and bodies serve as reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic 
/national/ community groups. It does not only matter whether women have children 
and reproduce the community but also whether their reproductive capacities remain 
within their and (their husbands’) community. This means that “very often religious 
and social traditions dictate who can marry whom so that the character as well as the 
boundaries of the group can be maintained from one generation to the other” (Anthias 
and Yuval-Davis 1989, 9).  
In the Egyptian case, maintaining the boundaries between Christians and Muslims 
by marriage and reproduction has become particularly salient in recent decades. Some 
scholars have noted the role of gender relations in sectarian strife and particularly of 
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inter-faith love stories and cases of conversion (Guirguis 2011, 12-22; Tadros 2010; 
Tadros 2013, 55-60,102-6). It becomes clear, also here, that women appear to embody 
and symbolize the interests of the entire community. Two particular cases have 
become famous and publicly debated over the course of years, notably the case of 
Wafaa Constantine, a wife of a priest, and Camillia Shehata, also a wife of a priest. 
These women had allegedly wanted to leave their husbands and convert to Islam5. The 
cases raised a high level of national attention and public debate and mobilized public 
protest in Cairo and Minya. Protests turned political as Copts showed “intense 
animosity toward the government” and salafist demonstrators chanted against the 
pope and the Coptic Church (Tadros 2013, 57) 57. In these protests, the protection of 
one woman and her being part of a faith community came to symbolize the protection 
of the entire community, its interests, rights and freedoms. Similarly testifying to this 
principle of community boundary protection is that Coptic Christian women wishing 
to marry someone who belongs to a different denomination need to convert to this 
denomination (Emad).  
Building on these insights about the importance of women’s symbolic role as 
guardians of ethnic or group boundaries, sociologist Kathryn Yount hypothesized that 
conceptions of women’s status and gender ideologies may be fields of differentiation 
between Muslim and Christian communities and that FGC (and anti-FGC campaigning) 
may be a salient example illustrating this. In other words, performing FGC or not may 
have become a gendered marker of group and religious identity between Copts and 
Muslims. Yount argues that “local Christian voluntary organizations began to promote 
ideals and activities that reflected a different vision of women’s empowerment and 
included the eradication of female genital practices” (Yount 2004, 1065). FGC, she 
argues, would be an illustrative example of how different ideas on gender norms and 
“competing ideas about women” developed between both communities (ibid.) (see 
also chapters 6 and 7). This differentiation was spurred, according to Yount, over 
debates on women’s roles in the private sphere and the rhetorics of cultural 
authenticity by islamists since the 1970s.  
 
                                                     
5 Christian women and men who want a divorce are faced with limited options due to the Christian Personal 
Status Law that does not allow divorce except in some very specific – and rarely occuring – cases. Therefore, 
conversion to Islam by one of the spouses has been utilized as a way to initiate divorce.  In the cases of the 
priests’ wives, some members of the Muslim community – salafists – protested to support what they 
considered as these women’s embrace of Islam. The women were considered new members of the Muslim 
community and therefore had to be protected to ensure their right to live as Muslims (Tadros, 2010). 
Another important factor that plays a role in the public debate and emotional display over cases of Christian 
women’s conversion is fear among Copts that these women disappeared because they had been abducted 
and forcibily converted to Islam (Tadros 2013, 58, 102).  
 230 
In this hypothesis, Copts would be more inclined to abandon FGC as an action that 
is part of a larger set of ideas concerning gender norms and gender ideology that they 
defined differently from and in contradistinction to Muslims. In other words, local 
Coptic organizations would have embraced the idea of abandonment of FGC within the 
larger development of redefining visions on gender and women’s empowerment. This 
process of redefining gender norms happened in a national sphere of debate on 
women’s role and status in society and at home and was stirred by islamist 
conservative politics.  
The national public debate centered on conservative values, according to the 
hypothesis, made the Muslim community more inclined to keep the cultural practice 
and/or redefine it as an Islamic practice, whereas the Coptic community on the other 
hand was more inclined to abandon it as a non-religious, harmful or unnecessary 
practice. My research questions then built on these prudent assumptions by 
examining prevailing discourses by development organizations in the field, by 
interrogating Muslim and Christian views of project beneficiaries and by the official 
Church hierarchy . 
Although Yount conducted her research in the early years 2000, her observations 
that Coptic organizations embrace the anti-FGC campaign wholeheartedly was easily 
confirmed by looking at the present-day state of campaigning. The largest Egyptian 
NGO, the Coptic Evangelical Organisation for Social Services (CEOSS) had pioneered 
campaigns against FGC before the organization of the ICPD in 1994. The earliest village 
that was said to have made a village level declaration of abandoning FGC, in 1991, – 
through the work of CEOSS – was the Christian village of Deir al Barsha, a locality that 
is well-known and “deeply rooted in the Coptic tradition” (Abdel Hadi 2006, 111-2) 
(for more on the specifics of Egyptian campaigning history, see chapter 3). The local 
small NGO’s I visited and that worked with the Coalition of NGO’s against FGM had 
predominantly a Christian affiliation. More than half of the trainers I met were 
Christian, except for two shaykhs and two Muslim trainers. Most importantly, in 2013,  
Unicef for the first time released statistics that documented prevalence of FGC divided 
by religion. Of girls and women aged 15 to 49 years, about 92% of Muslims is reported 
to have undergone FGC, in contrast to about 74% of the Christian population (United 
Nations Children’s Fund 2013, 73).  
Starting from these observations and the above sketched hypothesis that was 
formulated by previous researchers, my aim was to investigate prevailing discourses 
among development workers, beneficiaries and church employees concerning FGC 
and its perceived relation to religion. Is the relation between FGC and Christian faith 
also constructed as a faulty one, as is the predominant perception on FGC and Islam? 
When Christians abandon FGC faster than Muslims, is FGC indeed becoming a marker 
of religious identity or changing gender norms between both religious communities?  
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Figure copied from Unicef, Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A statistical overview and exploration of the 
dynamics of change, 2013, p. 73. 
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8.3 Ethnographic findings: Representations of FGC and 
demarcation of boundaries 
In awareness-raising seminars, Muslims and Christians are seated together listening 
to the same trainer who addresses their community. I’m starting with a small 
ethnographic description of one seminar I attended to introduce a discussion of how 
FGC figures in both narratives of sameness and difference concerning Muslim-
Christian relations.  
This morning I am attending the fifth nadwa tawᶜiyya, awareness-raising 
seminar, this time organized by CEOSS. I am meeting Mohammad of the Coalition 
of NGOs against FGM at the metro stop, from where we travel together by bus 
and tuktuk to reach the informal settlement where the meeting is. He seemed to 
have underestimated the time and effort it takes to reach the location, it is his 
first time to go there and he is also slightly nervous about it. It takes several 
phone calls and asking around on the street to find it so we arrive after the 
trainer had already started, which made me a bit nervous as well. I was not sure 
to what extent the trainer and the attending women were aware that I would 
visit and I was always a bit concerned about not imposing myself or causing 
uncomfortable situations. I had no choice then to enter the cramped room 
without any formal or informal introduction.  
The trainer, Hanan, was already in the middle of an anatomical explanation of 
the female genitalia. The room is filled with women who are listening attentively 
and this is the first seminar where I find a majority of Coptic women. I notice 
quickly that Hanan is a captivating and experienced speaker, standing in front 
closely to the women and speaking in a loud and clear voice, for which I’m also 
grateful. Her talk after explaining the anatomical and medical harm that occurs 
with FGC revolves around how it forms part of Egyptian tradition.  
She invites women to rethink their traditional beliefs concerning FGC and this 
results in the most interactive meeting I have seen so far. Women respond to her 
questions easily, they bring on the reasons for why FGC happens and she refutes 
them one by one. She emphasizes the importance of the brain for causing arousal 
and sexual desire, and stresses the central role of education and upbringing for 
making sure that daughters behave well. Hanaan says “FGC causes physical and 
psychological wounds and what we want is the opposite, a healthy girl (bint 
salima)” and she points in my direction “look, that is what I mean, beautiful 
(ᵓamar)!”. I am thinking, this is what happens inevitably if I cannot introduce 
myself as only a researcher and not a campaigner and feel I can only submit and 
be overpowered by my whiteness and the fact of being Western. Several women 
spontaneously stand up and speak up about their own experiences. A Muslim 
woman narrates her painful experience of having undergone FGC twice and how 
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this made her acting strongly against it. A Coptic woman sitting next to me 
narrates how she interfered when her cousin was almost getting circumcised 
and how she opposed and spoke her mind to her family. By the end of the 
meeting, still nothing had been said about religion. I ask the director of the NGO 
who is also the coalition’s contact person and she explains that Hanan cannot 
discuss Islam as a Coptic woman but that shaykhs and priests have been brought 
in before to discuss the matter from religious points of view.  When I ask whether 
we can continue our talk about this with Hanan, she responds we can do 
anything I want, that they can even invite shaykhs for me to talk, if I would like 
to. The feeling that I am in the NGO’s eyes somehow connected to donor funds 
or that my presence could somehow be beneficial to them in terms of projects 
remains present throughout the rest of our meeting.  
In this seminar the question of religion was entirely bypassed. Religious difference 
was not addressed and instead the focus was on what all these women shared, which 
led to a lively and engaging exchange around the theme of FGC. Women seemed to 
appreciate listening to the trainer and engage in discussions although most women 
already agreed with the speaker and opposed FGC. The discussion of FGC is 
surrounded by an athmosphere of disregard and almost disgust as she sums up 
traditional Egyptian logics and reasons for performing FGC disapprovingly. The 
personal expressions and stories of Muslim and Coptic women foregrounded that 
those traditional logics and reasons is what they all shared and suffered from.  
8.3.1 Narratives of sameness and Egyptian national unity 
It has been explained in earlier chapters how the relation between FGC and religion is 
conceptualized in anti-FGC campaigning generally and specifically in the Egyptian 
context of awareness-raising. The connection to Islam is said to be faulty and 
illegitimate because of a lack of authentic textual references in the Islamic tradition. A 
similar reasoning is employed concerning Christianity: FGC needs to be disconnected 
from religion all together because the scriptures do not mention the practice or do not 
support it. FGC figures in discourses concerning Copts and Coptic-Muslims relations 
in two main ways that align with the general discourses of sameness and difference. 
FGC can figure in discourses to describe and reinforce feelings of Egyptian unity and 
sameness as well as in discourses that stress difference and Coptic particularity. I will 
elaborate on that in the following sections and contextualize how both of these 
discourses are employed.  
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8.3.1.1 Sharing social realities, sharing gender norms 
The above fragment described a particular seminar and how the casting aside of 
religion lead to a central focus on what women share and their similarities. The central 
sentiment and understanding is here that FGC has nothing to do with religion, it is 
rather part of the national culture, it is part of Egyptian customs (ᶜadat wa taqalid) and 
we all need to work together to change this custom. In an interview, a (Christian) 
trainer, Rana, explains this as follows: 
“But in the villages you cannot differentiate between Christian and Muslim, 
khitan is a custom for all. In that place everything is universal, whether Muslim 
or Christian. When you go to talk you will discuss the harms of FGC from a social 
point of view (…). Most of the women’s vaginas’ opening need to be widened at 
the time of child delivery, and also at the first wedding night. The vaginal 
openings have narrowed because of FGC” (Rana 2014). 
The idea is that in rural areas, social and cultural customs among Christians and 
Muslims are the same. The strategies in campaigning therefore do not differentiate 
and address all women in the same ways. Campaigning discourse focuses on a “social 
point of view” (nahya igtimaᶜiyya) that is only concerned with the harms that women 
suffer from after FGC. The medical and social harms unite all these women, regardless 
of their religion. In the same interview, the trainer expounds what she was told when 
learning about FGC and preparing to give seminars herself: 
“When we started working on the project with the National Council, they gave 
us the Islamic and Christian point of view (iduna nazra al-diniyya al-islamiyya 
lil-khitan wa nazra al-diniyya al-masihiyya lil-khitan) and they clarified them to 
us. Before that, they had given us the health perspective from the Ministry of 
Health and the social perspective. They gave the religious points of view, even to 
us Christians because we were also explaining to Muslims and especially Muslim 
youth. I gave a seminar to young people and it was necessary that I spoke about 
the religious point of view, at least partially because it is not my right to speak 
about [Muslim] religion.  
 
An: Do they [Muslims] accept it that you, as a Christian woman, speak to them 
about the relation of FGC to religion? 
 
Rana: There is something that you need to know. At the countryside in the 
villages women are very simple, I mean that, when you see them you love them 
and care for them and you give them information and [the question] does not 
enter their minds whether you are Muslim or Christian” (Rana 2014) 
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First she explains how she was taught about the relation between FGC and religion in 
the training that she followed herself on the topic, organized and funded by the 
National Council for Women (the Luxor branch of the national NCW). She learned 
about both Islamic and Christian points of view in order to transmit this basic 
knowledge but as a Christian she is not expected to go into details or theological 
discussions that pertain to Islam. When asked further about the meaning of doing this, 
she waves it away by pointing out that this is not an issue. When working in such 
contexts against FGC, religious difference is not on the mind of either trainers or 
attending women, she argues. 
What Rana is pointing out is that in this context, the axis of religious differentiation 
becomes irrelevant. For the mainly illiterate, lower class and rural women, she argues 
that issues related to class and gender weigh more in their lives than issues concerning 
religion. In these communities where “women are very simple”, matters of religious 
difference that touch on and complicate issues of identity and representation reveal 
themselves as irrelevant in the face of the overwhelming similarities that women 
share in terms of concrete, material life worlds, everyday activities, shared values etc.  
This aligns with historian Margot Badran’s writing that “Christians in Egypt 
historically followed the social conventions of the mainstream Muslim majority” 
(Badran 2009a, 171), for example in matters of circumcision and women’s veiling 
(Badran 1995). According to Badran, “notions of woman as an omnisexual – and highly 
sexualized – being permeate the entire culture in Egypt. This is to say that such 
thinking is shared by both Christians and Muslims, who generally believe that 
women’s sexuality is the product of ‘nature’” (Badran 2009a, 171) Badran suggests 
that both Christian and Muslim views of sexuality are generally “a product of nature” 
without developing this argument. It seems first that this is in agreement with Rana’s 
explanation that both communities historically share ideologies of gender and 
sexuality and that religion does not appear as a difference-marker. The trope that all 
Egyptians share common, national Egyptian morals “akhlaqna wahid” expresses this 
well. However, where Badran seems to make a general statement on the similarity of 
Muslim and Christian gender and sexuality regimes, Rana speaks from her personal 
and professional experience and refers to women of rural areas and lower classes. For 
Rana, Egyptians share gender and sexual norms and religion matters less when their 
social and economic position unites them.  
8.3.1.2 “National Egyptian morals” and religious education 
During a group talk with Muslim women inside the building where CEOSS NGO is 
located in an informal settlement in the Northern suburbs of Cairo, and in the company 
of the local (Christian) director, we discussed the idea of FGC as a superfluous practice. 
Women argued that FGC is not needed but that instead a proper education is called 
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for. I asked about what makes a child’s education or upbringing good or what makes 
it particularly Islamic and women answered:  
“- There is nothing that is called an Islamic education and a Christian education. 
Both are just one and the same education (hiya tarbiyya wa hiyya tarbiyya). As 
Egyptians our morals are the same for all (kullina akhlaqna wahid kamasriyin).  
-Islam has laid out the fundaments of education. 
-Islam in our society has laid out the rights of women in Islam, it did not specify 
things related to girl’s education. We have women’s rights, in marriage, but we 
do not have girls’ rights. I belief that all monotheistic religions are the same. 
-Look, we as a region here, or as a country, you feel that your education is like 
theirs, there is no difference.  
-yes I’m sorry but there is no difference. A Muslim mother is concerned about 
her daughter, and a Christian mother is concerned too.  
-As a mother you raise them and want them to become very good people and I 
am not concerned about them. When I come home after doing chores I feel 
assured that my daughter hangs out with Christian friends. If I see that she [the 
Christian mother] is negligent, however, then I will not be assured of my 
daughter when she goes out and brings her children at our place. 
(…) 
-We as Muslims and Christians in the area where we live here everybody knows 
everything about everybody. Maybe someone will tell you, oh what is that in 
Islam, you have more rights so yes sometimes one envies the other for his 
religion. But I feel it more from other Muslims when they envy me, than from 
Christians. (Group interview) 
What is being expressed here is that the reasons why people perform FGC are the same 
among Muslims and Christians, and that both communities have similar social 
strategies of dealing with the abandonment of the practice. Both religious 
communities stress equally that FGC can be dropped because offering the right 
education (tarbiyya) and upbringing is crucial for girls, hereby saying that this basic, 
moral education does not differ among Egyptians.  
Some women did see a direct link between Islamic faith and tenets – as shown 
above – and how it structures fundaments of upbringing, but the majority of voices 
does not see that, in practice, this differs from a Christian-based one. No one 
maintained in this talk that an Islamic-based upbringing would be different from a 
Christian-based one, the dominant underlying argument being that both groups share 
ideas of gender and sexuality norms. When asked further about specifically religious 
aspects, it was mentioned for example that offering an Islamic education meant to 
learn one’s daughter how to pray and try to know and ensure that she consciously 
prays (“because she is convinced of it internally”), and does not only do it to please her 
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parents. That one knows how to pray and fast and worship God, this is what is 
understood as pertaining to the religious part of education.  
Similarly, a separate group of Christian women I spoke with in the same location and 
setting, would offer answers on the importance of regular church visits. Especially 
when girls enter puberty, one goes through phases of rebellion and disinterest to 
continue with church, it was argued. In that time particularly, one has to encourage 
them to visit church and “to keep her mind and thoughts on God instead of other 
matter”. Church volunteers (khuddam), particularly those who are in charge of youth, 
would then focus on these young girls (and boys) and make home visits (iftiqadat) in 
their family homes to talk to them and invite them to visit church and participate in 
church activities and meetings.  
When the Christian women were asked about what it means to raise “good girls” in 
general, what it means to raise them properly, this answer I received was echoed in 
many other occasions, in seminars and in informal talks, by Muslims and Christians 
alike: 
-“girls who are naïve and have not been involved yet in love stories .. for them it 
is possible that a boy tells her some loving words that provoke her quickly so 
that she exchanges many talks with him, and so they progress in the relation 
because the girl’s feelings are fragile to start with.. or maybe when the girl suffers 
from many tensions at home. Strict and harsh behaviour by her family at home 
[done in order] to make her become well-behaved and good may mean that 
when she leaves the house, any word from any boy will make her immediately 
weak in front of him. Then she will exchange many talks with him and the 
relation will get stronger and will become a love relation and then she possibly 
will start doing things that are not good.” (Group interview)  
Mothers’ main concern is expressed well here and seems to be representative for 
many families. One does not want their daughters to enter into pre-marital 
relationships. Befriending a boy may be fine as long as the family is aware of it but 
there seems always a haunting concern in the background that this friendship or 
loving relationship may develop and evolve into a physical and sexual one. But, “as 
long as the boy is of good character (al-walad kwayyis) and there is [only] friendship, 
there is no problem.” (Group talk). Both religious communities value virginity before 
marriage and female modesty throughout life although these norms may be rooted 
differently in their religious traditions. In Christianity for example, “there has to be 
sacrament [of marriage], if this has not happened by our priest, then it is not alright 
and not possible that any relationship takes place” (Group talk). 
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In the same suburban district I held another group talk with attending women who 
were gathered by a different NGO. This group was mixed with a majority of Muslim 
women attending.  
-“here in our society we do not only care about the education of girls and boys 
but [we are also concerned] in the manner of what is right and wrong 
[religiously/morally ordained] (ᶜan tariq al-haram wal-halal), not only about 
what is correct and false, I mean, in the mosque they teach them how, and in 
church they teach them how (Group talk) 
-(…) 
-What does it mean to be respectful according to you? 
-Behaviour 
-Appearance, behaviour and the education that she shows 
-Education differentiates between one showing good demeanor and another one 
that is ignorant of good demeanor. It is the family house that is the main factor 
in education 
-The family house determines whether one becomes good or not good 
(…) 
-What they just said is all hundred percent Egyptian, we [Christians] do not have 
wrong and right (haram wa halal), we speak about what is 
fitting/appropriate/proper and what is not (ᶜandina yaliq wa la yaliq). This 
means, is it alright that I do this thing or is it not, for example my son has stolen, 
we do not have wrong or right, is it befitting that you steal or not? (…) I am an 
Egyptian girl so I have to behave like an Egyptian girl but I also have to tell her 
right from wrong, whether this is fitting for you or not?  
This fragment of interaction shows again the relation between religious-based 
education on the one hand and general education that is about morals, good 
demeanour and maintaining conservative social gender norms on the other. The two 
sorts of education intertwine, and although the religious base may be different (either 
Muslim or Christian), everyday life morals are converging. In this group talk, one 
Christian woman intervened regularly to make a few nuances on how things are 
different for them as Copts. Here she reformulates the moral question as it is 
embedded in Christian faith by saying that there are no “do’s and don’ts” (haram and 
halal) as in Islam. Instead, one speaks of what is appropriate, befitting, proper for a 
Christian (ma yaliq bik), she argues. The underlying thought here is that Christians 
need to live up to a certain moral code and lifestyle as is expected from them by the 
fact of adhering to Christian faith. An implied difference with Islam appears in her 
reformulation of the moral basis and her explicit differentiating it from Islam’s haram 
and halal. Unlike complying or not complying with certain stated rules, Christians’ 
moral code, she argues, is grounded in a different way, that seems more intimately 
connected with the practice of Christians and what it means to be Christian. 
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8.3.1.3 The West as interfering force and questions of identity  
Until now I discussed those discourses concerning FGC and Muslim and Christian 
relations that weave into the well-known general discourse of sameness and national 
unity. The themes of sharing social realities and sharing gender norms and national 
Egyptian morals based on religion came up quickly while doing fieldwork.  Another 
possible perception of unity that I had in mind during fieldwork - a unity against the 
West as a foreign actor/aggressor intervening in a different and independent Egypt – 
appeared to be very weak. As this view of unity was a core point in the nascent 
nationalist movement in the early twentieth century I had expected to find it reflected 
in discourse in relation to anti-FGC campaigning.  
The weak presence of such thought can be explained in two ways: because of the 
strong vernacularization of anti-FGC campaigning in Egypt and secondly, - and related 
to this - because the discourses of difference and the ascribed role of religion in 
abandoning FGC appeared to be simply much stronger.  In contrast to the shared 
morals that are predominant among Egyptians, in both Muslim and Christian 
communities, the Western-based campaigns against FGC are (individual 
human/women’s) rights-based and imply a gender ideology based on liberal 
feminism. We have seen, however, that in the Egyptian context, campaigning discourse 
has become translated into a discourse that emphasizes the common understandings 
of conservative gender norms (see chapter four). Because of the strong 
vernacularization of transnational campaigning discourse into Egyptian cultural 
tropes, the campaigns are not felt as a threat to shared Egyptian morals. These morals 
become rather reinforced. Secondly, campaigning discourse essentializes religion as 
we have seen particularly in chapters four and five. My ethnographic findings show 
how this consequently leads to an equally essentialized understanding of how 
religious difference (Muslim/Christian) affects people’s abandonment or continuation 
of the practice. I will discuss this point further in the remaining of this chapter. First, I 
present shortly often-heard responses in relation the question foreign intervention.  
When women were asked in a mixed Muslim-Christian group talk about their 
opinion on the Western-backed campaigns, they offered the following answers: 
- Western attention is good, but it is not necessary that they tell us what to do 
and what not to do, if only they have logical things to say. 
-I hear that their society pays attention to the human rights in our society in all 
aspects 
(…) 
-We need to know whether the thing they promote is good 
-they intervene in everything and that is not accepted. They intervene in politics 
and in every aspect of our lives (Group talk) 
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Western concern was often received as a good thing by my interviewees whom I met 
through local NGO’s. As long as this concern (against FGC) is presented in the form of 
advice or information and not in a rule that needs to be followed, one seems favorable. 
In Luxor and surrounding villages where I was more removed of direct Western NGO 
influence, I heard more oppositional voices. As someone mentioned in an interview 
“We are concerned with the subject but they are more concerned with it. They have 
made it a priority that there is no more FGC. And we are concerned with doing FGC” 
(Interviews Akalta). In the same location I had the following exchange with another 
woman: 
-A: you mean awareness-raising? Shall I give her my opinion? 
-B: yes, sure.  
-An: I delete your name and personal identity in my work and only write about 
your opinions, do not worry about that 
-B: we are a democratic country now, you can say your opinion 
-A: I criticize that subject, I am against those campaigns against FGC (khitan al-
inath). The prophet has advices us to perform something like that. They are 
consequently in contradiction with the sunna of the prophet. So I am against that 
and campaigns that say so. Maybe advices (irshadat) [are fine], but not 
awareness-raising campaigns and a law that is against doctors performing it, I 
am honestly against it” (Interviews Akalta) 
For this woman, campaigns and laws that criminalize contradict the sunna of the 
prophet and are therefore wrong. She was not opposing a foreign agent interfering 
with her intimate life but rather a foreign agent interfering and hereby contradicting 
beliefs that she held about the practice being Islamically sanctioned. The idea that 
Western campaigns serve as morally corrupting was not raised although some level of 
incomprehension and amazement at the West’s attention was shown. One woman at 
the group talk among Christian trainers at the transnational NGO expressed this as 
follows:  
“We, even when we consider for example that Saudi-Arabia does not circumcise.. 
There has never been an Arab country that implements programs like this 
[against FGC] in Egypt. This does not happen, not even Lebanon or any other 
country does that. The National Council [for Women] is sponsored by the 
European Union for example, but it does not happen that it attempts to bring in 
financial aid from Saudi-Arabia or Lebanon or any other [Arab] country” (TNGO 
13-6-2014) 
Not drawing on arguments that denounce Western cultural imperialism, this 
participant in the group talk nevertheless expressed her wonder at the West’s 
insistence by pointing out that other Arab countries who do not perform FGC either, 
have never sponsored or participated in anti-FGC campaigns. The idea that the 
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campaigns result in an importation of Western morals and customs is, however, often 
heard by the women beneficiaries of programs that the trainers encounter: “We are 
not talking about ourselves, there are people who consider this as coming into the 
country in order to destroy Islamic traditions” (TNGO 13-6-2014). Or, as trainer Rana 
recounts: “She said, you want to bring us foreign customs – customs from places like 
America for example – they want that our girls become like theirs. And also, perversion 
will increase” (Rana 2014). In sum, the idea of Western import does not lead to an 
Egyptian unified response. For this, the discourse of difference is much stronger and 
in fact causes a rift between Christians and Muslims. The idea that Christians have 
dropped FGC completely – or have never performed it – are discussed in the remaining 
of this chapter.  
8.3.2 Narratives of difference between Copts and Muslims 
8.3.2.1 Religion as a distinct organizing force of social behaviour 
-A: The Christians who were raised in the villages are like us, they also 
circumcise their daughters. The traditions and customs (ᶜadat wa taqalid) 
control everything else (bitighlab ᶜala lkul), they also used to circumcise their 
daughters. But as we have developed in knowledge (ᶜilm), the same has 
happened with those who are raised in the villages, the elderly people were 
circumcised  but the current generation is not circumcised. They have received 
the message and stopped doing the practice, they do not have FGC (khafd) 
-B: but I have never heard of this, that Christians would circumcise 
-C: Those who are raised in the villages and the elderly people they were 
circumcised but the new generation has stopped it.  
-B: As I said before, this is sunna of the prophet. Christians do not follow our 
sunna. (Interviews Akalta) 
This sequence of interaction illustrates a basic conflict between a narrative of 
sameness and one of difference. One interlocutor maintains that tradition and custom 
weigh more heavily than religious difference: in the villages where all live together, 
tradition is what rules and organizes social norms. Another woman argues that she 
has never heard of that phenomenon, that Christian women in the villages would 
circumcise their daughters just as Muslims do. For her, this idea is unheard of and 
moreover, it is inconceivable. Muslims perform FGC because they understand it to be 
a sunna of the prophet, so how and why would Christians participate in it, she argues. 
As two of the women (A,C) depart from their knowledge of shared social realities and 
shared social gender norms, the second woman (B) departs from her more abstract 
knowledge on the relation between FGC and religion. That knowledge tells her that 
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Muslim do FGC because of a hadith attributed to the prophet and makes it impossible 
for her to conceive that Christians may perform it as well.  
These interviews were conducted in a small NGO in a neighbouring village to the 
town of Luxor. The director of the NGO, Naima, strongly felt against FGC, at least in the 
way that it used to be done traditionally by midwives (daᶜya). When done in the 
hospital by a trained medical professional, she believes it is fine. I spoke with her and 
some of her friends on a few terribly warm nights in her office, during which we sat 
talking for hours in the dark due to power cuts. Her office is a long room with walls 
that are lined with seats covered with blankets and facing her desk that is positioned 
in one of its corners. My field contact Ahmed had introduced me to her and she was 
happy to share her thought with me. Naima is a lawyer by education and well-known 
because she was the only highly educated woman in the villages surrounding Luxor. 
She argued that Muslims and Christians are alike in the village and that all circumcise. 
Her friend who was also a laywer and had graduated from al-Azhar university in 
Sohag, a small town in the center of Egypt, maintained that this was unheard of.  
Earlier, another friend of hers shared a similar opinion:  
-An: Is there a difference in the practice between Christians and Muslims? 
-I do not know but as far as I am aware I think no, they do not circumcise because 
among us [Muslims] some people take the question of FGC as sunna by the 
prophet. Of course we are believers in [the prophet] Muhammad and they are 
not believers in Muhammad so I do not think that they will do it as long as they 
are not convinced by it” (Interviews Akalta)  
Naima’s friends think of religion as governing social life independently. They 
attribute social behaviour to religious tenets that are text-based and detach it from 
other social realities that may give shape to social norms. In their eyes, only religious 
prescription as it is represented in text and tradition makes people act. Since Muslims 
associate FGC with the sunna, it is hard for her to conceive that Christians may be 
practicing FGC as well.  
Another example mirrors the above mentioned Muslim women’s astonishment 
about Christians practicing FGC.  It came up in a group talk among Christian women 
who had been attending awareness-raising seminars and shows how religion 
functions in such discourses as an organizing force by seeing Muslims’ performing of 
FGC as a strict religious duty:   
-An: “About the fact that the tradition is still present and that people still practice 
it. Is the practice present among both Muslims and Christians?  
-Among Muslims more because of what I said that there are more sides to it, but 
we [Christians] have knowledge and awareness and so on, we have 
understanding and awareness that the tradition is bad and causes problems. But 
  243 
they have it as a compulsory job (shughl igbari), they have to circumcise” (Group 
interview) 
I will continue in the remaining of this chapter to illustrate how religion and therefore 
also religious difference becomes essentialized in many of my interlocutors’ 
responses.  
8.3.2.2 “The texts will tell you nothing” 
During a group talk with Christian trainers who were all working for TNGO, I asked 
about the difficulties that they encounter when discussing FGC and trying to convince 
women and men to abandon the practice. A trainer and participant in the group 
illustrated how the boundaries between tradition and religion can be puzzling by 
trying to resolve it through introducing categorical hierarchy: “Muslims practice FGC 
first of all because of its connection to religion, and secondly as a tradition”. Here a 
hierarchic order is attributed to social behaviour by saying that it is being done first 
of all as a religiously ordained practice and separated from that, only in second rank 
as a tradition. The central idea, however, is that religion operates as a guiding force 
that stands independently from social and cultural tradition. In other words, religion 
is essentialized as an independent force. 
A recurrent thought in the group talk and by other interlocutors is that the link to 
religion is more complicated for Muslims than for Christians: “Islam has sunna and 
shiᶜa and those differ on many points, contrarily to Christianity that is one block. 
Muslims are divided in a group that is in favour of the campaigns and a group that is 
against it” (TNGO 13-6-2014).  A senior trainer put it as follows: 
“In Islam they say that it exists but in Christianity it does not exist. There is no 
priest or religious official that says that this subject is present [in texts] (innu al-
kalam da mawgud). But in Islam this subject is present because they say that the 
prophet – and there is a hadith as well, but this is not a Christian tradition and it 
does not have a connection to Christianity” (Emad) 
Again, it is presence in the founding texts (of Islam and Christianity) that is taken to 
signify real presence or to serve as a ground for real presence. Also religious 
authorities are here clearly shown to be important operators and organizers of social 
behaviour.  
In the offices of TNGO I came to know certain employees better who were much 
willing and interested to help me with my research. One of them, Christeen, 
accompanied me several times to meet with priests in two churches that she used to 
visit and to attend two seminars against FGC that were both given by an old colleague 
at TNGO, Rana, and who now worked independently. One of the priests I talked with 
took a copy of the Bible and showed me how he spoke with people in an effort to 
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convince them to stop practicing FGC. Holding the copy of the Bible in his hands and 
running his fingers through the pages he looked at me saying “I ask them, ‘show me 
what you can find in the Bible that speaks of FGC. You will find nothing’!”.  
Similarly, Bishop Moussa’s, Bishop for Youth of the Coptic Orthodox Church states: 
“ […] from the Christian perspective – this practice has no religious grounds 
whatsoever. Further, it is medically, morally and practically groundless. […] 
When God created the human being, he made everything in him/her good: each 
organ has its function and role. So, why do we allow the disfiguring of God’s good 
creation? There is not a single verse in the Bible or the Old or New Testaments, 
nor is there anything in Judaism or Christianity – not one single verse speaks of 
female circumcision” (UNICEF 2005a, 12)  
Or as pastor Sharubim ᶜAwad of the Mar Mina church in Imbaba writes in a booklet 
distributed by the parish that is dedicated to FGC and violence against girls:  “Of all the 
above theories on the origin of circumcision it is clear that historically circumcision 
was only for men and not for women at all. And this is also confirmed by the Holy 
Book”(Mina 15). 
In a booklet written by Maurice Asᶜad and published by the Committee for the Girl’s 
Upbringing, a Coptic institution, he argues that the church has been fighting FGC since 
1981: 
“The concern for the question of FGC has started since 1981. We have discussed 
this subject in many congresses and meetings that focus on questions 
concerning the family, women and the girl’s upbringing. We have founded the 
Committee for the Girl’s Upbringing (lajnat riᶜayat al-fatat) in 1982 and it has 
succeeded in giving special attention to raising awareness of Christian leaders of 
the harms of FGC and to enlighten fathers and mothers of what happens to their 
daughters of complications because of FGC and we raised attention to the rights 
of girl as a human” (Asᶜad undated, 11-12) p 11-12.  
Indeed, the church hierarchy has been involved in national initiatives among Christian 
communities before the national plan and strategy was designed in 2000 by the 
Mubarak regime. The early work of CEOSS indeed also demonstrates that concern 
among the Coptic civil society was present before the 1994 ICPD and the formulation 
of any national strategy (see chapter four).  
8.3.2.3 “Christians do not circumcise their daughters” and the trope of 
moral superiority 
This early Coptic rejection by both church officials as well as by prominent actors in 
civil society leads some to believe that all Copts have abandoned the practice by now, 
or in most remarkable cases, that Copts have never even practiced FGC when they did 
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not live together with Muslims in mixed villages. In this section I will look closer at 
these discourses of difference and bring them into relation with the trope of moral 
superiority, that I discussed earlier in this chapter. When I asked in the group 
interview of Christian trainers whether the early Coptic concern with FGC means that 
Copts in Egypt have all rejected it, the following interactions occurs: 
-The bishops all reject it 
-Among the Christians, the subject is a bit lighter, because we always follow the 
church in matters of what is correct and wrong (feh sah weh ghalat) and what is 
right and wrong religiously (eh l-haram weh l-halal). So this is what happened, 
in many families girls were being circumcised but when the church said no, then 
this stopped, except for the villages that interact with Muslims more, they still 
practice FGC too. (…) 
-The young Muslims and Christians [in these cases] miss culture, especially if 
there is no awareness-raising within the church and they do not have belief in 
the subject, of why we do not circumcise. For example when there is knowledge 
that the Church has said so and so but the youth has not become convinced of it. 
(TNGO 13-6-2014) 
The main idea is that Muslims are divided because of the plurality of religious 
authorities and opinions, whereas Christians are more united because they have only 
one church hierarchy whose opinions are largely being followed by its adherents. As 
soon as the Egyptian state set up the first national plan against FGC, “the church agreed 
and supported it”, in the words of one of the participants in the group talk.  Muslims 
on the other hand, just as Muslim authorities and the shaykhs of al-Azhar, have been 
divided.  
This stance is then being nuanced by pointing out that some places and people 
escape the reach of the church like in mixed Christian-Muslim villages. In mixed 
villages ,the idea of a shared culture and norms prevails. In places where the church 
has efficient outreach however, Christians review FGC as a cultural practice, it is 
argued: “We [Christians] understand that morally correct behaviour is about 
formation (takwin) and upbringing. The family has a role to play in this, and the 
church” (TNGO 13-6-2014).  
The main idea here is thus that Christians have learned and understood and 
abandoned the practice over the last decades. This point was pushed further in a talk 
with a senior trainer: 
“-Emad: Christians abandoned the practice since ten, fifteen years ago. The 
Christians who live amongst Muslims, those are the ones we need to work with, 
but the pious Christians, they do not perform this practice anyway (lakin fih 
masihiyyin mutadiyinin dol mabiymarush al-qissa di aslan).  
-An: Do you mean since campaigning started?  
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-Emad: No this was from the very beginning.  Christians consist of two groups, 
one part that lives in the midst of Muslims, they perform the practice just like 
Muslims. And then there are those Christians like those living  in Dranka in the 
area of the monastery in Assiut, those are Christian but they do not practice FGC. 
(..) 
-An: So these people are amazed that other people perform FGC? 
-Emad: They do not even know about it, about its existence. They have never 
known it because they are Christian. Christians have three tendencies: orthodox, 
protestant and catholic, and neither of them have this tradition. Those who 
practice FGC are only those who live in the Muslim society (illy biyaᶜamilu al-
ᶜada di al-masihiyin illy ᶜashyin fi mujtamaᶜ muslim) (Emad) 
While this piece of information was puzzling to me at first, I quickly understood how 
much Emad is embedded in separate Christian life and how deeply he embraces a 
discourse of radical difference between Copts and Muslims. He expounded on how 
Christians live in the proximity of their churches and monasteries and how the 
institution of the church has developed over time to provide its community with social 
and cultural services and aims to serve all its needs. Churches sell food and drinks that 
have been produced or manufactured in monasteries. He prefers that youth spends 
their time in clubs within the church premises that provide leisure activities for them, 
as this is safer than hanging out outside the church walls. He sketches the Muslim 
majority society as a hostile and dangerous place for them and that there is no other 
option than to retreat and take care of each other.  
Emad’s radical discourse on the relation between FGC and Christianity thus needs 
to be understood in the frame of his experiences of being part of the Christian minority 
and its histories and narratives of persecution. Through his story, links are being 
revealed between living a theology of persecution and showing beliefs of moral 
superiority.  In relation to FGC, ideas of occupying a higher moral ground are often 
connected to the central role attributed to the church in “enlightening mothers and 
fathers” as was mentioned above by Maurice Asᶜad. It is thanks to the presence of the 
church that a new understanding was established that formulates FGC as a non-
religious cultural practice and that was able to raise people’s awareness and convince 
them to abandon it.  As trainer Rana put it: 
“the church also has a great role because the church is not like the mosque. The 
church teaches and also goes along with health aspects. When they said that 
khitan is wrong, then khitan is wrong” (Rana 2014) 
In other words, the presence of the church is central in guiding the Christian 
community forward. It’s the church who is able to transmit the knowledge and to 
accompany social change. In a group talk with about eighteen Christian trainers of the 
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transnational NGO, ideas of occupying a higher moral position were expressed in 
different ways. According to a few participants in the group talk: 
- Subjects concerning sex and sexuality are more present [alive] among Muslims 
than among us Christians. What raises the interest and thoughts of young boys 
and girls most, are subject related to sex. We always run to the church and to the 
Sunday school. [But, on the other hand] when my thoughts are on this subject - I 
think that my daughter may deviate [sexually] -  when I am thinking of this 
subject a lot, my daughter may actually act like this.  
- We at church we say that our Lord has created hands and feet for us and this 
[female genitalia] is also part of his creation, it is not shameful. Because of that, 
we are not feeling awkward. But they [Muslims] do not have this, they do not 
have the church. Visiting the mosque or going to lectures happens only a few 
times and there may be talks that support FGC. The Islamic religion itself has 
bloody corporal punishment (al-din al-islamy nafsu fih hudud wadam).  
- Why is FGC important for them [Muslims], because they separate boys from 
girls. We also until recently had separated boys and girls schools but we started 
to change toward mixed, with the ministry. Even among the private schools 
there are girls-only schools and they invoke reasons of sexual desire for having 
separation. (TNGO 13-6-2014) 
Muslims have a higher preoccupation with issues of sex and sexuality, according to 
some women in the group talk. Unlike Christians who are more able to repress or to 
channel their thoughts of sexual desire by visiting the church and praying, Muslims 
are said to be more preoccupied by thinking of it or by fearing it. By fearing sexual 
deviancy among their children, parents indirectly lead them to such acts, it is argued. 
In the same reasoning, the same fear of sexual desire among teenagers becomes a 
reason for Muslims to support sex-segregated schools. In all three fragments above, 
Christians are shown to have somehow a moral upper hand. More able to socially deal 
with and arrange sexuality, by religious practice such as church visiting and as 
demonstrated by Copts’ move to mixed girls and boys schools, they distinguish 
themselves from Muslims. Visiting mosques is argued to be less enlightening than 
visiting churches because the lectures and talks that happen at mosques may be 
arguing in favor of FGC, or even corporal punishment as this forms part of the Islamic 
legal tradition.  
As was argued earlier in this chapter, Copts often conceive of themselves as a 
“beleaguered community” (Shenoda 2010) and for many, holding faith and belief is 
tightly connected to the existing socio-political situation. This means that many 
practitioners are committed to a “narrative of persecution” (Shenoda 2012, 478) and 
“that a skepticism of the Muslim Other on the part of the Copts is an important aspect 
of keeping Christian faith” (ibid.). The skepticism vis-à-vis Muslims and processes of 
 248 
Othering Muslims becomes particularly visible in areas of morality and sexuality 
(Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989, 10)6. The following fragment illustrates this further:  
- “The problem we have as Muslims and Christians is that Muslims consider girls 
as a disgrace (ᶜar) that needs to be concealed. Men look forward to have a son 
and if it is a daughter they are too concerned [about her actions and behavior] 
and ‘we also do FGC because you do not want to have what comes later (when 
she grows up) impact your reputation’ and the subject is closed from all 
perspectives. But we as Christians we consider girls just like boys, but in the 
Qurᵓan men rule over women (al-rijal qawimun al-nisa). Concerning women, 
‘you do not do this, me I will do it. You have left the house, do not be home late, 
you have to cover your hear’. But we as Christians, no, we have adhered to this 
because we have lived with them – to be home before 10 or 11 pm. Because 
people would not gossip we have circumcised our daughters, because we are 
afraid that they would be gossiped about” (TNGO 13-6-2014) 
Another participant picked up on this, pretending to speak from a Muslim 
perspective “I want to give birth to boys not girls, I will try to reduce her value by any 
means so that she does not cause me any problem” . When I asked about how things 
are different then among Christians, one replies:  
- “Among us, girls are like boys, even in the church we have them together, that 
is not an issue. Concerning FGC, they have taken the right decision that it is 
wrong if one circumcises his daughter. I mean, in the new generation no one is 
circumcised, this subject is almost finished, there is no FGC. Maybe in the villages 
where the mentality is still narrow-minded and those that interact a lot with 
Muslims. We understood that in the cities, everyone is doing as he pleases, 
everyone is in his house and turned inwards to his family” (TNGO 13-6-2014) 
The more equal norms concerning boys and girls are here presented as evident. In 
addition, FGC has been abandoned by now and only those interacting with Muslims 
may continue it, it is argued. Some complained that some churches are not doing 
 
                                                     
6 My Coptic interlocutors’ mechanisms of Othering and community boundary demarcation such as their 
perceptions of Muslim preoccupation with sex and sexuality in general can be contrasted with similar 
mechanisms directed toward Copts from Muslims. Richard Gauvain pointed out in his study of Egyptian 
salafism that salafists’ “view on sexuality, the purity of (male and female) semen and sexual pleasure is 
contrasted to what they perceive as Christianity’s harshness and encouragement of ascetism” (Gauvain, 
143). He continues “Salafists consider Christians not as ritually impure but as morally impure (akhlaᵓ 
najisa). A stereotypical salafi representation is that “Christians are fundamentally unhygienic, and devoted 
to evil/magical practices” (ibid. 152). Gauvain argues that these salafist perceptions are not radically 
different from other existing visions in society but that these perceptions rather confirm an already existing 
conservative trend of thinking among Muslims about Christians (ibid. 152-13). 
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enough and not giving enough information any longer about why FGC is wrong. I give 
the example of the dialogue that followed: 
- “The church has forbidden FGC but now there are no longer talks campaigning 
against it. Nobody in the church tells you why we have forbidden the practice, or 
what the harms of it are. Nobody  comes to tell you about it, of course, not all 
churches are the same but when we enter church they tell us ‘we do not want to 
open the eyes of our daughters for that subject’. So we tell girls that it is wrong 
but there are no reasons that we can tell them why it is so.   
-An: You think it is better to give more information? 
-Since a long time in the churches they told us, girls, that it is not right to wear 
tight trousers. I mean they were instilling fear on the subject more than they 
explained us why this is so. They make you afraid of the subject but do not tell 
you the solutions for it and this is the problem. I belief if there were seminars 
(nadawat) inside church, that this will be more motivating. Even if the topic of 
FGC is accepted in the villages, I belief that such seminars would restrict the 
practice a lot.  
-The lack of awareness-raising is also in the saᶜid inside the churches. In Cairo 
or other regions, there may be seminars.  
-Exactly, if there is nobody responsible inside the church, then there are no 
seminars. It is all on the level of the republic, if there is no project or someone 
who launches the subject, then nobody will touch the subject 
-Yes of course, until now these subjects are taboo (ᶜayb) 
-I wish that during the summer activities of all churches on the national level 
there were things like this. Me and Fawziyya we enter our communities and we 
talk even if we are not invited. But some people do not allow it, and we can of 
course not antagonize the authority of the priests. (TNGO 13-6-2014) 
Whereas some argue strongly to see the difference in general gender norms and 
acceptance of FGC between Muslims and Copts, others nuance and point out that there 
are still taboos that do not allow open discussion of gender and sexuality. They deplore 
that many churches, especially in the south, prefer to give the message that FGC is 
wrong without any further explanation.  It was argued that many churches and priests 
are not cooperative when it comes to subjects as sexual harassment, or gender and 
sexuality issues in general. Some felt a clear restrictive atmosphere that they wished 
to change.  
The talk developed into a conversation about their own experiences and grievances 
with awareness-raising in their churches. They were all trainers working for the 
transnational NGO and had profound experience with organizing activities with local 
women in the villages of the governorates of Luxor and Qena. At the same time they 
were involved in their local church communities. My questions offered an opportunity 
for them to exchange  thoughts and experiences which was not a common activity: 
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“outside of the NGO and outside of the development sector, it is difficult to talk about. 
Even to our girl friends, it is difficult”.  
In this second part of this chapter, I have aimed to discuss how certain ideas about 
Copts’ commitment to FGC or non-commitment need to be understood and placed 
within the larger frame of discourses of difference and mechanisms of Othering that 
circulate.  In the final section, I will focus on one concrete particularly Christian 
example of awareness-raising and embarking on discussions of gender and sexuality 
issues. Visiting families at home is a common practice for church volunteers and 
community workers (raᵓidat). Whereas the women in the group talk said that talking 
on these issues is difficult, the intimate sphere of house visits seems to enable more 
easy open and personal communication. 
8.3.2.4 Church activities against FGC: participating in house visits 
The Coptic Church has been officially committed to work against FGC by organizing 
awareness-raising programs. I met with a few women working for the Development 
Department of BLESS (Coptic Orthodox Church / Bishopric of Public, Ecumenical & 
Social Services (COC/BLESS) at the site of the Patriarchate located in Abbasiyya, Cairo. 
As the official department in charge of development programs, BLESS executes and 
embodies what the official Coptic Orthodox clerical vision. Since the Development 
Department was established in the early 2000’s within the Bishopric of Public, 
Ecumenical & Social Services, it has been committed to work against FGC, as I was told 
by the first women who were responsible for the program (Nahed Talaat and Salwa 
Morcos). The development department initiates programs in the classic areas of 
poverty alleviation, rural development, illiteracy etc.  
One of its reports that I was handed states: “FGM is seen by BLESS as a violation of 
the right to life, to physical integrity, to the highest obtainable standards of health, to 
freedom from physical or mental violence, to the right of development of the child and 
of the woman” (Services 2014). They deliberately aim to educate priests and raise 
awareness among Christian communities but also enter into coalitions with other 
national NGO’s that work with Muslim groups “aiming to protect every Egyptian girl 
from practicing FGM as a form of violence against women” (ibid.).  
It is clear from this that the church has been successful in leading campaigns and 
breaking through in many local communities with the message to abandon FGC. 
Supported by theological arguments (a lack of textual support in the Coptic Christian 
textual tradition), authoritative arguments as many prominent clergymen have argues 
against it and by actual programs that are implemented and carried out across the 
country. One of the main methods of such programs is house visits (iftiqadat), apart of 
the collective awareness-raising activities. After my visit to BLESS, I was allowed to 
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accompany a few church volunteers (raᵓidat), Samar and Nancy, on their rounds of 
house visits in the Cairene suburb of Imbaba.  
On the first day, we first made a quick visit to their church where I am told that 
their priest, Abuna Siba, is loved by all in the community because of his strong 
and outspoken support of women’s issues. He and the priest of the neighbouring 
Mar Mina church are well-known for their support of women’s rights and their 
disapproval of FGC.  The first day of house visits that I participated in, Abuna 
Siba’s wife also joined us and showed herself an outspoken opponent of FGC. 
This sort of support by their religious leaders visibly encourages the young 
women as volunteers to continue their activities and to continue fighting for this 
cause.  
Together we formed a small group of women heading to visit a few families and 
talk about FGC. The first family was already well-known to the volunteers. We 
filled Umm Jessica’s small house as she told me about her history of volunteering 
for a church in Assiut, the southern city they had migrated from. Now her fifteen-
year old daughter serves as well for a church in Imbaba. She no longer needs to 
be convinced of the harms of FGC or fact that the church calls for its 
abandonment. She had heard some words spoken by the previous pope Shinuda 
arguing against FGC and this was enough for her: “fa law huwa ᵓal kida, ana 
muqtanᶜa men gheyr niqaash”(If he said so, then I’m convinced without any 
further discussion).  
Umm Jessica tells us that she knows about a mother who is about to circumcise 
her daughter and that we better pay her a visit. We walk to her nearby house but 
we do not find her at home and visit instead her neighbor, Niviin. Another 
neighbor joins our group and we occupy Niviin’s living room to embark on a long 
talk in which we will discuss her thoughts on FGC, her sexual desire, marital sex 
life and Western women’s rights to name only the main topics. Even though the 
group of volunteers were still unfamiliar with Niviin, the frame of FGC opened 
up a talk about all related subjects and in the intimacy of her own house, she 
seemed to have welcomed her sudden visitors and the opportunity to talk.  
Whereas her neighbor sitting with us was already convinced that FGC is bad, 
Niviin was not. Abu Siba’s wife leads the talk and argued how sexual desire 
originates in the brain and not in the genitalia or the clitoris. It is not FGC that 
will guide a girl’s behaviour, it is her own mind and her upbringing and 
education that is important: “don’t you tell her not to let any man grasp your 
body or your hand on the street, not to walk with boys having arms crossed on 
the street, to look at Virgin Mary and try to resemble her, look at Jezus so that 
you resemble him. Is this not the most important?”.  
Niviiin has heard this arguments before in Mar Mina church but has not become 
convinced. Why is there all this sudden attention, while so many generations 
before us did not suffer or complain, she says. It was not the first time that she 
had received church volunteers at home to talk about this subject. I’m stepping 
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in to say that there has been activist talk against FGC by Egyptians since decades 
now in Egypt, that it’s not so very recent, but that I can understand possible 
dismay about Western intervention – as I felt the need to state my habitual 
disclaimer. My presence does not seem to bother her but instead she seems glad 
to talk to all of us. She points out that her husband does not appreciate it when 
she speaks her mind or that she has her own opinion. One of our volunteer group 
responds with stating that this is also a form of violence against women, which 
remains uncommented on by Niviin. The talk continues to point out harmful 
effects of FGC for marital relations. She tells us how she did not enjoy this for 
many years and that she only started to desire her husband since three years. 
The group searches for answers what may have caused this change and think 
that her husband’s travelling abroad in that period may have caused the change 
between them. That the alienation that he feels abroad leads him to better 
appreciate his home situation and family and that this also leads to more 
satisfying intimate relations. The volunteer young women ask her rhetorically 
whether it is wrong that she now finds more satisfaction and enjoys sex, showing 
again their feminist leanings. The talk continues on domestic and intimate 
relations and ends with the invitation to join with the activities at their church. 
Niviin seems happy with this and complains that her life has too much routine. 
She wishes to do more activities just as they, the raᵓidat, the volunteers do.  
 
The following week, Samar and Nancy picked me at the busstop to join them 
again and we visited four women in their apartments, all located in the same 
building. The meetings are structured in similar ways. The volunteers present 
themselves and the receiving women are welcoming us. It is asked which church 
they usually visit and they are then invited to come to their church (of which 
Abuna Siba is pastor). FGC is one of the topics that are touched on, but it is only 
brought up as part of a general talk in which the volunteering women get to 
know the woman and her family. In fact, the visited women mainly bring up what 
is bothering them or what is on their minds in these moments. One woman 
talked mainly about her daughter.  She described her as a heavy-weighted 
sixteen year old who was passing most of her time at home and this worried her. 
She was concerned about her daughter’s well-being. The volunteers encouraged 
her to insist that she goes out and goes to church and that she had to set the 
example herself as a mother. The whole meeting centered around her daughter, 
as our hostess told us that she doesn’t know whether it is wise for girls to 
continue education after high school when they will marry and stay home and 
do household keeping. Her daughter for sure was not interested in pursuing 
higher education. When asked about FGC, she said that her daughter’s body had 
grown and changed rapidly (baᵓit malyana)  in her early adolescence and 
because of that she had concluded that FGC was not necessary. In this visit, the 
raᵓidat focused their attention most on trying to make her and her daughter visit 
their church.  
  253 
A young twenty three year old mother of a toddler opened her flat to us for a last 
visit that day. She felt disturbed and unhappy in her sexual relations and blamed 
it on FGC so this topic easily became the central point of our conversation. She 
felt that it was not possible to discuss this with her mother or with her husband. 
She had watched a few fiction films on the other hand, and it was clear how much 
she had enjoyed this. It had enabled her to relate and connect to other (fictive) 
characters and seemed to have influenced her thoughts about herself. Samar and 
Nancy tried to advise her and told her to try not to think of anything negatively 
but instead to focus “on her wish and desire to enjoy”. The young woman 
answered that she cannot do that after which Samar asks “but do you want to 
enjoy it?” These questions leave her thinking. In their advices, Samar and Nancy 
focus a lot on women’s self-knowledge and outspoken wish to enjoy sexually. 
Whereas I was often tempted to think along - when I heard women’s stories -  
about ways to involve her direct environment (husband, mother) to improve 
understanding, they seemed more convinced of an approach that centered on 
women’s inner thoughts and feelings.  
This vignette illustrates the Coptic personalized approach to campaigning. 
Collective sessions in church or in an NGO are only one part of campaigning activity. 
The format of iftiqadat - spontaneous house visits by church volunteers to families 
living in the area - are an important means of socio-cultural transmission in the Coptic 
community. The typical format of the visit shapes the entire setting. The purpose of 
the visit is immediately recognizable and enables intimate and open conversation.  
Women’s familiarity with the volunteers’ work allows them to “use” the visit to 
their benefit. It allows the volunteers on the other hand to reach out socially, to get to 
know new families and invite them to visit their churches. Awareness-raising against 
FGC is here most indivualized and personalized, allowing women to ventilate their 
thoughts and feelings. It may involve a feminist approach, as illustrated by Samar and 
Nancy, who tried to strengthen women’s inner feelings and desires for sexual 
enjoyment. Feminism is of course not a fixed component, as with the reasons for 
iftiqadat visits, the personal take of the volunteers can vary greatly. 
  
 254 
8.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the question into the relation between FGC and religion was analyzed 
through the lens of Muslim-Christian relations. FGC as an Islamicate practice that has 
been historically associated with Islamic doctrine but is practiced and shared by 
society at large including non-Muslims shows a different dynamic in this context. By 
differentiating between two major narratives on Muslim-Christian relations: a 
discourse of difference and a discourse of sameness, I aimed to show how FGC figures 
in this constellation. 
Women’s bodies and sexuality often serve as boundary markers between different 
communities. The often heard remark during fieldwork that FGC is an Islamic custom 
and that Christians do not circumcise is indeed part of community boundary marking. 
It was clear from my ethnographic research that FGC can figure in discourses to 
describe and reinforce feelings of Egyptian unity and sameness as well as in discourses 
that stress difference and Coptic particularity.Based on group talks with development 
project beneficiaries and trainers, FGC is represented as a shared practice that is born 
out of sharing social realities and common ideas on gender and sexuality. In 
awareness-raising activity, the practice is presented as a through-and-through 
Egyptian practice, this is a cultural and traditional practice. It is a practice that cuts 
across religious borders and affects all Egyptian women. It requires therefore a 
combined national effort in order to abandon it.  
A related view, sees FGC as characteristic of defined Egyptian national morals. The 
particular religious teachings and backgrounds may be different but ultimately all 
Egyptians aim to raise decent and morally good girls, according to this view. This 
shared wish also connects them in practicing FGC, which  then needs to replaced by 
other educational strategies. FGC is not identified as a national practice in opposition 
to a perceived encroaching Western interference (which other anthropological work 
has turned attention to in other African countries). The weak presence of such thought 
can be explained in two ways: because of the strong vernacularization of anti-FGC 
campaigning in Egypt and secondly, - and related to this - because the discourses of 
difference and the ascribed role of religion in abandoning FGC appeared to be simply 
much stronger.  
The essentialization of religion in campaigning discourse (represented by the 
question : Is FGC Islamic or not?) seems to lead to an equally essentialized 
understanding of how religious difference (Muslim/Christian) affects people’s 
abandonment or continuation of the practice. Religion often figures as a reified 
independent force organizing people’s lives and behaviour. In this view, all Muslims 
will act a certain way and all Christians in that way. Following this is an 
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essentialization of religion to religious text and authorities. The presence of textual 
references in favor of FGC and the endorsement by certain authorities is presented as 
the main problematic and key to behavioural change. In this view, Christians have 
been more able and free to abandon FGC since there are no references in the Bible and 
the church hierarchy has taken a unified position against it. The perceived difference 
between both communtities treatment of FGC leads some to believe that FGC was  
never practiced by authentic Christian rural communities who did not cohabit with 
Muslim communities.  
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Conclusion 
The main research question that guided this dissertation was the question into the 
relation of FGC and religion and authoritative discourses about FGC in present-day 
Egypt. I aimed to demonstrate how these discourses compete and interact with each 
other. The question at the heart of this study relates to the double cultural and 
religious nature of FGC and the desire to reduce it to either the cultural or religious 
realm. I asked why FGC is defined and considered Islamic for some and why it is 
defended as a cultural practice by others and what is at stake in raising this question. 
My main approach can therefore be seen as a “discursive study of religion” (von 
Stuckrad 2010). This means that I have looked at how religion figures within 
transnational anti-FGC campaigning, how this becomes translated and vernacularized 
and how this evokes various responses in the Egyptian normative, religious landscape. 
It interrogates how FGC is actively being made un-islamic by some and yet how it is 
made to be Islamic by others.  
Methodologically it is embedded in feminist, postcolonial and critical 
anthropological perspectives. Such a combination of perspectives easily invites 
questions into my own positionality. Indeed, I share the postcolonial concern about 
the continuation of colonialist reasoning and the perpetuation of unequal power-laden 
structures. I hope that this concern transpires through the questions I have been 
raising in several chapters in part one. Secondly, the choice to study FGC and 
ideologies of gender and sexuality reveal also a feminist concern and interest. My aim 
was to look critically at present-day feminist transnationalism and how it operates “on 
the ground” in actual development practice. I have attempted to move beyond an NGO-
ization critique. Development projects have often ambiguous results and effects, 
reproducing certain power structures while challenging others. It’s in this latter 
exercise of seeking nuance that I aim to inscribe my own research. by looking at how 
anti-FGC campaigning operates on the ground. I asked which discursive frames are 
used and how do they connect to local cultural debates ? What is at stake in claiming 
FGC as a strictly culture practice and rejecting its association with religion?  
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Two decades of Egyptian activism and debate on FGC have led to medicalization as 
the preferred way of performing FGC. Egyptian debate has been present since the early 
twentieth century but discursive shifts following international campaigning have been 
reflected in social change since two decades. The organization of the International 
Conference on Population and Development was crucial in mobilizing local activism 
and interrogating the deeply rooted social practice. Chapter two looks at the genealogy 
of anti-FGC activism as a global norm. Second-wave liberal feminists subscribed to 
understandings of female agency and female victimhood that are modern and secular 
by nature. In other words, they shared a characteristic secular viewpoint that 
necessarily divides between (wo)men as either agents or victims (Asad 2003, 79). By 
raising the issue, these early feminist activists played a crucial role in determining 
hegemonic discourse about FGC and thereby raising it to the negotiation tables of 
international institutions such as the World Health Organization and United Nations 
agencies. Voices expressing postcolonial critique, however, refused to be caught in the 
binary structures of modern/secular/civilized opposing the non-
modern/religious/barbaric.  
Campaigning discourse in Egypt today frames the practice predominantly in 
medicalized terms. The question whether a girl “is in need of it”, then refers to 
anatomical, medical need such as genitals that are deemed too large. This popular 
vision is not necessarily in contradiction with traditional religious points of view. 
Discourses that expressed the confluence of medical concern, education and a 
religious framework also appeared as early as the 1950s, when they were one 
religious opinion among others. The current dynamics of transnational activism and 
its method of interpellating religious authorities, however, has reinforced this 
particular religious point of view and turned it into the hegemonic discourse.  
In literature and in development campaigns against FGC, the relation between FGC 
and religion (and specifically Islam) has been mainly approached through study of 
Islam’s textual tradition, the Qurᵓan, sunna and hadith. Several ahadith can be 
interpreted as referring to female circumcision and on this basis FGC can be 
considered as a practice that is situated in Islamic tradition, norms and morality. In 
Egypt, the most well-known is the saying attributed to Umm ᶜAtiyya. In this narrative, 
Muhammad spoke to a woman (called Umm ᶜAtiyya) who used to circumcise girls and 
he told her “cut little and do not overdo because it brings more radiance to the face 
and it is more pleasant for the husband”. Former shaykh of al-Azhar, Jad al-Haq, 
particularly supported the authenticity of this saying. This hadith lays the religious 
basis for the much referred to principle of moderation in cutting.  
I have argued in this thesis that the principal question that is raised (is FGC or 
Islamic or not?) and its offered answer (no) are partial. When only textual sources and 
religious male authorities are examined, an array of other responses and experiences 
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remains unseen, and more profound questions remain unanswered. Inquiring into the 
relation between FGC and religion raises questions of what defines a practice or 
experience as religious and Islamic. To what extent do the Qurᵓan, sunna or Islamic 
scholars determine what is Islamic or not and for whom? How to evaluate and discuss 
classical scholarship in relation to new hermeneutical methodologies, such as Islamic 
feminism, especially when one is committed to find strategies to end the practice? 
Dominant discourse fails to recognize the heritage of Islamic scholarship that 
predominantly speaks favorably about FGC in its desire to end the practice.  
An (internal) Muslim debate over the evaluation of classic Islamic legal sources 
against the backdrop of contemporary social and ethical demands, is thus complicated 
by the general context in which these questions are raised. In sum, the question 
whether FGC is Islamic or not is reductionist because it does not recognize the 
inherent pluralism in classical Islamic scholarship, the heterogeneity of actual 
practicing communities, and the diversity of lived personal experiences.  
Anthropology of FGC and religion has pointed at connections moral personhood 
and belonging to a community through initiation rites, of which FGC forms part. It has 
also pointed at how FGC can relate to processes of group identity formation and thirdly 
that the relation between FGC and religion may become established by underlying 
interconnected and interrelated socio-cultural values that express similar norms on 
gender and sexuality. This connection cuts across religious differences. What is clear 
in those contexts is how the religious and the cultural (or secular) are inextricably 
intertwined. Against this background, I argued that the intervention of campaigning 
discourse against FGC aims to disentangle both concepts that rather form a unit in 
lived experience. It first “clears” religion from culture, by making FGC unIslamic and 
secondly it seeks authoritative approval from religious leaders.  
This is particularly apparent through ethnographic study of awareness-raising 
seminars attended in Cairo and Luxor. After exploring notions of cultural translation 
and vernacularization, chapter five interrogates the main premises of awareness-
raising activity and conscientization. Against this backdrop, I demonstrated how 
vernacularized campaigning discourse subverts transnational discourse and the 
premises of its own method. Reference to medical knowledge is invoked to correct the 
popular views that FGC reduces female sexual desire. Other discursive strategies 
invoke the notion of a “hard” cultural tradition (that ought to be differentiated from 
religion) and dominant norms of gender and sexuality and threatened family values. 
Through representations of FGC as a harmful “hard” tradition, a discursive register of 
othering is employed. FGC and those who perform it are depicted as backward and 
traditional. By locating the origin of the practice in Africa or Sudan and pointing at 
European and Arab countries as examples of modernity and progress, the practice and 
those who perform it become hierarchically racialized. Trainers appeal to women’s 
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desire to be part of the modern and advanced and not of the backward. Representing 
FGC as a hard and “ugly” African tradition relies on a racialized imagery and calls on 
women’s desire not to be considered as belonging to Africa and its traditions. This 
imagery often invokes southern Egypt, the saᶜid as its own internal Other, 
representing all what one wishes not to be.  
After establishing FGC as a practice that cannot regulate sexual desire, its dangers 
and harms to sexual enjoyment are highlighted in the light of dominant norms of 
gender and sexuality. In this manner, the fight against FGC becomes translated as a 
fight for marriage. It is argued that having undergone FGC is likely to cause women to 
experience sexual problems. Circumcised women may not want to engage in sexual 
relations or on the other hand may become promiscuous when desire cannot be 
satisfied, in these views. Having unsatisfying sexual relations are harmful for the 
stability of the relation, and thus for marriage. Alluding to the much debated social 
crisis, high divorce rates and the threat to family values, not performing FGC is 
therefore framed as beneficial to social and marital stability. While discouraging to 
perform FGC, the values of virginity, modesty and raising “good girls” are being 
reinforced. FGC does not protect girls against licentious sexual behaviour, only 
education and instilling religious values is able to do so, in these representations.The 
externally located bodily practice of FGC has then become replaced by internally 
located morality and discipline.  
Transnational campaigning discourse that is grounded in the modern narrative that 
desires the “progressive elimination of all morally shocking social behavior” (Asad 
2003, 103) is translated and resolved in the Egyptian vernacular of instilling moral 
and religious values in girls’ education. The modernizing call to abandon FGC as a form 
of intolerable violence and pain inflicted on the body that is not appropriate in modern 
society, finds expression in discourse through racialized hierarchies, in narratives of 
“hard” traditions, backwardness and national progress. Individual rights-based 
discourse has become subverted to a renewed emphasis on the collective: 
conservative gender and sexuality norms, and the importance of family and social 
cohesion.  
This research shows therefore a paradox in development initiatives in a 
modernizing secular frame and understandings of the human agent-subject: the 
inevitable need to create divisions between backward and modern, inhuman and 
human. It requires to first discursively exclude parts of society from “humanity” (by 
means of condemning social practices as uncivilized, not modern, in short inhuman) 
in order to consequently include them into “humanity”, to shape them to the desired 
modern image of the human. These research findings open up questions from different 
natures: to start with, how could we evaluate such findings? Is it recommendable to 
aspire for alternatives of action against FGC that are not based in such binaries but are 
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rather based in positive imageries of the self and “local” culture? Cultural changes 
always occur through abandonment of some aspects to replace them with other. Can 
social change and transformation be obtained without initiatives of persuasion and 
political or legal coercion?  
In part two of this thesis, I looked into the relation of FGC to religion as understood 
by contemporary Islamist actors and this against the background of the dominant 
movement to make FGC un-islamic. In transnational discourse and its Egyptian 
translations, demonstrating that FGC is traditional and cultural at the same time 
emphasizes its disconnect with religion. The separation and disentanglement of the 
cultural from the religious thus involves an essentialist approach on both concepts. In 
this effort, the fluid boundaries between what is experienced as custom (ᶜadat wa 
taqalid) and what is experienced or defined as Islamic are rendered visible and fixed. 
Disentangling Islam from culture is then understood by some as reaching a higher and 
better level of understanding of Islam.  
During my fieldwork period, large scale social and political transformations took 
place and it is well-known that they brought political Islam to the forefront. For 
religious conservatives, including the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic vision goes 
hand in hand with a political anti-Western vision and a call for a “retraditionalization” 
of society. Islamic revivalism is therefore about reinvigorating conservative gender 
and cultural norms as much as it focuses on Islamic discursive traditions and historical 
legacies of Islamic teachings.In chapter six, I demonstrated the centrality of family 
values and the politics of morality through a study of the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
discourse and policies for their first period of governing Egypt (2012-2013).  
This chapter contextualizes why the Brotherhood remained formally ambiguous 
toward FGC, an Islamicate practice that is deeply embedded in conservative gender 
norms. It asked why the Muslim Brotherhood and the FJP party did not claim FGC as 
an Islamic practice, historically considered as noble to perform, as the predominant 
Islamic tradition of fiqh scholarship tells us .Maintaining an ambiguous position that 
leaves the practice as both cultural and religious forms an important part of its cultural 
politics. The movement was reluctant to evaluate and define FGC within its Islamic 
referents. Instead, the issue is left ambiguously unresolved. This ambiguous treatment 
of FGC as neither an Islamic nor as an un-Islamic practice, as something to be 
encouraged and endorsed but yet without explicitly belonging to traditional Islamic 
norms, is a typical characterization of a gendered Islamicate practice. This feature is 
also shared by other religious voices. After 2011, the salafist landscape transformed 
radically by developing into political parties and obtaining significant numbers of 
parliament seats. As with the Muslim Brotherhood, salafist gender politics was subject 
of much public attention and concern. .The salafist Nur Party distanced itself from the 
law proposal that was tabled by one of its members in parliament to revise Egypt’s 
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law against FGC and to decriminalize the practice. The proponent of the proposal and 
the Nur party drew both on arguments of authority and the principle of Islamic 
grounding (marjaᶜiyya islamiyya), rejecting an imposed formal law and instead 
insisting on personal discretion and freedom whether or not to have FGC performed.  
Looking in-depth at religious speech on FGC by Azhari and salafist shaykhs in 
practice shows the diversity of religious opinions and reveals the politics involved in 
the interpretation and production of religious knowledge. Some Azhari shaykhs locate 
themselves firmly in the official Azhar and state opinion that dissociates FGC from 
Islam. Others are more hesitant in recognizing the Islamic legacy and association yet 
decide to disapprove it. Similarly, salafist shaykhs differ in their interpretation, 
emphasis and undertone. Influential shaykh Muhammad Hassaan’s opinion aligns 
with moderate Azhari opinion that advises to leave the case to medically trained 
profesisionals’ discretion, while emphasizing how this interpretation builds on 
tradition of Islamic jurisprudence. Shaykh al-Huwayni on the other hand defines the 
practice as religious and equally stresses on the importance of treating this question 
within the Muslim community.  
The desire to keep the affair a Muslim affair is also at the heart of chapter eight. The 
essentialisation of religion in campaigning discourse is reflected in conceptions of 
religion among Muslims and Christians about FGC. My ethnographic findings show 
how this leads to an equally essentialized understanding of how religious difference 
(Muslim/Christian) affects people’s abandonment or continuation of the practice. 
Looking at FGC as an Islamicate practice - that has been historically associated with 
Islamic doctrine but is practiced and shared by society at large, including non-Muslims 
– again opens up different perspectives. FGC figures in discourses to reinforce feelings 
of Egyptian unity and sameness as well as in discourses that stress difference and 
Coptic particularity. FGC is represented by some as a shared practice that is born out 
of sharing social realities and common ideas on gender and sexuality. In these views, 
FGC is even representative of shared national Egyptian morals. On the other hand, 
religion often figures as a reified independent force organizing people’s lives and 
behaviour. In the latter view, all Muslims and all Christians necessarily behave as their 
beliefs, their texts and leaders dictate. The perceived difference between both 
communtities’ treatment of FGC leads some to believe that FGC was never practiced 
by authentic Christian rural communities who did not cohabit with Muslim 
communities.  
Moving beyond an understanding about the relation between FGC and Islam as the 
simplistic binary of “Islam forbids it” or “Islam allows it”.may not be the easiest way, 
but it does open up possibilities for Muslim debate on the nature of Islamic law and 
how it shapes contemporary morality. It may enable a reconnection to ethical and 
moral concerns that characterize the early period of Islamic scholarship (Abou El Fadl 
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2001). The practice of FGC is not static and neither is theological interpretation. 
Moving beyond the simplified binary could lead to innovative and reformist 
hermeneutics such as practiced by Islamic feminists and well-known Islamic 
reformists (e.g. Nasir Hamed Abu Zayd, Muhammad al-Jabri, Fatima Mernissi). This 
enables a reinterpretation of hadith and fiqh that disfavors or condemns FGC but it 
would also imply a broader systematic re-evalution of gender and sexuality norms in 
Islamic scholarship. In other words, such hermeneutics favor a re-interpretation of all 
practices concerning gender and sexuality in established traditional Islam. I hope that 
this dissertation may be read as a small contribution of movinig in that direction. 
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